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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the reasoning practices of forensic scientists, with specific 
focus on the application ofthe Bayesian form ofprobabilistic reasoning to forensic 
science matters. Facilitated in part by the insights of evidence scholarship, Bayes 
Theorem has been advocated as an essential resource for the interpretation and 
evaluation of forensic evidence, and has been used to support the production of 
specific technologies designed to aid forensic scientists in these processes. 
In the course of this research I have explored the ways in which Bayesian reasoning 
can be regarded as a socially constructed collection of practices, despite proposals that 
it is simply a logical way to reason about evidence. My data are drawn from two case 
studies. In the first, I demonstrate how the Bayesian algorithms used for the 
interpretation of complex DNA profiles are themselves elaborately constructed 
devices necessary for the anchoring of scientific practice to forensic contexts. In the 
second case study, an investigation of a more generalised framework of forensic 
investigation known as the Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model, I show 
how the enactment ofBayesian reasoning is dependent on a series of embodied, 
experiential and intersubjective knowledge-forming activities. 
Whilst these practices may seem to be largely independent of theoretical 
representations of Bayesian reasoning, they are nonetheless necessary to bring the 
latter into being. This is at least partially due to the ambiguities and liminalities 
encountered in the process of applying Bayesianism to forensic investigation, and also 
may result from the heavy informational demands placed on the reasoner. I argue that 
these practices, or 'forms ofBayes', are necessary in order to negotiate areas of 
ontological uncertainty. 
The results of this thesis therefore challenge prevailing conceptions of Bayes 
Theorem as a universal, immutable signifier, able to be put to work unproblematically 
in any substantive domain. Instead, I have been able to highlight the diverse range of 
practices required for 'Bayesian' reasoners to negotiate the sociomaterial 
contingencies exposed in the process of its application. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
'Much has been said and published about the educated college policeman 
and detective and it is all bunk. Give me the practical detective with 
actual experience in handling criminals and criminal cases and with ten 
such men I will do more work than any college professor or so-called 
expert can do with one hundred of his trained nuts. Most of those that I 
have seen couldn't put a harness on a mule, let alone catch a 
crook ... There is an overabundance of self-styled scientific detectives and 
crime experts in this country. They would have a gullible public believe 
they are so scientific that the crooks would respond to engraved 
invitations to visit police headquarters and surrender. Just how long the 
public will stand for this rot is a question' (Dunlap 1931) 
Such were the brusque words of Captain Duncan Mathewson, the 
longstanding Chief of Detectives at the San Francisco Police Department, 
expressed at a conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. 
Captain Mathewson's remarks were originally quoted in an article published 
in The American Journal of Police Science, a leading periodical of its time in 
1931, which addressed the issue of' Science vs Practical Common Sense in 
Crime Detection' (Dunlap 1931 ). 
The author of this particular article, Al Dunlap, the editor of The Detective, 
continues in an equally colourful vein, in his remarks concerning the supposed 
sophistication of his European police counterparts. Mention is made of reports 
from Europe, where the investigators of crime 'have some kind of magic wand 
called science, with which they are able to solve all crime mysteries', and that 
all their cops and detectives are scientists' (Dunlap 1931, p.322). Dun lap 
contrasts Europe, where 'every police station .. .is pictured as a great crime 
laboratory wherein the detective solves crime problems just as a chemist in 
America analyzes bootleg liquor', with the supposed inferiority of the 'old 
fashioned' and 'ignorant and incompetent' American detective, who should be 
'displaced by a college-trained scientist' (Dunlap 1931, p.322). 
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The author is at pains to reassure his readers that, having had the chance to 
visit his counterparts in Europe, these tales of the 'alleged miracles performed 
by their scientific crime laboratories' are largely myths (Dunlap 1931, p.323). 
Instead, facilities for the scientific investigation of crime in Europe are 
portrayed as 'decidedly disappointing in view ofthe extravagant claims that 
have been published broadcast throughout the world' (Dunlap 1931, p.323). 
Of the much-vaunted crime laboratories that do exist, Dunlap rather bizarrely 
alleges that they bear a 'striking resemblance' to the 'old-fashioned dime 
museums originally started by P.T. Bamum and containing wax figures of 
characters such as Jack the Ripper and Jesse James' (Dunlap 1931, p.324). 
According to the author, the stories emanating from the Europe concerning the 
contribution of science to solve crime have been overblown: 
'Much of the wrong impression now prevalent in America about the 
European miracles wrought by science are unquestionably due to the 
interesting reports of cases solved by analyzing the wax from the suspects 
ears and scrapings of his fingernails. These reports are no doubt, 
authentic and true; but the fact remains that probably not more than one 
case in ten thousand could be solved ... by this particular method. As 
against these stories, our experienced detective can point to numerous 
cases solved purely through common-sense methods and without wasting 
valuable time examining ear-wax and fingernail scrapings.' (Dunlap 1931, 
p.324). 
To add further weight to his argument, he cites a case involving the murder of 
female student which took place on the campus of Northwestern University, 
Illinois: 
'It was a so-called baffling crime mystery. With all the great scientists of 
Northwestern University available, it was decided that this crime should be 
solved by science. The various professors got together for a conference, 
went into a huddle and became scientific detectives. They photographed 
the scene of the crime, searched thoroughly for clues, analyzed the soil and 
everything found nearby and adjourned to a further date for a further 
scientific conference. Meanwhile, an old-time Irish detective assigned to 
the case by the police department, using only practical common-sense 
methods gained by long experience, solved the crime, brought in the 
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murderer and had a complete confession- all within forty-eight hours. He 
simply noted carefully the description of a watch missing from the victim's 
handbag; then found where a small boy purchased such a watch from a 
negro bootblack for fifty cents. The bootblack was the murderer.' (Dunlap 
1931, p.324). 
That is not to say that scientific methods are regarded as lacking application to 
the field of criminal investigation. In his article, Dunlap is quick to 
distinguish between the two domains, limiting his conception of 'science' to 
'those various branches of scientific research that we hear so much about in 
connection with modern crime detection such as biology, pathology, 
toxicology, bacteriology, parasitology and the like' (Dunlap 1931, p.323). He 
does not reject out of hand the potential contribution that science can make: 
'no sane person should care to under-estimate the value of any scientific 
means for solving crime problems. Science in all its branches should be called 
into play wherever there is possible use for it' (Dunlap 1931, p.325). 
Furthermore, he celebrates the achievements of figures such as Calvin 
Goddard, the director of the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory at 
Northwestern University, viewed as a key centre for furthering cutting-edge 
scientific methods. Alongside Goddard, a number of key figures are also 
hailed for their work in developments in fields such as ballistics, microscopy, 
chemistry, and polygraphy. 
Ultimately however, the contribution of science in the course of crime 
investigation is viewed as limited. Instead, Dunlap emphasises 'that immense 
body of crime investigating forces who have used practical common sense as 
their chief asset in the great bulk of the work of crime detection' (Dun lap 1931, 
p.326). Whilst investigators should welcome the input of established scientific 
methods where appropriate, 'science' as a whole, needs to know its place: 
'Science should simply confme its efforts to the solution of all problems 
that call for special scientific treatment, and never undertake to steal the 
show, so to speak, by underrating the importance of practical common-
sense methods in the general investigation of practical common-sense 
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methods in the general investigation of nearly all crime cases ... Science is 
not, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, a substitute for practical 
methods, as the public has often been led to believe; instead it is just a 
most valuable acquisition and potent aid which should go hand in hand 
with plain practical common sense and good judgement in a combined 
effort to cope with the difficult crime situation that confronts the law-
enforcement agencies in every section of the land' (Dunlap 1931, pp.326-
327). 
Hence, in this interwar reflection on criminal detection, 'science' is kept 
distinct. It is seen to encompass a number of recognisable disciplines, each of 
which might yield insights that may be of relevance in only a relatively limited 
number of cases. However, as the example of the Northwestern campus 
murder is intended to show, the 'practical common-sense' mode of reasoning 
is, in this missive at least, viewed as superior to the consciously 'objective' 
non-experiential but empirical reasoning processes employed by the scientists. 
Thus here, scientific disciplines are, as a whole, viewed as providing mere 
technologies, sources of aid through which some useful and relevant 
information might be garnered that may help the detective in his quest to solve 
a particular crime. Whatever evidence may be revealed via these methods, 
however, is seen as only one piece in a bigger puzzle, the resolution of which 
is seen as being better suited to the methods ofthe 'old time successful crime 
investigator' (Dunlap 1931, p.327). 
We cannot speculate further on the precise leanings of the author with regard 
to his philosophical views as to what constitutes 'scientific' reasoning, but it 
is clear that he sees no place for the conscious use of a 'scientific' mode of 
reasoning, (regardless of specific epistemological discussions), in the world of 
criminal detection. For the author, there is no substitute for 'the natural 
aptitude for crime investigation, the genius and skill for getting results 
displayed by experienced detectives of the so-called old school' (Dunlap 1931, 
p.323). 
Hence, as the title ofDunlap's article makes clear, the reasoning processes of 
'science' and those of 'practical common-sense' associated with 'old school' 
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detectives are regarded as wholly distinct with the latter being usually 
preferred for the task in hand. These two forms of reasoning can thus be 
viewed as demarcating specific roles (scientist, detective) and practices 
(scientific inquiry vs criminal detection). Here, the reasoning employed by the 
detective is of the 'old school 'variety; it relies on skill, experience and 
intuition. 'Science', on the other hand, is seen as abstract, esoteric, but only of 
limited use to criminal detection, where an everyday sense ofthe nuances 
which constitute social life is essential to understand the doings of criminals. 
What Dunlap's comments provide is a sense of the long, complex and ongoing 
debate about the extent to which 'science' can be employed in the context of 
criminal investigation. In the modem age, and in the light of the portrayal of 
forensic science in both the news media and in popular television programmes 
such as CS/, one may be forgiven for assuming that things have changed so 
much over the past seventy years or so, that science is now an inextricable and 
vital part of the detection process- indeed, science is the detection process. 
Given ihis portrayal, it is perhaps easy to assume that criminal detection 
occurs merely via the click of a computer mouse; if one is able to derive a 
DNA match with a suspect, then the difficult cognitive work of 
comprehending the evidence is done. All that is left to be achieved is to 
apprehend the suspect and bring them to justice. 
This popular representation of forensic science does, however, raise a number 
of further questions. First, there is the question of the extent to which science 
can be held responsible for modem detection practices. This however, begs 
more questions: 'how and why has science come to exert such an influence? 
What, if anything, has changed since the criticisms raised by AI Dunlap in the 
1930s? In his critique Dunlap does emphasise what he sees as a certain over-
estimation of the capabilities of crime laboratories of the time, as well as 
heightened expectations of the public in terms of what science can achieve. It 
is perhaps open to question whether either of those situations have changed to 
any great extent; yet ifwe return to the question ofhow and why science has 
come to be so influential, it leads us to consider precisely what it is that grants 
science the power to exert such a hold in this context. It leads one to consider 
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what is behind this representation of forensic science. New technologies such 
as DNA profiling are, at least in the popular idiom, viewed as sophisticated 
systems involving complex science. However, this complexity is possibly 
taken as an indicator of an immutable product. DNA profiling may be viewed, 
in one way at least, as a scientific 'black box' (Latour and Woolgar 1979). It 
produces results which often play an instrumental role in securing justice, but 
considerations concerning the inner workings of these systems may be 
sidelined. A closer investigation of the inner workings ofthe system may risk 
stepping into realms of further complexity, but in doing so it may reveal a 
hitherto unforeseen set of circumstances behind this apparently 'objective' 
technology. 
Another related issue that arises is that of what, or who, dictates the outcome 
of forensic decision-making via technologies such as forensic DNA profiling. 
Furthermore, a consideration of black-boxed technology raises the question of 
what kind of reasoning processes are buried within these systems. What is the 
nature of the calculative procedures which lead to the generation of evidence? 
Are such forms of reasoning comprehendable, and justifiable, in a legal 
context? What relationship do these forms have with the traditions of the 
adversarial system? Then there are issues of accountability, an area which 
touches on the notion of 'expert testimony'. The ways in which 'expert 
witnesses' may be defined and identified is one that continues to elicit interest 
within the field of legal scholarship, in which the issue of admissibility plays a 
notable part in such discussions. However, the topic of expertise has also 
aroused a certain amount of interest within sociological circles. Here, interest 
has centred around the issue ofhow social actors may come to recognise 
'experts' and 'expertise'. Sociologists have been interested in the practices 
through which such definitions may be drawn, and some have focused on the 
way in which 'expertise' is produced in the courtroom. These kinds of studies 
hold interest for this discussion. For example, with regard to forensic 
scientific evidence, who can be identified as being responsible for the 
evidence which is produced? How may they justify their responsibility, and 
hence authority, for this evidence? And by what precise means do they 
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comprehend and interpret evidence to support the kinds of conclusions they 
report in court? 
This final question is of particular interest to this thesis. Previous studies have 
tended to highlight the way in which social framings, such as courtrooms, act 
as settings for the construction and bestowal of 'expertise', and the practices 
which are involved. This study takes a different approach, in that it focuses 
less on the specifics of settings, and more on the practices involved in creating 
'expert' knowledge. The emphasis in this study is on how these practices 
relate to intersubjective understandings of what constitutes expert knowledge, 
and I aim to make visible the role of these understandings by examining 
certain technologies of reasoning. The kinds oftechnologies outlined in this 
thesis exert relatively little visibility in the courtroom; instead they are largely 
the preserve of forensic scientists responsible for interpreting evidence of use 
in criminal investigations. The thesis therefore aims to provide a view of 
forensic science which is not normally rendered visible in courtroom or 
laboratory studies. In doing so, it is partly my aim to demonstrate the 
importance of such practices which may lead to the eventual construction and 
presentation of expert evidence in court. I seek to show how these 
technologies themselves reveal, upon close investigation, a series of 
ambiguities and areas of contestation, and thus I aim to shed some light on an 
area previously not covered in the science studies literature. 
My specific focus of study is a form of probability theory known as Bayes 
Theorem. This is finding increasing application in a variety of fields, and has 
elicited a significant degree of interest amongst many working in the area of 
forensic science in the UK and abroad. Bayes Theorem has informed the 
development of a number of technologies involved in the interpretation of 
forensic evidence. In the context of forensic science, Bayes Theorem is 
viewed as a logical probabilistic framework for combining beliefs about 
numerous pieces of evidence relevant to a case. It is also said to enable 
reasoners to provide a convenient and accurate means of updating measures of 
belief in the light of incoming information. In some cases, the claims made of 
Bayes Theorem are that it provides a wholesale system for the general 
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interpretation of forensic evidence, in a manner which suggests attempts to 
position Bayes as some form of defining feature of a new disciplinary identity 
for forensic science. Hence, Bayes Theorem, and the forms of 'Bayesian 
reasoning' which arise from it, are currently attracting considerable interest, 
and controversy, within forensic scientific communities. 
The broadening of the use ofBayes Theorem in forensic science suggests a 
possible change in attitudes toward the role of science in criminal 
investigation. The words of Al Dunlap suggest an opinion that science only 
had but a part to play in the criminal investigation ofthe time. Yet in modern 
times this conception appears to have become somewhat blurred with the 
introduction of DNA profiling, typically viewed by publics as a particularly 
powerful form of evidence. The potential contribution that such evidence may 
make to the outcome of a case may be far greater than other non-scientific 
forms of evidence, such as eyewitness testimony for example. However, 
Bayes Theorem can possibly be seen to blur these boundaries further. It is a 
distinctly mathematical construct, yet one that is said to measure 'subjective' 
probabilities of belief, although these must be expressed in numerical terms. 
Bayes has found use in assessing the significance of DNA profiles, but it has 
also been used as a basis for methods which seek to provide guidelines for 
reasoning about evidence as a whole. This latter development in particular 
shows how Bayes Theorem becomes at once both an abstract mathematical 
construct, but also a means of guiding the reasoning of individuals involved in 
the process of evidential interpretation. Bayes therefore is not just another 
scientific tool, but potentially becomes a way of reasoning through an entire 
investigation. 
A study of the ways in which Bayes Theorem is used in forensic investigation 
therefore provides an interesting and relevant opportunity to study the 
reasoning processes involved in the apprehension and construction of forensic 
evidence. As I attempt to illustrate in the course ofthis thesis, Bayes Theorem 
should not be merely regarded as an abstract mathematical equation, 
transcendent of social behaviour. I must make clear however, that I accept 
that Bayes Theorem is derived from a formal axiomatic system, and that my 
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focus here is on the ways the theorem is used and interpreted in forensic 
science. It acts, however, as an important locus around which social 
practices occur. Viewing Bayes Theorem, and 'Bayesian reasoning' in such a 
way, enables me to posit an important contrast; namely between the idealised 
accounts of forensic investigation which occur regularly in the literature, and 
forensic investigation as it is actually practiced. My work builds on previous 
studies in this regard (Williams 2007), by showing how even the supposedly 
cognitive processes of forensic investigation are dependent on a range of 
practices (Williams 2007). Through these practices, renditions of Bayes arise 
which both facilitate, and are constituted by, intersubjective understanding. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of relevant 
literature pertaining to work carried out within, and related to the field of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS). Here I present an overview of certain 
STS positions, such as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and 
ethnomethodological approaches, and discuss the influence of these 
approaches on sociological studies of the relationship between law and science, 
and forensic science. I also discuss the potential of using other concepts 
developed within STS, with particular focus granted to the notion of 
performativity. I discuss work which has sought to show how expertise is 
constructed in localised settings such as courtrooms, and the ways in which 
the credibility of certain forensic scientific techniques may be constructed. I 
also provide an overview of sociological studies that have been carried out on 
the topic of forensic DNA profiling. In Chapter 3, I discuss and defend my 
methodological approach. I describe the resources that were utilised in the 
course of my research, and I present the lines of inquiry that were followed 
during the course of this study. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss the origins ofBayesian probability. Here I attempt to 
argue that the original aim of the development of Bayes Theorem was 
different to how it subsequently developed; hence I aim to demonstrate how 
Bayesianism is essentially a social construct. I show here, how a version of 
Bayesianism arose out of an attempt to define itself against other competing 
modes of probability. 
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Chapter 5 provides a history of attempts to build theoretical approaches to 
evidence, which have subsequently influenced developments in forensic 
science. Although the field known alternatively as 'evidence studies' or 
'evidence scholarship' is still arguably developing as a discipline, I show how 
it can trace its roots back to the early part of the 20th century. I present an 
overview of significant developments in this area, beginning with the work of 
the legal scholar John Henry Wigmore, who developed a graphical system of 
evidential interpretation. I then discuss more recent developments, including 
the use of Bayesian methods, and describe the impact of this area of study on 
forensic science. I compare and contrast Wigmore's methods with newer 
initiatives, and focus upon recent attempts to combine graphical methods with 
probabilistic approaches. 
In Chapter 6, I provide an overview of the scientific basis which has 
underpinned the development of new technologies related to DNA profiling. I 
describe how legal challenges to DNA profiling exposed sources of 
uncertainty and contestation within these scientific foundations. I also discuss 
the application of probabilistic theories and approaches such as Bayes 
Theorem to DNA profiling, and draw upon the literature to describe the 
related controversies that have arisen concerning the reporting and 
interpretation ofDNA profile data. 
These chapters are intended to provide sufficient background for what is to 
follow in subsequent chapters, in which I focus in more depth on applications 
ofBayes Theorem to forensic science. These chapters are case studies which I 
use to study in more detail the relationship between theoretical approaches to 
the assessment and interpretation of evidence, and attempts to apply these 
approaches in certain forensic scientific contexts. In Chapter 7 I focus upon 
the development of automated systems used to interpret complex DNA 
profiles. The resolution of DNA profiles is by no means unproblematic, 
particularly in cases involving partial profiles, mixed DNA profiles or those 
obtained by the Low Copy Number LCN technique. Hence automated 
systems for their interpretation using Bayes-derived algorithms have been 
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developed, most notably by the UK Forensic Science Service (FSS). In this 
case study I explore various issues related to these technologies. I show how 
these technologies demonstrate a conflation of the subjective/objective work 
involved in interpreting profiles, and how the process of interpretation is itself 
a constructed phenomenon. I seek to achieve this by closely investigating the 
scientific basis of these technologies, as given in the relevant technical 
literature. Furthermore, I show how these technologies have contributed to a 
change in the nature of the organisation of police investigation of crimes, and 
how new practices, such as the use of media, have been used to project a 
certain image of these technologies. However, I also show how these 
Bayesian technologies are also sites of contestation: in recent times these 
technologies have come under renewed challenge from the legal realm. Via a 
history of this legal challenge, and recourse to qualitative interview material, I 
recall how this area of contestation has developed. 
My second case study, which forms the topic of Chapter 8, widens the study of 
Bayes to focus upon the Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model. 
This model has been developed in order to provide a general framework for 
the apprehension and comprehension of evidence in forensic casework. It uses 
principles based on the Bayesian mode of probability in an attempt to guide 
the reasoning processes of forensic scientists and police investigators. In this 
chapter I first chart the development of the theoretical principles of the model 
via an investigation of the relevant technical literature. With recourse to 
qualitative interview material I then attempt to depict the experience of using 
the CAI to reason in a 'Bayesian' manner in the context of forensic 
investigation. My intention here is to highlight practices which are not 
reflective of the theoretical literature, but which still are very much an 
inextricable part of what it means to perform 'Bayesian' reasoning in this 
particular context. I also include a discussion of the issues faced by the 
developers of the CAI in trying to facilitate acceptance ofthe model. In this 
way I show how this framework, based on supposedly 'objective' statistical 
and probabilistic principles, has not received the kind of acceptance one might 
expect from such a supposedly 'scientific' construct. Hence I show how a 
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series of pragmatic concerns, in the widest sense of the term, constrict the 
meaningful use of the CAI. 
In Chapter 9 I re-assess and evaluative the results of the two case studies. 
Here I focus on the implications the results of the two case studies hold for 
relevant STS approaches, and for certain concepts of pragmatic reasoning 
which have been cited by evidence scholars and forensic scientists as forming 
the basis of investigative reasoning. I argue that my research depicts a 
complex picture in relation to previous relevant work, but that ultimately, it 
points to a need to consider in more detail the role of human agency in 
facilitating intersubjective understandings within scientific networks. Whilst 
the creation of scientific networks may involve a relational character, where 
actors and objects are arranged in a particular fashion, distinctly human 
practices play a vital role in constructing these networks. Human agency 
should, therefore, not be under-emphasised in approaches which seek to 
explain the stabilisation of such networks, as 'expertise' has a heterogeneous 
and intersubjective aspect facilitated by human practices. I conclude this 
chapter by discussing the implications that my work has for the field of 
evidence scholarship. Finally, in Chapter 10, I conclude the thesis by briefly 
considering possible future directions for further research in this area, and how 
this work may fit into a wider context. 
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CHAPTER TWO -THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
Technologies of forensic science arise in the intersection between the realms of 
science and law. This is a space in which the need to determine justice meets with the 
need to maintain scientific propriety, and therefore where two ostensibly well-
entrenched epistemological traditions cross paths. Forensic technologies, and the 
actors and institutions concerned with them, are embedded in this contested terrain. 
The processes of negotiating such an environment can be a viewed as a complex 
sociomaterial achievement, and these processes also show how the boundaries 
between 'scientific' and 'non-scientific', 'natural' and 'social', may be fluid, 
contingent and constructed. This is a theme which permeates much of the literature in 
the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), and a small but significant number 
of STS analyses have devoted attention to the construction of forensic evidence. In 
this chapter I draw upon this literature to describe both its theoretical approach in 
general, and also more specific applications to forensic science. In doing so, I seek to 
introduce a number of studies which have considered the emergence of new scientific 
objects as 'eo-products' ofboth nature and a variety of social agents (Jasanoff2004). 
They also show how the distinction between the 'natural' and the 'social' is often 
contestable, and how the origins of such objects are difficult to trace to a definitive 
extent, emerging as they do from a complex network of practices, institutions and 
artefacts. By drawing upon these studies I aim to illustrate how scientific objects can 
be seen to originate from, and in some cases perpetuate, a state of epistemological and 
ontological flux. 
I first discuss Actor-Network Theory (ANT), along with a closely related approach 
which centres around the concept ofperformativity. I will use the latter approach as a 
means of introducing some of the research areas I seek to pursue in the course of this 
thesis in relation to Bayes Theorem. I then discuss the implications of previous 
sociological studies of forensic science for the evaluation of ANT -related approaches. 
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My intention here is to foreground the areas which the studies outlined seek to 
develop. From this I move on to discuss the problem of defining what may be 
recognised as 'scientific' or 'expert' knowledge in the forensic realm. This is an issue 
which has been of interest to both sociologists and legal scholars. Sociologists have 
sought to identify and characterise the ways in which 'expertise' is constructed and 
recognised, and I show how various authors have approached the issue. Some ofthe 
sociological literature has specifically focused on the way in which 'expertise' is 
constructed in legal settings, and in related areas such as forensic science. I discuss 
this literature, and I also briefly describe the general problem of defining 'admissible' 
scientific evidence. 
Finally I conclude the review by indicating how the literature discussed leads me 
towards the area on which I will subsequently focus in more detail. This concerns the 
use of probabilistic reasoning in forensic science, and in particular the growing 
influence of Bayes Theorem amongst forensic practitioners. In the next chapter, I 
describe how the theoretical insights outlined in the first section have acted as a guide 
for inquiry into an area of forensic scientific practice that has hitherto received 
relatively little attention from STS, but which, as I hope to show in the course of this 
thesis, can be illuminated by social analysis. 
2.2 Networks of Science 
Modem scientific enterprise is an increasingly multi-faceted socio-organisational 
process. The manner in which 'society' may be seen to shape scientific knowledge 
and practice has been studied in various ways. For example, Merton ( 1973) saw 
communities of scientists as adhering to a shared set of ideals concerning the goals and 
methods of science (Merton 1973). 1 The so-called 'Strong Programme' of science 
studies has, inter alia, highlighted the role of individual and social interests in 
resolving scientific controversies (Collins and Pinch 1993). Other works have sought 
to describe in more detail the complexity of the linkages between science and the 
1 Namely communalism (common ownership of scientific discoveries), universalism (claims to truth 
are evaluated in accordance with universal and criteria, and not on the basis of race, class, nationality, 
religion or gender), disinterestedness (scientists are rewarded for acting in ways that outwardly appear 
to be selfless), and organised scepticism (all ideas must be tested and subject to rigorous collective 
scrutiny). 
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wider social realm, and have shown how scientific inquiry is constituted by a rich 
array of actors and material entities. In this latter regard, a number of studies have 
described the emergence of 'technoscientific' practices and objects with an emphasis 
on the organisational networks which underpin them. Such networks may represent 
the convergence of a heterogeneous combination of interests, actors, disciplines, 
organisations and technologies (Latour 1999). Whilst the objective products rely on 
such networks for their existence, they also exert certain effects in return. 
Accordingly scholars have sought to describe the conditions which have led actors and 
organisations to co-ordinate their activities in the pursuit of certain desired scientific 
outcomes, and there has been a corresponding focus on the epistemic changes brought 
about by the realisation of such projects (Nowotny et al. 2001 ). 
The Actor-Network Theory (ANT) approach, as advocated by Latour, Law and others, 
has played a particularly prominent role in demonstrating how scientific objects 
emerge and become embedded in networks through which new knowledge may 
circulate, perpetuate and adhere (Latour 1987; Latour 1990; Law and Hassard 1999). 
Although the precise nature and aims of ANT have been subject to some deliberation, 
certain common features are apparent. ANT studies generally accord human and non-
human actors symmetric ontological status prior to their positioning within networks, 
which consist of a heterogeneous assemblage of actors and physical objects. It is these 
networks, or actor-networks to which they are often referred, which are able to exhibit 
collective agency. The role that each component plays in sustaining the network is 
relational, and the strength of the actor-network is dependent on the extent to which 
information is able to flow through the network (Latour 1999; Law and Hassard 1999). 
According to ANT, the strength of the scientific claims emanating from a network will 
be a consequence of the strength of the links in a network, and in its scope: convincing 
scientific claims require strong networks which reflect powerful forces. 
The network concept broadly advocated by ANT has spawned a relatively small 
number of studies of forensic science, but these have demonstrated how the networks 
which perpetuate forensic technologies may reflect the influence of certain wider 
forces. For example, Williams et al (2004) describe how the development of the 
National DNA Database (NDNAD) was dependent on a series of changes to the 
legislation determining the ways in which police were able to legitimately take, store 
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and use DNA samples (Williams et al. 2004). Whilst the existence of the NDNAD 
was reliant on the commitment of a number of actors, such as the Forensic Science 
Service (FSS), and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), it can be seen as 
a particularly strong example of the way in which the policy of 'New Public 
Management' (NPM) has been put int9 practice, involving the introduction of 
measures designed to monitor and improve the quality of public sector services. 
Hence the direct influence of policy can be seen in the establishment and subsequent 
expansion of the NDNAD, and as a manifestation of the desire to standardise, measure 
and optimise the levels of forensic science service delivery within and across police 
forces (Williams et al. 2004, p.60).Z 
In another example, Aronson (2008) describes the dominant role played by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBD in shaping the standardisation of DNA profiling in the 
US in the 1980s and 1990s. The history he describes contrasts with other ANT 
accounts in that rather than having to actively cultivate an interest in order to compel 
actors to join the network, the FBI began from an a priori position of strength 
(Aronson 2008, p.197). Hence it did not have to recruit allies in order to establish 
itself as an obligatory passage point in DNA profiling, and was able to decide which 
institutions and actors could participate in the process largely by fiat. Aronson 
identified a number of strategies which enabled the FBI to reinforce this position of a 
priori authority. The FBI used a different restriction enzyme in its DNA protocol than 
Cellmark and Lifecodes, the two primary commercial suppliers of forensic DNA 
profiling at the time. The discrepancy between restriction enzymes, used to cleave 
DNA into fragments prior to profiling, meant that DNA fragments of different sizes 
would be produced, leading to a lack of uniformity ofDNA profiles, and causing 
validation problems (Aronson 2008, p.201). More notably still, the FBI recruited and 
trained individuals with previously little or no experience in molecular biological 
techniques to perform their protocols. It was through these individuals, working in the 
network of existing public crime laboratories, that the FBI optimised its own set of 
standards and protocols, to the exclusion of the commercial companies. Although the 
standard-setting process would eventually widen to include several other influential 
2 However, the extent to which the NDNAD has impacted upon detection levels has been questioned 
(McCartney 2006). 
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parties and institutions,3 these debates ultimately centred around technology 
constructed by the FBI. Hence, Aronson argues that the FBI 'built a forensic DNA 
typing [sic] network by constructing the network and the human, material and social 
aspects of it at the same time' (Aronson 2008, p.213). 
Government policy, and the actions of powerful agencies such as the FBI, is not the 
only driving forces that have been identified as playing a role in the development of 
forensic DNA profiling. Other studies have highlighted the potential role of 
commercial enterprise. Daemmrich (1998) has focused on the construction of 
'convincing expert testimony' by American DNA typing firms (Daemmrich 1998). 
He argues that these companies employed a strategy of 'vertical integration' in order 
to stabilise a form of knowledge able to withstand the highly contested domain of 
judicial identity testing. Daemmrich charts how firms sought to control as many facets 
of the forensic DNA testing process as possible, from basic method development and 
related research through to the production of DNA probes and other such reagents. 
The same firms also introduced complex bureaucratic procedures, producing a 'chain 
of custody' capable of guaranteeing the integrity of DNA samples, and were 
instrumental in forming self-regulatory organisations through which scientific 
procedures were standardised and validated. Daemmrich describes how these 
companies even provide training schemes to enable future expert witnesses to hone 
their skills in conveying evidence in the notoriously adversarial arena of the 
courtroom. The analysis thus demonstrates how commercial firms have had to 
manage a diverse array of activities and products, both 'upstream' and 'downstream' 
of the act of DNA testing in order to maintain the appearance of a coherent, 
convincing and credible form ofknowledge. 
Daemmrich's study displays how organisations, given sufficient resources, are able to 
structure sites of production in order to provide a suitable supporting network for their 
epistemic claims. However, it may be possible that the underlying values and interests 
of organisations may penetrate deeper into the realm of science with the corollary of 
influencing the course of development of new scientific paradigms. For example, 
3 Which included the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, the National Academy of 
Sciences National Research Council, Congress, the legal system and several leading scientific journals 
(Aronson 2008, p.213). 
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economic interests may become realised through the advent of new fields such as 
bioinformatics. In his exploration of this field, Adrian Mackenzie (2003) has argued 
that, by it's very nature, bioinformatics represents a particularly germane means for 
economic and commercial concerns to dictate the progress of scientific advances. 
Mackenzie sees bioinformatics as 'an economic process of ordering certain abstract 
determinations of living bodies so that information can circulate (more) freely through 
them' (Mackenzie 2003). Attempts to maximise the potential of the new discovery 
science are constrained by commercial pressures. Here there may lie implications for 
forensic DNA profiling and databasing, in that commercial interests may come to 
influence the future development of related technologies equally as much as the 
interests of government or law enforcement agencies. 
ANT has also highlighted the ways in which consensus may be reached on complex 
and problematic areas of science. The attempt to construct objective knowledge in this 
regard can be construed as an attempt to 'black-box' subjective judgement. Black-
boxing can also be seen to represent a form of closure regarding the production of 
scientific objects when their status is unquestioningly accepted by an epistemic 
community (La tour 1999). La tour and Woolgar ( 1979) argue that the creation of black 
boxes is a key element of scientific activity. They view black-boxing as the activity of 
'rendering items of knowledge distinct from the circumstances of their creation' 
(Latour and Woolgar 1979), p.259-260). In this way, scientific activity is seen to 
incorporate a process of establishing scientific facts as somehow transcendent of the 
practices that gave rise to them. Latour and Woolgar give the example of a mass 
spectrometer as a scientific black box (Latour and Woolgar 1979, p.150). The 
technique of mass spectrometry, which is commonly used in chemistry and 
biochemistry to analyse the molecular weight of chemical molecules, has been applied 
to these fields for several decades. Although modem mass spectrometry can itselfbe 
construed as a complex physical and chemical process, the results it produces are often 
accepted unquestioningly, particularly if they contribute toward the progress of a 
scientific discovery. For example, Latour and Woolgar show how mass spectrometric 
data was used in establishing the discovery of a hormone known as Thyrotropin 
Releasing Factor (TRF). The results of the mass spectrometer provided an important 
locus around which the existence of TRF could be discussed and agreed upon; 
however the scientific basis of mass spectrometry as a technique was never questioned 
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during the course of the scientific work. To open the 'black box' of mass 
spectrometry would have been highly costly in terms of time and resources for the 
laboratory, whilst the pursuit of TRF was the priority. Black-boxing of scientific 
artefacts is, therefore, a necessary part of the process of scientific work, for it may be 
necessary to close down sources of contestation in order for the given scientific goals 
to be attained. 
In a forensic context, Halfon (1998) provides a study of how technologies maintain 
their black-box status in order to maintain an appearance of objectivity and thus 
credibility in courtroom settings (Halfon 1998). Whether or not the integrity of 
scientific objects is challenged is possibly dependent on how well they relate to 
relevant domains of expertise. Half on ( 1998) has investigated the issue with recourse 
to forensic DNA profiling (Halfon 1998). He argues that objects which do not fully 
align with the purview of expert communities go unchallenged, and that this indirect 
process of closure is never subsequently contested in the courtroom. It is only those 
elements which have stimulated controversy between experts (i.e. those elements 
which they feel suitably qualified to comment upon) that may form sites of 
contestation in the courts. Through interviews with four scientists who have been 
involved in DNA cases to a varying extent, Halfon demonstrates how areas of closure 
became mutually dependent on the delimitations of the areas of expertise. In each of 
these cases individuals were able to negotiate areas of contested knowledge by 
defining narrow areas of expertise which overlooked certain 'extraneous' concerns 
(Halfon 1998, p.817). This gradual process of constraining the focus of criticism also 
narrowed the number of relevant individuals involved, and thus facilitated closure of 
controversies, which became reduced to a few technical issues (Halfon 1998, p.822). 
Linda Derksen, in her exploration of issues relating to the development and acceptance 
of DNA profiling, has also sought to demonstrate how supposedly 'objective' 
knowledge is achieved via a series of markedly social processes and interactions, 
which attempt to 'erase the actions of the representing subject from the representations 
made of the natural world' ((Derksen 2000), p.803). Derksen argues that 
measurement is the result of a series of negotiations between nature, and, equally 
importantly, people. It was from social practices that judgements arose regarding what 
might be considered 'normal', what was accurate for practical purposes, and when 
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procedures could be judged to have been competently performed. Socially constructed 
judgements and evaluations were therefore crucial for establishing what constituted a 
sufficient degree of accuracy and competence for the task at hand. Derksen argues 
that a direct link existed between the 'personal judgements, evaluations and 
negotiations' involved in assessing measurement error of DNA profiles on the one 
hand, and the debate between a disparate collection of actors concerning the 
calculation of random match probabilities on the other. Legal acceptance of the 
accuracy and objectivity of forensic measurements resulted from a series of efforts to 
establish and represent 'consensus' amongst the relevant epistemic communities. 
Thus human activity, be it in the form of organised action, can also be seen to play an 
important role in the construction of 'objective' credible knowledge. Cole (1998), in 
his study of the rise of fingerprint evidence, argues that a representation of credibility 
in this case came about via the construction, by fingerprint examiners themselves, of 
specific rules and practices (Cole 1998). Firstly, dactyloscopists have always insisted 
that fingerprints be examined only under the guidance and supervision of an expert, 
arguing that correct fingerprint interpretation requires the requisite 'expert' training 
and experience. Second, dactyloscopists organisations such as the International 
Association for Identification (IAI) formulated rules preventing individual examiners 
from testifying in contradiction to one another. Third, cases of error were attributed to 
individual examiners rather than questioning the technique itself; once again this 
position has largely been mediated by dactyloscopy organisations and unions. Cole 
argues that these strategies have served to convey an image of fingerprint analysis as a 
specialised science, requiring years oftraining in interpretation. Furthermore, the 
decision to close ranks can be taken to be a sign of an attempt to present a unified 
front, thus attempting to convey an image of a unified and thus credible discipline. 
The point that should be taken here is that, whilst inscriptions are involved in relaying 
knowledge, it also takes social action, in the form of organisation, to portray 
credibility. 
One feature common to many ANT studies is an interest in the way social orderings 
are able to stabilise and adhere, and how certain social and natural distinctions, such as 
'human/non-human', 'natural/non-natural' etc, are constructed. ANT takes a semiotic 
approach to studying how these constructions arise, showing how each element in a 
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network is defined in relation to the other components of that network (Law and 
Hassard 1999, p.4). This process of 'material relationality' (Law 1999, p.4) is seen as 
a performed phenomenon, and thus networks are emergent and potentially fluid 
entities. Hence ANT is interested in how it is that relations are performed, for these 
practices are never pre-given. The practices through which entities are constructed in 
such a relational manner are referred to as instances of performativity (Law and 
Hassard 1999, p.4). The concept of performativity has itself developed into a fully 
fledged area of interest, particularly with regard to economic sociology (Call on 1998; 
Callon 2006). In what follows I introduce the performativity thesis in more detail. 
2.3 Representation and Performativity 
The concept of performativity in this context is rooted in a discussion by Pickering 
(1994), who argues for the existence of two different ontological approaches to 
science, namely separate representational and performative idioms (Pickering 1994). 
According to Pickering, the representational idiom has traditionally predominated in 
philosophy and science studies, running from logical empiricism to logical positivism, 
as well as the history of science and the sociology of scientific knowledge, even 
through attempts to understand science as a textual phenomenon (Pickering 1994, 
p.413). This idiom is seen to have been preoccupied with the production of 
representations of nature, including facts and theories. However, Pickering regards 
this idiom as betraying a dependence on a narrow version of human agency: 'all of the 
agency in this idiom, then, is the agency of knowledge's human producers, the 
scientists' (Pickering 1994, p.413). Whilst the representative idiom is seen to have 
served the disciplinary interests of some philosophers, sociologists and historians, 
Pickering argues that a preference for alternative approaches to human agency, 
impedes the possibility of interdisciplinary synthesis (Pickering 1994, p.414).4 
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'As far as I can make out, within the representationalist idiom it is very difficult to achieve any real 
synthesis between the science-studies disciplines (or between those disciplines and their parents). The 
problem is that the disciplines take up quite different perspectives on agency: philosophers reinforce 
their own disciplinary identity by trying to spell out super local characteristics of reason and so on; 
sociologists are likewise enamoured of local and situated interests, or whatever; and historians tend to 
oscillate between the two competing master-narratives. The best that one can do towards synthesis in 
this situation is, it would appear, to add up the rival stories, to run both at once in the approach that I 
call multidisciplinary eclecticism.' (Pickering 1994, p.414). It may be more appropriate to think of 
Pickering's ambitions regarding the performative idiom as antidisicplinary, as he mentions later in this 
article: 'the synthesis promoted by the performative idiom is an antidisciplinary one, in which history, 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology and whatever collapse into one another' (Pickering 1994, p.416). 
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Pickering continues to argue that the adherence to the representative idiom is not 
mandatory, and that a second option, the performative idiom, is available which may 
facilitate a truly interdisciplinary approach. The key feature in this case is the 
requirement to think 'symmetrically about agency' (Pickering 1994, p.414). To confer 
agency to material artefacts, Pickering argues, is to accept the true interdependency of 
every stratum of scientific culture: material, conceptual and social. Furthermore, an 
adherence to the performative idiom removes any a priori assumptions about the 
nature of human agency, which is 'not, as the representationalist idiom would have it, 
something reliably given in advance that can provide an enduring explanatory resource 
in the analysis of scientific knowledge production'. (Pickering 1994, p.415). 
At the heart of Pickering' s performative idiom is a radical ontological position. 
According to Pickering, there are no 'pure' objects which lend themselves easily to 
monodisciplinary study. At the heart of the performative idiom is a radically emergent 
ontology, in which the different strata of scientific culture are: 
'continually and constitutively intertwined with the others in practice via processes of 
heterogeneous interactive stabilisation. The social then, for example, is never purely social; 
there is no purely social dynamics of scientific practice; and there is, therefore, no room in the 
world for a pure (e.g. Durkheimian) sociology of science. And the same goes for the material 
and conceptual.' (Pickering 1994, p.416). 
The key consequence that the performative idiom holds for human agency is an 
apparent 'incommensurability of human powers' insofar as human agency is portrayed 
as indeterminate, and shaped by the social-material-concept networks in which 
individuals reside. 
Pickering (1994) provides few further guides to what a performative position entails. 
However, the work of other authors, most notably Callon (1998, 2006), have 
advanced this thesis (Callon 1998; Callon 2006). The broad concept ofperformativity 
has since been applied in a wide range of studies, although the work of Call on and 
Mackenzie has focused primarily on the field of economics. In a challenge to 
economic sociology, Callon ( 1998) has argued that the discipline of economics 
'performs the economy' in that it creates the phenomena it describes. The thesis 
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advanced is that economics, and economic sociology, is wrong to enrich the 
supposedly calculative, self-centred homo oeconomicus, for such an entity does a 
priori exist. Instead, the focus should be to understand how such an agent is produced. 
In the later of the two studies referred to above, Call on (2006) attempts to advance a 
more rigorous understanding of the concept ofperformativity. Here he shows that the 
basis for the 'performativity thesis' originates in pragmatist positions concerning 
language (Callon 2006, p.8). For example, Charles Morris argued that the supposed 
three-fold division oflanguage into syntax (relations between signs), semantics 
(relationships between signs and what they denote), and pragmatics (relations between 
signs and their use context), cannot be entirely dissociated from one another (Morris 
1938). In commenting on this, Callon argues that, rather than being considered one 
component of linguistics alongside syntax and semantics, pragmatics actually 
encompasses the totality of linguistic phenomena. This argument is supported by the 
work of J.L. Austin, who proposed the distinction between constative utterances ('the 
cat is on the mat') and performative utterances ('I promise', 'I baptise you', I sentence 
you to ten years imprisonment' etc). Austin sought to criticise the notion that 
language is purely representative, and argued that because language is uttered, no 
statements escape constituting the context in which they function: 'there is no 
language, only acts oflanguage' (Callon 2006, p.lO). 
Callon sees no reason why Austin's argument cannot be applied to scientific 
discourse. The consequence ofthis, he argues, is that all science is performative, as 
opposed to simply creating representations of reality (Callon 2006, p.lO). Central to 
his argument in this case is the supposed necessity of singular existential statements 
(SES) in science. SESs are indexical statements which refer to specific, singular 
entities and events located in a particular temporal and spatial situation: 'At such-and-
such a place, at such-and-such a time, such-and-such a thread can be observed to break 
when we apply such-and-such a force over x kilograms' (Callon 2006, p.ll). Glossing 
over the controversies between SESs and universal statements (USs)5, Callon argues 
that scientific theories and models require SESs. The raison d 'et re of science is its 
inductive force; there must be a link between the USs of science, as represented in 
5 Universal statements being of the type 'At all places in time and space, all threads will be observed to 
break when such-and-such a force over x kilograms is applied'. 
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theories and models, and SESs which describe the actualised instances that those 
theories and models seek to capture. Without the ability for USs to beget SESs, there 
. . 1s no sc1ence. 
The existence of SESs is, of course, dependent on the material worlds they describe. 
Callon argues that this also implies that these selfsame material worlds have no 
meaning unless one has a means of describing them, and if they are without meaning 
they cannot exist as a scientific entity. An SES, therefore, 'is entangled with the 
device that produced what it describes; the device and the series of actions undertaken 
are shaped by the statement, and vice-versa' (Callon 2006, p.l2). Callon likens SESs 
to instructions for a complex scientific instrument, which are required for one to 
understand what the instrument may do, and how it may be used in order to carry out 
those tasks. Clearly, instructions hold no meaning if they refer to no discernible 
material entity. 
Borrowing a term from Deleuze and Guattari (1983), Callon refers to the relationships 
between statements and their worlds (sociomaterial complexes), as agencements 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983). Callon deliberately chooses this term, ahead of 
'arrangement' or 'assemblage', in order to emphasise the potential of these constructs 
to possess agency. 'Agencement has the same root as agency: agencements are 
arrangements endowed with the capacity of acting in different ways depending on 
their configuration' (Callon 2006, p.l3). However, whilst agencements may perform 
in different ways depending on their fine-grained composition, the basic nature of the 
relationship, namely the inseparability of statement to referent, remains the same. 
Because agencements encompass statements as well as their referents, there is no need 
for any external explanatory factor to account for their formation. The construction of 
its own meaning is a crucial part of an agencement. 
Of the studies that have attempted to utilise Callon's concept ofperformativity, the 
work of Mackenzie et al is worthy of particular attention (Mackenzie 2003; Mackenzie 
and Millo 2003). Mackenzie (2003) and Mackenzie and Millo, (2003) has used and 
developed the performativity thesis in their studies of financial derivatives markets, 
and the use of the Black-Scholes-Merton equation. The latter is a widely used 
mathematical tool for calculating the price of options in derivative markets. 
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Mackenzie (2003) charts the development of the equation, arguing that the 
mathematical work involved in the development of the equation did not correspond to 
a logical process of rule-following, but was instead the result of a creative, contingent 
process of bricolage, and that it emerged despite certain theoretical disagreements 
between the developers of the theory (Mackenzie 2003). 
In a related paper, Mackenzie and Millo (2003) show how the operation and 
application ofBlack-Scholes-Merton has been performative (Mackenzie and Millo 
2003). They chart how, in an initial phase, the predictions of option prices made by 
the model differed sharply with empirical prices. However, as time wore on 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the equation became regarded as a reliable indicator 
of prices, so much so that it became increasingly integrated into the informational 
infrastructure of large trading centres such as the Chicago Board of Exchange 
(Mackenzie and Millo 2003, p.l27). In particular, the equation provided a reliable 
basis for the calculation of 'implied volatility', namely the potential deviation ofthe 
value of an option. However, following the US financial crash of October 1987, this 
predictive ability disappeared, and any subsequent measurements of implied volatility 
had to be modulated by a daily 'skew' estimate. Mackenzie argues that this latter 
development, in which behaviours worked against the predictions of the theory, 
represents an instance ofwhat he refers to as 'counterperformativity'. 
Mackenzie also tackles the question of how homo oeconomicus can create markets 
even when such a rational agent wouldn't, in theory, do so. In answer to the question 
of how to theorise the articulation between performativity and markets in terms of 
networks, cultures, moral communities etc, Mackenzie suggests that the answer 
involves 'both impoverishing and enriching conventional economic views of the 
rational actor' (Mackenzie and Millo 2003, p.140). With regard to the latter, 
Mackenzie points to the continuing importance of relational values, e.g. respect and 
reputation, in playing an important role in maintaining the existence of these 
agencements. 
The studies above show how the construction of a 'scientific' technology can be 
regarded as a socially constructed entity. If science can be construed in such a way, as 
a complex and wide-ranging interlinkage of sociomaterial performances, then this 
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consequently raises questions concerning boundaries of science. How does society 
demarcate 'science' from 'non-science'? In the following paragraphs I consider this 
issue in more detail. A related subject concerns the demarcation of forms of 
'expertise', and I subsequently discuss this issue. 
2.4 Boundaries of Science and Expertise 
The concept of 'boundary work' has found significant import in sociological studies of 
science, most notably in studies by Gieryn (Gieryn 1983; Gieryn 1995). Rather than 
treat the delimitation of science as an analytical problem for philosophical inquiry, 
Gieryn frames it as a practical issue faced by scientists themselves. 'Boundary work' 
is used to describe the practices employed by scientists to demarcate 'scientific' work 
from 'non-scientific', or 'pseudoscientific' pursuits (Gieryn 1983). In describing these 
practices, Gieryn shows how science can be construed as a flexibly defined and thus 
rather ambiguous concept. Using a number of historical case studies, Gieryn (1983) 
highlights a number of ways in which boundaries may be drawn. For example, he 
describes how John Tyndall, a Superintendent of the Royal Institution during the 
Victorian era, used public addresses and writings to advance the authority of science 
over the previously pre-eminent domains of religion and engineering (Gieryn 1983, 
pp. 784-787). He also shows how anatomists in nineteenth century Edinburgh blocked 
the acceptance of phrenology as a science by denying practitioners university 
positions, access to lecture halls and membership of scientific fora (Gieryn 1983, 
p. 789), and how the scientific establishment in the US in the 1980s were able to 
maintain open research in the face of government concerns over national security 
(Gieryn 1983, p.791). In each case, Gieryn argues that 'science' was no definite a 
priori entity; instead it had to be constructed, through a variety of strategies, in relation 
a non-scientific 'other'. Hence "science is no single thing: characteristics attributed to 
science vary widely depending upon the specific intellectual or professional activity 
designated as "non-science", and upon particular goals of the boundary-work.' (Gieryn 
1983, p. 792). 
The construction of boundaries that delineate what is, and what isn't, 'scientific', can 
be regarded as a social achievement. A crucial factor in producing this delineation is 
the ability of 'scientific' actors to project a suitably convincing image of 'credibility'. 
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In the case of forensic science, 'credibility' is equated with public displays of 
expertise. A concern with the possibility of scientific 'boundaries' reminds us that 
the bestowal of 'expert' authority is a particularly social phenomenon. This contrasts 
to the view of classical philosophy of science, which considers 'expert knowledge' as 
a strictly epistemic phenomenon, able to be unproblematically delineated with 
recourse to some form of suitable epistemological scrutiny (Selinger and Crease 
2006). Both sociology, and more modern philosophical works, have challenged this 
classical view. The work of Polanyi, for example, ( 1967) brought to attention the role 
of inexpressible, or tacit, knowledge in developing beliefs (Polanyi 1967). 
Whilst tacit knowledge may take several forms, a key form is embodied skill. Dreyfus 
(1986) draws upon Merleau-Ponty (1962) to argue that expert judgement and 
behaviour is essentially a matter of embodied performance (Dreyfus et al. 1986; 
Merleau-Ponty 2002). Dreyfus argues that all expertise is principally a matter of 
practical reasoning, 'knowing how' rather than 'knowing that', and proposes a five-
stage model to demonstrate how an individual acquires a particular skill. This model 
effectively represents points on a continuum, beginning with a 'novice' stage in which 
the individual first learns a context-free set of rules for performing an action, 
progressing through stages in which the learner gains experience in actualised contexts 
of performance and gains an awareness of the plurality of nuanced challenges, 
culminating in the 'expert' stage in which responses to the subtleties of a particular 
situation become intuitive and virtually automatic. 
Dreyfus' position has been criticised for providing an incomplete account of how one 
comes to recognise expertise in others, and how any claim to expertise involves some 
form of social demand (Selinger and Crease 2006). Whilst Dreyfus is viewed as 
presenting a distinctly asocial account of how expertise is acquired, he also argues that 
political, social and cultural movements may obscure the ability to recognise expertise 
in others. However, Selinger and Crease (2006) raise the issue that it is actually 
precisely these factors which lead one to recognise expertise in the first place. In 
ignoring the recognition issue, Dreyfus' position is seen as leading to a paradox. He 
argues that nonexperts are unable to know what to look for when evaluating skill, and 
that only experts can recognise other experts (Dreyfus et al 1986, p.201; Selinger and 
Crease 2006, p.231 ). However, he also argues that experts do behave in a similar way 
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to 'ordinary' people; the mechanism for the acquisition of simple, everyday skills is 
exactly the same for more complicated and technical competencies. 'We can 
projectively identify with experts, and understand the kind of knowledge they use in 
their judgements.' Dreyfus needs this latter claim to be predominant, 'as otherwise 
nonexperts would lack any basis to recognise, accept and trust the kind of knowledge 
that experts possess.' (Selinger and Crease 2006, p.232). 
Selinger and Crease, along with others, notably Fuller (2006), argue that expertise 
should be construed as a distinctly social phenomenon; expertise cannot be assigned to 
oneself, it must recognised and bestowed by society (Selinger and Crease 2006, 
p.229). Indeed, one of the main themes of sociological accounts of science concerns 
the conditions in which expertise may come to be constructed, bestowed and 
recognised. In a similar manner to Gieryn (1983) these kind of accounts question the 
notion that expertise can be demarcated unproblematically via epistemological means, 
and instead point to the conditions and processes through the 'expert' is demarcated 
from the 'non-expert'. 
Whilst such studies may serve to describe the conditions in which expertise arises, 
Collins and Evans (2002) argue that the problematisation of expertise in such a way 
has considerable political implications. They view this challenging of boundaries as 
creating a 'problem of extension', over where to draw the line at who to include and 
exclude when allotting decision-making rights for making scientific and technical 
policy decisions (Collins and Evans 2002). They propose a new area of study-
Studies of Expertise and Experience (SEE), encompassing a normative theory of 
expertise, in order to 'disentangle expertise from political rights in technical decision-
making.' (Collins and Evans 2002, p.235). Suggesting new categories of expertise, 
they argue for a method of analysis able to identify groups of 'experts' in specific 
technical disputes that resists the temptation to classify expertise simply on the basis 
of formalised accreditation, yet they reject a position that is claimed to be commonly 
found in science studies literature, namely the conflation of the scientific and the 
public realms (Collins and Evans 2002, p.250). Instead, expertise is classed as 
'interactional' (in which an individual is equipped with enough knowledge to 
comprehend the vocabulary used by a particular group of experts), and 'contributory' 
(whereby an individual possesses enough knowledge to make a tangible contribution 
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to a particular disciplinary field). Using a series of case studies, they argue that their 
theory is able to identify when more or less public involvement is required to solve a 
specific dispute, depending upon the amount of interactional and/or contributory 
expertise groups may possess, regardless of formal credentials. 
The extent to which individuals and groups possess these forms of expertise depends 
on whether they are able to communicate across disciplinary boundaries and resolve 
technical disputes. In addition to interactional and contributory expertise, 'referred 
expertise' may be possessed by an individual (Collins and Evans 2002, p.257). This is 
where one may have experience of contributory expertise, which enables them to 
engage with individuals despite the latter possessing a different form of contributory 
expertise. Such referred expertise may be required by those managing or overseeing 
large scientific projects involving multiple forms of expertise. Furthermore, 
translation between different forms of expertise may be necessary, and for that 
interactional expertise is required in order for different experts to communicate freely 
with one another (Collins and Evans 2002, p.258). Another crucial factor is the ability 
to discriminate between credible and non-credible instances of 'expertise'. Collins 
and Evans argue that this ability comes through one's existence as a social actor. 
Judgements about the credibility of an actor may be formed on the basis of a number 
of different criteria, such as whether the actor is allied with the 'correct' social 
networks, whether they can demonstrate the right experience to support the claim, 
whether they have been known to make credible or non-credible claims in the past , 
whether the claim is internally or externally consistent, or whether the claim appears to 
be self-serving (Collins and Evans 2002, p.258). Collins and Evans therefore argue 
that expertise is largely performed. Language plays a particularly important role, 
enabling actors to communicate across disciplinary boundaries and to convince others 
that they possess expertise. 
Collins and Evans bring further attention to the manner in which expertise may be 
identified, but also how expert knowledge may be shared and appropriated. This is an 
issue which has also received attention in direct relation to forensic science. The 
studies of Doak and Assimakopoulos (2007a, 2007b) have focused on collaborative 
networks in forensic science laboratories in the Republic of Ireland. They argue that 
tacit knowledge plays a key role in the formation of such networks, and that the 
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acquisition of this tacit knowledge is highly dependent on social relations and 
interactions. The development of expertise was found to rely on a face-to-face 
interactions; for example the initiation of a nascent digital evidence service in the FSL 
was found to have been dependent on the attendance of certain individuals at other 
laboratories where digital evidence techniques were well-established (Doak and 
Assimakopoulos 2007a). Attendance at forums and conferences was also viewed by 
scientists as a vital means of gaining tacit knowledge. Furthermore, face-to-face 
consultations over evidential interpretation, were found to be a habitualised feature of 
working life within the organisation. Aware of the fact that their knowledge claims 
could be scrutinised in the courts, forensic scientists routinely conferred with 
colleagues to check whether they had followed the correct procedures, and to discuss 
their personal judgements concerning evidence. Possibly due to a familiarisation with 
the adversarial nature of the courts system, scientists relished the opportunity to have 
their judgements rigorously challenged by colleagues (Doak and Assimakopoulos 
2007a). 
These forms of interaction were not the only practices through which knowledge 
transactions were seen to flow, and Doak and Assimakopoulos (2007b) found that the 
socialised nature ofthe organisation was vital in providing an environment in which 
knowledge could be transferred via a wide array of practices. For example, 
negotiation of the complex and potentially overwhelming series of codified standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) was often circumvented by simply asking a colleague for 
guidance. Experience was also viewed as an important personal asset, and more 
experienced scientists were viewed as a key resource by their more junior colleagues. 
Indeed, the experience of handling cases was regarded as eliciting competencies in a 
manner unable to be captured by SOPs alone. Scientists also readily recognised 
which of their individuals had particular capability in certain areas, and were often 
targeted for consultations over specific matters. Furthermore, social practices relating 
to the maintenance of personal relationships were viewed as vital conduits for relaying 
tacit knowledge. 6 Informal contexts, such as the meeting of acquaintances during 
coffee breaks, were found to provide a suitable setting where tacit knowledge might 
6 Doak and Assimakopoulos (2007b) do counter that social interactions may potentially lead to the 
formation of cliques, which was not necessarily as beneficial. The formation of a number of cliques 
31 
permeate casual conversation, and working friendships might actually amount to 
relationships of coaching and mentoring. The need to reciprocate instances of help 
was also regarded as highly important, as was the sharing of information and the need 
for open dialogue. Even personal demeanour was regarded as an important factor, as 
approachability was cited as another important factor in the effective communication 
and transfer of knowledge. 
The preceding discussion has demonstrated the potential richness of social orderings 
of science and expertise. This in turn brings attention to the indeterminacy of such 
concepts, which has been emphasised by other authors. For example, Wynne (1998) 
challenges the tendency to treat 'science' or 'expertise' as an 'autonomous, objective 
entity which has authority independent of the institutional settings in which it is used.' 
(Wynne 1989, p.28), and legal cross-examination has often successfully challenged 
the immutability and universality of scientific knowledge. For example, legal scrutiny 
of certain scientific tests, such as the Greiss test for nitroglycerine (which was used in 
prosecution evidence in the original trial of the Birmingham pub bombers), has shown 
them to be 'restricted to more limited, special, situations or cases, as hidden conditions 
or assumptions have been exposed by critical examination.' (Wynne 1989, p.32). 
However, in such contestations over the status of 'scientific' or 'expert' knowledge, no 
one position can be taken to be absolute: 
' ... studies of scientific controversies have shown how scientific knowledge taken as natural 
and universal by one school may be exposed as a tissue of selective observations based upon a 
limited set of localised technical practices and theoretical resources, and accepted inference 
bridges across gaps in evidence, while partly leaning for credibility upon commitments to 
adjacent bodies of knowledge which are similarly constructed.' (Wynne 1989, pp.33-34). 
Confronted with such a complex network of 'combined social-cognitive 
commitments' (Wynne 1989, p.34), social processes may serve to limit the extent of 
these deconstructive tendencies. Some controversies may involve highly competing 
scientific cultures or disciplines. Hence the importance of legal settings, and the 
procedures through which expertise is selected, becomes a vital social factor in the 
within an organisation was seen as potentially leading to social barriers which might impede the flow 
of information (Doak and Assimakopoulos 2007b ). 
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constitution of expert authority. Scientific knowledge is 'intrinsically vulnerable to 
systematically applied scepticism' (Wynne 1989, p.38). 
Jasanoff (1998) has also highlighted the issues apparent in the negotiation of the 
divide between law and science, in a way which builds on the work ofWynne (1989). 
Using examples of exchanges between expert witnesses and legal professionals, she 
describes the division in understandings and worldviews between the two parties. In 
the adversarial court system, the notion of 'credibility' is not decided against a set of 
pre-given criteria; instead it emerges from a heterogeneously expressed, overlapping 
set of understandings, which amount to 'the dense cross-hatchings of lay and expert, 
communal and esoteric, vulgar and initiated', and accordingly she considers the 
practices involved in recognising what constitutes 'scientific' or 'credible' testimony. 
Credibility is 'constituted in legal contexts over scientific evidence' (Jasanoff 1998, 
p. 721 ). J as an off cites judges as examples of' gatekeeper' figures, able to demarcate 
the distinction between experts and non-experts, and argues that their judgements may 
lead to the creation of recognisable hierarchies of expertise ('scientists' over 
'technicians', 'treating physicians' over 'epidemiologists' etc); they may also reject 
the testimony of one expert in favour of another, appoint their own neutral experts, or 
implicitly incorporate their own understandings of science. Whatever practices they 
employ, judges 'not so much find as actively participate in creating the dividing line 
between appropriate and inappropriate offers of expertise' (Jasanoff 1998, p. 722, 
original emphasis). 
Furthermore, J as an off ( 1998) argues that the constitution of credibility in such a 
manner has important consequences for individuals' powers of perception. She argues 
that 'lay intuitions and perceptions of the world, founded upon direct, unmediated 
witnessing, continually bump up against professionally con figured claims of 'virtual' 
or expert vision (Jasanoff 1998, p. 731 ). Jasanoff describes how the presentations of 
'expert' witnesses may involve the use of technical means of depicting evidence, 
followed by interpretation by a designated 'expert', and provides the example ofhow 
the prosecution in the O.J. Simpson murder trial insisted on the need to exclude 
videotape footage of LAPD investigators, arguing that such footage required specialist 
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knowledge to make sense ofit7. This argument was rejected by the judge, who 
favoured the defence argument that the nature of such footage did not require expert 
interpretation. In this way, the judge ruled what was amenable to 'lay' knowledge 
over 'expertise'. Jasanoff does not indicate that a simple dichotomous hierarchy 
holds, but rather that these ways of seeing overlap in complex ways and it requires 
some form of authority figure, namely the judge, to act as an arbiter (albeit in ways 
that are dependent on legal practices and rules of general application which 'shape the 
overall context in which experts testify and may deprive some would-be experts of the 
opportunity to participate'). (Jasanoff 1998, p.732). Importantly, however, the 
ultimate issue of who is bestowed with perceptual authority in individual cases cannot 
be explained with any systematic recourse to rule-following. Jasanoffs heterogeneous 
set of examples show how 'expertise- contrary to what the law may doctrinally 
suppose- is constituted or reconstituted to some extent within the framework of the 
trial itself.' (J as an off 1998, p. 734). 
The legal arena is certainly one in which the makeup of science may be seen to be 
particularly malleable. Edmond (2000) has examined the ways in which judges make 
decisions regarding the epistemological status of scientific evidence (Edmond 2000). 
Using examples taken from English and Australian courts, as well as the US, he argues 
that decisions concerning admissibility are not achieved on the basis of any internal 
standards locatable within the realm of science itself, and nor do they correspond 
directly to external tests which may be imposed on courts to assess admissibility. 
Instead, Edmond argues that judges interpretations of the admissibility of scientific 
evidence is extremely flexible and can be seen largely as a matter of personal fiat. 
Judges use a range of criteria, which may reflect their own subjective opinions on 
what constitutes norms such as 'scientific method'. However, Edmond contends that 
the relationship between science and law is never unproblematic, for certain other 
considerations have to be taken into account, such as the need to balance the fact-
finding process with wider social values and conceptions of justice. Difficulties may 
also arise involving the weighing of expert testimony against potentially conflicting 
7 The prosecution argued that the lay jurors watching the footage would be misled into thinking that the 
investigators appeared to be on top of each other, when in fact they had maintained a proper distance in 
accordance with procedures (Jasanoff 1998, p. 727). 
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lay eyewitness testimony. Such factors may well play on the mind of judges when 
defining 'science' and determining admissibility (Edmond 2000, p.251 ). 
Edmond (2000) brings to attention the fact that decisions regarding the scientificity of 
evidence do not occur in a vacuum, and shows how considerations of scientific 
evidence are intertwined with wider societal concerns. Saks and Faigman (2008) 
however highlight the extent to which ostensibly 'scientific' evidence has often 
managed to escape what may be construed as more rigorous scrutiny. They argue that 
the scientific status of a great many widely used forensic procedures is baseless (Saks 
and Faigrnan 2008). Forensic identification techniques, such as the analysis of 
handwriting, bitemarks, toolmarks, tyre prints, and notably fingerprints, are described 
by Saks and Faigman as 'nonscience forensic sciences' (Saks and Faigrnan 2008).8 
This term is also used by the authors to describe other areas such as fire investigation, 
gunshot residue analysis and aspects of forensic pathology. Saks and Faigman give a 
number of reasons to justify the use of this term. First, they claim that these 
techniques were largely developed in police environments, and escaped the purview of 
institutionalised science departments located within universities, where, the authors 
argue, they would have been scrutinised for their adherence to well-established 
scientific norms and standards. More fundamentally, Saks and Faigman attack the 
way in which these kind of forensic techniques are designed to attempt to identify and 
individualise offenders.9 The kind of categoric claims that are made via application of 
these techniques is argued to be antithetical to conventional scientific practice, in 
which truth-claims are regarded as conditional. 
The situation is seen to have been compounded by the apparent incompatibilities 
between legal culture and the scientific domain, and by the inappropriate use of 
admissibility criteria for scientific evidence. Saks and Faigman argue that 
admissibility standards of scientific evidence in US courts, supposedly introduced by 
the 1993 Daubert ruling have been subject to flexible interpretation by judges. 
Daubert obliged the courts to consider a number of factors in determining whether 
proffered evidence could be considered 'scientific' or not. These factors encompass a 
8 These methods have alternately been referred to as 'soft' forensic sciences by National Institute of 
Justice (2007) (McCiure 2007, p.4 ). 
9 Referred to in a critique by Broeders as the 'positivity doctrine' (Broeders 2005, 2006). 
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number of epistemological and methodological criteria (e.g. whether the evidence 
adheres to the Popperian concept of falsifiability, whether 'the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review', etc). This represents a somewhat more rigorous view 
than its predecessor, the 1923 Frye ruling, which merely required that scientific 
evidence had to have gained 'general acceptance' in the 'particular field to which it 
belongs' .10 However, Saks and Faigman also suggest that the Daubert ruling, which 
had been seen as providing a more universal test of scientific admissibility, has often 
been ignored in the case of nonscience forensic science. They describe a paradoxical 
situation in which evidence, if regarded as lacking scientific validity, may become 
admissible, as this lack of scientific validity means it is not considered relevant for 
Daubert analysis (Saks and Faigman 2008, p.l63-164). In the US, it is still the 
province of the judge to determine what evidence may require a Daubert hearing; 
however this paradox brings to light the fact that it is up to the judge to determine 
what, if anything, is 'scientific'. 
Saks & Faigman add support the view that the boundaries that determine what is, and 
what isn't, accepted as admissible scientific evidence in court are fluid and perhaps not 
reflective of a commitment to philosophical strictures, or to what conventionally may 
be considered as appropriate scientific criteria. In this regard, they indicate another 
form of boundary work in which notions of 'science' are dependent on institutional 
context. Along with Edmond, they also show how decisions regarding scientific 
admissibility are often a matter of personal fiat with regard to the judge, who may be 
seen to act as a pivotal 'gatekeeper' figure. 
Sociological studies have therefore emphasised the complications apparent in the 
demarcation of 'scientific' and 'expert' knowledge, particularly in legal settings. A 
certain number of studies have sought to argue that the creation of expert know ledges 
involves a highly localised and contextualised set of performances. This work has 
emanated from the ethnomethodological school of science studies. In what follows I 
introduce some examples of this work which has explored the relationship between 
science and law. 
10 Le iter ( 1997) claims that Frye actually represents a far more realistic epistemology of accessibility 
than Daubert, taking into account as it does the epistemic limits of the courtroom setting. As well as 
potentially offering a false view of 'science', Daubert places unrealistic demands on the finders of fact. 
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2.5 Ethnomethodology and the Construction of Expert Testimony 
The mode of inquiry referred to in broad terms as ethnomethodology, was introduced 
in the late 1950s, primarily through the work ofHarold Garfinkel (Garfinkel 1967; 
Lynch 1993). With regard to the production of scientific knowledge, 
ethnomethodological studies have largely involved descriptions of the micro-
contextual work involved in defining a series ofboundaries relating to intellectual 
labour. Ethnomethodologists can be seen to have elaborated upon the original notion 
of boundary work by describing the contextualised practices at play in delineating 
'scientific' from 'common sense' reasoning, and 'expert' from 'non-expert' identities. 
Garfinkel claimed that he decided upon the term ethnomethodology whilst preparing 
reports for multidisciplinary study of jury deliberations at the University of Chicago 
(Lynch 1993, p.4). He became interested in how juror's pursued 'some kind of 
knowledge of the way in which the organised affairs of the society operated' (quoted 
in Lynch 1993, p.4). Garfinkel recounted how they appeared to be reflexively 
concerned with certain relevant social postures, and talked of 'wanting to be legal' and 
'of being legal'. However, when pressed on what they meant by these terms, the 
jurors claimed how they could not define what it meant to be 'legal' without first 
actually being a lawyer. Using this example, Garfinkel claimed it showed an 
awareness of the need to fix the meaning of the kind of terms used in everyday 
conduct. The jurors conducted themselves as practical reasoners, with no credentials 
or professional expertise for collecting and assessing evidence, conveying an 
argument, or making judgements (Lynch 1993, p.4). The jurors discussions over how 
to comprehend, and effectively taxonomise, 'facts' 'reasons', 'evidence' etc 
represented questions of social scientific interest. However the commonsensical 
manner in which they went about deliberating over these concepts did not reflect the 
methods of the sciences. Garfinkel saw their methods for making sense, and defining 
such terms, as phenomena to be studied in their own right (Lynch 1993, p.4). 
Thus the manner in which agreement emerges is itself taken to be a rich source of 
study. A heterogeneous series of practices and representations, carried out between 
actors, are involved in forming, co-ordinating and reinforcing intersubjective 
understandings. Ethnomethodology endorses a mode of inquiry that focuses on the 
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construction of intersubjective understandings as they occur, and without recourse to 
preconceived, idealised notions as to precisely what these understandings constitute. 
Building on the example recounted by Garfinkel, Lynch (1993) views reflexivity as 
constituting a key feature of ethnomethodology. Added to this he cites the importance 
of accountability, namely the way in which ethnomethodology studies the everyday 
methods for rendering activities rational and reportable for all practical purposes. 
Social activities should be orderly, observable, ordinary and oriented (e.g. participants 
orient to the sense of one another's activities, and contribute to the temporal 
development of those activities. They should also be rational (they make sense to 
those who know how to produce and appreciate them), and describable. 11 
Ethnomethodological studies have been applied to a variety of contexts, with a notable 
amount of attention paid to the manner in which credibility may be constructed in 
public settings such as public hearings and courtroom proceedings. In their novel 
study of the controversy over the !ran-Contra affair, Lynch and Bogen (1997) draw 
attention to the ways in which credibility was constructed in the context of the 
hearings which attempted to investigate the affair. In particular, they show how 
Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North was able to subvert the question-and-answer format 
of the cross-examination process via the employment of various speech acts and 
performances which undermined the concept of the hearing as a 'truth-finding engine' 
(Lynch and Bogen 1997, p.l22). Through strategies such as answering questions with 
political speeches, or by querying the questions of his interrogators, North was able to 
skilfully deconstruct the process of the hearing as it occurred, and maintain his own 
standing at the expense of the investigative process. 
Whilst not concerned with science as such, Lynch and Bogen's study sheds light on 
the public hearing as an important arena for the construction of credibility. In the case 
of forensic science, it can be seen that the setting of the courtroom hearing functions as 
a key site in which credible 'expert' testimony is constructed. Lynch (2004) studied 
how terms such as 'scientist' or 'expert' are instances of 'membership categories' 
(Lynch 2004). Such categories may be used to classify individuals or objects, but 
11 Lynch also describes indexicality, but claims that it generally encompasses a way of thinking about 
the whole field of language use which ethnomethodologists investigate. As Lynch puts it, 'indexicality 
is a ticket that allows entry into the ethnomethodological theatre, and it is tom up as soon as one 
crosses the threshold.' (Lynch 1993, p.18). For a more detailed account of the origins of the concept of 
indexicality, see Lynch (1993), pp.18-22. 
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more importantly still, they may be used by an incumbent in reference to themselves 
and their activities (Lynch 2004, p.l65). With regard to terms such as 'expert', it is 
obvious how incumbents may refer to them in order to support claims to credibility, 
particularly in certain contexts such as courtrooms. However, whilst membership 
categories may bestow high status to the incumbent, they are also prefigured by a 
series ofrights, obligations, credentials and tests ofworthiness (Lynch 2004, p.l66). 
The crux of Lynch's description of how the instance of membership categories work 
centres on the essential role of settings, such as courtrooms, as sites where such 
identities are locally constructed and contested. Membership categories are assigned 
to individuals through a series of performances and interactions located within specific 
arenas. Lynch uses examples drawn from the UK case R. v Deen, in which the role of 
DNA evidence featured prominently. Here, he attempts to show precisely how the 
'expert' identity of a Professor Peter Donnelly, a statistician specialising in issues 
relating to population genetics who was appearing as a defence witness was 
constructed and contested in and through a dialogue with the defence counsel. Lynch 
first shows how Donnelly's credentials were relayed in sequence, starting from his 
academic qualifications, charting his membership of leamed societies, and his research 
achievements (Lynch 2004, pp.170-171). However, he also demonstrates the fluid 
nature of 'expert' identity via Donnelly's cross-examination in which prosecution 
challenged whether Donnelly's particular disciplinary type of 'expertise' was relevant 
to the issue, and questioned whether the abstract nature of statistics was to be accorded 
standing relative to the practical experience of the forensic scientists who carried out 
the DNA tests. Lynch's analysis highlights the ambiguities inherent in conceptions of 
'expert' knowledge, and how it is ultimately dependent upon the decision of external 
actors such as judges and juries. 
Lynch and MeN ally (2003), in their history of the appeal hearings of the R. v Dennis 
John Adams case, have shown how courts maintained a distinction between 'scienti fie' 
and 'common sense' reasoning (Lynch and McNally 2003). The prosecution case 
against Adams, who was convicted of rape, rested largely on DNA evidence, which 
supposedly indicated that the probability of the DNA matching a random member of 
the population was one in two hundred million. However, this was the only significant 
piece of evidence put forward by the prosecution, and was opposed by strong evidence 
for the defence. Adams' girlfriend had provided an alibi, and the victim had also 
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failed to identify him in a police lineup. During the appeal hearings the defence used a 
novel strategy, which involved the explicit use ofBayes Theorem. This technique was 
employed in order to attempt to demonstrate that the prosecution probability 
calculation had failed to take into account every piece of relevant information. Bayes 
Theorem was used as it was viewed as a method of incorporating this information to 
produce a figure which the defence hoped to show that the prosecution had wildly 
overestimated their claim. Bayes Theorem was employed by the defence to test the 
juror's own subjective estimates of probability, and to show how, if all the relevant 
information pertaining to the case was taken into account, the random match 
probability estimate actually increased to a point well beyond reasonable doubt. The 
implementation of such a strategy required members of the jury to reach their figure in 
a manner redolent of a mathematical exercise, by working through the problem 
individually and making the calculations themselves. 
The approach was rejected in the course of two appeal court hearings. In the first 
appeal, the court opined that, in using Bayes Theory in such a way, expert testimony 
had encroached upon the jury's role as the trier of fact. Whilst expert evidence may be 
used in an advisory capacity, the testimony produced in this case was seen as 
inappropriately pronouncing upon the issue of guilt or innocence (Lynch and McNally 
2003, p.94). Furthermore, according to the court, the apparent objectivity ofBayes 
Theory masked the 'element of judgement on which it entirely depends' (1st Court of 
Appeal, R. vs [Dennis John] Adams, cited in Lynch and McNally 2003, p.94). The 
second appeal also rejected the defence case on similar grounds, and in it, the judges 
expressed misgivings about such an attempt to 'attach mathematical values to 
probabilities arising from non-scientific evidence adduced at the trial' (2nd Court of 
Appeal, R. v. [Dennis John] Adams, cited in Lynch and McNally 2003, p.96). 
In describing the case, Lynch and McNally argue that the courts produced their own 
definitions with regard to 'scientific' testimony. The employment of mathematical 
calculations was viewed as entirely suitable when used in conjunction with ostensibly 
'scientific' techniques such as DNA profiling, but not in relation to other forms of 
evidence, upon which the Bayesian technique was thought to impinge. Furthermore, 
the decisions reinforced the norm associated with the collective reasoning of the jury, 
re-drawing the boundary of legitimacy for 'common sense' reasoning. The 
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individualistic nature of the Bayesian technique was ruled as antithetical to the 
traditions of the jury system. Lynch and McNally quote the memorably expressed 
view of one judge who stated: 'consider your verdict amongst yourselves, all of you 
together and not with one huddled in a corner with his calculator'. (quoted in Lynch 
and McNally 2003, p.95). 
Some other studies have studied on the construction of forensic science outside the 
courtroom. In his study of forensic crime scene examiners, Williams (2007) 
emphasises the role of bodily techniques, particularly visual perception, alongside 
technologies which make use and build upon those capacities to construct forensic 
artefacts. Williams (2007) criticises arguments taken from the forensic science 
literature, which adopt idealised depictions of 'science' to account for the character of 
criminal investigation. Instead he argues that greater insight can be gained by 
studying the actual practices, and accountable conduct, of crime scene examiners. 
Williams argues that certain 'incorrigibles' such as Locards principle ('every contact 
leaves a trace') do not have any clearly defined epistemological basis, but still function 
as an instrumental principle guiding the conduct of the crime scene examiners. The 
resulting artefacts, rendered via the embodied skill of the crime scene examiners, 
function as mediating objects which facilitate understanding to others and aid 
reconstructive reasoning. The ensuing success or failure of an investigation is then 
dependent upon a series of standardised products and procedures which lead to the 
construction of these artefacts. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter I have drawn selectively from existing literature to outline 
several approaches to the analysis of forensic scientific techniques such as DNA 
profiling, the assembly and use of 'expert' testimony in the courtroom, and the 
production of forensic evidence at crime scenes. In doing so, I have also outlined the 
theoretical basis of these studies. These constructionist accounts highlight the manner 
in which evidence, and understandings of it, can be seen to be 'eo-produced' (Jasanoff 
2004) in that 'scientific' products arise in a manner interdependent with the social 
orderings and orientations- in this case largely legal ones - which create and 
recognise them. Approaches differ, however, on the precise ontological basis upon 
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which such eo-production occurs. ANT argues that scientific endeavour is dependent 
on the way in which its components are arranged and positioned. Be they human 
actors or inert objects, these components are accorded equal ontological status in 
networks. Whilst retaining broadly similar ontological assumptions, performativity 
studies emphasise the role of language in the array of interdependencies intertwined 
within the assemblages through which science, and indeed, all social action, are meant 
to proceed. Ethnomethodology follows a slightly different line, arguing that 
'scientific' products, and understandings of them, emerge from a primordial milieu of 
uncertainty, and are formed and clarified via human practices and performances. 
All of these accounts therefore posit a mutual dependence between 'scientific' objects, 
and the means through which they come to be recognised as authoritative. In doing so 
they provide frameworks for explaining how intersubjective understandings of science 
arise. Yet it must be questioned to what extent these approaches are able to provide a 
fully comprehensive picture of scientific labour. Many studies have focused on 
certain ontological questions, concerning what might exist to create these 
understandings. However, it is not clear how these studies define 'understanding' 
itself. Part of the concern here is whether these approaches put too much stock in 
emphasising certain ontological assumptions in the course of attempting to explain 
how 'scientific' entities are recognised, and less on what it means to reason in a 
'scientific', or 'expert' way. A range ofepistemic activities are involved in forensic 
science, such as interpretation, assessment, evaluation, justification etc., yet it is 
unclear to what extent STS approaches are able to recognise these different activities 
and account for them. 
This is particularly evident in the case of ANT. For example, Latour (1990) argues 
that 'inscriptions' are the exclusive means by which knowledge is comprehended and 
disseminated amongst human actors: 
'We are so used to this world of print and images, that we can hardly think of what it is to 
know something without indexes, bibliographies, dictionaries, papers with references, tables, 
columns, photographs, peaks, spots, bands' (Latour 1990, p.36). 
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Drawing upon the work ofPiaget, who described an experiment involving children 
measuring volume through the use of differentially sized beakers, Latour contends that 
all human cognition is instrumentally mediated. Original thought only comes about 
via the manipulation and re-organisation of material resources and the related 
inscriptions: 
' ... most of what we grant a priori to "higher cognitive functions" might be concrete tasks done 
with new calibrated, graduated, and written objects' (La tour 1990, p.51 ). 
Latour posits a world where knowledge is projected onto an unreflective social actor 
via a series of inscriptions, 'immutable mobiles' able to be modified, recombined, 
reproduced, superimposed, integrated into written text, or used to convert three-
dimensional space into quantitative data. There is little room in Latour's schema for 
independent human thought; from his account, the pursuer of scientific knowledge is 
portrayed as a blank slate, a 'Lockean tabula rasa in Foucauldian garb' (Benhabib 
1994 quoted in Wight 1999, p.l30). With scientific information conveyed in such a 
manner, there is no scope for a differentiated consideration of reasoning activities, for 
it appears that, according to Latour's schema, these do not really exist. 
Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, could be seen to take a different approach to 
epistemological matters, via the aim to describe the practices, and hence processes, 
through which actors come to generate understandings of what is involved in 
recognising scientific activity as such, in and through the course of scientific activity 
itself. Approaches taken by ethnomethodology studies have, however, generally 
involved a distanced stance in relation to the individuals and practices being studied, 
either through direct observation or via the use of recordings or transcripts. 
Ethnomethodology appears to construe the reasoning process as being determined by a 
combination of language and performance. Whilst this has highlighted the socialised 
nature of the manner in which understanding is reached, it may be the case that such 
an approach does not alone capture the whole process. For example, there appears to 
be little scope within ethnomethodology to study the 'internalisation' of 
understandings, and how the process through which this may occur. This is important, 
as the manner in which collective understandings become translated into personalised 
ones may have consequences for repeated, or similar, future instances of inquiring 
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activity. The question here is to what extent purely intersubjective understandings can 
exist, or whether hermeneutic gaps between collective knowledge and personal 
meanings linger in attempts to reach shared understandings. Intersubjective 
understandings may not arise immediately; they make take time, or involve processes 
of mediation. How do personalised interpretations therefore become translated and 
incorporated into collective knowledges? 
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CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
AND RESOURCES 
3.1 Introduction 
The theoretical issues pursued in the course of the last chapter are further explored in 
the course of this thesis, which focuses upon the increasing application of statistical 
and probabilistic methods in forensic science for the interpretation and evaluation of 
evidence. In particular, the mode of probability based around Bayes Theorem has 
aroused both interest and, as I will subsequently describe, controversy. Bayes 
Theorem is used to assess personal measures ofbeliefunder conditions of uncertain 
knowledge, via a probabilistic formula. It is used for conveying beliefs as 
quantitative, probabilistic depictions, and as a framework for updating these belief-
measures in the light of incoming information. Bayes Theorem is already used widely 
to calculate the weight of evidence of DNA profiles, and is being applied to the 
analysis of other forms of evidence. 
Bayes can be viewed as possessing 'objective' and 'subjective' elements. It can be 
considered an 'objective' form, in that it is a quantitative mathematical construct, but 
at the same time it also possesses a subjective facet, in that it measures personal 
estimates of probability. This tension within Bayes, as an 'objective' measure of 
subjective experience, raises issues for the way in which theory and practice in 
forensic science are construed. Whilst Bayes may provide some form of theoretical 
framework, operating it to assess subjective measures of belief is practice-led. The 
precise practices from where these belief-measures may arise, and the role ofBayes in 
shaping them, is investigated in this research. This combination of the objective and 
the subjective presents a challenge to existing STS positions in the unpacking of these 
two aspects. What relationship do 'subjective' and 'objective' modes ofbeliefhold in 
the operation of Bayes Theorem? Furthermore, can a mathematical form which 
encompasses objective and subjective aspects be regarded as a technology? If so, 
precisely what kind of technology does it represent? How is it used to facilitate 
intersubjective understandings of evidence? Crucially, what does the use of this 
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technology mean for the way in which forensic investigation is practiced? Does it 
exert any influence on these supposedly 'expert' behaviours? 
Although previous studies have concentrated on practices relating to the genesis of 
evidence in a variety of settings, relatively little work has focused on the uses of this 
evidence, or the manner in which the practices of evidence interpretation are managed 
and organised. The way in which evidence informs the progress of criminal 
investigations is an area which demands further sociological attention. The process of 
evidence interpretation begins right from the initial apprehension of the scene, with 
items of evidential interest being singled out for further consideration. Forensic 
evidence is subject to a process of identification, recovery, and subjected to transfer 
procedures before being interpreted and evaluated by forensic scientists working 
alongside police officers. Their findings in turn can influence the considerations of 
investigating police officers, who may then use evidence to inform the identification 
and questioning of possible suspects. Where it is felt appropriate, this evidence will 
play a vital role in the decision to charge a suspect, and subsequently this evidence 
will be conveyed in court to advance a prosecution argument, where it is also open to 
scrutiny by the defence. 
Evidence may take on a plurality of forms: it may take on an inert material form, or it 
may come in the form of eyewitness testimony, information about individual 
character, or psychological profiles. It may be derived from a variety of material 
sources, such as fingerprints, footprints, toolmarks etc.; it may be used in various 
ways, used either in a directly investigative or prosecutorial manner, or to perform an 
ancillary function, existing in a relationship which informs the validity and reliability 
of another piece of evidence. Hence a whole range of items and procedures may be 
utilised in the course of a criminal investigation. Evidence may exist in a complex, 
and potentially problematic, series of inter-relationships; pieces of evidence may 
contradict each other, or may be recovered in a manner which enables only vague or 
ambiguous information to be derived from it. Whatever the precise nature of the 
crime, or the investigation, evidence interpretation can potentially involve a complex 
series of ratiocinations, encompassing a high degree of interdependent elements. 
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The interpretation and evaluation of evidence raises important issues however, as they 
represent the key processes around which understandings of evidence arise. Although 
pieces of evidence may be viewed as 'boundary objects' (Star and Griessemer 1989), 
it is not always clear in those kinds of studies by precisely what process mutual 
understandings arise, nor is it always clear why or how particular objects become 
rendered as boundary objects over others. The work outlined in this study is intended 
to advance previous approaches by shedding more light on the complexity involved in 
forensic investigation of evidence away from the courtroom. My intention, however, 
is not to examine technologies of evidence production, but instead to investigate the 
technologies of reasoning which facilitate evidence interpretation, a phenomenon, 
which has, so far, received relatively little attention from an STS perspective. The 
practice of interpretation seems to be something of a problematic area in STS. The 
view of it seems to be strongly linked with a certain Wittgensteinian notion, in which 
interpretation can only occur through some form of collective action, and is 
exclusively intersubjective in nature. In this case however I did not intend to enter 
into this research with too much in the way of assumptions as to what particular 
processes of 'interpretation' could entail. Bayes was treated as a locus around which 
interpretation of evidence was organised and shaped; yet the particular epithet 'Bayes' 
was also viewed as potentially concealing a highly heterogeneous picture, in which 
highly personalised contributions, e.g. those based on subjective experience could 
continue to play a part. One aim was to consider precisely how these contributions are 
used, and how experiences might be re-formed, in the context ofBayesian reasoning. 
Whilst this study has acknowledged certain STS approaches when considering the 
topic, I have sought not to be too heavily influenced when considering my own 
methodological approach. A study ofBayes presents certain challenges. As with a 
large amount of research which involves a qualitative component (Bryman 2004, 
p.289), the questions of interest have tended to emerge out of an engagement with the 
topic itself. Whilst some initial research questions were posed however, it wasn't until 
further research was carried out that the study of Bayes was found to be so rich and 
potentially complex. Hence the research agenda has evolved as the study has 
progressed. 
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It must also be made clear that this study follows certain STS approaches in taking a 
sceptical approach to formalised methodological forms. I accept the position, 
common to ANT, performative and ethnomethodological accounts, ofthe reluctance to 
pin faith on the ability of more formalised methodologies to garner insight in an area 
which has so far evaded detailed exploration. Instead of accepting the claims made by 
certain forms of social theory, I adopt a stance which anticipates the complexities 
presented by the topic of interest. Given the complications and the untidiness 
associated with this domain, forensic science demands an approach which reflects a 
'sensibility to the messy practices ofrelationality and materiality of the world' (Law 
2007). Hence this study exercises caution towards supporting any grand social 
theoretic postulates, and, like Lynch and Bogen (1997), leaves 'no room for the special 
epistemic privileges often assigned to the use of social-science methods and theories' 
(Lynch and Bogen 1997, p.265). This study is intended to be interdisciplinary in 
nature, with science being apprehended with a sceptical but informed gaze; in order to 
propagate such an interdisciplinarity it was deemed appropriate to extend this to the 
more all-encompassing claims of certain social scientific theories and their apparent 
'craving for generality' (Wittgenstein quoted in Lynch and Bogen 1997, p.270) 12 . 
The approaches discussed in the early part of this chapter act as starting points for 
inquiry, rather than representing full guidelines that have shaped the design of this 
study. Nonetheless, the concept ofperformativity has provided one influence for this 
work, insofar that the application of a probabilistic concept such as Bayes to a 
practical field such as forensic science represents an apparently clear instance of the 
usefulness of this concept. In this regard, part of the rationale for this study is assess 
to what extent the concept of perfonnativity can explain the way in which Bayes is 
utilised. At the same time however, this project has kept open the possibility that 
certain areas may require other conceptual tools to account for the observed results 
12 
'Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I 
mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of 
primitive natural laws; and mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a 
generalisation. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of 
metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be 
our job to reduce anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is purely 'descriptive' 
(Wittgenstein, quoted in Lynch and Bogen 1997, p.269-270). 
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3.2 Studying Bayes 
Bayes has, so far, only been the subject of one published study by STS scholars 
(Lynch and McNally 2003). Although Lynch and McNally's article raises some 
extremely valuable insights, I was concerned that it did not capture the rich series of 
practices involved in using Bayes in the course of forensic scientific investigation 
away from the courtroom. Accordingly, this thesis should be understood as a 
preliminary step in inquiring about the relationship between theory and practice in 
forensic scientific investigation, rather than being concerned to analyse the 
presentation and interrogation of evidence in court. The initial stage of the work 
therefore involved a high degree of fact-finding and familiarisation with the basic 
concepts of Bayes and the way it was portrayed as being of use to forensic 
investigation. At this stage the technical literature was the major object of a 
familiarisation process. Making initial sense of the precise nature of the issues of 
interest became a complex task. This was aided however, by a small number of 
interviews with forensic scientists and other figures. It must be added here that none of 
the discussions directly led to respondents suggesting areas of study; most of the 
individuals had little knowledge of STS, and did not press me to pursue specific paths. 
I was thus able to maintain a balance, between being engaged, informed and interested 
in the work of forensic science, but remaining distanced and impartial. Over time, 
informed by both the technical literature and the discussions that I experienced and 
also witnessed, a tangible series of research questions began to emerge. In some ways 
the research followed a path typical of other qualitative studies, where interviews were 
carried out, the results reviewed, with the consequence of informing future interviews, 
and in doing so, helping guide the progress of the research. Given the lack of previous 
studies in this area, this was deemed an appropriate strategy to follow. 
In addition, certain events took place during the period of my study which have also 
driven the direction of the research. In particular, the outcome of the Omagh bomb 
trial, and the publication of the Caddy report into Low Template Number profiling, 
have raised considerable controversy both within and outside the UK forensic 
scientific community, and continue to resonate in laboratories and courtrooms. I 
outline the details of such controversies in a later chapter, but suffice to say here that 
such developments emphasised both the manner in which Bayes could be construed as 
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a controversial and contested technology, and also indicated that this research could 
address certain issues which underpin these more high-profile controversies. 
Whilst STS has made a major contribution in its interrogation of the theory-practice 
divide, the fact remains that there is still a perceived distinction in forensic science 
between the two, especially with regard to evidence interpretation. That does not 
mean however, that forensic scientists are not keen to bridge that divide; one of the 
main aims of this thesis is to gain further understanding ofhow forensic scientists 
apply supposedly theoretical constructs such as Bayes Theorem in the course of their 
work. Therefore, the sociological problem at issue here is only partially one of how 
actors come to recognise evidence. What is of further interest is the way in which 
actors use specific theoretical constructs, and the uses made of these constructs in the 
practice of interpreting evidence. 
What I aim to show is that, although theoretical constructs such as Bayes Theorem 
may play some form of guiding role in modem forensic investigation, the latter alone 
only play a partial role in actual interventions of evidence interpretation. An 
understanding of the role Bayes Theorem plays in forensic investigation is not 
complete without a consideration of the practices through which it is interpreted and 
applied. In doing so, I hope to make a notable contribution, by demonstrating the 
usefulness of a sociological perspective on some of the problems faced by scholars of 
evidence. 
However, I also still ultimately aim to show that attempts to introduce a secure 
fundamental epistemological basis for forensic investigation give insufficient attention 
to the ways in which reasoning processes themselves are socially constructed. I 
emphasise the possibility that reasoning systems may evolve, or at least fluidly adapt. 
I discuss this further in my final remarks on Bayesianism and abduction. It is equally 
important to consider the possibility that not only do systems of reasoning evolve, but 
so too does the nature of the milieu in which the reasoning takes place -thus we need 
to consider whether the role of the forensic scientist is changing, how and why it may 
be changing, and how this might be accommodated within the current UK legal 
system. 
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3.3 Approach of Thesis 
In order to begin to understand the place Bayes Theorem occupies in forensic science, 
and to start to address the possibility that the shaping of 'Bayesian reasoning' is a 
contingent phenomenon, it is first necessary to examine the way in which Bayes 
Theorem itself has evolved and changed over time. Whilst the equation which depicts 
Bayes Theorem has remained largely the same, ideas concerning the use of the 
Theorem, and what ontological assumptions it was meant to reflect, have been subject 
to a significant amount of interpretation. By understanding the changing 
interpretations ofBayes itself, it is possible to gain an idea how Bayes may be 
considered - not as a rigid mathematical construction, but as a more fluid form of 
technology, where the precise possibilities for actualisation and use may take a 
plurality of forms. 
Hence I begin the study by focusing on the origins ofBayes theorem. Drawing upon 
both primary and secondary sources I show how the modem interpretation ofBayes 
differs from the version originally conceived by its eponymous progenitor. I do this in 
order to show how the context in which Bayes is used has affected representations of 
the theorem. I also show how Bayes has emerged out of a competing set of ideas 
about probability, and how they in turn have been affected by underlying ontological 
and metaphysical assumptions held by certain individuals. Both Bayesianism, and 
another mode of probability known as frequentism, emerged out of a debate which 
had, at its heart, issues relating to how the world was perceived to be ordered. 
I introduce this work in order to show the usefulness of regarding Bayes, and 
probability as a whole, as technologies which are shaped as much by the contexts in 
which they are used, as much as they influence the behaviour of those who seek to use 
them. I carry this notion forward in Chapter 5. Here I draw upon a variety of primary 
and secondary sources to introduce attempts to adduce a greater degree of 
systematisation to the interpretation of evidence of relevance to criminal cases. Again 
my approach is historical, as I seek to trace the introduction of Bayes into legal and 
forensic scientific reasoning. In this chapter I therefore seek to show how Bayes, and 
the role of statistics in general, has come to be an important part of discussions in 
modern forensic science, and of a wider academic approaches to the issue of evidence. 
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I broadly use the same approach in Chapter 6, where I provide an introduction to the 
scientific issues that have been raised in the course of the utilisation ofDNA profiling 
for forensic use. This serves a number of functions. First, this chapter provides an 
overview ofthe scientific basis ofthe production and interpretation of forensic DNA 
profiles. The latter has played a particularly important role in introducing the greater 
use of statistics and probability for the evaluation of forensic evidence, and this 
chapter also outlines the relationship between technology and statistics. More 
importantly however, it also shows how the scientific and statistical basis of DNA 
evidence has come to be comprehensively examined by the adversarial Anglo-
American legal system. Hence I also explain, in detail, how legal deliberations have 
also shaped the development and use of statistical applications in forensic science. 
I explore the way in which Bayes has been used in forensic science in more depth in 
Chapters 7 and 8. Here I present two case studies which comprehensively explore the 
use ofBayes in two separate contexts. The first concerns the development of 
automated systems for the interpretation of complex DNA profiles. This area was 
chosen since Bayes Theorem has formed a significant element in the generation of the 
algorithms which form the calculational basis of these systems. Thus, an opportunity 
presented itself to study the practices involved in the development and use of these 
systems. It was intended to investigate the extent to which the use ofBayes, and 
representations of it in scientific literature, were sufficient to project an image of the 
resultant technology as being ostensibly scientific. The aim of the case study then, 
was to highlight the amount of scientific labour involved in the creation of systems of 
evidence interpretation, involving as they do a series of mathematical and scientific 
technologies. Furthermore, this case study also sought to investigate the extent to 
which the deployment of Bayes could be seen to project an image of 'objectivity' to 
these technologies. Hence, the study sought to identify how areas of objectivity and 
subjectivity were defined and managed. Of particular interest in this case was the 
possibility that a number of areas still dependent on a relatively high degree of 
experiential judgement and assumption still existed, in a manner not alluded to in the 
scientific literature, or by forensic scientists themselves. 
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This case study focused on one relatively narrow area of forensic science. However, 
as recent cases have shown, these technologies have made an important contribution to 
criminal justice in the UK. Techniques such as Low Template Number DNA 
profiling, and Pendulum List Search, which utilise Bayesian reasoning as a 
calculational platform, have attracted considerable interest in the media, and have 
helped to reinforce an image of modem forensic science as an efficient 'hi-tech' mode 
of producing criminal justice. Such technologies have also made an important 
contribution to policing practices in facilitating the re-inquiry of so-called 'cold cases'. 
However, they have also come under increasing scrutiny in recent times, particularly 
with regard to LCN. The controversies which continue to dominate discussions in the 
UK forensic science community13, have been brought to public attention via events 
such as the judicial criticism ofLCN in the Omagh bomb trial. The study ofBayes in 
this context is therefore not a trivial matter, and a closer examination of the way in 
which Bayes has been used in the construction of these technologies brings to light the 
reasoning practices of the forensic scientists who developed them. An important point 
to consider is that these technologies have been developed by the FSS, now a 
Government-owned company who, despite a certain widening of the market, continue 
to dominate the provision of forensic science services in the UK. The work of their 
scientists is therefore highly influential with regard to both policing strategies and 
criminal justice, and hence their practices merit close study. Furthermore, the way in 
which the FSS communicates its work is also important. The growing marketisation 
of forensic science provision in the UK may play a role in the manner in which Bayes 
is depicted in FSS literature. Hence part of this case study has involved focusing on 
this relationship. 
The second case study involved a more holistic look at the management of evidence, 
and centred on the Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model, which was also 
originally developed on behalf of the FSS. The CAI was developed with the growing 
commercial nature of forensic science provision partly in mind, and was intended to 
consider how forensic scientific services could be delivered to police to ensure optimal 
cost-effectiveness. The CAI consists of a framework which draws heavily on 
Bayesian probability. It seeks to clarify and define a number of processes which the 
13 As discussed at a conference organised by the Forensic Science Society and attended by the author, 
17 April 2008. 
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authors perceive as being instrumental to reasoning about evidence. A key aim of the 
CAI is to help guide forensic scientists in formulating rational propositions to test and 
explain the origin of evidence, which is viewed one of the central aspects of the 
Bayesian approach to forensic science. The CAI can thus be construed as a 
technology which provides a means for forensic scientists to clarify and organise their 
reasoning processes concerning criminal cases. Viewed in other way however, the 
CAI, and Bayesianism as a whole, can be perceived as making a significant 
contribution to the disciplinary identity for forensic science as a whole. The CAI 
framework is intended to be applied holistically to all forms of forensic evidence, and 
the language of the authors of the CAI, who suggest that Bayes is the 'only logical 
way to reason about evidence', suggests a certain prescriptive and programmatic 
intent. 
The CAI has featured prominently in forensic scientific literature, and the authors of 
the CAI continue to actively contribute to forensic science conferences, both in the UK 
and abroad. Their work has elicited a considerable amount of interest, and in some 
cases formal acclaim, but it also attracted criticism, and doubts have been expressed 
concerning the applicability ofBayesianism to casework. Hence the CAI provided a 
significant topic for the second case study. It also provides an interesting contrast to 
the first case study. Whilst the use ofBayes in automated DNA interpretation systems 
represents an application to a specific piece of evidence, the CAI represents a notable 
extension ofBayesian reasoning, being applied generically across a range of forms of 
evidence. Moreover, it became clear that the application of Bayes to the investigation 
of criminal cases as a whole presented a greater set of issues. With this came the 
realisation that, in the case of CAI, a diversity of practices could be seen as being 
linked to the actualisation ofBayes. A key difference in this second case study 
concerned the fact that a greater role was placed on human actors in performing 
Bayesian reasoning, in contrast to the first case study, where human actors merely 
designed the calculative processes. An opportunity arose therefore, to consider the 
role of embodiment in Bayesian reasoning. This, in turn, led to the consideration of 
the construction of different forms ofBayesian reasoning. This issue of differing 
'forms ofBayes' and the role ofhuman agency in constructing them, is a topic which I 
discuss further in Chapter 9. 
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3.4 Choice of Methods 
This study used a mixture of methods. The consultation and analysis of a number of 
different documentary forms played an important role in this work. Although I outline 
below the various kinds of documents that were collected and consulted, I will briefly 
comment on the reasons why documentary analysis formed a prominent part of my 
approach, and then explain how this, in combination with other methods, comprised 
the methodological strategy for this study. 
Firstly, the use of documentary analysis allowed the study to incorporate a historical 
dimension, the reasons for which I explain above. Given that a number of intertwining 
topics are discussed in this research (such as the origins and development ofBayesian 
theory, its use in judicial and forensic settings, the evolution of studies concerning 
evidence interpretation, the permeation of statistical concepts into forensic science, the 
development of DNA profiling and resultant challenges etc), it was necessary to 
provide overviews of a number of these issues in order to provide the appropriate 
historical background for understanding how Bayes has come to be applied to forensic 
science, and to highlight the issues such a development presents. This often involved 
the consideration of relatively long timespans; for example, the history of Bayes 
Theorem dates from 1763, and attempts to provide a systematic basis for evidence 
interpretation date from around the early 1900s. Hence documentary material was 
used to develop my accounts. Although secondary sources were used in order to 
verify some ofthe arguments, primary sources, in the form of relevant academic 
articles, are readily available. 
Documentary material also played an important role in the cases studies. The kind of 
material consulted in these studies involved technical documents, most notably articles 
from scientific journals and related textbooks, to understand how Bayes is understood 
and applied by forensic scientists to produce technologies of reasoning better suited to · 
the challenges presented in the course of forensic casework. Together these provided 
the most convenient and readily accessible guide to the scientific basis of the current 
work which forms the subject of the two case studies. A small number of other 
documents were also consulted in the course of the case studies. These involved 
official documents provided by police forces, court reports and news media. These 
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documents provided some details of the impact of Bayesian forensic technologies on a 
series of activities, such as policing strategies, judicial decision-making and media 
reception. 
The approach to the collection and analysis of documentary material broadly followed 
the model which is suggested by Altheide (2004). Preliminary research questions 
were considered which were based on an initial familiarisation with the area of study. 
This informed the creation of more specific areas for research, out of which arose the 
two case studies pursued in the thesis. These particular case studies were regarded as 
representing a pair of instances which were not only considered to possess research 
potential, but which had also attracted a significant degree of attention from within and 
outside the UK forensic science community. Hence both these case studies were 
regarded as not just major scientific issues, but distinctly social ones as well. 
Furthermore, the two studies were also regarded as sufficiently distinct, yet also 
displaying enough commonalities to facilitate a fruitful exercise in comparing and 
contrasting two instances of the application ofBayesian reasoning in evidence 
interpretation. 
The documents consulted in the case studies may be regarded as largely official, or at 
least public, documents, and thus an awareness was constantly maintained that these 
were constructed texts (Abraham 1994). That is not to say however, that the 
information found within them has been uncritically absorbed, and a suitably sceptical 
stance was maintained. On the contrary, one ofthe key aims of the case studies was to 
critically examine the kinds of claims made in these texts, with a view to comparing 
the depictions ofBayesianism with 'real-world' experience. Here however, is where 
the documentary approach was found to possess limitations. Much ofthis technical 
material provided a theoretical account ofBayesianism, with little attention paid to 
specific instances of the issues encountered when utilising this technology in the 
course of actual casework, a crucial area of interest. Furthermore, it was only possible 
to gain a minimal understanding of the latter through some ofthe comments made in 
other literature such as judicial and news media reports. Hence other methods were 
considered necessary in order to gain a broader understanding of the issues involved. 
Originally, these were sought in order to gain a fuller idea of the process of using 
Bayes in forensic investigation. As the research progressed however, it also became 
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more apparent, via media reports and other sources, that certain questions were being 
raised about the effectiveness and suitability of using such a technology in forensic 
science. Literature that addressed the actual experience of using Bayes in casework 
was not available in the public domain, and it was therefore decided to pursue this via 
a small number of semi-structured interviews. 
The use of semi-structured interviews was deemed appropriate for a number of 
reasons. As discussed in further detail below, given the access issues, a full 
participant observation study was ruled out at an early stage. As the study was 
concerned with self-assignations of Bayes, it was necessary to allow interviewees to 
talk about how they themselves viewed Bayes, and hence the interview technique 
provided highly insightful. It enabled interviewees to talk directly about some of the 
processes related to criminal justice. This in turn enabled me to gain an insight into a 
wide variety of procedures and issues at various stages of the criminal justice process, 
and they made a significant contribution to the evolution of more specific research 
questions, in a manner typically encountered in the utilisation of qualitative methods 
(Silverman 1993, Foster 1995, Davies 1999). It is unlikely however, that I would have 
been able to gain access to such a variety of stages if a full participant observation 
approach had been adopted, but the interviews added a great deal of colour to the 
research. The capacity to gain such a broad understanding was considered necessary, 
given the position forensic science occupies between the realms of science and law. 
Efforts to incorporate Bayes have occurred both at the level of the courtroom and of 
the forensic science laboratory (of which I provide a further overview in Chapter 4), 
and any understanding of how Bayes is applied at the forensic scientific level must 
also consider possible impacts at other stages of the criminal justice process. I provide 
further details of this in chapter 6. 
An ethnographic approach was considered less appropriate for this study, as there was 
less emphasis on the construction of a material forensic technology, and more on how 
a forensic technology was shaped, and how conceptions of a pre-existing term such as 
'Bayes' were interpreted and represented. A small amount of participant observation 
was conducted via attendance at conferences organised by professional associations. 
Through these, it was possible to observe the deliberation of issues relating to 
Bayesian interpretation of evidence. Being a technology of reasoning however, it was 
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decided that an investigation of the forms it took would need to occur with the 
cooperation of reasoners, whenever possible, in order to delineate how it might be 
enacted. Few a priori assumptions were made concerning how Bayes might come to 
be rendered as a tangible reasoning technology, and the possibility was left open from 
the start that in different contexts, different forms of Bayes might arise by different 
means. This precluded an especially rigid approach to methodology in general, but it 
also indicated there was more to be studied than by observation alone. 
Even if an ethnographic technique had been adopted, it is likely that it would have run 
into the same problems experienced by Innes (2003), such as an unwillingness for 
investigators have 'on the record' comments attributed to them. Innes also notes how 
some of the most frank and most useful comments came in relatively less 
institutionalised contexts (Innes 2003, p.287). With the interviews that I conducted 
occurring away from similarly institutionalised and less pressurised environments, a 
similar level of relaxed honesty was encountered during the course of this work, and I 
also paid particular attention to honing the kind of techniques for good practice in 
interviewing as suggested by the likes of K vale (1996) and Charmaz (2002). 
Innes (2003) also highlights the difficulties experienced in gaining access to police 
organisations in order to perform ethnographic analysis of detectives at work (Innes 
2003, p.284). This study had originally been envisaged as a comparative study 
involving two police organisations. Although Innes was granted access to one 
organisation however, he reports difficulty in gaining access to a second force; 
approaches to several other police organisations for access were rejected with the 
consequence that the focus of the study had to be adjusted in order to compensate for 
this problem (Innes 2003, p.284). 
His experience of the difficulties in gaining access to law enforcement agencies 
involved in sensitive casework influenced the course of this study. For example, 
attempts were made to contact key actors within the Forensic Science Service (FSS) to 
interview them about their work on Automated DNA Evidence Interpretation Systems, 
yet no replies were forthcoming and hence no direct access could be gained. This is 
certainly in line with an established FSS reputation for longstanding concerns with 
security and confidentiality, along with a more recent concern with commercial 
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confidentiality. In this case, the access issues experienced in this study were of a 
distinctly non-public nature (Lofland and Lofland 1995), than the more 'public', but 
perhaps no less challenging groups as encountered in other studies (Willis1977, 
Giulianotti 1995, Hobbs 1993, O'Reilly 2000). Although some studies on the police 
have shown it is possible to gain access on a covert manner to a closed public 
organisation (Rubinstein 1973, Punch 1979, Holdaway 1983), this was simply not an 
option for this study, given time and other constraints. 
As I describe in Chapter 7, questions have been raised concerning the relative lack of 
information that has been released by the FSS with regard to the scientific 
technologies used by that organisation to interpret DNA profiles. In my research, one 
interviewee openly criticised the FSS for failing to provide suitable levels of 
information relevant to cases. The kinds oftechnologies that have been produced by 
the FSS were identified as an important topic of study in the course of this research, 
yet it was decided that given the lack of response from the organisation, any direct 
engagement with the actors would have proved to be extremely problematic. 
3.5 Specific Methods and Materials 
3.5.1 Interviews 
This research did not involve a direct consideration of crime. Instead, the focus of the 
project largely centred around the actions of forensic scientists and the technologies 
they utilised in their reasoning processes. Nonetheless the nature of the research did 
mean that interviews often involved discussions of a relatively sensitive nature. The 
interviews often covered criminal cases, which in some instances were still ongoing. 
These instances did provide highly relevant information, and where relevant parts of 
these discussions are included in the ensuing case studies. In most cases however, 
interviewees were able to generalise to the extent that the precise details, e.g. names, 
locations and other such identifiable specifics were omitted without compromising the 
usefulness ofthe information which was divulged. 
During the course of the research however it was possible to gain access to a number 
of key figures involved in the areas of forensic science of interest to this study. A total 
59 
of 12 individuals were interviewed during the course of this work, with 1 Interviewee 
(Interviewee 5), being interviewed on two separate occasions. There was a certain 
amount of overlap of topics, such that discussions with some interviewees often 
resulted in topics relevant to both case studies being addressed. Of these interviews, 
all but 2 of the interviews took place directly in person, with the results being recorded 
and transcripted where the data was felt to be relevant to the study. The remaining 2 
interviews involved individuals who were based in the USA, and took place by 
telephone, with notes being recorded. 
Consultation of much of the literature provided a somewhat idealised view ofBayes 
which contrasted with some ofthe accounts given by interviewees. A more serious 
issue which arose from the research, and which acted as a justification for the 
interview approach, was the fact that the degree of awareness of Bayes varied greatly 
amongst individuals consulted. Whilst all the interviewees were aware of the term 
'Bayes', the extent ofthe knowledge varied from wide-ranging experience of 
attempting to apply it to forensic science, to hardly further knowledge beyond the 
name itself. The lower limit of knowledge was often found with more junior 
practitioners, as those involved in the provision of forensic scientific training exhibited 
a relatively strong awareness of the potential uses ofBayes in forensic science. 
Furthermore, it was those practitioners who were largely involved in the collection of 
evidence (e.g. crime scene examiners), who demonstrated the least awareness of 
Bayes. This is perhaps not surprising as it is these individuals who are perhaps least 
likely to have been trained about Bayes; although some interviewees felt that a 
knowledge ofBayes might help scene examiners in knowing 'where to look' for 
relevant evidence in the context of an investigation, this opinion was not reciprocated. 
3.5.2 Profiles oflnterviewees 
a. Interviewee 1: Had recently completed a PhD in the US on the application of 
Bayesian Networks to DNA profiling (parental analysis). At the time of the interview 
this interviewee had embarked on postdoctoral work at a leading UK university, which 
concerned the further development ofBayes Networks in order to apply them to DNA 
profiling, and had already published in the scientific literature at the time of the 
interview. 
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b. Interviewee 2: This interviewee holds two PhD qualifications in Mathematics and 
Computer Science, as well as a medical degree. He is based in the US where he is the 
CEO of a company which develops computer programs for the derivation of DNA 
profiles from mixed samples. He has also published work on this subject and 
submitted conference papers. 
c. Interviewee 3: Ran a forensic science consultancy in the UK, generally specialising 
in defence work. He had a scientific background, and had previously been head of a 
police lab in a large British city. His current work had led him to testify in high-
profile criminal court cases in the UK, and in one particular instance he had featured 
prominently in criticising Low Template Number (LCN) DNA. This interviewee also 
has a slightly more critical view ofthe application ofBayes to forensic science, and 
has written articles pursuing this line. 
d. Interviewee 4. A professor of genetics in the US, he also runs a consultancy which 
advises defence briefs over issues associated with DNA evidence. He had also 
testified in a high-profile court case in the UK, where he had been critical of LCN 
evidence. 
e. Interviewee 5: Had worked for the FSS for over thirty years before moving on to 
run his own consultancy business. He has been involved with the genesis of the CAI 
from it's onset, and continues to teach the application ofBayesianism to 
undergraduate students. He has published a number of articles and book chapters on 
the CAI and on the application ofBayesianism to forensic science as a whole. 
f. Interviewee 6: Professor of Statistics at a British university, he has published several 
books and articles on the application of statistics and probability to forensic science. 
He has been conducting research on the development and application of Bayesian 
Networks to forensic scientific problems, from issues surrounding DNA evidence to 
their application to a whole criminal investigation. 
g. and h. Interviewees 6A and 6B: Postdoctoral students of Interviewee 6. 
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i Interviewee 7: Worked in police before leaving to organise and teach forensic science 
courses to undergraduate and postgraduate students. 
j. Interviewee 8: A Senior Lecturer of forensic science at a British university. Worked 
for the FSS for eighteen years, leaving as a senior scientific officer to become part of 
an FSS management team. After writing a widely circulated report, he helped found a 
new operational forensic scientific support resource for the police, and took part in 
around 230 reviews of murder investigations. Until he retired in 2005, he was a 
member of a number of ACPO committees and served as an advisor to the UK 
Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry into forensic science. He has also acted as a 
consultant on a number of TV and film projects concerning forensic science. 
l. Interviewee 9: Works as a researcher at the National Policing Improvement Agency 
(NPIA). 
In most of the interviews, inquiries were pursued which attempted to cover both case 
studies. The lines of questioning are detailed in the more detailed consideration of the 
case studies below. 
3.6 Case Study 1: Automated DNA Interpretation Systems 
3.6.1 Documentary Examination 
Various forms of literature were used in the course of this case study: 
Scientific and technical literature 
This literature encompassed books and chapters, articles published in academic 
journals, and conference papers and presentations. These were referred to in order to 
gain an understanding of a number of issues. First, to gain an understanding of the 
kind of theoretical approaches that have been applied to the design ofprobabilistic 
systems for DNA evidence interpretation. Second, to gain an understanding of the 
kind of claims made regarding these technologies. Third, to gain an understanding of 
the scientific concepts underpinning these systems. Journal articles were taken from a 
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number of disciplinary areas, encompassing forensic science and legal medicine, 
statistics and probability, and genetics 
Other articles and papers, often published in forensic science journals, or presented at 
conferences for forensic scientists, sought to comment upon these techniques, and 
aimed to highlight specific scientific and legal issues. Examples of such papers 
include Budowle et al (2001) and Butler (2006) These articles were consulted in order 
to gain an understanding of the controversies raised by DNA evidence interpretation 
technologies amongst the relevant scientific communities and individuals. 
Although an awareness of the constructed nature of such documents was maintained, 
this material provided a wealth of information, and together constituted an important 
resource for understanding the fundamentals ofBayesian theory and how it has, (and 
is intended to be) used in forensic science. 
Reports and Reviews 
Prior to, and during the course of this study, a number of reports, commissioned either 
by government or private bodies, were published which included discussions of issues 
relating to the technologies of interest in this study. These also highlighted a number 
of related scientific, legal and ethical controversies. For example, Williams et al 
(2004), Genewatch (2005), and the Nuffield Council ofBioethics (2007) included 
discussions of a number of topics related to the technologies involved in the case 
study, amongst other considerations of a range of topics related to the forensic use of 
genetic material and bioinformation in general (Williams et al 2004; Genewatch 2006; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007). The report on the Omagh judgment (Weir 2007) 
featured a concerted discussion ofLCN DNA (Caddy et al 2008). The Caddy (2008) 
report was dedicated to the issue of the scientific and legal validity of LCN DNA 
profiling (Caddy et al 2008). As I discuss in one of the case study chapters, the Caddy 
Report itself was the subject of a significant amount of controversy, and I include two 
responses to that report amongst this collection of data (Jamieson and Bader 2008, 
Gilder et al 2008). 
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Many of these kind of reports were more critical about the introduction ofBayesian 
technologies into forensic science, in particular the application to DNA profiling. 
Whilst these must also be regarded as constructed documents, this material added to 
the sense in which Bayesian technologies are contested sites, within the domains of 
ethics, law, and, importantly, science. Whilst these documents alone did not provide a 
comprehensive indication of these issues, they highlight a series of areas of dissensus 
which informed the study, and helped to guide the formation of questions for the semi-
structured interviews. 
Court Reports 
Reports from UK Appeal Courts are freely available, and a number of these were 
consulted in the study, in order to assess the extent to which techniques such as LCN 
were utilised as evidence in court, the way in which they are used to incriminate 
suspects. They were also consulted in order to help gauge the extent to which 
technologies such as LCN feature in court cases, and to ascertain how such evidence is 
received in court. 
Police and Government Literature 
Material published by police and government bodies provided information about the 
role of DNA evidence interpretation technologies in the course of certain police 
operations, most notably cold case review operations such as Operation Advance and 
Operation Phoenix. This literature provided information about the precise aims, 
objectives and scope of the operations and how DNA interpretation technologies were 
to assist in them. The literature also provided some statistical information concerning: 
the number of re-opened cases, the number of cases in which LCN could be applied, 
number of arrests made, convictions secured etc. This literature helped to provide an 
understanding of how new Bayesian technologies have influenced a change in certain 
police practices with regard to serious crime, a development which has been 
influenced in part by central government policy. 
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Literature from Forensic Science Providers 
Material taken from providers of forensic science products and services, such as the 
UK Forensic Science Service (FSS), was also consulted to assess the contribution 
made by DNA evidence interpretation technologies to the resolution of criminal 
investigations. This material took the form ofwebsite information, and 'fact sheets' 
which provided summaries of the technologies and their use in investigations. 
News media 
News media sources were also consulted as a further source of information, which 
included: further details of the circumstances of criminal investigations and their 
subsequent success/failure; notification of relevant published reports and their 
subsequent reception by relevant public figures; opinions expressed by public figures 
such as judges, police officers and politicians etc; actions and responses of 
governments and other bodies such as the Crown Prosecution Service, Association of 
ChiefPolice Officers (ACPO) etc. 
e-Symposia 
Prior to, and during this study a number of symposia have been held by the Forensic 
Institute, which have been conveyed via the Internet. £-symposia have been held 
annually since 2005 on the theme of Human Identification, and considerable focus has 
been given to the type of theoretical and technological approaches to DNA 
interpretation featured in this case study. The e-symposia have consisted of a series of 
presentations on legal, scientific and technological developments in this field, and also 
panel discussions on related issues. Participants have included a number of leading 
figures, many of whom have been directly involved in the development ofBayesian 
algorithms and subsequent interpretation technologies, and who have also published 
extensively on these areas. As well as being relayed live via the internet, the 
conference proceedings are also available in archived form for access to subscribers. 
Hence these have also been used in this study, and have been found to be another 
valuable resource for gaining an understanding of the scientific basis of the 
technologies, as well as the nature of the discussions and debates surrounding them. 
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Other Websites 
The intemet was also accessed on occasions, in order to search for other relevant 
material, using intemet search engines. This returned a relatively limited amount of 
suitable material, although it did result in the discovery of online discussions of some 
aspects of the featured technologies. However, more notably this did result in the 
discovery that the FSS had employed a public relations firm to promote a particular 
product via news media. This is discussed in the case study. 
Secondary Material 
A number of transcripts which formed part of an early study of the history of DNA 
profiling. These also provided access to some of the thoughts ofkey actors 
concerning the use of statistics in forensic science, and have been incorporated into 
this research where it was deemed appropriate 
3.6.2 Fieldwork 
This comprised of: 
1) semi -structured interviews, 
2) attendance at conferences for forensic scientists 
1) Semi-structured Interviews 
The type of enquiry pursued in the course of these interviews can be differentiated into 
the following lines of questioning: 
- Questions concerning the precise nature of the work involved in the development of 
Bayesian algorithms used in the systems for interpreting DNA profiles, and the 
subsequent process surrounding the implementation of these systems in casework. 
Hence themes in this area included: the lived experience of constructing the algorithms 
and finding solutions to design flaws etc; the nature of the skills, expertise and 
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background knowledge required in this area; the type of actors involved in the creation 
of the systems and the forms of communication between them; how the input of these 
actors affected the subsequent design of the systems; challenges involved in using 
these systems in theoretical examples and making the subsequent transition to actual 
casework etc. 
-Questions concerning the scientific and legal validity of such systems, including 
themes such as: identification of the nature of the scientific and legal issues associated 
with these technologies, including the recovery of evidence, and the generation and 
interpretation of resulting DNA profiles; identification ofthe stances associated with 
discussions over these issues, and how these positions were justified; the reception of 
these technologies by jurisdictions outside the UK; the experience of the use ofthese 
technologies to supply evidence in court cases; means ofvalidating the systems etc. 
-To what extent these technologies embodied the tenets ofBayesianism: how the data 
was shaped and interpreted to fit with the formulae; identification of the kind of 
approaches used to adapt Bayesianism to the problem of DNA evidence interpretation. 
2) Conference Attendance 
In addition to the interviews, it was also possible to access more candid discussions of 
the issues via attendance and involvement with a small number of conferences and 
seminars. These events functioned as important spaces where scientific issues were 
debated and discussed. In some cases the technologies under study came under a 
strong degree of scrutiny. Although it could not be said that technology was 
'deconstructed' in the same way as Jasanoff and Lynch report the locale of the 
courtroom, these discussions served to open up many of the issues which were 
circumscribed in the published material. They also allowed an insight to be gained of 
the most up-to-date developments, as opposed to the literature in which a certain 
backlog in publishing was assumed in some cases. Two conferences were attended in 
person, plus a day-long seminar given at a university. In addition to this, four web-
based seminars were accessed. 
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In addition to the interviews, I attended two conferences organised by the Forensic 
Science Society. These were held at British Universities over the course of 1-2 days 
each, with the first taking place in June 2007, and the second in April 2008. These 
were organised by the Forensic Science Society, a leading professional body which 
has members in over 60 countries (FSS 2008). These conferences attracted leading 
figures in the fields of DNA evidence and evidence interpretation, and the second 
conference placed particular focus on the issues surrounding LCN analysis. 
The visits to these conferences had the following purposes: to help understand how 
those in the UK police and forensic science communities viewed DNA Evidence 
Interpretation Technologies in general; how these communities identified and framed 
the scientific and legal controversies associated with these technologies, but also how 
they identified related advantages; to keep updated with new scientific developments 
within the field. 
3.7 Case Study 2: The Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) Model 
3. 7.1 Documentary Examination 
Academic Articles 
A series of articles have been published in forensic science journals which have 
specifically outlined the principles and key features of the CAI. These articles were 
used in addition to book chapters which also described features of the CAI. In 
addition, literature was also consulted which discussed the use of Bayes in forensic 
science and the law on a more general basis. These articles were located across a 
range of disciplinary areas, encompassing not only forensic science, but also legal 
studies, evidence scholarship, and statistics and probability. 
3.7.2 Fieldwork 
Fieldwork was undertaken which comprised of: 
a) Semi-structured interviews 
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b) Attendance at a one-day seminar for undergraduate forensic science students at a 
British university, which focused on the use ofBayesian reasoning in criminal 
investigation. This seminar was a compulsory part of their degree course. 
c) Attendance at conferences which focused on the application of probabilistic 
approaches such as Bayes, held in April 2008 (see previous section for details). 
Interviews 
All interviews were carried out in person. The following individuals were all 
interviewed once, with the exception of Interviewee 5, who was interviewed twice, 
and was also present for part of the interview with interviewee 7. Given this 
interviewees close relationship with the CAI, it was felt appropriate to interview him 
more than once in order to help gain greater insight into the CAI. The length of the 
interviews varied from approximately 45 minutes to approximately 2.5 hours. 
During the course of these interviews, inquiry focused on the following themes: 
The relationship between forensic scientists and the police, and the relationship 
between forensic science providers and the police as separate organisations: 
determination of the possible changing nature ofthe type of products and services 
offered to police forces; expectations of forensic science on the part of the police; 
discussion of whether the roles of forensic scientists is changing, and whether the 
scope of 'forensic investigation' is widening; 
Attempts to apply the CAI to casework: the identification of specific issues 
experienced when attempting to apply the framework to casework; identification of 
the kind of cases to which the CAI has been applied; discussion of whether certain 
kinds of cases suit the use of the CAI in comparison to others; assessments of the 
suitability and potential of the CAI for casework use; questions concerning the 
existence and availability of data sources for use in CAI-based inquiries; 
Questions concerning the origins of the CAI: Key drivers toward the initial 
development of the CAI; the nature of theoretical work which influenced and shaped 
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the development of the CAI; the individuals involved in the creation ofthe CAI, and 
the decision-making procedures that were employed; 
The manner in which the CAI has evolved and developed: how, and why, the CAI has 
evolved in a particular direction; how actual casework has influenced the design of the 
CAI; issues specific to particular forensic sub-disciplines, e.g. DNA, fingerprints, 
handwriting analysis etc; how operational forensic scientists have contributed to the 
development process etc 
The reception that the CAI has experienced: the nature of the response from 
operational forensic scientists, police officers, the FSS and the forensic science 
community as a whole; criticisms of the CAI and attempts to apply Bayesianism to 
forensic investigation in general; to what extent the CAI and Bayesianism is actually 
being used in the course of casework. 
The nature of the relationship between academic/theoretical research conducted in the 
domain of forensic science, and forensic scientific practice in the course of criminal 
investigations. 
Translating and conveying probabilistic data to lay audiences: Discussions of the 
problems associated with converting numerical data into a form more readily 
comprehendable to jurors, advocates judges etc. 
Field Visit 
In addition to the above, a two-day visit was undertaken to a large and prominent 
police force based in a vast metropolitan area. During this visit I was able to engage 
with a number of members of staff from all levels of the hierarchy. This ranged from 
custody officers, scientific support staff, procurers of forensic science, to the head of 
forensic sciences. The field work included visits to police stations and to forensic 
laboratories, as well as the headquarters of the force itself. 
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CHAPTER FOUR- THE ORIGINS OF 
BA YESIANISM 
4.1 Introduction: Bayesianism Today 
It is an appropriate starting point to this study to consider not only what is 
meant by 'Bayesianism' in modem forensic science, but also to understand 
how such a form of reasoning has to come to take its current shape, which is 
the aim of this chapter, and Chapter 5. In what follows I provide a brief 
historical overview which seeks to trace the origins and development of Bayes 
Theorem, from the original publication of the work by its eponymous 
progenitor, to the current interpretation of Bayesianism as it is regarded today. 
My aim here is to question the extent to which the development of such a 
mathematical form can be attributed to a steady and iterative logical process. 
Hence I consider the manner in which the original publication was received in 
its original epoch and by its contemporaries, and how it has been subsequently 
interpreted by a succession of figures associated with the field of statistics and 
probability. 
In the first part of this section I provide a brief history of the development of 
Bayesian theory. In the course of this I seek to demonstrate how modem 
Bayesianism has arisen out of two approaches to probabilism that are often 
portrayed as existing in direct opposition to each other: inverse probability, 
which attempts to assign measures of belief to the probability of causes of 
observed events, andfrequentism, which concerns itself with drawing of 
conclusions based only on the observations that can be garnered from data 
generated in the course of experiments. I will argue that the modem 
interpretation of' Bayesianism' (sometimes referred to as 'neo-Bayesianism ') 
owes as much to individuals traditionally conceived of as opponents of the 
position, as it does to its ostensive acolytes. Bayesianism can be seen to have 
arisen from an ostensible dialectic, between inverse probabilistic and 
frequentist positions. However, I question the basis of this apparent dialectic, 
and I demonstrate that the ways in which modem Bayesianism is conceived of, 
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and practiced, reflect the way in which it has transcended the conventional 
dichotomy between the two opposing probabilistic positions. Finally I 
conclude by briefly considering how this transcendence of the inverse 
probabilistic/frequentist dichotomy may have served to bring into being a 
powerful new dynamic, one which facilitates intersubjective agreement, albeit 
one in which agreement is reinforced in a more 'objective' manner. 
4.2 'Essay Toward Solving A Problem In The Doctrine OfCbances' 1 
Today, Bayes Theorem is generally accepted as taking the following form: 
Posterior Probability (Probability of a Hypothesis Given Evidence) 
= Prior Probability (Probability of Hypothesis) x Probability of Evidence Given Hypothesis 
Or, in mathematical terms 
P (H[E) = P(H) x P(E[H) 
The name 'Bayes Theorem' can trace its origins back to a paper published in 
1764, entitled 'An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of 
Chances' which was published in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London, posthumously attributed to the Reverend Thomas Bayes. 
In this paper, the specific 'problem' is given as thus: 
'Given the number of times in which an unknown event has happened and failed: Required the 
chance that the probability of its happening in a single trial lies somewhere between any two 
degrees of probability that can be named." (Bayes 1764, p.4). 
1 Questions have been raised concerning whether Bayes himself actually wrote the article. Stigler 
(I 999) cites a passage in a volume entitled Observations of Man, in which the author, David Hartley, 
talks of an 'ingenious Friend (sic)' who has worked on the same problem that Bayes had addressed 
some fifteen years earlier. Stigler has argued that, whilst there is no evidence to suggest that Thomas 
Bayes was acquainted with Hartley, the latter was a friend of Thomas Saunderson, the fourth Lucasian 
Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge University. Stigler thus puts forward the possibility that it may 
have actually been Saunderson who was responsible for the article. It has even been suggested that a 
widely-published portrait of the Reverend Bayes is not actually that of himself. 
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The article describes a scenario in which a ball, W, is rolled across a flat and 
square table, in such a way that the final resting place is represented by the 
horizontal co-ordinate 8. A second ball, 0, is repeatedly rolled across the 
table n times. A 'success' is recorded whenever 0 comes to rest to the left of 
W. The main proposition that Bayes proves in this case is that, if one assumes 
a uniform distribution for the prior distribution of the probability of success 
(p), then it is possible to obtain an expression that the true probability, 8, lies 
between two values a and b, given the number of observed successes x . What 
is being investigated therefore, is a probability distribution, where a and b 
denote bounds of a probability distribution between which 8 may lie (Stigler 
1982, p.251 ). In mathematical terms the aim is to find the following: 
P(a<8<bJX=x), where X is a binomially distributed variable, and x the 
observed instances of it (e.g. in the above example, whenever a success is 
recorded with 0). 
At the time of publication, the probability distribution ofthis unobservable 
'true' probability, on the basis of the observable outcomes oftrials P(8ix), was 
known as the inverse probability, in contrast to direct probability, which 
concerned the probability of directly observable events (the latter denoted 
mathematically as P(xi 8). Inverse probability generally involved the 
estimation of an unobservable parameter from observed data, and was 
commonly associated with fields such as astronomy or biology, where the 
direct, non-mediated access to objects of interest was impossible. Inverse 
probability was also often perceived as implying, at least with its critics, an 
interest in causality. A controversial issue with regard to inverse probability 
centred around the concern with prior probability distributions. In the billiard 
table example, a uniform distribution is assumed, recognising the fact that on 
an even table, there is an equal chance of the ball coming to rest at a particular 
position than any other. In other circumstances however, where less is known 
about the nature of a particular scenario, the setting of a uniform prior 
distribution, (or, for that matter, any other kind of prior probability 
distribution), can be seen to amount to an ontological claim about the world. 
This was viewed by many as reflecting an unsustainable metaphysical aspect, 
73 
inappropriate for supposedly rational philosophising, and formed partial 
motivation for a series of criticisms, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. 
These acted as a partial catalyst for the development of the frequentist 
interpretation of probability. In what follows I provide a briefhistory of these 
responses and their impact upon probabilistic thinking. 
4.3 Critiques of Inverse Probability 
Although inverse probability became the subject of a considerable degree of 
interest from mathematicians from the late eighteenth century onwards, and 
throughout the nineteenth century, Thomas Bayes was a rather marginalised 
figure during this period. Instead, figures such as Pierre-Simon de Laplace, 
more often associated with 'classical' probability,came to be attributed in 
pushing forward inverse probabilistic theory, in works such as his Memoire 
sur la Probabilite des Causes par les Evenements, published in 1774. Like 
Bayes, Lap lace argues that any prior probability distribution for an unknown 
parameter must be uniform. However, Laplace also makes clear that any 
posterior probability distribution (the perceived distribution in the light of new 
information) must be proportional to a factor which is now taken to be the 
'likelihood' of the data. Despite this innovation, Laplace maintained a 
principle of 'indifference' which prevented one from specifying a prior 
distribution. Furthermore, although the concept of 'inverse probability' is 
commonly attributed to Laplace, he does not appear to refer to it directly as 
such (Fienberg 2003). It also seems apparent that Laplace produced his work 
independently of any knowledge of the Bayes article (Stigler 1999). 
The .eighteenth century probabilists were not generally inclined to draw a 
sharp distinction between states of mind and states of the world (Daston 1994, 
p.333). Furthermore, the dichotomy of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' was 
seen at the time as an archaic idiom, confined to largely obscure works on 
metaphysics and logic, and of little relevance to mathematical probability 
2 Laplace defined 'probability' as follows: 'The probability of an event is the ratio of the number of 
cases favorable to it, to the number of all cases possible when nothing leads us to expect that any one of 
these cases should occur more than any other, which renders them, for us, equally possible.' (Lap lace 
1820) 
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(Daston 1994, p.333). Hence the sense of probability as a personal measure of 
belief intermingled relatively comfortably with the idea of probabilities being 
derived from observed frequencies (Hacking 1975). However, from the mid-
nineteenth century onwards, a number of mathematicians and philosophers 
sought to critically respond to the work of figures such as Lap lace, who came 
to be seen as promoting a dangerously erroneous form ofjudgementalism. 
For example, certain French positivist authors, including Auguste Comte and 
Destutt de Tracy, denounced the application of inverse probability to areas 
such as judicial decision-making and scientific inquiry (Porter 1986, p.84). In 
Comte's case, this reflected his fundamentalist beliefs about the place and role 
of mathematics viz. society (Porter 1986, p.155). He believed that 
mathematics had no place in social science, his own positivist philosophy 
dictating that the sciences were irreducible, and hence that each science 
required its own distinctive method: 'As for any application of number and of 
a mathematical law to sociological problems, if such a method is inadmissible 
in biology, it must be yet more decisively so here ... ' (Comte 1855 [ 1974], 
p.492) 
Comte went even further in denouncing the whole project of mathematical 
probability, or, as he referred to it, a' fanciful mathematical theory of chances' 
(Comte 1855 [1974], p.492). He saw the work of figures such as Laplace as 
counter-productive to the development of truly rational mathematical 
approaches: 
'It is impossible to conceive of a more irrational conception than that which takes for 
its basis or for its operative method a supposed mathematical theory, in which, signs 
being taken for ideas, we subject numerical probability to calculation, which amounts 
to the same thing as offering own ignorance as the natural measure of the degree of 
probability of our various opinions. While true mathematical theories have made 
great progress, for a century past, this absurd doctrine has undergone no 
improvement, except in some matters of abstract calculation which it has given rise 
to. It still abides in the midst of its circle of original errors, while mankind are 
learning, more and more, that the strongest proof of the reality of speculation in any 
science whatever is the fruitfulness ofthe conceptions belonging to it.' (Comte 1855 
[1974], p.493). 
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Comte saw the work of figures like Laplace, with their emphasis on subjective 
beliefs, as hopelessly solipsistic and metaphysical, and acted as a barrier to the 
need to investigate phenomena at close hand, and in detail, before making any 
conjectures about them:. 
'It is with a feeling of shame ... that I should have to announce at this time of day that 
we must study simpler phenomena before proceeding to the more complex; and that 
we should acquaint ourselves with the agent of any phenomenon, and with the 
medium or circumstances, before we proceed to analyze it.' (Comte 1855 [1974], 
p.493). 
This kind of classical probability then, was seen as a barrier to the 
development of truly rational methods, like Comte's positivist philosophy that 
would supposedly liberate mankind from metaphysical folly. However, 
despite his vehement opposition to probability, Comte was cited as a key 
influence by the Belgian Adolph Quetelet, who developed a social theory 
which revolved around the conception ofthe 'average man', formed from the 
collation of statistical details from collections of individuals (Porter 1986, 
p.l56).3 Thus much ofthe adverse response to the Laplacean model of 
probability may have been stimulated by attempts by certain mathematicians 
to apply statistics to the study of social problems. What may be seen in their 
responses is a desire to move away from abstract mathematical discussions 
and towards a more practical, and readily applicable version of probability. 
The French economist and mathematician Antoine A. Coumot did not view 
subjective probability as invalid per se, but denied the existence of it 
possessing any meaningful use. Maintaining a distinction between objective 
and subjective probabilities, Coumot claimed the supremacy of the former, 
which gave the 'measure of the actual possibility of things', whilst subjective 
probabilities related 'partly to our knowledge and partly to our ignorance' 
(quoted in Porter 1986, p.84). Subjective probabilities were inherently 
fallacious in that they varied 'from one intelligence to another, according to 
their capacities and the data with which they are provided' (quoted in Daston 
3 And who would perform statistical research linking crime to a range of social factors. 
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1994, p.336). However, Cournot did not wish to see the practice of statistics 
brought down to a too prosaic level, and thought that rigorously developed 
theory would allow observers to transcend mere 'compilations of facts and 
figures' (Daston 1994, p.336). Furthermore, there appeared a desire amongst 
others to define and clarify a number of related terms in their bid to develop a 
more usable science. For example, the mathematician Denis Poisson appears 
to have been instrumental in clarifying the distinction between the 'chance', 
say, of obtaining a head or a tail from a coin toss, and the 'probability' of 
one's beliefs about obtaining a certain result (Daston 1994). 
Thus whilst the intentions of these critics may have varied, they all promoted 
in their critiques an alternative conception of probability that emphasised the 
observation of sequences of real events over any epistemic notion of 
probability. Porter (1986) and Daston (1994) have both drawn attention to the 
possibility that these authors promulgated a revitalised distinction between 
objectivity and subjectivity, and that they shared a conception of 'objective 
probability' which can be seen to represent the origins of the frequentist 
position (Porter 1986, Daston 1994). Ofthe British authors ofthe time, the 
polymath Robert Leslie Ellis pursued the critique of the existing probabilistic 
order in a particularly enthusiastic manner. Having initiated a public debate 
involving, amongst others, the astronomer John Herschel (Porter 1986, p. 79), 
Ell is concluded that the form of probability as practiced by Lap lace and others 
amounted to nothing more than a 'sensational philosophy', and in response, 
proposed that probability statements be only made about series of events 
rather than measures of belief, the first time that any such argument had been 
made (Porter 1986, p.80). Ellis argued for an empiricist form of probability, 
one in which 'probability must be associated with observation, not ignorance, 
of phenomena and allied with notions of order and statistical regularity, not 
chance'. (quoted in Porter 1986, p.80). 
The interpretation of probability put forward by Ell is, which emphasises the 
observation of repeatable instances ofthe same phenomenon, and the 
measurement and analysis of their frequencies, is now referred to as 
frequentism. Although this term would not be coined for some time to come, 
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the roots of frequentism can be detected in a number of critiques of inverse 
probability put forward by other thinkers throughout the nineteenth century, 
who viewed the latter as involving questionable assumptions. 
For example, the mathematician George Boo le viewed the conversion of direct 
to inverse probability as involving two arbitrary parameters, first the a priori 
probability that a fixed cause exists, and to the probability that this unspecified 
cause would suffice to produce the observed effect (Porter 1986, p.80 
verbatim). Boole came to subscribe to an empiricist approach to probability, 
stating that 'logic and probability set before us, what, in the two domains of 
demonstrative and of probable knowledge, are the essential standards oftruth 
and correctness - standards not derived from without, but deeply founded in 
the constitution of the human faculties' (quoted in Porter 1986, p.81). 
However, he combined this with a certain realist construal of the regularity of 
nature: 
'the rules which we employ ... in the other statistical applications of the 
theory of probabilities, are altogether independent of the mental 
phenomena of expectation. They are founded upon the assumption that 
the future will bear a resemblance to the past, that under the same 
circumstances the same event will tend to recur with a definite numerical 
frequency ... ' (quoted in Porter 1986, p.81). 
Boole concluded that one could determine probabilities given strong or perfect 
knowledge of a particular situation, but even this knowledge needed to be 
based on repeated instances of success or failure. 
Whilst others promulgated an early form offrequentism in their responses to 
Laplacean probability, a certain heterogeneity can still be detected in their 
attitudes. Like Ellis, John Stuart Mill began as another vehement critic of the 
probability of causes, although he refined his view somewhat following the 
intervention of John Herschel (Daston 1994, p.337). However, with regard to 
Mill's conception ofprobability, Daston (1994) argues that Mill's view of 
'scientific' probability was not the same as those ofPoisson or Coumot. 
Whereas the views of the latter were of an ontological bent, emphasising states 
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of the world not necessarily experienced by human observers, Mill, it is 
argued, based his notion of probability on personal knowledge: 
'We must remember that the probability of an event is not a quality of the 
event itself, but a mere name for the degree of ground which we, or some 
one else, have for expecting it'. (quoted in Daston 1994, p.337). 
The German Jacob Friedrich Fries, a Kantian, was responsible for introducing 
frequentism to his native country (Porter 1986, p.85). Taking a distinctly 
nomological bent, Fries criticised the inverse probabilists for ignoring the 
faculties necessary for rational judgement. He saw the object of probability as 
the rescue of general laws of nature from the obfuscation of contingency. If 
this were achieved, it would render the arbitrary assumptions of inverse 
probability erroneous and redundant (Porter 1986, p.85). John Venn 
developed a particularly rigorous treatment of frequentism, arguing that 
quantitative belief could not be justified with respect to individual 
nonrepeatable events, but, like Fries, argued that true probability rested on a 
postulate of ultimate statistical regularity (Porter 1986, p.85). 
Thus this period saw the genesis of approaches which can be seen to form the 
foundations of the frequentist position. However, it would be some time 
before frequentism would become accepted as a viable and applicable 
scientific approach. This occurred in the early part of the twentieth century, 
driven by the work ofRonald Aylmer (R.A.) Fisher in response to the 
statistical hegemony of the day, which at the time was represented by the work 
ofKarl Pearson at University College London. 
4.4 Karl Pearson and R.A. Fisher 
Although Karl Pearson is primarily associated with a number of other 
statistical innovations, such as the chi-squared test, linear regression, and the 
classification of probability distributions, Pearson· also subscribed to, and 
promoted, a form of inverse probability. However, although Pearson 
emphasised the role of experience in determining a priori personal 
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probabilities, Harold Jeffreys (later to play an important role in the renaissance 
of inverse probability) claimed that a strong frequentist thread ran through 
Pearson's work: 
'the anomalous feature of his work is that although he always 
maintained the principle of inverse probability ... he seldom used it in 
actual applications, and usually presented his results in a form that 
appears to identify a probability with a frequency.' (Jeffreys 1939, 
p.383, quoted in Fienberg 2003, p.7). 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Karl Pearson was a venerated figure 
within the field of statistics, and came to found the first ever academic 
statistics department, at University College London. However, in papers 
published in 1912 and 1915, Pearsons' work came under the first series of 
attacks from R.A. Fisher, then still an undergraduate at Cambridge (Fisher 
1912, 1915; Howie 2002). In his critique ofPearson's chi-squared test, Fisher 
proposed an alternative method, suggesting an 'absolute criterion' based on 
what may now be conceived of as frequentist principles- 'a direct and 
invariant procedure for maximising a function proportional to the chance of a 
given set of observations occurring' (Fisher 1915). However, Pearson's 
response was to accuse Fisher of mis-applying inverse probability, and of 
falling prey to the Principle of Insufficient Reason (the idea that, in the 
absence of any useful information, equal probabilities must be assigned to all 
possible hypotheses). Following his academic feud with Pearson, Fisher 
rejected an offer of a position in the latter's statistical Laboratory at UCL and 
instead took up a position at a small agricultural research facility at 
Rothamstead, Hertfordshire. Here he developed and refined certain statistical 
techniques, most notably confidence intervals and significance testing. 
Fisher devoted a great deal of his career attempting to overcome what he saw 
as the inherently arbitrary nature of inverse probability, taking his cue from 
the proto-frequentist critics of the 191h century (Zabell 1989). Fisher 
attempted to make his first break with inverse probability via his formulation 
of the maximum likelihood estimate of a parameter, which he delineated from 
80 
the concept of maximum posterior probability (where probability distributions 
are adapted to reflect new information). However, rather like his forebears 
Fisher appears to have had a rather idiosyncratic idea of what 'inverse 
probability' actually meant. Edwards (1997) claims that Fisher employs two 
contradictory meanings of the term in his 1912 paper (Edwards 1997). Fisher 
does state in this paper that an estimated probability, p, of an observed random 
variable corresponds to the function of an underlying causal parameter e, in 
line with a generalised definition of inverse probability at the time. However, 
he also states: 
'P is a relative probability only, suitable to compare point with point, but 
incapable of being interpreted as a probability distribution, or giving any 
estimate of absolute probability.' (Fisher 1912, Edwards 1997,) 
Here Fisher appears to be insinuating that the measure of p, obtained from 
direct observation, is but an estimate based on the observers individual 
experience, and that this experience alone is insufficient to enable any 
underlying causal parameter (if one can be construed to exist) to be calculated. 
Furthermore, according to Fisher, inverse probability is incapable of reflecting 
any continuous probability distribution from which the true value of e may be 
drawn, given the lack of information concerning the causal parameter. 
Fisher's rejection of the possibility of the inverse probabilistic method to 
reflect continuous probability distributions reflects his failure to accept the 
setting of uniform prior probabilities. He opposed this assumption as many 
before him had, as he saw it as dangerously arbitrary and unable to be verified 
on a strictly empirical basis. 
Somewhat ironically however, Fisher had been accused by Pearson and his 
colleagues of employing such an assumption in his early work. In their 
response to Fisher's criticisms of their work on chi-squared, Pearson and his 
colleagues interpreted Fisher's use of the phrase 'most likely value' as the 
value obtained from maximising a posterior probability distribution from an 
assumed uniform prior (Soper et al 1917). Although they did not mention the 
term outright, Fisher accused them of assuming that he himself had been 
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influenced by Bayes Theorem (Fisher 1921). Part ofFisher's work had 
focused on the correlation coefficient, the means of determining the strength 
of the relationship between two random variables. He had shown how the 
'most likely' value of the correlation of a sample was slightly smaller than 
that of the population from which they were derived. As he states in Fisher 
(1921): 
'This conclusion was adversely criticised in Biometrika, apparently on the incorrect 
assumption that I had deduced it from Bayes theorem. (Fisher 1921, p.207). 
Fisher vehemently denied this assumption, and rejected the concept of inverse 
probability outright: 
'As a matter of fact, as I pointed out in 1912 (Fisher 1912) the optimum is obtained 
by a criterion which is absolutely independent of any assumption respecting the a 
priori probability of any particular value. It is therefore the correct value to use 
when we wish for the best value for the given data, unbiased by any a priori 
presuppositions.' (Fisher 1921, quoted in Edwards 1997, p.180). 
In his later work Fisher's approach to inverse probability appears to have 
changed slightly, to a form which appears to be closer to the Bayesian 
reasoning used today. In his 1922 paper 'On the Mathematical Foundations of 
Theoretical Statistics', Fisher states the principle of inverse probability as 
resting on: 
''If the same observed result A might be the consequence of one or the 
other of two hypothetical conditions X and Y, it is assumed that the 
probabilities of X and Y are in the same ratio as the probabilities of A 
occurring on the two assumptions 'X is true', 'Y is true'. (Fisher 1922, 
quoted in Aldrich 1997, p.164). 
Fisher still had his reservations about the tenability of inverse probability 
which centred on the assumption of a uniform prior distribution. His 
objections reflected his frequentist beliefs: 
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'Inverse probability amounts to assuming that. .. it is known that our 
universe had been selected at random from an inflnite population in 
which X was true in one half, Y in the other.' (quoted in Aldrich 1997 
p.l69) 
The formula above also reflects another of Fishers intentions. In the two 
papers published in 1921 and 1922, Fisher sought to strike out against inverse 
probability and formalised the concept of 'likelihood'. Fisher still felt that 
inverse probability made too many presumptions on the basis of the data that 
it used: 
'if the population of interest is itself drawn from a known super-
population, we can deduce using perfectly direct methods the 
probability of a given population and hence of the sample. But if 
we do not know the function specifying the super-population, we 
are hardly justified in simply taking it to be constant.' (quoted in 
Howie 2002, p.61). 
Fisher regarded the shortage of empirical warrant as a major shortcoming of 
inverse probability, and argued that Bayes himself had considered this a 
problem. Furthermore, he saw the 1763 article as a resolutely frequentist 
document, a logical relationship between direct frequencies in populations. 
He accused the inverse probabilists of the day of mis-interpreting the paper: 
'Bayes attempted to fmd, by observing a sample, the actual probability 
that the population value lay in a given range. In the present instance the 
complete solution of this problem would be to fmd the probability 
integral of the distribution of [an underlying parameter] e. Such a 
problem is indeterminate without knowing the statistical mechanism 
under which different values of e come into existence; it cannot be solved 
from the data supplied by a sample, or any number of samples, of the 
population. What we can find from a sample is the likelihood of any 
particular value of e, if we defme the likelihood as a quantity proportional 
to the probability that, from a population having the particular value, a 
sample having the observed value of 0, should be obtained. (Fisher 1921, 
p.24) 
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Here, Fisher argues that Bayes emphasised the fact that a series of 
observations were being made, which constituted a sample in a larger, and 
possibly infinite, set of observations. In order to determine 0, a probability 
distribution curve would need to be plotted, the function of which would 
represent another function, that of the 'statistical mechanism' which would 
have to be known to the observer. In the absence of this knowledge, the value 
of 0 derived from observations could only be regarded as a likely estimate. 
The 'likelihood' would be the measure derivable from the probability of 
observing a particular value of 0 given that this is the true value. Fisher 
essentially argues therefore, that Bayes had not after all appealed to inverse 
probabilistic assumptions, but emphasised observation instead, rendering him 
an empiricist and a pro to-frequentist. 
Fisher continued to define likelihood as a notion distinct to the concept of 
probability. In his 1925 publication, Statistical Methods for Research 
Workers, a volume that came to be used widely by a variety of scientific 
researchers, Fisher writes: 
'The deduction of inferences respecting samples, from assumptions 
respecting the populations from which they are drawn, shows us the 
position in statistics of the theory of probability ... this is not to say that we 
cannot draw, from knowledge of a sample, inferences respecting the 
population from which the sample was drawn, but that the mathematical 
concept of probability is inadequate to express our mental confidence or 
diffidence in making such inferences and that the mathematical quantity 
[likelihood] which appears to be appropriate for measuring our order of 
preference among different possible populations does not in fact obey the 
laws of probability' (Fisher [1925]1932, pp.9-ll, quoted in Aldrich 2003, 
pp.80-81). 
Rather than a measure of probability per se, likelihood is therefore viewed as 
an entirely separate calculational measure. 
In outlining his conception of likelihood, he used the phrase 'Bayesian' in a 
pejorative fashion to define any approach different to his own, and rejected 
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the ability of any such approach to deliver probability distributions for 
unknown parameters (Fienberg 2003). The use by Fisher of the term 
'Bayesian', albeit in such a belittling way was somewhat striking in that, until 
then, Bayes' name had remained largely at the margins of statistics and 
probability, eclipsed by the supposedly more prestigious figures like Lap lace 
and Pearson. More intriguingly however, Fisher's concept oflikelihood bears 
striking parallels with the likelihood function central to modern interpretations 
ofBayesianism ('Neo-Bayesianism'): the probability of observed data given a 
particular choice of parameter (or hypothesis). This despite Fisher's 
overriding philosophy of probability being normally viewed as frequentist, a 
position now normally strongly contrasting with Bayesianism. Fisher defined 
probability in terms of frequencies of theoretically infinite populations, and 
argued that many inferences concerning parameters, such as linkage values in 
genetic problems, were simply inexpressible in terms of probabilities, given 
the way in which inverse probabilities were used at the time (Howie 2002). 
To summarise this section, I have sought to describe how the intervention of 
R.A. Fisher, via his work and also with his debates with Karl Pearson, laid 
many of the foundations for what is now regarded as frequentist probability. 
Particularly in the early part of his career, Fisher was opposed to inverse 
probability and sought to develop statistical methods which overcame its 
apparent shortcomings. Most notable amongst these is the formulation of his 
concept of likelihood. What can also be seen through the discussions between 
the Fisher and Pearson however, is the inconsistency of the use of terms such 
as 'inverse probability' and 'Bayesianism'. Much ofthe criticism from 
Pearson about Fisher's work is based on the latter supposedly mis-interpreting 
what inverse probability was meant to represent; and even continuing to rely 
on inverse probabilistic assumptions in his work. On the other hand, other 
figures, such as Harold Jeffreys, accused Pearson himself of essentially using 
frequentism in his own work. As I have described however, in his derivation 
of likelihood, Fisher actually claims the original work ofThomas Bayes to be 
frequentist in orientation, and misunderstood by avowed inverse probabilists. 
Yet this did not stop Fisher from using the term 'Bayesian' as a pejorative 
term on a par with inverse probability. This is possibly all the more ironic 
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given the manner in which the work of figures such as Fisher, and 
subsequently Jerzy Newman and Egon Pearson (Karl's son), represented 
attempts to semantically fix terms such as 'significance', 'confidence' and 
'likelihood' itself. 
The work of Fisher and his colleagues proved to be enormously influential, 
and was instrumental in delivering frequentism to a position ofpre-eminence. 
By the 1930s, inverse probability, despite being the subject of so much 
interest in the previous century, had fallen considerably out of favour. 
Fisher's own earlier work can be seen to have contributed to this decline. 
Statistical Methods for Research Workers, which espoused his earlier 
frequentist views, had sold widely in the US and UK. Furthermore, Karl 
Pearson's son Egon, and his collaborator Jerzy Neyman, had developed their 
own frequentist approach. Thus by 1930 frequentism had become the 
dominant paradigm in statistics, with both Fisherian and Neyman-Pearsonian 
ideas being used in a wide variety of scientific fields, albeit in an often 
erroneous chimeric form (Gigerenzer et al 1989). 
The methods of Fisher, Neyman and Egon Pearson were embraced as suitably 
powerful and original by researchers, but more importantly the semantic fixity 
of such terms as 'confidence', 'significance' and 'likelihood' in the hands of 
these figures must have also lent considerable authority to their ideas. Indeed, 
the fixing ofterms such as these could be seen to be one of the main 
contributions of statistics and probability during the early twentieth century. 
However, this was generally a tendency of frequentist thought, and the work 
ofBayes during this period appears to have been subject to a fair degree of 
interpretation. What may also help explain the lack of movement in 
probability theory circles was the strong and widely accepted distinction that 
had arisen between 'statistics' and 'probability'. By now the former term had 
come to be referred to the treatment of large quantities of data, whereas the 
latter was taken as an epistemic concept associated with inference (Howie 
2002, pp.186-187). Given the fact that 'statistical' concerns were by now 
closely tied to practical applications, (and hence proving exceedingly useful), 
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it is perhaps unsurprising that there was little theoretical activity to reconcile 
the two elements of the dichotomy. 
4.5 The Revival of Inverse Probability and the Rise of Neo-Bayesianism 
Through the work of figures such as Harold Jeffreys however, inverse 
probability would come to be revived. His volume Theory of Probability, 
published in 1939, outlined a theory of inductive inference based on the 
principle of inverse probability and using Bayes theorem (Aldrich 2003). 
Whilst Jeffreys largely respected Fisher's views and his standing in the field 
(Howie 2002), he sought to provide a more systematic form of inference in 
contrast the relatively ad hoc style employed by Fisher. It is, however, 
interesting to focus upon how each conceived of likelihood. Aldrich (2003) 
distinguishes J effreys' idea of likelihood from Fisher's by pointing out that 
the former derived likelihood from a family of conditional distributions where 
the conditioning variable is a parameter, whilst the latter involves a family of 
unconditional distributions merely indexed by a parameter (Aldrich 2003). 
Hence, in the case of Jeffrey's likelihood, the parameter is viewed as 
causative, whilst in Fisher's case, it is merely correlative. Fisher also claims 
that likelihood is 'appropriate for measuring our order of preference among 
different possible populations', whilst it seems Jeffreys would have argued 
that posterior probability to be the most appropriate measure (Aldrich 2003). 
It would take some time before J effreys' work was used by others seeking to 
develop inverse probabilistic methods further. However, the onset of the 
Second World War provided an impetus for further research, and Jeffreys 
ideas did influence the work of the celebrated computer scientist Alan Turing 
(Fienberg 2003)4 . This in turn impacted upon the work ofDenis Lindley and 
I.J. Good, who would later make significant contributions to the growth of 
what has been coined the neo-Bayesian movement (Fienberg 2003). However, 
neo-Bayesianism is regarded as gaining further impetus via the instrumental 
4 The development of computers during this time appears to have been instrumental in facilitating the 
increased study ofneo-Bayesian methods (Interviewee 2). 
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interventions of Leonard J. Savage at the University of Chicago, and, Howard 
Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer at Harvard Business School. 
What is notable about the work of Savage, and of Raiffa and Schlaifer, is that, 
despite their status as the progenitors of neo-Bayesianism, little recourse is 
actually made to the original Bayes article in their key works. L.J. Savage's 
influential 1954 volume The Foundations of Statistics, often cited as a key 
neo-Bayesian text, makes only one reference to the term 'Bayesian' in the 
entire text, and does not appear to avowedly subscribe to any form of 
Bayesian philosophy (Fienberg 2003). Furthermore, in the preface to the 
1971 second edition ofhis volume, Savage admits to his ignorance ofthe 
likelihood principle during the writing of the original volume. Perhaps rather 
controversially, Savage cites Neyman and Pearson as leading the way towards 
Neo-Bayesianism: ' ... personalistic statistics appears as a natural late 
development of the Neyman-Pearson ideas', and claims that the likelihood 
principle, 'a corollary ofBayes theorem', is a consequence of the analysis of 
admissibi lity5 as carried out by the frequentists (Savage 1972, p.iv). 
Savage's retrospective acknowledgement of the distinctly non-Bayesian 
approach of Neyman and Egon Pearson is somewhat at odds with the 
approach taken by Howard Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer, who were researching 
the problems faced by businessmen making decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty. They had attempted to apply frequentist concepts to personal 
decision-making, but apparently found difficulties in translating these ideas. 
Commenting on Schlaiffer (who had no mathematical background), Raiffa 
made the point that his colleague saw the work of the frequentists as 
incommensurate with their intentions: 
"he read Fisher, Neyman and Pearson ... and he concluded that 
standard statistical pedagogy did not address the main problem of a 
businessman - how to make decisions under uncertainty. Not 
knowing anything about the subjective/objective philosophical 
5 Admissibility: a particular decision function (ie a function chosen in an attempt to optimise a random 
variable x), which produces an expected loss less than or equal to any other value. 
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divide, he threw away the books and invented Bayesian decision 
theory from scratch.' (quoted in Fienberg 2003, p.l7). 
Here it seems that, whilst Fisherian and Neyman-Pearsonian methods served 
the purposes of certain types of scientific inquiry, Raiffa' s remark about 
Schlaiffer appears to indicate the limitations of frequentism outside of 
scientific contexts, (e.g. laboratory situations where experiments can be 
controlled etc.) There appears to be recognition of the fact that frequentist 
methods were limited in the guidance they could provide in other areas of 
decision-making. Or, frequentism was found to be worthwhile for scientific 
reporting, but not necessarily for inference in conditions of uncertainty. 
However, as Raiffa's remark about Schlaifer 'inventing Bayesian decision 
theory from scratch' indicates, the rejection offrequentism did not come about 
from a certain logical inevitability of the superiority of the Bayesian method. 
In fact, the ad hoc nature of Schlaifer's approach indicates a certain disregard 
for any kind of frequentist/inverse probability dichotomy. Instead, their 
approach represents a combination of the two. Schlaifer, along with Raiffa, 
who had been trained in classical statistics, derived Bayesian definitions for 
previously frequentist concepts such as sufficiency, and, more crucially, 
adopted Fisher's definition of likelihood (Fienberg 2003).6 There is also an 
explicit acceptance of the ability of frequentist and Bayesian methods to co-
exist: 
'the so-called 'Bayesian' principles underlying the methods of analysis presented in 
this book are in no sense in conflict with the principles underlying the traditional 
decision theory ofNeyman and Pearson' (Raiffa and Schlaifer, quoted in Aldrich 
2002, p.86). 
Thus despite the comments by Raiffa about his colleague above, it appears to 
be the case, that, like Savage, they eventually recognised the contribution of 
frequentism during the later stages of their work. 
6 Fienberg (2003) actually claims that Raiffa and Schlaifer adopted a version of likelihood used by both 
Fisher and Jeffreys. However, this of course runs counter to Aldrich's claim of a distinction between 
the two, which I accept. 
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The leading Anglo-American statistician I.J. Good was the first to explicitly 
use the term 'neo-Bayesianism', defining it as such: 
'By a neo-Bayesian or a neo-Bayes/Laplace philosophy we mean 
one that makes use of inverse probabilities, with or without utilities, 
but without necessarily using Bayes' postulate of equiprobable or 
uniform initial distributions, and without explicit emphasis on the 
use of probability judgements in the form of inequalities.' (quoted 
in Fienberg 2003, p.18). 
What is notable here is the rejection of the postulate of uniform prior 
distributions, which seems to have been a firm tenet of the original 1763 
article. This is a key move which helps define the neo-Bayesian approach, 
enabling neo-Bayesians to widen the scope of their analysis to personalised, 
subjective degrees of confidence, and to allow the justification for determining 
prior probability distributions via a range of methods. 
The fact that Good makes explicit reference to 'Bayesianism' is significant 
nonetheless, as is the Fisherian tendency to use 'Bayesian' only sparingly, and 
then normally as a generally derisive term, had endured until the 1950s/60s 
(Fienberg 2003, p.18). Even in Good's comment it is clear that, despite the 
use of 'Bayes' in their new philosophy, there is a considerable move to 
distance the new approach from the concepts outlined in the 1763 article. The 
rejection of the uniform prior assumption appears as an acknowledgement of 
the criticisms ranged against Bayes and Lap lace from the litany of critics, 
from the likes of Cournot et al in the nineteenth century to Fisher in the early 
twentieth. 
The permeation ofNeo-Bayesianism into the wider scientific milieu appears to 
have been stimulated by a number of developments. In addition to the 
wartime efforts of their UK counterparts, US statisticians had made important 
contributions to weapons development, including the atomic bomb 
(Interviewee 2 2007). Another notable development also came about via a 
military application. In 1966, aB-52 bomber carrying four hydrogen bombs 
collided mid-air with a refuelling aircraft above the Mediterranean Sea, nearby 
the coast of Spain. Three of the devices were recovered on land near the 
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Spanish village ofPalomares. The fourth however was declared missing, and 
a search team, led by Dr John Craven, was charged with recovering the device. 
In the course of this search they devised a system in which the area of 
investigation was divided into a grid. This effectively acted as a probability 
distribution, and the team went about searching for the device in an order 
where the highest probability were searched first. As each area was searched, 
the probabilities in each grid area were revised using Bayes Theorem. If an 
area did not show signs of containing the device, the probability that this area 
contained the bomb were lowered at the expense of other areas. As well as 
providing a means of guiding the search party around the search site, it also 
enabled the team to estimate the length of time they would need to search, 
which also helped with the planning of the mission. The success of this 
method led to Bayesian search theory being used on other occasions, most 
notably for the recovery of the submarine USS Scorpion, which went missing 
in 1968, and has the method has since been incorporated into search and 
rescue planning software by the US Coast Guard (de Groat 2004). 
The approach found even more widespread application, with statisticians 
working for NBC in the USA developing a series of sophisticated Bayesian 
methods to enable the results of elections to be called (Fienberg 2003). Since 
then, Bayesian inference has also played an instrumental role in the field of 
Artificial Intelligence, and is now commonly used as the algorithmic basis of 
intemet search engines such as Google (Economist 2006). The apparent 
success of Bayesian inference in this context has stimulated a great deal of 
academic interest over the issue of whether the human mind can be likened to 
operate in a Bayesian way, with some studies arguing for a positive correlation 
(Griffiths and Tenenbaum 2006; Xu and Tenenbaum 2007; Gopnik et al 
2007). Bayesian Theory has also enjoyed a heightened level of popularity in a 
number of academic disciplines, most notably economics, but also 
archaeology (Scales and Snieder 1997), medicine (Lucas 2001), veterinary 
science (Clough et al 2003). Some Bayesians have even gone as far as stating 
that Bayesian inference goes far beyond the uses of conventional statistical 
methods, enabling reasoners to determine the relationship between correlation 
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and causation, such as that between smoking and lung cancer (Economist 
2000). 
4.6 Conclusion 
This brief historical survey has sought to describe the development of 
Bayesian approaches to probability, beginning with the publishing of the 
Reverend Thomas Bayes' original article on the subject in 1793. What this 
account demonstrates is an enduring degree of uncertainty concerning the aims 
and intentions ofBayes. Some histories of probability align Bayes' work with 
the inverse probability movement which was in existence at approximately 
time, and most notably associated with Lap lace. It was the latter who bore the 
brunt of much criticism from empiricist critics in the nineteenth century, who 
themselves lay the seeds for the development of frequentist methods by R.A. 
Fisher and others. Bayes' work was largely marginalised until it received 
mention by Fisher, who alternated between using his name as a synonym for 
inverse probability and claiming it as a frequentist innovation. Hence it can be 
seen that a fair degree of uncertainty exists regarding what the work of Bayes 
was meant to truly represent. What is more clear however, is that Fisher's 
conception of likelihood, and other frequentist assumptions, were incorporated 
into the work of'Neo-Bayesians'. This new usage ofBayes therefore, appears 
to encompass insights from both the frequentist and inverse probabilist 
traditions. 
The origins of Bayes are therefore shrouded in a considerable amount of 
interpretive and semantic ambiguity. The modern interpretation of Bayes 
owes a considerable amount to the work of figures who are either associated 
with a frequentist, or at least proto-frequentist position. In modern statistical 
and forensic scientific discourse the term 'frequentism' is however used to 
describe a mode of probability entirely separate, and often opposed to, the 
modern Bayesian approach. 
It is this approach which has aroused a great deal of recent interest in forensic 
scientific circles, namely for the apparent potential it apparently holds for the 
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interpretation and evaluation of forensic evidence. Bayesianism is seen in 
some respects at least as a suitably more 'scientific' method, in contrast to the 
reliance on experience and intuition, which is viewed by supporters of 
Bayesianism as a flawed and inappropriate means of performing forensic 
scientific investigation. Furthermore, in forensic scientific circles, Bayes is 
seen as a superior form of probability to frequentism, most notably for the 
apparent ability to function as a holistic means of assessing various pieces of 
evidence relevant to an investigation, in contrast to the apparent limitations of 
frequentism, which can only address individual evidential problems. Yet as 
this chapter has demonstrated, modem Bayesianism itself rests on foundations 
which themselves demonstrate signs of subjectivity and ambiguity. 
In this way, modem forms ofBayes represent a combination ofboth 
'objective' and 'subjective' ideas concerning probability. The rejection of the 
uniform prior probability assumption opened the way for the possibility of 
using Bayes Theorem in a way that allowed prior assumptions to be based on 
various forms of data, including datasets of observed variables. 
The combination of what are sometimes taken to be incommensurable 
approaches - inverse probabilism and frequentism - has notable implications. 
In the form ofneo-Bayesianism, the two have been combined to form an 
extremely powerful model of 'rational' decision-making, based on the 
combination of two deterministic modes of thought pertaining to each position. 
Neo-Bayesianism borrows from frequentism the obsession with patterns and 
sequences, and, from inverse probabilism, it borrows the emphasis on 
ascertaining underlying causal factors influencing observed events. A model 
of a 'rational decisionmaker' is created, albeit one that has to contend with an 
ontology in which an underlying 'cause' that can be ascertained from a world 
in which nature is seen to adhere to ordered patterns of sequences. It is a 
model which serves to combine versions ofboth the 'objective' and the 
'subjective'. A dynamic of 'objective subjectivity' is constructed, whereby 
cohorts of decisionmakers come to agree on their beliefs, supposedly free of 
personal bias, and instead come to accept their way of reaching a decision as 
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being 'objective'. This may be seen to act, therefore, as a powerful social 
instrument for facilitating and reinforcing intersubjective agreement. 
In the next chapter I chart the history of Bayes Theorem in relation to its 
application to the study of legal evidence, and show how it has come to be a 
highly influential part of modem evidence studies. 
94 
CHAPTER FIVE - THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
EVIDENCE SCHOLARSHIP 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I provided a historical account of the uses of, and attitudes 
toward, Bayes Theorem in a variety of contexts. In this chapter I supplement this with 
an overview of the development of other related efforts to provide systematic methods 
for the interpretation of evidence - in relation for courtroom trial procedures in 
particular and forensic science in general. Modem approaches differ from earlier ones 
in that they involve the use ofprobabilistic methods, most notably the version of 
Bayes Theorem described in the previous chapter. However, an examination of their 
historical trajectory demonstrates how each attempt has contributed to the evolution of 
a field of study which has been referred to by terms such as 'evidence scholarship' or 
'evidence studies'. Insights from this field have exerted a major influence on thinking 
within forensic scientific circles regarding evidence interpretation and evaluation. In 
what follows, I map the development of this area by drawing upon examples of work 
which have sought to address issues of evidence interpretation in a more systematic 
manner. Examples, drawn from a number of different disciplines, including law, 
philosophy, statistics and forensic science, will show how the study of evidence has 
evolved to encompass Bayesian forms of reasoning. 
I begin by describing the work of the legal scholar John Henry Wigmore, who, in the 
early part of the twentieth century, outlined what is generally regarded as the first 
holistic and systematic framework for the interpretation of evidence in the course of 
criminal trials. Whilst now regarded as highly influential by scholars working in the 
field of evidence interpretation, Wigmore's work was largely marginalised for a 
considerable part of the twentieth century. In the 1950s and 1960s however, the 
possible use of statistics and probability aroused both interest and controversy within 
the academic study of law in the USA, and I describe the debates which arose within 
the academic literature at the time. I also compare the reception of probability in other 
fields with that found in forensic scientific circles. I show how the work of the 
Americans Paul Kirk and Charles Kingston proved to be influential in introducing a 
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greater consideration ofprobabilistic concepts in forensic science. This was also 
facilitated in the UK by figures such as Ian Evett, who, working in conjunction with 
the Bayesian Denis Lindley, helped to introduce Bayes into some of the working 
practices of the UK Forensic Science Service (FSS). I discuss both of these 
developments, and then show how Bayesianism in UK forensic science has evolved 
further. I show how this process of evolution has not only been influenced by the 
work of figures such as Kirk, Kingston, Evett and Lindley, but also by the revival of 
interest in the work ofWigmore himself. This rediscovery has contributed to what has 
been referred to as 'The New Evidence Scholarship' (Lempert 1986), which in turn 
has also helped facilitate the emergence of new technologies from bodies such as the 
FSS. 
5.2 Beginnings: John Henry Wigmore 
In June 1913, John Henry Wigmore published 'The Problem of Proof, an article in 
which he set out a programme for studying legal evidence presented in court 
(Wigmore 1913). Wigmore viewed his programme as focusing on two distinct areas: 
the issue of proof in the general sense, 'the part concerned with the ratiocinative 
process of contentious persuasion' (Wigmore 1913, p.77), and the other that of 
admissibility, 'the procedural rules devised by law, and based on litigious experience 
and tradition, to guard the tribunal (particularly the jury), against erroneous 
persuasion' (Wigmore 1913, p. 77). In his opinion, studies of law had exclusively 
focused on the latter, in a manner that he felt to be detrimental to the progress of law. 
For Wigmore, notions of proof 'in the general sense' would remain invariant as the 
foundation for law, in contrast to admissibility, which he saw as 'merely a preliminary 
aid to the main activity' of proof, namely 'the persuasion of the tribunal's mind to a 
correct conclusion by safe materials.' (Wigmore 1913, p. 78). 
Wigmore also saw the principles of proof as an invariant, objective set of postulates 
which concerted scientific inquiry would help to reveal in the course of time. In his 
writings he anticipates that: 
'The judicial rules of Admissibility are destined to lessen in relative importance during the 
next generation or later. Proof will assume the important place, and we must therefore prepare 
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ourselves for this shifting of emphasis.' (Wigmore 1913, p.78). 
Here, Wigmore appears to predict a move away from a concern with tradition in legal 
procedure, to one more in thrall to the influence of rational, and more avowedly 
'scientific' principles. However, he also argued that legal professionals required 
suitably timely instruction in a 'science of proof, otherwise he feared a repeat of the 
experience of Continental Europe ofthe 1800s, where one system had been abandoned 
without a clear definition of a suitable replacement: 
'For centuries, lawyers and judges had evidenced and proved by the artificial numerical 
system'; they had no training in any other,- no understanding of the living process of belief; in 
consequence, when 'legal proof was abolished by fiat and the so-called 'free proof -namely, 
no system at all, was substituted, they were unready, and judicial trials have been carried on 
for a century past by uncornprehended, unguided, and therefore unsafe mental processes.' 
(Wigmore 1913, p.78). 
Whilst the previous numerical system may be seen by modern standards to be lacking 
in rationality, Wigmore's point is that it was replaced by a subsequent system which 
contained no equivalent system for guiding the process of proof. Although Wigmore 
saw the nature of legal procedure as open to reform, he saw more work needed before 
it could be considered as a suitably rational method ofproving. 
In approaching the issue of proof, Wigmore stated his aims as: 
'To perform the logical (or psychological) process of a conscious juxtaposition of detailed 
ideas, for the purpose of producing rationally a single final idea. Hence, to the extent that the 
mind is unable to juxtapose consciously a larger number of ideas, each coherent group of 
detailed constituent ideas must be reduced in consciousness to a single idea; until the mind can 
consciously juxtapose them with due attention to each, so as to produce its single final idea.' 
(Wigmore 1913, p.80). 
Wigmore was concerned that the large number of pieces of evidence, testimony, 
arguments etc that make up most criminal cases meant that the average finder of fact 
1The numerical system to which Wigmore refers to above involved the method of weighing evidence 
based either on the number of witnesses who testified in a particular fashion, or by representing witness 
testimony by other numerical means, such as allocating fractions to testimony depending on the nature 
of the issues which were the subject of such testimony. 
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could struggle to comprehend all the elements relevant to it: 'Many data, perhaps 
multifarious, are thrust upon us as tending to produce belief or disbelief (Wigmore 
1913, p.79). Furthermore, he saw the need to avoid adducing disproportionate weight 
to individual pieces of evidence by privileging them over other evidence: 
'our object is (in part) to avoid being misled ... through attending only to some fragments of the 
mass of data. We must assume that a conclusion reached upon such a fragment only will be 
more or less untrustworthy.' (Wigmore 1913, p.79). 
Wigmore emphasised what he saw as the inherent fallibility of human belief, distinctly 
separate from 'external reality, or actual fact' (Wigmore 1913, p.79). Belief about an 
apparent fact, being a purely mental phenomenon, is dependent on 'how fully the data 
for the fact have entered into the formation of our belief (Wigmore 1913, p. 79). 
However, a key issue for Wigmore with regard to the apprehension of facts is 
temporality; one can only apprehend multiple facts one after another: 
'But those data have entered into the formation of our belief at successive times; hence a 
danger of omission or of interior attention. "Knowledge in the highest perfection would 
consist in the simultaneous possession of facts. To comprehend a science perfectly, we should 
have every fact present with every other fact. We are logically weak and imperfect in respect 
ofthe fact that we are obliged to think of one thing after another"2. And in the court room or 
office the multitude of evidential facts are originally apprehended one after another. Hence, 
the final problem is to coordinate them. Logic ignores time; but the mind is more or less 
conditioned by it.' (Wigmore 1913, pp.79-80, original emphasis). 
Hence one of the main problems that Wigmore perceived with regard to the process of 
proving concerned the formulation of an appropriate method of depicting the 
numerous pieces of evidence relevant to a case. Allowing the apprehenders of fact to 
view the evidence in such a holistic way would facilitate a more logical approach to 
the consideration of evidence, and overcome the privileging of certain pieces of 
evidence due to the conditioning effect of temporal succession. Wigmore saw the 
latter as exacerbated in the context of judicial procedure: 'So many interruptions and 
distractions occur, both to the lawyer in the preparation to the jurors in the trial, that 
2 Wigmore does not cite his source for this quotation in his article. 
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facts cannot be properly co-ordinated on their first apprehension' (Wigmore 1913, 
p.80). 
However, there were a number of issues with regard to evidence that Wigmore had to 
take into account. For example, he was conscious of the possible uncertainties 
concerning the reliability of certain forms of testimony. Hence he sought to devise a 
system which enabled each piece of evidence relevant to a case to remain prominent, 
but which simultaneously allowed a comprehensive overview of all the facts 
pertaining to the case. For any such systemic representation of evidence, Wigmore 
specified a number of conditions: 
it must contain a logical typology of evidential forms 
it must be possible to use this typology to depict and arrange all the evidential data in a 
given case 
it must be able to depict the relation of an evidential datum to each and all of the 
others 
it must be able to show the distinction between a 'fact' as alleged and a fact as 
believed/disbelieved 
it must present the evidence in a simultaneous manner 
it must be generally be usable by practitioners of law 
the scheme should not attempt to show what one's beliefs ought to be; 'it can hope to 
show only what our belief actually is, and how we have actually reached it' (Wigmore 
1913, p.82). 
This final point is of particular interest, as a subsequent discussion by Wigmore 
demonstrates that in some ways he is ahead of his time with regard to his approach to 
evidence. Wigmore is quick to point out that any such scheme cannot tell one what 
should be believed: 
'We know only that our mind, reflecting upon five evidential data [A,B,C,D,E], does come to 
the conclusion X, or Not-X, as the case may be. All that the scheme can do for us is to make 
plain the entirety and details of our actual mental process. It cannot reveal laws which should 
be consciously obeyed in that process.' (Wigmore 1913, p.82, emphasis added). 
Perhaps more notably still, Wigmore is keen to argue over the existence ofthe limits 
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to current logic in terms of the kind of conclusions, and hence general laws, that can 
be induced from evidence. In doing so he also distinguishes his aims from other 
contemporary scientific approaches to evidence: 
'Much indeed has been done that is theoretically presentable in judicial trials. Much indeed 
has been done that is theoretically applicable to circumstantial evidence; e.g. the method of 
differences, in inductive logic, may enable us, with the help of a chemist, to say whether a 
stain was produced by a specific liquid. But these methods must be pursued by a comparison 
of observed or experimental instances, newly obtained for the very case in hand, and usually 
numerous, hence they are impracticable for the vast mass of judicial data.' (Wigmore 1913, 
pp.82-83). 
What Wigmore appears to be arguing here is that each criminal case is unique, and, 
given this fact. The rules of scientific induction, which he sees as central to scientific 
analysis, are inapplicable. Because each criminal case is unique, at least to a certain 
extent, it is impossible to make any comparisons across cases. Hence any system used 
to study the means of proof by evidence, has to be able to reflect the nuances of each 
case. 
Wigmore argued that the logical and psychological developments of the time had not 
yet extended sufficiently in scope to consider the net effect of a mass of mixed data 
bearing on a single fact, i.e. problems concerning how the possibility of contradictory 
evidence affected the comprehension of a particular fact to be proved. Wigmore's 
stance toward developments in scientific disciplines, and over their potential to inform 
a science of proof, was therefore somewhat unclear3. What Wigmore sought was 
significantly different of the aims and objectives informed by the logic and psychology 
of his day. Although those disciplines made some contribution to the study of legal 
proof, Wigmore viewed them as betraying a certain lack of practical application with 
regard to the concerted study of judicial evidence considered as a whole. Furthermore, 
Wigmore accepted that even a consciously 'scientific' approach could not provide 
definitive answers with regard to questions of guilt or innocence. The kind of system 
he proposed was not intended to enable one to calculate such answers, or to attempt to 
3 Wigmore did not advocate methods such as the conscious use of psychological methods to help assess 
the reliability of witnesses for example. However, in this case his objections appear to be based to a 
great extent on pragmatic grounds, namely that complex psychological testing to determine the degree 
of reliability of a set of witnesses would unnecessarily delay the progress of a trial (Wigmore 1913). 
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uncover general laws regarding evidence and criminality, but to guide the reasoning 
processes of the finders of fact and enable sources of error or bias to be weeded out: 
'Perhaps we cannot explain why we reach that result, but we know at least that we do reach it. 
And thus step by step we set down the separate units of actual belief, - connecting, subsuming, 
and generalising, until the subfinal grouping is reached; then dwelling in consciousness on 
that; until at least a belief (or disbelief) on the final fact evolves into our consciousness.' 
(Wigmore 1913, p.83). 
What Wigmore appeared to have in mind was not the production of a 'science' of 
evidence as such, but to merely the consideration of the development of technologies 
which might help judicial reasoners to overcome the cognitive problems associated 
with cases, such as bias, oversight or the unbalanced privileging of certain pieces of 
evidence against others. He also sought to highlight the types of interdependencies 
between pieces of evidence which could be identified, such as the ability of one form 
of evidence to influence the perceived level of accuracy or reliability of another piece 
of evidence. 
Wigmore's method involves the use of a graphical system to depict supposedly how 
advocates reason through a case. In doing so Wigmore aimed to provide a suitably 
holistic and descriptive representation of how the reasoning processes in a case may 
proceed. The Wigmore method also enables one to map the reasoning processes of 
evidence interpretation from both a prosecution and a defence viewpoint. 
An example of Wigmore's chart system is provided in Figure S.l. Evidence is first 
classified into a number of different forms: testimonial, circumstantial, explanatory 
(used either to explain circumstantial evidence in a prosecution context, or to discredit 
circumstantial evidence, when used in accordance with a defence position), and 
corroborative, which involves different usages depending on whether it is being used 
in conjunction with circumstantial or testimonial evidence. Corroborative evidence 
for the former could involve the divulgence of extra information which could restrict 
the number of possible explanations surrounding circumstantial evidence. For 
example, in the case of the discovery of a knife possibly implicating a defendant in a 
murder case, the evidence that no third party was seen near the knife might add weight 
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to prosecution circumstantial evidence concerning a defendant's guilt. In a similar 
prosecutorial vein, corroborative evidence for testimonial evidence might seek to add 
further trustworthiness to testimonial evidence, for example by emphasising the 
supposed neutrality of any eyewitnesses etc). Corresponding defence evidence might, 
for example, advance evidence which could question the trustworthiness of the 
testimonial evidence. 
Figure 5.1 displays many of the features typical of a Wigrnore chart. The case under 
consideration concerns the murder of a farmhand in Massachusetts, which was brought 
to court in 1901. The accused, who was subsequently found guilty, worked alongside 
the deceased on the same farm. The headless body of the victim had been found 
hidden in a sack in an unused well four to five hundred feet away from the horse barn 
of one Keith, the landowner. The prosecution alleged that the defendant killed the 
victim in the barn, using some kind of tool located in the building. 
Circle 60 indicates a proposition relating to circumstantial evidence. The dot inside 
the circle indicates that this is believed by the prosecution to be true. In this instance 
the proposition is that clothing found on the remains of the body had mud from the 
barn. The adjoining square 61 indicates testimony from a witness which claimed a 
match with mud from the barn. Arrowhead 62 indicates testimonial evidence from the 
defendant that this mud hadn't been identified. 
Figure 5.2 depicts the symbols used in Wigmore' s method. Different sets of symbols 
are used for different forms of evidence, depending on whether the evidence is 
testimonial, circumstantial, explanatory or corroborative in nature, and whether it is 
being used in an affirmatory or negatory manner. The positioning of symbols in 
relation to each other bears upon their affirrnatory relationship, with a single straight 
line being placed between two evidential facts to indicate the supposed relationship 
with each other. Any supposed fact seemingly acting to prove the existence of another 
fact is placed below the latter. A supposed explanatory or corroborative fact, which 
may strengthen or lessen the evidential force of another, is placed, respectively, to the 
left or right of that fact. The relevant symbol for a fact observed by the court is placed 
under the relevant fact. 
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Wigmore also proposed a system for indicating the possible probative force of 
evidence, using various types of labelled arrows. Affirmatory evidence is depicted by 
adding a single arrowhead. Supposed negatory evidence is represented by a single 
arrowhead plus the addition of a small circle (see Figure 5.2). Multiple arrowheads 
may be used to show where particularly strong credit may be accrued to certain pieces 
of evidence. For pieces of evidence which elicit a strong degree of belief, solid dots 
may be added to broadly represent the degree ofbeliefin the alleged fact. Where 
there may be reason to doubt evidence, a question mark may be added to the relevant 
symbol, or to an arrow to indicate doubts over the probative force. Measures of 
disbelief in an evidential fact are represented by hollow circles. 
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Figure 5.1. An Example of a Wigmore Chart (reproduced from Wigmore 1913, 
p.93) 
Plate A 
ISSUE: DID U. KILl, J.! 
"" ·~ 
"' 
Evidence Chart for COMMONWEALTH 11. UMIL!AN 
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Figure 5.2a. Reproduction from Wigmore (1913) showing key for symbols used 
in chart system (Reproduced from Wigmore 1913, p.84) 
3. EXPLANATION OF APPARATUS FOR CHARTING AND LISTING 
THE DETAILS OF A MAss OF EVIDENCE. The apparatus consists of a 
Chart for symbols and a List for their translation. The types of 
evidence and logical processes have already been set forth in former 
chapters. 
1. Symbols for Kinds of Evidence. Each human assertion, 
offered to be credited, is conceived of as a testimonial fact; each 
fact of any other sort is a circumstantial fact. 0 Tes~monial evidence affirmatory (M testifies that de-
fendant had the knife). n Testimonial evidence negatory (M testifies that defend-
0 ant did not have the knife). Circumstantial evidence affirmatory (knife was picked n up near where defendant was; hence, defendant had it). 
Circumstantial evidence negatory (knife was found in EJ deceased's hand; hence, defendant did not have it). 
Fl 
u 
A 
00 
> 
<] 
Same four kinds of evidence, when offered by the de-
fendant in a case. (These are the same four kinds of evi-
dence; it is merely convenient to note which party offers 
them). 
Any fact judicially admitted, or noticed as a matter of 
general knowledge or inference, without evidence intro-
duced. 
Any fact presented to the tribunal's own senses, i. 1!. 
a coat shown, or a witness' assertion made in court on the 
stand. Everything actually evidenced must end in this, ex-
cept when judicially noticed or judicially admitted. 
Expla11atory evide11ce; i. e. for circumstantial evidence, 
explaining away its effect (knife might have been dropped 
by a third person; for testimonial eviden~;e, discredit-
ing its trustworthiness (Witness was too excited to see 
who picked up the knife). 
Corroborative evidence; i. e. for circumstantial evi-
dence, strengthening the inference, closing up other possible 
explanations (No third person was near the parties when 
the knife was found); for testimonial evidence, supporting 
it by closing up possibilities of testimonial error (Witness 
} 
stood close by, was not excited, was disinterested spectator). 
Same two kinds of evidenc~ when offered by the de-
fendaut in a case. 
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Figure 5.2b Reproduction from Wigmore (1913) showing key for symbols used in 
chart system (Reproduced from Wigmore 1913, p.SS) 
2. Relatio11 of brdividzioJl Pieces of Evidence, shown by posi-
tion of Symbols. 
A supposed fact tending to prove the existence of an-
other fact i' placed below it. 
A supposed explanatory or corroborative fact, tending 
to lessen or to strengthen the force of fact thus proved, is 
placed to left or right of it, respectively. · 
A single straight line (continued at a right angle, if 
necessary) indicates the supposed relation of one fact to 
another. 
The symbol for a fact observed by the tribunal or ju-
dicially admitted or noticed (~, oo) is placed directly below 
the fact so learned. 
3. Probative Effect of an Evidential Fact. . 
When a fact is offere~ or conceived as evidencing, explaining, 
or corroborating, it is noted by the appropriate symbol with a con-
necting line. But thus far it is merely offered. We do not yet 
know whether we believe it to be a fact, nor what probative force 
we are willing to give it, if a fact. As soon as our mind has come 
to the necessary conclusion on the subiect. we symbolize as fol-
lows: 
( 1) Provisiot~al credit given to affimatory evi-
dence, testimonial or circumstantial, is shown by add-
ing an arrow~ead. . 
Provisional credit given td negatory evidence, 
testimonial or circumstantial, is shown by adding an 
arrow-head above a small cipher. 
Particularly stro1rg credit given to those kinds of 
evidence respectively is shown by doubling the arrow-
head; this is usually applicable where several testi-
monies or circumstances concur-upon the same fact. 
(2) A small interrogation mark, placed along-
side the connecting line, signifies doubt as to the pro-
bative effect of the evidence. 
Similarly, for each kind of symbol, a small inter-
rogation mark within it signifies a mental balance, an 
uncertainty ; the alleged fact may or- may not be a 
fact. 
(3) A dot within the symbol of any kind of al-
leged fact signifies that we now believe it to be a fact. 
Particularly strong belief may be signified by two dots; 
thtL!I 8· 
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Figure 5.2c Reproduction from Wigmore (1913) showing key for symbols used in 
chart system (Reproduced from Wigmore 1913, p.86) 
66 
J 
A small cipher within the symbol of any kind of 
alleged fact signifies that we now disbelieve it to be a 
fact. Particularly strong disbelief may be signified by 
two such ciphers; thus (§). 
( 4) If a single supposed explanatory fact does, 
in our estimation after weighing it, detract from the 
force of the desired inference (in case of a witness, if 
it discredits his assertion), we signify this by an ar-
row-head pointing to the left, placed half way across 
the horizontal connecting line. 
If a single corroborative fact is given effect in 
our estimation, we signify this by a short Roman let-
ter X, placed across the connecting line. 
Doubling the mark indicates particular strength 
in the effect, i. e. --(f- ,.or ~-
Ultimately, when determining the total effect, in 
our estimation of all explanatory and corroborativ~ 
facts upon the net probative value of the specific fact 
explained or corroborated, we place a short horizontal 
mark or small X, respectively, upon the upright con-
necting line of the latter fact. 
Thus, for 1zet probat·ive value, several grades of probative ef-
fect may be symbolized: t signifies that the inference is a weak 
one; T signifies that it has no force at all; * signifies that it is a 
strong one; * signifies that it is conclusive. When the supposed 
inference is a ?tegatory one, the same symbols are used, with the 
add;tion of the negatory symbol, ;_ e. 6 cw;tness asserts that de-
fendant had not a knife in his hand; witness's credit is supported by 
the fact that he is a friend of the deceased). 
4. Numbering the Symbols. 
Each symbol receives a number, placed at the upper left out-
side margin. These numbers are then placed in the Evidence List; 
they are written down consecutively, and opposite each one in the 
list is written a brief note of the evidential fact represented by it. 
The List is thus the translation of the Chart. 
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With regard to ancillary evidence, the presence of an arrowhead pointing left on a link 
between explanatory evidence and testimony represents a degree of detraction in the 
apparent force of the evidence (e.g. it may represent evidence that might discredit the 
assertions of a witness). A single corroborative fact is signified by placing an 'X' 
across the line. As before, in both these cases double symbols may be used to indicate 
a particularly significant degree of strength. In instances where they may be numerous 
instances of explanatory and/or corroborative facts bearing upon a particular piece of 
evidence, a single 'X' or horizontal line, is respectively placed on the connecting line 
of the latter fact. A piece of evidence may thus be seen to have net probative value, 
which is symbolised by either the presence of a single horizontal line to indicate weak 
probative force, whilst a double line is used to indicate no net probative force. An 'X' 
is used to indicate strong net probative force, whilst a double 'X' indicates conclusive 
force. For negatory probative force, the same symbols are used, with the addition of a 
circle to indicate negation. 
Wigrnore's chart method was unique. It represented one of the first, and certainly the 
most enduring attempt to address the issue of the rationality of courtroom testimony. 
What made his method particularly innovative was the emphasis on addressing the 
problem of courtroom proof in a holistic way. The chart method not only emphasises 
the fact that a multiplicity of pieces of evidence and testimony may be involved in a 
trial, but also that interdependencies may exist between them, in terms of how they 
influence each other's perceived worth. Hence another important feature of the chart 
method is the means by which it allows a reasoner to estimate the possible inferential 
strength of evidence. Wigmore's work is also notable in the use of a visual system 
through which evidence is depicted, allowing the reasoner an overview of the inter-
relationships apparent in a case. 
Despite this, Wigmore's work had little impact in either academic or practitioner 
contexts at the time of its initial publication. The precise reasons for this are largely a 
matter of conjecture; however they may be largely related to practical concerns. The 
construction of Wigrnore charts, particularly via the technology available at the time, 
would have been a highly time-consuming and labour-intensive affair. A more serious 
defect however, is the fact that Wigrnore charts only allow one to interpret evidence 
after the case. This in itself would have limited the chart method to be considered 
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largely as a pedagogic aid only, and as a means of demonstrating to students the 
possible sources of irrationality present in a case. The chart method, in the manner 
that Wigmore describes, does not possess any predictive power, which might have 
accorded it more usefulness, and was mainly confined to use as a teaching aid in his 
lectures to students at Northwestern University. 
5.3 Statistics in the Courtroom 
The subject of evidence continued to be addressed by American legal scholars 
nonetheless, notably by figures such as Charles Tilford McCormick and John 
MacArthur Maguire, who both wrote influential textbooks (Maguire 194 7, 
McCormick 1955). Discussions on matters of evidence also continued in the 
American academic literature, such as the issue of re-defining key evidential 
expressions such as 'reasonable doubt', 'clear and convincing evidence' and 
'preponderance of evidence', in terms that could convey the degrees of belief 
(McBaine 1944). Later articles addressed the issue ofthe extent to which the study of 
evidence could be modelled on the methods of science. Criticisms were made about 
the lack of scientific import into evidential matters, for example Cleary (1952) 
advocated greater consideration of the insights of psychology in enabling an improved 
understanding of the perception and behaviour of witnesses brought to give evidence 
in court (Cleary 1952). The call for external influences to help aid the problem of 
evidence also included considerations of the potential of probability theory and 
statistics. For example, Ball (1961) advocated a 'change in attitude toward judicial 
truth, a change which channels intuition into the realisation of what can be 
accomplished with the aid ofmodern statistical tools' (Ball 1961, p.830). 
Discussions concerning the use of statistics in the American courtroom continued 
throughout the 1960s in the wake of one particularly controversial instance. The case 
People vs. Col/ins involved the trial of an inter-racial couple for a robbery in 
California of an elderly woman. The victim claimed that her assailant had been a 
young Caucasian woman with blond hair tied in a ponytail, who escaped in a yellow 
car driven by an African-American man who wore a beard and moustache. The 
prosecution case rested on the argument that the chances of selecting any couple 
possessing these characteristics would be one in twelve million, a figure that was 
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obtained by the use of the product rule. The California Supreme Court ruled against 
this prosecution argument, viewing the use of probability theory in such a manner as 
·erroneous. Aside from the issue concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony, 
objections were made concerning the application of the product rule in such a way. 
The assumptions of independence for each characteristic were seen as patently false; 
for example, the probability of a man possessing a beard and a moustache was not 
seen as encompassing two strictly independent features. 
Around the same time, a parallel discourse was emerging in forensic science. In 1963, 
Paul Kirk, a leading figure in the US forensic science community, published a short 
article, 'the ontogeny of criminalistics', which effectively marked an attempt to define 
the scientific essence of forensic science: 
'The real aim of all forensic science is to establish individuality, or to approach it as closely as 
the present state of the science allows. Criminalistics is the science of individualism.' (Kirk 
1963, p.236, original emphasis). 
Kirk's statement came at a time when there was also an increased interest in the 
possibility ofthe use of statistical methods in forensic science. In 1964, a special 
session on statistics was held at a meeting of the American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences, which reflected the apparently 'growing awareness of the usefulness of 
statistical methods' (Kingston 1965a, p. 79). Charles Kingston, a student and 
collaborator of Kirk, published two articles concerning 'Applications ofProbability 
Theory to Criminalistics' ( 1965a, 1965b ), which discussed and put forward a number 
ofprobabilistic models for the assessment ofPartial Transfer Evidence (PTE), 
including an explicitly Bayesian model. Kingston ( 1966) also addressed the issue of 
statistical dependence, which had been ignored by the court in People vs. Collins 
· (Kingston 1966). 
A further notable intervention in this context came via Kaplan (1968) who sought to 
apply the insights of decision-making theory which had been developed in the field of 
business studies. As described in the previous chapter, the challenge of business 
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty was approached via the application of 
a form of Bayesian reasoning. In advancing a Bayesian model, Kaplan sought to 
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address the 'incredibly unsophisticated' use of statistics in court, as represented by 
People vs. Collins. In the article Kaplan draws a distinction between 'objective' and 
'probabilistic' theories of probability, equating respectively to frequentist and 
subjective modes, in which probability in the latter corresponds to measures of 
personal belief (Kaplan 1968, p.1 066-1 067)4• Kaplan viewed objective probability as 
'not very helpful for application to the complex factual decisions that are the grist of 
our legal system', given that trials were singular events: 
'Given a typical contested trial, for instance, it is meaningless to speak of the probability of the 
defendant's guilt in terms of the number of times he would be guilty in an infmite number of 
exactly similar cases because, first, there are not even two exactly similar cases, and, second, 
even if there were many identical cases the court must reach a verdict, not a ratio, in the case at 
the bar.' (Kaplan 1968, p.1066). 
The trial scenario is instead viewed as more amenable to a personalistic mode of 
probability which informs decision theory. In its most elementary form, the 
decisionmaker, faced with a range of options, anticipates the consequence of each 
option by estimating the probabilities of outcomes relating to each option. The 
expected value of each option is determined by multiplying the probability of each 
outcome by the value accorded by each outcome. For example, in a simple gambling 
game where there is a 1 in 2 chance of receiving£ 1000 (say on calling the outcome of 
a coin toss), the expected value would be £500. In a game where there is a 1 in 3 
chance ofwinning £1000 (where one has to guess the location of a ball hidden under 
one of three upturned cups), the expected value would be £333.33. The concept of 
expected value however is not able to explain decisionmaking alone, for it does not 
account for the differences in how individuals may personally perceive and value 
rewards, which may vary due to individual circumstance. This is explained by 
expected utility, which shows how decisions may be reached on options that have less 
expected value. For example, a decision to insure a property may have lower expected 
4 
'For many years most mathematicians and statisticians defined the probability of an event's occurring 
in a given trial as the proportion of times an event would occur as the number of exactly similar trials 
approached infinity. We shaH call this 'objective' probability' .Professor Savage, in a smaJI number of 
postulates, described the personalis tic theory of probability. This theory postulates that it is meaningful 
to ask of someone "If I gave you a reward for guessing correctly, would you choose to guess that A is 
true of that B is true?" If the subject chooses A, then we may say for him A is more probable than B. If 
he is indifferent to whether he chooses one or the other, we may say that as far as he is concerned they 
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value than a decision not to insure (i.e. it will cost an individual to pay a premium for 
an event with relatively low probability, such as fire, burglary etc), but the possible 
consequences of not insuring, if such a disastrous event were to occur, are normally 
considered as too damaging for this option to be taken (Kaplan 1968, p.l 069). 
Although expected utility is considered a largely personal measure, in a business 
context it nevertheless usually equates to financial loss or gain. In a criminal trial 
scenario, expected utility is less easy to tangibly define and may vary according to a 
number of factors. For example, expected utilities may vary according to different 
forms of miscarriages of justice; the decision to convict an innocent suspect may be 
considered more harmful than the acquittal of a guilty one, hence the use of the 
'reasonable doubt' standard in the prosecution of criminal trials. The disutility of a 
miscarriage may also vary according to the individual, with a wrongful guilty verdict 
more damaging in the case of someone considered of good moral character or high 
social standing. It may vary depending on the link between the nature of the crime 
and the mandatory punishments. The correct decision in a capital murder case may 
carry greater utility than in a case involving a minor transgression which carries a far 
less severe sentence. Furthermore, expected utility may vary according to the nature 
of the crime and other circumstances. For example, it may be considered less serious 
to society to acquit an embezzler who may not be placed in a position of trust in the 
future, than a sex offender who may repeatedly continue to transgress (Kaplan 1968, 
pp.1073-1 074). 
Under this schema the possible variance of expected utility may condition the personal 
assessments of jurors considering the probability of guilt or innocence. At the 
beginning of a trial, a juror could be asked to guess a personally selected probability of 
guilt or innocence of the defendant. This prior probability could be an entirely 
subjective guess, but as the trial progresses, the measure of probability of guilt or 
innocence may vary as pieces of evidence are sequentially put forward. The 
probability estimate following the presentation of all the evidence may well have 
changed to a posterior probability of a different value. Such a process is redolent of 
Bayes Theorem, and the latter is put forward by Kaplan as a suitable means of 
are equally probable. Professor Savage also demonstrated that this personalistic probability can easily 
be expressed in terms of quantitative probabilities.' (Kaplan 1968, pp.1 066-1 067). 
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continually formulating updated posterior probabilities of guilt or innocence, and thus 
allowing beliefs to be updated in the light of new information. The hypothetical 
question of what might be considered a suitable starting prior probability is kept open, 
with Kaplan offering possible alternatives such as 1 in 2 (equivalent to an even 
balance between guilt or innocence), or 1 in 200 million for an American trial 
(corresponding to the population of the USA). 
Kaplan's article is best regarded as an exploration of the possibilities of using 
Bayesian decision theory in a trial context, rather than advancing it as a suggested 
solution to the challenges of judicial factfinding. In conclusion Kaplan admits that the 
judicial process is ultimately better suited to the human brain, rather than the. 
technology available at the time of writing, arguing that the deconstruction of all 
potential variables relevant to a case into probabilities and sub-probabilities would 
create an impossibly vast computational task. This leads Kaplan, in his conclusion, to 
rumi~ate about the possible differences between human reasoning and digital 
computation: 
'Even though a judgement about a compound probability such as guilt must rationally be based 
on conclusions about a vast number of subprobabilities, the human mind, at least consciously, 
does not work that way. Perhaps a more accurate ultimate probability would be reached by 
asking a factfinder for its judgement about all subprobabilities, but no one has yet 
demonstrated that this is true. It may well be that, because of processes not yet understood, the 
human brain behaves more like an analogue than a digital computer, or that for some other 
reason the brain automatically corrects for misjudgements about some probabilities, either by 
making compensating errors in others or by reaching a final result by a mathematically 
incorrect means that intuitively compensates for the previous error.' (Kaplan 1968, p.1 091 ). 
The insights ofboth Kingston and Kaplan came together in an influential article by 
Finkelstein and Fairley (1970). Also responding to the criticisms over 
People vs. Col/ins, they published an article proposing an approach based on Bayesian 
probability theory (Finkelstein and Fairley 1970). The authors accepted the dangers 
inherent in the misuse of probability and statistics, and argued that it was both wrong 
and futile to attempt to attribute uniqueness to evidential data (Finkelstein and Fairley 
1970, p.496). However, in presenting a Bayesian framework, they argued instead that 
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it was possible to use probability theory to establish the significance, and probative 
force, of seemingly infrequently occurring evidence. 
Finkelstein and Fairley argue that in many cases, identificatory evidence can 
not be claimed to be unique, merely rare (Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, p.516). 
Such evidence however, may still possess significant probative value. In order 
to assess and express this probative value however, a suitable statistical 
method is required. Finkelstein and Fairley cite Bayes theorem as an 
appropriate means for translating frequencies of rare events into a probability 
assessment by combining them with prior probabilities. In their paper, they 
show how Bayes Theorem may be used by introducing the example of a 
defendant being accused of using a knife in an alleged murder, based on an 
incriminating print found on the weapon 
Their stated aim is to find P(GIH) in terms ofP(HIG) and P(HING), where G is 
the event the defendant used the knife, and H is the event that a palm print 
similar to the defendant has been found ('Probability of given event H', in 
terms of 'probability of event H given guilt of defendant' (G), and 'probability 
of event H given the defendant is not guilty (NG)'), Therefore they wish to 
find the probability that the defendant used the knife, taking into account the 
chances that the defendant, or someone else left the palm print (Finkelstein 
and Fairley 1970, p.498). This is depicted as: 
P(GIH) = P(G&H) 
P(H). 
They show how this is actually an instance of: 
P(GIH) = P(G)P(HIG) 
P(G)P(HIG) + P(NG)P(HING), 
114 
which corresponds to Bayes Theorem. According to Finkelstein and Fairley, an 
application of Bayes Theorem would 'start with the probability that the defendant used 
the knife P(G) and that our views are modified or weighted by the two probabilities 
associated with the print, P(H\G), and P(H\NG). Our final estimate of the chance 
defendant used the knife is our initial or 'prior' view as modified by the statistical 
evidence.' (Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, p.499-500) Hence they envisage the use of 
Bayes as involving the formulation of a prior probability (P(G)), which is then 
modulated by subsequent evidence. Whilst P(H\G) would be assumed to be 1, 
P(H\NG) would depend on the frequency of characteristics in a suspect population, in 
this case statistics concerning the frequency of observing a certain type of palm print 
amongst a population of individuals. With P(H\G) set at 1, the values ofP(G) and 
P(H\NG) play a crucial role in determining measures of the posterior probability of 
guilt P(G\H). The values for P(H\NG) relate to the frequency of a particular palm print 
occurring in a population, i.e. so if 50% of a population of individuals (all assumed not 
guilty) were found to deposit the same palm print on a knife, the posterior probability 
P(G\H), would be low (0.019) if the prior probability of guilt, P(G), was also low. A 
rarer frequency of a particular palm print occurring in a population will however result 
in a low value ofP(G) increasing significantly to a high posterior probability of guilt; 
note a value ofP(H\NG)=0.01, with P(G)=O.Ol results in P(G\H)=0.909. 
Table 5.1. Posterior Probability Table showing the effect of variance of the 
Frequency of Evidential Characteristics in a Population (Reproduced from 
Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, p.SOO). 
Posterior Probability P(GIH) 
Frequency of Prior Probability P(G) 
Characteristics(lf\N G) 0.01 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 
0.5 0.019 0.181 0.4 0.666 0.857 
0.25 0.038 0.307 0.571 0.8 0.923 
0.1 0.091 0.526 0.769 0.909 0.967 
0.01 0.502 0.917 0.97 0.99 0.997 
0.001 0.909 0.991 0.997 0.999 0.999< 
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The results presented in this case are theoretical and intended to show how the 
occurrence of evidence in a population may serve to act as an aid to guiding 
considerations of guilt or innocence if a Bayesian framework is used. Finkelstein and 
Fairley see the use ofBayes for identification evidence as a 'modest use which merely 
eliminates an unwarranted distinction between the force of statistical and other types 
of identification evidence' (Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, p.502). They also argue 
however, for the possibility of a 'stronger, more explicit use of the theorem', in which 
an expert witness could suggest a range of hypothetical prior probabilities, and 
specifying the posterior probability associated with each. For example, each juror 
would then choose the prior estimate that most closely reflected their subjective view 
of the evidence. The provision of precise statistical evidence would then be 
introduced to show how the resultant posterior probabilities would be generated. To 
illustrate their point, Finkelstein and Fairley cite the example of a case involving a 
lawyer accused of altering a document for his own gain. Eleven defects in the 
typewritten letters on the document were alleged to correspond with defects found on 
the defendant's machine. A professor of mathematics testified for the prosecution, and 
argued that, via application of the product rule, the joint probability of all the defects 
occurring from a random typewriter was one in four billion (Finkelstein and Fairley 
1970, p.501). This argument was thrown out on the grounds that it was not based on 
observed data, and that such an abstract theory could not supply sufficient proof. 
Finkelstein and Fairley argue that this evidence, if incorporated into a Bayesian 
framework, could have been rendered acceptable. If each juror had adopted a prior 
probability estimate, then each piece of probabilistic data pertaining to the occurrence 
of each defect could then have been advanced on an iterative basis to obtain a 
posterior probability of belief. The authors argue that such an approach enables the 
data to inter-relate to the subjective beliefs of each juror, and is therefore more faithful 
to the traditions of the jury system: 
'The jury's function is not to compare a defendant with a person selected randomly but to 
weigh the probability of defendant's guilt against the probability that anyone else was 
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responsible. Bayes' theorem translates [a statistic] into a probability statement which 
describes the probative force of that statistic.' (Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, p.502). 
Interestingly however, Finkelstein and Fairley continue by arguing that personalistic, 
or subjective probabilities, in the legal context, 'are likely to be interpreted as 
expressing a frequency, just as "the chances of heads is one-half' expresses a 
frequency' (Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, p.504). Their view differs from previous 
authors in that they accept a possible role for statistics derived in a frequentist mode in 
a judicial context. They view such statistics as merely providing supporting 
information to inform factfinders in the course of Bayesian deliberations. Yet they go 
further in this combination of Bayesian and frequentist thinking, in their discussion of 
the 'reasonable doubt' standard: 
'When we say that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we mean that the evidence 
has brought us to a state of belief such that if everyone were convicted when we had such a 
belief the decisions would rarely be wrong. The 'beyond reasonable doubt' standard thus 
groups together cases which are similar but because the degree of belief in guilt has passed a 
certain mark ... Thus, although it would it will usually be artificial to imagine a repetition of 
similar cases, one can nonetheless interpret subjective probability of guilt as the relative 
frequency of guilt over cases judged to be similar by the degree of belief they engender. The 
statement thus that 'there is a fifty per cent chance that defendant is guilty' thus means that if a 
jury convicted whenever the evidence generated a similar degree of belief in guilt, the verdicts 
in this group would tend to be right about halfthe time' (Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, p.504). 
In criticising People vs. Collins, Finkelstein and Fairley show the use of statistics to be 
primitive and flawed; they do not however, reject the use of such statistics outright. 
Instead, they argue that the formulae used to generate the probative weight of the 
evidence was erroneous. They show instead how the incorporation into a Bayesian 
formula enables such data to be considered sequentially, avoiding certain assumptions 
made in that case. However, their arguments elsewhere belie a conflation of previous 
views concerning the status of criminal trials viz quantitative methods. They 
emphasise the use of frequentist statistics where appropriate, but in the course of 
informing a Bayesian schema which they view as suitable for jurors to reach 
conclusions on the ultimate issue given appropriate guidance. Their views on criminal 
trials however, appear to indicate some belief in a certain role for considering trials in 
a frequentist manner, in contrast to other authors who saw such proceedings as too 
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individually nuanced to reflect such an outlook. Finkelstein and Fairley advance an 
approach that is both frequentist and Bayesian: it allows for frequentist data to inform 
decisionrnaking, but only if subsumed into a Bayesian form of information processing. 
Yet their emphasis on 'reasonable doubt' seems to show they accept that cases do 
exert some form of commonality in terms of final outcomes. Hence it is unclear what 
form of probability is ultimately privileged. 
Regardless of their ambiguous ontological outlook, Finkelstein and Fairley's paper 
sparked a celebrated debate with opposition led by Tribe ( 1971 ). Tribe's article 
criticised the use ofBayes in legal proceedings in a number ofways. First, the 
imperative to formulate prior odds was viewed as inviting arbitrariness. The need to 
combine probability estimates about each piece of evidence presented in the course of 
a trial was viewed as problematic in the case of 'fuzzier', less readily quantifiable 
items of evidence, and that the use ofBayes could possibly privilege quantitative data 
in the minds of jurors. Tribe also argued that the use of an explicitly mathematical 
technique could lead to the disproportionate consideration of certain questions and 
issues over others; issues pertaining to identity and occurrence would receive greater 
attention at the expense of questions of 'volition, knowledge and intent' (Tribe 1971, 
p.1366). The potentially high amount of information that might need to be considered 
in a case could lead to a need to use unwieldy mathematical constructions. More 
seriously, Tribe viewed the adoption ofBayesian principles as risking negative 
changes in reasoning behaviour, and that they threatened fundamental tenets such as 
the presumption of innocence and the concept of reasonable doubt. He argued that, in 
the process of employing probabilistic reasoning, a juror would have to give some 
weight to the fact that the accused had been chosen to stand trial, something which 
was wholly inappropriate under the presumption of innocence (Tribe 1971 ). This, he 
argued, might dangerously skew the opinion of jurors against the accused. 
Furthermore, the proposal to reach verdicts in terms of the probability of guilt or 
innocence (as well as the suggested use of expected utility theory to derive the suitable 
sentence) was seen to override the notion of reasonable doubt. Even if the ultimate 
decision was made on the basis of probabilistic reasoning, Tribe argued that the point 
at which the probability of guilt was sufficient to merit punishment such as a custodial 
sentence was essentially arbitrary, and hence inappropriate for use in court 
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5.4 The 'New Evidence Scholarship' 
The Finkelstein & Fairley debate with Tribe helped to revive interest in the study of 
evidence, which by the 1970s had been questioned as an intellectually viable field. 
Despite the interventions of the authors discussed above, a great deal of what passed 
for evidence studies at this time concerned itself largely with rules and procedure for 
reporting evidence. In his overview of the field ~uring this period, Twining (1984) 
opines thus: 
' ... a stocktaking of our heritage of specialised scholarship and theorising about evidence 
suggests the following: a clear and straightforward theory of proof integrated with a rather 
simplistic normative truth theory of adjudication. A collection of relatively sophisticated 
concepts and distinctions in respect of such matters as rationality, relevance, standards of proof 
and presumptions. A broad consensus among specialists that any deviation from a 
presumption in favour of freedom of proof requires justification; a lack of consensus about 
what constitute good justifications, with the result that there is a rich, but confusing body of 
literature on the rationales and practical utility of those particular derivations that make up the 
surviving laws of evidence' (Twining 1984, p.273). 
Twining criticised the field for the supposedly disproportionate emphasis on normative 
debate. He saw this as a result of adherence to the 'Rationalist tradition', which 
encouraged the postulation of' one law of evidence, one type of process, one kind of 
inquiry, and a single purpose and end to litigation.' (Twining 1984, p.273, original 
emphasis). This kind of argument had eclipsed empirical studies, with the result that 
little attention had been paid to a number of issues, including understanding of the 
psychological processes of proving, the actual operation and impact of the rules of 
evidence, the probative value of particular types of evidence in respect of certain types 
of hypotheses to be tested, or about how information was actually processed and used 
at different stages of litigation. Furthermore, Twining argued that this tradition of 
evidence scholarship exhibited contextual bias, in that it favoured attention to the 
progress of evidence in contested jury trials, 'rather than on what happens to 
information at every stage in a great variety of different processes and arenas' 
(Twining 1984, p.273). 
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From the late 1970s onwards however, a number of scholars began to reconsider the 
nature of evidence, and of proof itself, as a subject of fruitful study. The phrase 'New 
Evidence Scholarship' would come to be coined to describe this renewed academic 
approach to evidentiary matters, which shifted the agenda from a concern with the 
articulation of rules, to a more explicitly epistemological emphasis on the process of 
proof, which appropriated insights from fields including psychology, philosophy, and 
probability (Cohen 1977, Schafer 1976, Lempert 1986, p.439). Related studies on the 
nature of inference considered jurisprudential problems, and in doing so set the scene 
for the renaissance ofthe Wigrnore chart method, particularly via the work of Peter 
Tillers and David Schurn (Schum 1977, Tillers and Schum 1988). 
Tillers and Schum (1988) cite Wigmore's chart method as an important demonstration 
that 'research on descriptive and normative matters might proceed hand in hand' 
(Tillers and Schum 1988, p.935). In their appraisal of the chart method, they cited two 
factors which they argued lent the method powerful heuristic potential for research on 
inferential reasoning. First, Wigrnore's work was viewed as a clear indication of the 
extremely wide array of evidential factors that could form the focus of formal analysis. 
Tillers and Schum used the chart method as demonstration of the existence of 
'recurrent generic forms of inferential structures, that, when examined, reveal a wide 
array of evidential and inferential subtleties' (Tillers and Schum 1988, p.936). 
Second, the original work by Wigrnore was viewed as pointing to an ever wider 
potential research programme, namely behavioural studies concerning how reasoners 
evaluate and combine multiple pieces of evidence in forming beliefs. Wigrnore's 
work was viewed as instrumental in helping to identify meaningful variables that 
might lend themselves to study, and for also helping researchers to structure the kind 
of tasks subjects could perform in experimental conditions (Tillers and Schum 1988, 
p.936). 
A key difference concerning the re-appraisal ofWigrnore's work was the 
incorporation ofprobabilistic approaches into the framings of evidential issues. Tillers 
and Schum (1988) saw the chart method as providing a basis for exploiting new 
developments in probability theory relating to the study of evidence. In discussing 
Wigmore's work in an updated context, Tillers and Schum (1988) thus provide a 
rather telling re-description of the chart method. They redefine his charts as: 'directed 
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acyclic graphs whose vertices represent propositions and whose edges represent 
"fuzzy" probative force qualifiers' (Tillers and Sebum 1988, p.936, original 
emphasis). In doing so, they place the work in the context of inference networks, 
which at the time of writing, had began to attract a significant degree of scholarly 
interest. Tillers and Schum praise Wigmore for his precedence, achieved seemingly 
without the knowledge of many working in the newer field. 
More importantly however, Tillers and Sebum argue that the Wigmore chart method is 
a significant contribution to efforts to better understand the process of what they call ' 
discovery-related activity' (Tillers and Sebum 1988, p.944). Whilst Wigmore 
provides the means of representing an inference problem, more consideration is 
needed in order to determine how to put together that representation in the first place. 
They define Wigmore's work as a relational means of representing reasoning about 
evidence, but argue that it needs to be combined with a serial, or temporal aspect if it 
is to aid a discovery-led process. The key method of combining the two aspects is via 
the construction of case theories about a specific incident. Wigmore's method is 
therefore able to act as a set of tools for outlining possible theories which relate to a 
specific case. Whilst the Wigmore method does not in itself act as a way of generating 
new hypotheses, it may act to strongly facilitate the process by enabling one to view 
the relationships between different pieces of evidence. However, Tillers and Sebum 
argue that it is vital for the reasoner to consider new incoming evidence, but only in a 
way that may lead to new explanations and theories. For example, the introduction of 
a new piece of evidence, N*, about event N, may lead to a reasoner to formulate a new 
theory wherein N* is able to explain N. However, according to Tillers and Schum, the 
'new' theory generated on the basis of evidence N* is of little use if it only explains N. 
IfN* is to lead to a new theory which accounts for other evidence relevant to a case 
however, it may be considered significant. This new theory may then be used to 
generate evidentiary tests in order to assess its feasibility. 
5.5 Wigmore Meets Bayes 
The emphasis on the serial nature of combining evidence allotted a role for which 
Bayesianism was used in subsequent works, and prompted further research which 
sought to reconcile Wigmore charts and probability. The work ofKadane and Schum 
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(1996) who comprehensively applied the Wigmore method to the analysis ofthe 
controversial Sacco and Vanzetti case, represented a particularly notable fusion of 
Wigmore charts and Bayesianism5 In doing so, their work exhibited strong parallels 
with the development of Bayesian Networks, inference charts incorporating Bayesian 
algorithms, which had been pioneered by the work of figures such as Judea Pearl 
(Pearl 1988). These can be used to depict chains of reasoning in which the probability 
of propositions may be conditional on the outcome of other probabilistic hypotheses 
(see Figure 5.3). Each of these hypotheses may be represented as a node, linked in 
relation to their perceived interdependencies by a series of arcs. Using Bayes 
Theorem it is then possible to model the spread of conditional probabilities. 
5 Ferdinando Sacco and Barthelemeo Vanzetti, were Italian-bom anarchists who were convicted and 
subsequently executed for the murder and robbery of two pay-clerks in South Brain tree, Massachusetts, 
in 1920. Their conviction has long been contested, and it is claimed that political motivations 
underpinned their guilty verdicts and subsequent executions. 
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Figure 5.3. An example of a Bayesian Network Developed for Crime Science 
Analysis (Reproduced from Shen et al (2007) 
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Although parallels have been drawn between the two, Bayesian Networks can be seen 
to differ from the Wigmore chart approach in a number of ways (Leucari 2005). 
Wigmore charts have been viewed as a technique for describing and representing a 
reasoning process, and hence for constructing arguments. Bayes Networks on the 
other hand, are viewed as tools for deriving statistical measures of inference given 
available evidence. Whilst Wigmore charts are formulated retrospectively, Bayes 
Networks may be built in a manner which adduces a certain amount of predictive 
capability; they may act as a means for representing the probability of a course of 
events taking place if reasonably accurate background data is available. Whilst 
Wigmore charts do not contain quantitative information enabling one to draw 
inference from the relevant evidence, they do provide a means for showing how 
particular arguments may be constructed; this is something that Bayes Networks, 
given their simpler representational structure, are less able to depict. The latter may be 
construed more as tools for assessing and measuring inference. Wigmore charts are 
also able to represent hypotheses at different levels of analysis, being able to depict the 
ultimate probandum of guilt or innocence, the penultimate probanda (hypotheses 
which need to be proved in order to lead toward a guilty verdict), and intermediate 
probanda (hypotheses which need to be assessed at earlier stages of the evidential 
chain). It is unclear to what extent Bayes Networks may be able to reflect this. 
Nonetheless, the graphical form of mapping chains of evidential reasoning can be seen 
to reflect an influence from the Wigmore method. Bayes Networks have featured 
prominently in discussions concerning the application ofBayes to issues in both legal 
proceedings and forensic science (Dawid et al2006; Shen et al 2007, Taroni et al 
2006). Bayes Network-based methods have been developed to model the investigation 
of whole criminal cases (Shen et al 2007), but have also been used to model a number 
of more specific problems within forensic science, including fire incidents and DNA 
profiling (Evett et al 2002, Biedermann et al 2005, Taroni et al 2006). Due to the 
more simple means of representation, Bayes Networks can be built on a modular basis, 
and hence are considered applicable to a range of forensic problems. Computer 
programs such as HUGIN, which enable Bayes Networks to be modelled, are also now 
freely available. 
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The question remains however, as to what extent this field can be considered as a 
discipline in its own right. Wigmore's aims appeared to relatively modest. Whilst not 
rejecting the contribution of scientific evidence to a case, Wigmore appeared to 
caution against regarding the use and comprehension of evidence as a topic of science 
in its own right. This contrasts with certain current evidence scholars, who regard the 
rigorous study of evidence as potentially leading to a greater understanding of the 
nature of inference as a whole. In a separate development, the incorporation of Bayes 
into chart-based forms shows at least the potential for predictive power which 
Wigmore charts are unable to provide. 
Around the same time as the advent of New Evidence Scholarship, the Bayesian 
approach to evidential reasoning began to receive application in the work of the UK 
Forensic Science Service, most notably via the efforts of Dr Ian Evert. A statistician 
by training, Evett had been approached whilst working for the FSS by the 
distinguished Bayesian Denis Lindley (Evert and Joyce 2005). Lindley and Evett 
would subsequently work together on the problem of applying Bayes to forensic 
science, and the FSS made progress in applying Bayes to PTE analyses such as glass 
and fibres, documented in a number of scientific articles (Evett 1984, 1986, 1987). 
Evett saw the use of Bayes as providing a solution to the apparently unique problems 
experienced in forensic scientific work, and sought to argue that it provided a means 
of evaluating evidence in cases where the transfer of material had occurred from 
'criminal to crime scene' (Evett 1984, p.26). Evett states that an investigator will seek 
to ascertain the odds on contact having taken place, or: 
PCCI E, I) = P(E, 11 C) X PCCI I) 
P(CI E, I) P(E, Il C)x P (CII) 
Where C denotes a hypothesis that contact has occurred between an individual and a 
source, and C denotes a hypothesis that contact has not occurred. E denotes PTE of 
interest, for ex amp le glass fragments, and I denotes relevant background information 
(in the case of glass transfer, this might involve details about the source: for example, 
the size of window if one is suspected to have been broken, its height from the ground, 
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the length of time elapsed between the incident and the apprehension of the suspect 
etc). 
Notably, Evett argues that this derivation highlights the differences between the role of 
the scientist and the investigator (Evett 1984, p.28). According to Evett, the 
investigator is concerned with prior and posterior odds, and is interested in questions 
of the type 'what are the odds on contact having occurred between a suspect and 
source?' The scientist, on the other hand, is concerned with the derivation of 
likelihood ratios, and thus poses questions of the type 'what are the probabilities of the 
evidence under each ofthe alternative hypotheses C and C?' In this way, the scientist 
provides data corresponding to the first term on the right-hand side of the above, P(E, 
Il C)/ P(E, Il C), which informs the investigator, who is concerned with the left-hand 
term. Hence, the scientist is able to provide information which aids the investigator in 
formulating posterior odds from the likelihood ratio and the investigators prior odds. 
This formula has since been adapted for further forensic use, whereby C and C has 
been replaced by hypotheses which attempt to account for specific events of forensic 
interest. This method involves the use of two competing hypotheses, one pertaining to 
a prosecution argument (Hp), and an opposing hypothesis relating to a corresponding 
defence argument (Hd). In this version the formula is rewritten as: 
P(HpiE. I) = P(Hpll) x P(EIHp,I) 
P(HdiE,l) P(Hdii) x P(EIHd,I) 
In applying Bayesianism to a different context, namely the evaluation of evidence in a 
forensic scientific laboratory, as opposed to courtroom proceedings, Evett also defined 
a certain delineation of roles between investigator and scientist. The former is 
concerned with the assessment of probabilities of guilt or innocence given the 
evidence, whilst the latter evaluates this evidence, providing likelihood ratios and 
incorporating information based on other circumstances relevant to the case. 
In a later paper however, Evett admitted to experiencing a 'marked reluctance to think 
in terms of prior and posterior odds' (Evett 1987, p.1 03), amongst scientists and 
investigators (Evett 1987). In order to help facilitate acceptance, Evett proposed a 
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verbal convention in order to aid understanding of the significance of the numerical 
information generated by the use of Bayes. Evett also identified five interrelated 
challenges that had to be faced 'if any mathematically based system is to become an 
operational reality' (Evett 1987, p.1 03). Firstly, Evett points to the complexity of real-
life cases. Admitting to the simplified nature of the examples presented in his work, 
Evett mentions the possibility of multiple forms ofPTE being involved in a case, and 
the possibility of two-way transfer further complicating calculations. A second major 
challenge is the problem of realistic modelling, in which the key issue is seen as one 
oftradeoff: 'the more assumptions we make the less complex the mathematics, the 
more tractable the solutions and the less the demands on our computing power; but at 
the same time we move further from operational reality and the smaller we make the 
domain of applicability' (Evett 1987, p.1 04). A third key issue concerns the collection 
of adequate data upon which to assess propositions. Evett admitted that the collection 
of data was largely a pragmatic affair and that FSS scientists were generally limited by 
the evidence that was presented to them in the course of casework: 'we have to resort 
to collecting whatever data we can lay our hands on and this generally comes down in 
to our laboratories' (Evett 1987, p.1 04). Evett cites a New Zealand colleague as 
describing the disparate collection of evidence as leading to 'lab door statistics', 
namely the formulation of statistical inferences being dictated by the small and 
possibly unrepresentative amount of data available to the scientist concerning a 
particular question. Fourth, Evett points the problem of imponderables. This refers to 
the multiplicity ofbackground information that might play an influential role in the 
way a forensic scientist evaluates evidence. With regard to an individual instance of a 
window being broken: ' ... the scientist may have no information whatsoever about 
how close the suspect was supposed to be to the window when he hit it, or how hard 
he hit it, whether he ducked or swerved as he hit it' (Evett 1987, p. 1 04). ·Finally, 
there are the circumstances of a particular case to consider. This brings forth the fact 
that the flow of information relevant to a case may be ongoing, and hence subsequent 
information may be contradictory to the previous circumstantial knowledge that a 
forensic scientist was using in order to evaluate evidence. 
Despite the acknowledgement of these challenges, Evett's work represented an 
application of the ideas outlined in Finkelstein and Fairley's paper, and Evett himself 
has cited the latter as highly influential (Aronson, unpublished transcript). Now a 
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consultant with vast experience of testifying on evidence in high-profile cases, Evett, 
along with other colleagues at the FSS, has initiated the Case Assessment and 
Interpretation (CAI) model, which forms the basis of the case study in Chapter 7. The 
CAI, which has been the subject of a number of scientific articles, aims to apply 
Bayesian principles in the development of a set of procedural guidelines to guide the 
progress of forensic investigation in relation to criminal cases. The work of evidence 
scholars such as Wigmore, and the more recent work of scholars such as Robertson 
and Vignaux, and Kadane and Schum, have been cited as strongly informing the 
development of the model. In taking a holistic approach to the issue of evidence 
interpretation, the CAI attempts to encompass the issues mentioned above, but more 
importantly also serves to use Bayes to clarify the role of forensic scientists in an 
investigation: 
'the Bayesian framework tells you what kinds of questions you should be addressing. And if 
there are numbers, the Bayesian framework shows you how to take account of those numbers' 
(Evett in unpublished interview with Aronson, emphasis added). 
In terms of the introduction ofBayes into forensic science, Lindley's key intervention, 
occurred at a time when it appeared that forensic science was seeking a stronger sense 
of disciplinary identity, as shown by the programmatic remarks by Paul Kirk, 
proclaiming forensic science as the 'science of individualisation'. That Bayesianism 
was viewed at that time as possibly contributing to the disciplinary identity of forensic 
science is suggested by the subsequent work performed by Kirk's pupil, Charles 
Kingston. In the UK, the collaboration ofDenis Lindley and Ian Evett proved crucial 
in introducing Bayes into the powerful FSS. Lindley's intervention originally came 
about in direct response to the previous use of frequentist methods by FSS scientists, 
with Lindley effectively arguing that Bayes provided a more suitable way to assess 
similarity rather than difference. In this way, the frequentist-inverse probability 
debate, outlined in Chapter 4, is carried forward. Once again, it is possible to identify 
to identify different interpretations as to what various modes of probability are suited, 
and what they can and can't achieve. Furthermore, in considering the problem of 
applying probability theory to forensic science, and outlining the practical issues to be 
overcome, Evett shows how the problem of interpreting evidence in such a manner is 
inextricably linked to a wider set of circumstances and issues. Moreover, Evett shows 
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how Bayes may come to be able to guide the behaviour of scientists in the pursuit of 
an mqmry. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have drawn upon academic literature to present an overview of 
approaches towards evidential reasoning. Questions of the nature of evidence and 
proof received significant attention from John Henry Wigmore in the early part of the 
twentieth century, and his studies on the nature of inferential reasoning continue to be 
influential to scholars of evidence today. His influence can be felt in the emergence of 
technologies of inference. Some of these have taken the form of graphical depictions, 
whereas. others have involved mathematical operations, yet they all have been intended 
to provide guidance to reasoners in apprehending the potentially complex series of 
pieces of evidence in a trial, or to help them assess the probative weight of evidence. 
Over time, statistics and probability have come to play an increased role in these 
technologies, with Bayes Theorem featuring prominently in these initiatives. In such a 
way, the story outlined here concerns the evolution of an identity for Bayes Theorem 
itself in a particular context, for much of the debate has concerned the role it may play 
in the nexus of law and science. It lies at the heart of a wider set of discussions which 
encompass questions about the nature of judicial reasoning itself, namely issues of 
whether mathematical systems will ever be fully able to cope with the potential 
complexity of criminal trials, or whether such deliberations are best left to human 
minds which possess some other, currently poorly understood mechanism, as 
ruminated upon by Kaplan. Furthermore, the emergence ofBayes Theorem in this 
context has also informed discussions over whether criminal cases can be considered 
as exhibiting commonalities which can inform statistical models, which in turn has 
shaped particular ideas and representations ofBayes, most notably the seeming 
incorporation of frequentist notions into an ostensibly Bayesian framework by 
Finkelstein and Fairley. 
Regardless of the way in which these kinds of technologies have been realised, 
together they represent efforts to develop technologies of expertise. They are designed 
to aid users to reason about evidence in a manner which circumvents supposedly 
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'irrational' behaviours. As well as removing sources ofbias and prejudice, these 
technologies help one to convert conjectures of evidence into quantitative measures. 
Hence technologies of expertise have a two-fold function: They convert subjective 
beliefs into tangible, intesubjectively comprehendable and standardisable measures. 
More importantly however, by highlighting sources of epistemological weakness in 
the reasoner, and acting as guides for reasoning, they serve to act as blueprints for 
behaviour. They provide sophisticated models for reasoning about evidence in a 
rational and scientific way, and in doing so help define conceptions of 'expert' 
reasoners. 
These technologies, although discussed in US legal literature, have appeared to have 
received relatively little uptake by legal professionals. Although the shortcomings of 
the current Anglo-American legal system in relation to evidence continue to be 
discussed on both sides of the Atlantic, technologies of evidential reasoning have 
stimulated little in the way of actual reform to the system. As I have briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 2, and as I describe in more detail in the next chapter, attempts 
to use Bayesian reasoning in UK courtroom deliberations have met with outright 
rejection. What is notable however is the way that the thinking represented by these 
technologies has been appropriated more keenly in the domain of forensic science. 
The remarks of Paul Kirk echo those of forebears such as Edmund Locard in reflecting 
the desire of forensic scientists to pinpoint a defining epistemic identity for their 
discipline to distinguish it from other scientific undertakings. The use of Bayes in 
forensic science can be seen to exert a dual function in this regard. First, it aids the 
transition of forensic science from the categorical epistemological position towards 
identification, to a more conditional paradigm which is viewed as more suitably 
'scientific'. Second, by providing a guide to reasoning behaviour, it enables actors to 
construct an identity. It contributes in the construction of the persona of a judicial 
'expert'. This is important not only for placing forensic scientists on a similar footing 
to other scientists, but also forms a crucial part of their personal makeup which 
enables them to project a persona as a credible expert in the legal arena. Furthermore, 
the work of Ian Evett shows how Bayes Theorem can help formally define the role of 
the forensic scientist, not only in helping clarify the questions to ask but in 
distinguishing their role from those of their colleagues, the police investigators. 
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CHAPTER SIX- FORENSIC DNA 
TECHNOLOGY AND MODERN 
STATISTICAL APPROACHES TO EVIDENCE 
INTERPRETATION 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I provide an overview of the development of forensic DNA 
profiling and related statistical procedures. By doing so, I aim to provide an 
introduction to the scientific basis of DNA profiling techniques, and to the 
probabilistic concepts which have been developed for the interpretation of 
DNA evidence. Applications of probability theory developed for DNA 
profiles, particularly those involving Bayesian analysis, have also been applied 
to other forms of evidence. This chapter therefore provides background 
information for the two case studies to follow, which involve the development 
of complex Bayesian technologies for the analysis of more complex DNA 
profiles (Chapter 7), and a generalised Bayesian approach to forensic 
investigation of evidence (Chapter 8). 
In addition, in the course of this chapter I also consider the interdependence of 
technical, statistical and judicial discourses, by discussing the ways in which 
the scientific and statistical basis of DNA profiling has been contested. I 
examine the challenges made in the American legal arena, and how these 
stimulated a series of wider debates over a range of scientific issues. I also 
discuss arguments concerning the way in which DNA evidence has been 
presented to courts in the United Kingdom, and how this has led to 
controversies concerning the presentation of scientific and statistical 
information in general. 
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6.2 Initial Developments and Applications 
The modern history ofthe forensic use of DNA is generally accepted to have 
begun with the work of Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys at the University of 
Leicester (Buckleton and Gill 2004, p.2). The technique, known initially as 
'DNA fmgerprinting', but which is referred to more widely as 'DNA 
profiling', originated largely as a corollary of that group's studies of 'non-:-
coding' regions of the human DNA. Although DNA serves as the molecular 
blueprint for the construction of amino acids, and hence proteins, large areas 
of DNA have since been discovered where this function does not arise. The 
functional significance of these non-coding regions (known as 'introns', in 
contrast to 'exons', which do code for amino acids) has been, and continues to 
be, the subject of great interest (Fedorov et at 2003)1• Studies on the gene for 
myoglobin (the oxygen carrier protein in muscle) revealed the existence within 
it of an intron containing a DNA motif repeated several times over. Further 
work led to the identification and characterisation of a number of other similar 
repeat sequences, termed 'minisatellites', existing elsewhere within the 
genome (Jeffreys et al 1985). 
DNA fingerprinting became a possibility once it was realised that the precise 
number of repeats within certain minisatellites showed considerable variation 
between individuals. Through the application of a technique known as 
Southern Blotting, it became possible to obtain unique patterns based upon the 
number and distribution of mini satellite repeats in individuals. If treated with 
restriction enzymes, which recognise and cleave specific DNA motifs, 
minisatellites yield fragments ofDNA of varying size. These fragments can 
be identified via the use of 'primer' DNA, short sequences composed in such a 
way that they bind to minisatellite fragments. If labelled with a radioactive 
isotope or fluorescent chemical group, these primers can be used to effectively 
visualise the presence of fragments within some form of supporting matrix. If 
gel electrophoresis is used (see Figure 6.1 ), whereby the fragments are 
effectively separated on the basis of size, they are visualised as a series of 
1 The completion of the entire human genome sequence revealed that the overall proportion of non-
coding DNA was even far greater than originally thought. 
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Figure 6.1. Gel electrophoresis of DNA fragments. Bands represent 
fragments of DNA of a certain molecular weight. The column of bands in lanes 1 and 6 
are 'standard ladders', sets of marker fragments used to assess the molecular weight of 
DNA from other samples. In the other lanes, bands which are horizontally level with 
each other are deemed to be of the same molecular weight. In a forensic DNA profile, 
this phenomenon would be deemed to indicate a 'match' between DNA alleles. 
(reproduced from 
http://www.americanheritage.com/assets/images/articles/magazine/it/2006/2/2006 2 54.j 
J!&, Accessed 10 November 2008) 
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bands arranged in such a fashion that they can be rendered as distinct or 
identical patterns. 
The first legal application of DNA fingerprinting in its original form came 
about soon after the publication of Jeffrey's findings in 1985, where it proved 
to be instrumental in settling an immigration dispute involving a Ghanaian 
family living in the UK as British citizens. The youngest son, having travelled 
back to Ghana, was detained on his return to the UK under the suspicion of 
being an impostor. Using the new technique, the DNA of the boy under 
suspicion was compared with that of his supposed siblings and mother. 
Although no father was available for comparison, the results showed that the 
boy possessed a profile which both matched with that of his siblings 
(indicating common paternal ancestry), and that of the mother. The case 
against the son was subsequently dropped. 
Around the same time as the case, Jeffreys had been collaborating with Dr 
Peter Gill and Dr Dave Werrett of the UK Forensic Science Service (FSS), and 
together they published the first scientific article outlining the forensic 
application of DNA fingerprinting (Gill et al 1985). This paper demonstrated 
how DNA could be extracted from crime scene stains, involving biological 
material such as semen. The utility of the technique came to further 
prominence through its use in the investigation of the rape-murders oftwo 
fifteen year old girls, Lynda Mann and Dawn Ashworth, which occurred in 
1983 and 1985 respectively. Although the prime suspect, seventeen year old 
Richard Buckland, originally confessed to the murder of Ashworth, biological 
analysis showed that he did not share the same blood group as that of the 
person whose biological materials were recovered from the victim's body. 
Moreover, despite confessing to the attack on Ashworth, he denied any 
involvement in Mann's death (Williams et al 2004, p.17). 
Police from Leicestershire constabulary, who were investigating the crimes, 
contacted Jeffreys about the possibility of using his technique in order to aid 
their inquiries. FSS scientists were also approached to further verify Jeffreys 
work (FSS 2007). A DNA profile from Buckland did not match the profile 
recovered from the crime scene, although subsequent analysis revealed that the 
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crime scene profiles from each of the Ashworth and Mann cases matched each 
other. In January 1987, police initiated a mass screening of DNA from men 
aged 16 to 34 living in villages near to the crime scenes. One of these men, 
Ian Kelly, supplied his sample under the name of one Colin Pitchfork. 
However, having let slip that the former had deliberately misled the police, he 
and Pitchfork were arrested. Once the latter's DNA was sampled and profiled, 
it produced a conclusive match with the crime scene samples. Pitchfork was 
subsequently charged with the murders, convicted and sentenced to life 
imprisonment in 1988 (Williams et al 2004, p.18). 
6.3 The Science of Forensic DNA 
A forensic DNA profile consists of a number of fragments of an individual's 
DNA taken from specific sites, or loci, of the genome. Each locus is 
composed of a pair of 'alleles', two DNA strands which consist of a repeated 
series of pairs of short nucleotide sequences (nucleotides are four compounds, 
adenine, thymine, guanine and cytosine, normally represented as A, T, C and 
G. Together these nucleotides constitute the central 'building blocks' of 
DNA). Variation arises according to the different type of short sequences at 
each locus, and on the number of times a specific nucleotide sequence, or 
motif, is repeated at each allele (see Figure 6.2). 
If treated with restriction enzymes, which recognise and cleave specific DNA 
motifs, minisatellites yield fragments of DNA ofvarying size which 
correspond to specific alleles. These fragments can be identified via the use of 
'primer' DNA, short sequences composed in such a way that they bind to the 
allele fragments. If labelled with a radioactive isotope or fluorescent chemical 
group, these primers can be used to effectively visualise the presence of 
fragments. When a number of loci from an individual are analysed together, 
the resulting aggregrated data results in the generation of a profile which may 
be used to match an individual suspect with a DNA sample taken from a crime 
scene. 
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Figure 6.2 Variation in DNA sequences at non-coding loci. Locus A depicts 
a homozygous pair of alleles, so called due to an identical number of the repeat sequence 
A TC. Each allele at Locus A is 4.2 base pairs in length. Locus B is thus heterozygous 
due to the difference in the number of the repeat sequence CGT at allele Bl (6 repeats) 
and allele B2 (5 repeats). 
A T c 'A T c E T c lA T c I A T Allele AI 
A T c I AT cl AT c I A T cj A T Allele A2 
c G T le G T j c G T jc G T ~ G j c G ~ 
Allele 82 
Locus A 
(Homozygous) 
Allele Bl 
Locus B 
(Heterozygous) 
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6.3.1 Short Tandem Repeats (STRs) and the Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(PCR) 
A major step forward in the development of the technology manifested itself 
in the discovery of 'microsatellite' DNA sequences, and the coupling of these 
with the application of the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR). Microsatellite 
sequences, also termed Short Tandem Repeats (STRs), typically exist as 
alleles of 100-400 base pairs (bp) in length, and are comprised of a series of 
repeat motifs of 2-8 bp (Buckleton and Gill 2004, p. 7). Due to their smaller 
size in terms ofboth allele and repeat motiflength, STRs proved themselves to 
be amenable to analysis via the relatively recent technique of PCR. This latter 
procedure, now well-established within molecular biology, provided the power 
to synthesise and replicate DNA sequences at a far greater speed and 
efficiency than before. 
PCR reaction occurs via a number of steps. Firstly, the DNA is heated at high 
temperature in order to separate the original two strands. Once separated, the 
reaction temperature is lowered and DNA primers, consisting of short 
sequences able to selectively bind to the strands, form the site of synthesis of 
new copies of the DNA of interest, a process catalysed by the use of a heat-
stable enzyme. Once new DNA is formed, the temperature is increased again, 
in order to separate the strands once more. More primer and enzyme can then 
be added to initiate another round of DNA synthesis. This cyclic process of 
heating to separate DNA strands, followed by the addition of primer and the 
production of new DNA, can be repeated numerous times, leading to the 
production of copies of a specific sequence of DNA at an exponential rate 
(Newton and Graham 1997). 
The use ofPCR conferred a number of methodological advantages to the DNA 
profiling technique. Being an automated process, analysis time was drastically 
reduced, to less than 24 hours. The shorter STR loci were relatively resistant 
to degradation, and were thus far more appropriate for forensic use, with crime 
scene samples being susceptible to a series of contaminating factors from the 
external environments from which they were recovered. More importantly, 
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the use of STR in conjunction with PCR technology allowed unambiguous 
assignment of genotypes. DNA fragments that differed by one repeat could be 
amplified, analysed and visualised using gel electrophoresis. The highly 
sensitive nature of PCR also enabled the utilisation of extremely low amounts 
of DNA, equivalent to the quantity from a single cell (Findlay et al 1997). 
The ability to identify and target individual loci represented an important 
development, allowing analysts to visualise products with a far greater level of 
precision. However, this improved procedure, known as the single-locus 
probe (SLP) method in the UK, and as variable number of tandem repeats 
(VNTR) in the US, was hindered by other shortcomings related to 
instrumentation. For example, the procedure was reliant on the use of 
relatively primitive separation technology, in the form of agarose-based gels. 
Agarose, a naturally occurring substance, is disadvantaged in that the size of 
pores existing within gels (which act as passage for molecules) are large and 
often arranged in irregular fashion (Ream and Field 1999). This irregularity of 
pore distribution in agarose hindered the reliability of analyses, whilst the 
large pore size prevented fine resolution of alleles separated by one or a few 
repeat units, because of the tendency for these molecules to travel within the 
same pores. Due in part to the problems relating to resolution, fragments were 
measured by molecular weight rather than fragment length. 
The introduction of polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (PAGE) allowed 
greatly improved resolution of fragments. Polyacrylamide gels, being 
synthetic products, could be formed and manipulated with a greater degree of 
control over the shape and size of the pores within them. A more regular pore 
shape guaranteed more reliable analyses, and the ability to create smaller pores 
allowed separation ofDNA fragments at the appropriate required level of 
resolution. Coupled with the use of 'standard ladders', consisting of DNA 
fragments of known length, samples could be identified on the basis ofbase 
pair length rather than molecular weight. Further improvements in 
instrumentation and visualisation techniques have enabled workers to create 
multiplexes of several different STR primer pairs, allowing the amplification 
of several loci at once (Gill and Buckleton 2005, p.8). This development was 
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further enhanced by the introduction of dye-labelled PCR primers. Through 
the use of different dyes, PCR products could be characterised via the use of 
fluorescence detection coupled with an appropriate electrophoresis method 
(Balding 2005, p.44). 
However, although gel technology improved, issues remained over the 
interpretation of DNA evidence using this method, as it meant that 
comparisons between DNA to determine possible matches were made on a 
largely visual basis. As I describe in another section of this chapter, this 
meant that a considerable degree of subjective judgement was involved in the 
comparison of profiles, and considerable controversy was generated over 
problems concerning measurement error. In many jurisdictions, the gel-based 
method has since been superseded by capillary electrophoresis (CE), which 
confers certain advantages, namely a significant reduction in the degree of 
subjective interpretation involved in the process (Balding 2005, p.44). In this 
case PCR products are characterised according to the time taken to emerge 
from a capillary or gel, rather than being identified on the basis of their 
location within the latter. The whole process can be recorded entirely digitally 
via relevant software packages, with alleles represented as a series of peaks. 
PCR products from several different loci can be separated on the basis of 
length (proportional to elution time), through the addition of size standards, 
and by locus through the use of different dyes. An example of a typical piece 
ofCE data is depicted in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3. A typical DNA profile obtained via capillary electrophoresis. 
Single peaks correspond to homozygous alleles, pairs of peaks to heterozygous peaks at 
particular loci (Petricevic et al 2005, 23). 
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Aside from improvements in instrumentation and other such technological 
developments, efforts have continued to enhance the potential evidential 
weight proffered by DNA profiling. Whilst some of these have involved new 
developments relating to statistical analysis of data, the introduction of 
increasing number of loci has also provided ever greater discriminatory 
capacity. In 1996 the second-generation multiplex (SGM) system was 
introduced within the UK, replacing SLP analysis. Originally SGM involved 
six loci plus the amelogenin sex test, but has since been superseded by SGM+, 
which increased the number of non-sex loci to ten. The SGM systems utilise 
complex and highly polymorphic loci such as HUMD21 S 11 and 
HUMFIBRA!FGA, which has contributed to the potential to report match 
probabilities in the region of 10-10 to 10-13 (Gill and Buckleton 2005, pp.9-10). 
The advent of improved multiple loci systems facilitated the introduction of 
national DNA databases. The UK has led the way in the implementation of 
forensic DNA databases, introducing the National DNA Database (NDNAD) 
in 1995. Using SGM+ as a platform, the NDNAD now numbers over 3.5 
million suspect samples. In the US, the Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS) operated by the FBI contains over 2.8 million suspect samples and 
uses a 13-loci STR system. Numerous other countries have also established 
DNA databases of their own, and the spread of databasing has led to efforts to 
harmonise the use of certain loci across national jurisdictions (Kimpton et al 
1995; Gill et al 2000). 
The following paragraphs have provided a brief introduction to the 
development of the science of DNA profiling. In what follows I describe how 
challenges in the US courts led to a far deeper interrogation of the scientific 
basis of the technique. This section not only demonstrates the high level of 
complexity involved, but also indicates the relationship between the scientific, 
technological and statistical aspects of DNA profiling. 
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6.4 Probabilistic Assessment of DNA Profiles 
The evidential weight of a DNA match is ascertained via the calculation of a 
random match probability (RMP), from which can be derived a likelihood 
ratio. The match probability is taken as the chance of an individuals DNA 
profile randomly matching with a crime scene sample. In order to calculate 
this figure, data are required concerning the frequency of each type of allele at 
each locus in a population. A match probability is typically obtained by 
multiplying the frequency ofthe occurrence of particular alleles at each locus. 
Match probabilities can range to as low as < 1 x 1 o-6• 
The RMP is used by forensic scientists to assess the significance of a possible 
match between the DNA profile taken from a crime scene stain, and that of a 
possible suspect. Scientists use the RMP to help determine whether DNA 
profile data is able to make a meaningful contribution to judging the 
probability of whether the suspect is guilty or innocent. Two hypotheses are 
considered, with a 'prosecution hypothesis' normally taking the form 'the 
suspect is the offender', and a 'defence hypothesis' of the form 'a person other 
than the suspect is the offender'. The prosecution hypothesis, where the 
suspect is assumed to be the offender, will consider the probability of the 
individual's profile matching a crime scene stain to be 1. The defence 
hypothesis on the other hand, considers the probability that the suspect's 
profile could have matched at random, and it is this hypothesis which the RMP 
directly informs. 
The two hypotheses are compared together, and it is accepted practice to 
generate likelihood ratios which utilise the RMP figure using the formulation 
of Bayes Theorem as introduced in Chapter 5 
Pr(Hp I E) = Pr(Hp) x Pr(E I (Hp) 
Pr(Hd I E) Pr(Hd) x Pr(E I (Hd) 
For example, the prior measure ofbeliefin a prosecution hypothesis in a 
burglary may be informed by eyewitness testimony. Hence one's prior belief 
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in the guilt of a suspect accused of a burglary may be informed, inter alia, by 
testimony which claims that an individual, resembling the accused, was seen 
fleeing the area of a burglary shortly after an incident was reported. DNA 
evidence may then be presented which purports to show a match between the 
profile of the suspect, and DNA recovered from the scene. Although a 
likelihood ratio figure will have been calculated, this is normally translated 
into a verbal measure for ease of comprehension in court. If the DNA 
evidence is seen to be particularly incriminating for example, a scientist 
reporting in court may claim it provides 'very strong' support for the 
hypothesis that the suspect is the offender. The idea behind the use of such an 
approach is that the report of DNA evidence will contribute to the modulation 
of juror's beliefs. Although an explicitly numerical approach is not used in the 
courts, DNA evidence in this case is said to aid the estimation of a posterior 
probabilistic belief in the guilt of the suspect. 
6.5 Legal Challenges to DNA Profiling in the USA 
When DNA evidence was first introduced in the 1980s, it was portrayed by 
some as a largely immutable means of determining guilt or innocence. A 
positive DNA match between a suspect and a crime sample was often 
presumed to virtually amount to a guilty verdict (Derksen 2000). However, 
towards the end of the 1980s, a number of legal challenges were made in the 
US courts which served to question the validity of DNA profiling procedures. 
The resultant series of controversies, which engulfed the scientific community 
in the US, was coined 'The DNA Wars', and led to the publication of two 
reports by the US National Research Council. Prominent in leading the legal 
challenges were two criminal defence lawyers, Peter Neufeld and Barry 
Scheck. It was they who were able to mount the first successful challenge to 
the admissibility of DNA evidence (Derksen 2000). 
In her study of these controversies, Derksen (2000) provides a detailed 
account of how Scheck and Neufeld made their first challenge during the New 
York vs Castro murder case (Derksen 2000). This case involved the murder of 
a pregnant woman and her two-year old daughter, who had been stabbed to 
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death in their apartment in the Bronx, New York City. The woman's husband, 
who had discovered the bodies, told police he had seen a man leaving the 
building with what appeared to be blood on his hands. Joseph Castro, a 
caretaker's assistant, was later identified as this suspect, and during 
questioning detectives noticed a small bloodstain on his watch. Subsequent 
DNA testing of the watch, along with blood samples of the two victims, 
reported a match between the former and the blood of the adult victim. 
Lifecodes Corporation, the company who carried out the testing, reported that 
the probability of such a match occurring at random was 1 in 189,200,000 
(Derksen 2000, p.807). Although the prosecution attempted to submit this 
result for evidence, the defence decided to challenge the figure via a pre-trial 
admissibility hearing. 2 
Scheck and Neufeld's justification for conducting an investigation into DNA 
testing procedures was based around the issue of the fact that Lifecodes was a 
private and unregulated firm, with no accountability. Concerned about the 
lack of transparency regarding the methods used by Lifecodes, Scheck and 
Neufeld obtained subpoenas to enable them to gain access to Lifecodes data, 
which included laboratory notebooks, computer printouts and 
electropherograms. They discovered that Lifecodes had reported one locus at 
the DNA bands of the watch stain and the victim sample as being exactly the 
same size, 10.25 kilobases (kb) long. However, on further examination ofthe 
original computer printout data, the watch stain locus had actually been 
recorded as 10.16 kb, whilst the corresponding victim stain result was 10.35 
kb. Lifecodes had reported that it confirmed visual matches by measuring the 
bands and confirming a match by checking the bands fell within three standard 
errors of each other. This finding led Neufeld and Scheck to argue that 
Lifecodes had failed to follow their own matching rules, an argument 
strengthened by the subsequent discovery over similar discrepancies in the 
case of other band comparisons. Determination of matches was thus actually 
more dependent on visual, subjective judgements. 
2 Often referred to as a 'Frye' hearing. 
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Furthermore, with the help of Dr Eric Lander, a geneticist and mathematician 
with appointments at MIT and Harvard, Neufeld and Scheck were also able to 
attack the scientific basis of Lifecodes statistical calculations, which involved 
a three-step method to calculate the random match probability (Derksen 2000, 
p.81 0). First, the frequency of each allele, across a certain population was 
calculated. The relevant population as determined by ethnicity, and in the 
Castro case a Hispanic database was used. Second, each locus was tested to 
check for Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium, which is used to ascertain that random 
mating is occurring in the population. Third, the allele frequencies at each 
locus, calculated in the first step, were multiplied together, with the 
assumption that there is no linkage of inheritance between loci. According to 
Lander (1989), none ofthese steps stood up to scientific scrutiny in the Castro 
case (Lander 1989, p.503). Although Lifecodes used a three-standard 
deviation error for matches between two samples ('forensic matches'), it used 
a far smaller standard deviation, two-thirds, when comparing allele bands 
within a population database. This had the dangerous effect, Lander argued, 
of erroneously slanting the random match probability in favour of the 
prosecution (Lander 1989, p.504). Furthermore, a test for the presence of the 
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium in the Hispanic population database showed a 
significant deviation, and also indicated the presence of genetically distinct 
subgroups. Together these placed the assumption of no linkage between 
alleles under doubt, possibly invalidating the use of the product rule to 
multiply allele frequencies together to derive the random match probability. 
Although Joseph Castro was eventually found guilty, Neufeld and Scheck's 
efforts led to the DNA evidence being ruled inadmissible, the first time this 
had occurred in the US. The case led to a number of similar challenges to the 
validity ofDNA evidence, and eventually involved a number of leading 
academic figures. 
Another case which featured prominently was US vs. Yee et al. The Yee case 
involved three members of a Hell's Angels motorcycle gang accused of 
murder. In this case, the reliability and reproducibility of DNA work carried 
out by the FBI came under scrutiny. In addition to questioning the effect of 
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environmental insults and degradation on DNA, as well as issues concerning 
proficiency testing, the defence sought to challenge the calculations made by 
the FBI on the basis of the allele frequency databases they had developed and 
used. The FBI's Caucasian frequency database had used DNA samples taken 
from 225 of its own agents. However, the FBI had lost the original data, and 
had to take the samples again (Derksen 2000, p.818). In the original analysis, 
the FBI had used a technique known as 'binning'. Due to the limitations of 
the gel-based technology used at the time, the band fragments could not be 
accurately measured into discrete lengths. Instead, allele bands conforming to 
a certain measurement range were grouped together, and placed in 'bins' 
which conformed to a certain kb range, or group of lengths. As such, this 
amounted to the conversion of discrete values into continuous data, and then 
back again into an altered, approximated discrete format; specific alleles 
subsequently corresponded to certain bins. 
A subsequent study by Fung (1996) attempted to demonstrate that, although 
the FBI claimed that the 'match window', (the allowed apparent measurement 
difference between two bands alleged to demonstrate a match), used by them 
was 5% (±2.5%), it was actually significantly greater in reality (Fung 1996). 
Fung's analysis indicated that the actual match window was around 10%, a 
figure with serious implications as this amounted to a value greater than the 
size of the bins used by the FBI to allocate allele sizes to molecular weight 
measurements. 
On the second occasion however, the imprecision of the gel technique meant 
that different fragment lengths were recorded, which in turn meant that bands 
were classified into different bins, resulting in different frequency distributions 
from the same set of individuals. When asked in Court about the issue of 
calculating random match probabilities, Lander opined that no consensus 
existed with regard to a reliable method for deriving match probabilities 
(Derksen 2000, p.819). A second defence challenge raised questions over the 
nature of the Caucasian database used by the FBI. The use of the epithet 
'Caucasian' was viewed as arbitrary, and it was argued that this masked the 
possibility of so-called ' population substructure', a phenomenon by which 
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multiple alleles, the inheritance of each being supposedly independent of one 
another, are inherited together on the basis of ethnicity. The term 'Caucasian' 
was viewed as too broad, with the possibility that a number of ethnic sub-
groups contained within the database could display substructural inheritance 
patterns. 
The issue of substructure, and how it affected random match probability 
calculations, strongly divided the experts involved in the case. Defence 
experts pressed further the argument that probability estimates based on this 
database could not be considered reliable due to the presence of unrecognised 
population substructure. In response the prosecution experts argued that even 
if population substructure did exist, it was of a magnitude so small as to bias 
the defendant as much it might the prosecution (Derksen 2000, p.819). 
However, both sides were agreed that the extent to which North American and 
European Caucasian populations might be substructured by ethnic groups was 
unknown. 
The work ofNeufeld and Scheck in exposing the relative fallibility of DNA 
profiling led to a number of areas being subjected to further legal and 
scientific scrutiny. In the next section I discuss in further detail the science 
involved in these areas. I show how these debates touched upon statistical and 
probabilistic issues, discussed in two controversial reports commissioned by 
the US government. I continue by describing other debates which have 
impacted upon discussions of DNA database searches. In a subsequent section 
I consider the use of statistics and probability in forensic science, and I focus 
upon the use and presentation of statistics and probability theory in the UK 
courts. 
6.6 Population Substructure 
The occurrence of a particular set of alleles at an individual locus is generally 
taken to be an independent event. The generation of RMPs is calculated 
according to the product rule of probability, which states that the probability of 
a number of independent events occurring in conjunction is derived by 
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multiplying the probabilities of each individual event. In the case of DNA 
profiling, the use of the product rule rests on certain assumptions, namely no 
eo-inheritance of loci, and that random mating has occurred within the 
population of interest. These assumptions, especially the latter, have been 
subject to question ever since DNA profiling was first established as a 
widespread forensic technique. It is clearly evident that mating across the 
global population is not random, and instead there is a tendency for it to occur 
within certain ethnic and geographical subgroups. This being the case, the 
likelihood exists that certain alleles which might be more prevalent in certain 
subgroups, may become more preserved within that subgroup at the expense 
of less common alleles. In theory at least, there will be a tendency within that 
subgroup for certain alleles to tend toward homozygosity if inbreeding within 
that subgroup continues. Thus independence cannot necessarily be assumed 
for alleles, and has prompted considerations amongst forensic scientists 
regarding the phenomenon of population substructure. 
Although it was obvious that random mating was not widespread, it was 
unclear whether substructuring had any truly significant impact on the 
calculation of match probabilities. Some geneticists argued that the true extent 
of population substructuring had to be assessed before assertions could be cast 
about the nature of match probabilities, and that this could only be achieved by 
detailed empirical studies (Lewontin and Hart! 1991). According to them, 
only specific sub-population databases could be used to confer accurate data. 
Opponents claimed that the generation of such data was unnecessarily time-
consuming, and that such adjustments made little difference given the 
extremely low figures associated with match probabilities. 
Furthermore, critics such as Eric Budowle of the FBI asserted that there were 
indeed no significantly large variations between allele sub-populations, and 
that the existing demographic and genetic conditions did not allow this to be 
the case. In response, Lewontin, Hartl and other colleagues pointed to an 
excess ofhomozygotes in populations as evidence of deviation from 
independent inheritance. The FBI's reply to them was rather unconvincing, 
and returned full cycle to the issue of unreliable measurement. Their rejoinder 
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was that, due to the inability of gels to resolve bands fully, it only appeared 
that homozygotic alleles were apparent, when in fact they were just as likely to 
be heterozygotic (Derksen 2000, pp. 826-827). 
The controversies over population substructure and other issues that followed 
the Castro case would eventually lead to two reports being published by the 
US National Research Council in an effort to settle the disputes. The first of 
these, often referred to as 'NRC 1 ', was published in 1992 (NRC 1992). NRC 
1 concluded that population substructure had to be taken into serious 
consideration, and that measures had to be taken to account for any possible 
substructuring effects. Whilst proposing widespread sampling of ethnic 
groups to assess the issue, the report called for the application of a 'ceiling 
principle' to induce conservancy in genotype frequency estimates before the 
true effects of substructure were known. It was recommended that random 
samples of 100 individuals should be taken from 15-20 populations, 'each 
representing a group relatively homogeneous genetically' (NRC 1992, p.83). 
For each allele at each locus, the relative frequency was to be assessed, with 
the largest frequency in any of these populations being used in the calculation 
of genotype frequencies, provided that it was greater than 5%. If this did not 
happen to be the case, then 5% would be used instead. In the absence of the 
necessary population work, an 'interim' ceiling approach was also put forward 
whereby population studies could be carried out 'on at least three major 
"races"', with the data being used to calculate allele frequencies provided it 
met Hardy-Weinberg (HW) and linkage disequilibrium (LE) criteria. The 
NRC claimed that these methods conferred certain advantages. The 
calculation of high-frequency alleles did not, it was claimed, require large 
population samples. The ceiling principle also claimed to circumvent the 
problem ofthe existence of rare alleles which were possibly more susceptible 
to genetic drift induced by substructuring effects (NRC 1992, pp.83-84). 
In itself, the ceiling principle was perhaps redolent of a self-conscious lack of 
knowledge about population substructure, as well as a recognition of the 
limitations of the technology as it existed at that time (the SLP platform in 
widespread use at the time relied on less loci than modem systems). 
149 
Nevertheless, both the ceiling principle and the application of confidence 
intervals were subject to vehement criticism, most notably in the second NRC 
report ('NRC 2'), published in 1996 (NRC 1996). NRC 2 acknowledged a 
number of inherent flaws present in the first report. The ceiling principles 
were seen as excessively conservative, and more seriously still, the 0.05% 
threshold value was attacked for being a completely arbitrary figure with no 
scientific justification (NRC 1996, p.157). Furthermore, NRC 2 criticised the 
lack of acknowledgement, on the part of the previous authors, of 'standard 
procedures long used by population geneticists to study subdivided 
populations' (NRC 1996, p.157)3• There was also reference to the poorly 
specified guidance concerning which population groups to include in the 
calculation of ceiling frequencies. With regard to database size, NRC 2 also 
pointed out to the inherent circularity in the use of small databases to check for 
HW conformity and linkage disequilibrium (NRC 1996, p.159). 
In response to this, NRC 2 recommended a more sophisticated theoretical 
approach. The report saw the use of the inbreeding coefficient, 8. This value 
gave an indication of the tendency towards 'fixity' of an allele in a given 
population, i.e. the extent to which homozygosity was established in the 
population. This allowed for the possibility for the occurrence of mating 
within distinct subpopulations. Thus NRC 2 proposed a new formula for 
determining allele frequencies of homozygotic loci which accounted for the 
tendency toward fixity. This formula however, only applied where precise 
genotypes were ascertained; the primitive gel technology in general use at the 
time had difficulty in resolving heterozygotic alleles of similar MW. These 
often appeared as a single band and could be easily mistaken for a 
homozygote. In cases where resolution was problematic, NRC 2 
recommended certain mathematical adjustments to ensure a conservative 
estimate. 
Furthermore, the use of confidence intervals, in conjunction with the ceiling 
principles as suggested in NRC I, were considered unsuitable for use with the 
3 Without specifying exactly what was meant by' standard procedures' (NRC 1996, p.157). 
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PCR-based systems that were emerging during the time of publication ofNRC 
2. The use of SLP systems involved loci each exhibiting several allele types, 
none of which existed with high frequency. In contrast, PCR-based systems 
involving smaller allele distributions at loci produced larger allele frequencies 
that added up to > 1 given the application of upper confidence limits, which 
also led to heterozygote frequencies exceeding the HW threshold of0.5 (NRC 
1996, p.l58). This was in addition to other criticisms of basic errors made in 
the application of confidence intervals. For example, the erroneous 
multiplication of upper 95% confidence limits for each allele frequency was 
also highlighted, for as according to Weir, 'confidence limits for products are 
not obtained as products of confidence limits' (quoted in Buckleton and 
Curran 2004, p.201). 
Although the NRC 2 solution was regarded as being grounded on sound 
mathematical principles4 , it was deemed unsuitable for use with small 
databases due to the inversely proportional relationship between range of 
confidence interval on a logarithmic scale and square root of database 
population (N). It was also questioned whether the method would be 
amenable to use with additional loci due to the additional variability that this 
adduces to the estimate, leading to a wider log scale interval (NRC 1996, 
p.l46). However, the logarithmic multiplication method5 was ultimately seen 
to suffer from a lack of consideration of other sources of uncertainty, e.g. the 
effects of population subdivision. 
In the light of this NRC 2 proposed an alternative method, which can be 
summarised as thus: 
'Within a racial group, geographic origin and ethnic composition have very little 
effect on the frequencies of forensic DNA profiles, although there are larger 
differences between major groups (races). It is probably safe to assume that within a 
race, the uncertainty of a value calculated from adequate data bases (at least several 
hundred persons) by the product rule is within a factor of about 10 above and below 
the true value. If the calculated profile probability is very small, the uncertainty can 
4 This method is still applied in certain jurisdictions in Australia (Buckleton and Curran 2004, p.202). 
5 Referred to as Asymptotic Normality of the Logarithm in Buckleton and Curran (2004, pp.202-204). 
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be larger, but even a large relative error will not change the conclusion.' (NRC 1996, 
p.l56). 
Here the authors of the NRC report appear to have taken a substantially 
different direction. Disregarding matters of statistical theory, this conclusion 
was reached not by calculation, but through empirical means. Comparisons 
were made of genotype frequencies between and within 'races'. Individual 
genotype frequencies were plotted, using a logarithmic scale, on scatter 
graphs, with abscissae and ordinates representing differing racial, ethnic and 
geographic groups. These graphs, the report argued, proved that genotype 
frequencies gathered around a factor of± 101 if the two populations analysed 
were of the same racial composition, but varied by a greater factor if they 
differed (NRC 1996, pp. 151-156). This effect was observed, it was claimed, 
regardless of whether or not issues such as potential substructuring were taken 
into account. 
In addition to the obvious lack of theoretical foundation, this proposition 
rested on relatively little in the way of scientific evidence. The claims made 
with regard to racial differences in NRC 2 are made largely on the basis of 
comparisons within and between white and black populations, and it is not 
clear how large the study populations were. As such it can clearly be seen to 
serve as a set of assumptions rather than a systematic methodology.6 
From this brief discussion of some of the controversies which raged in the US 
during the 1990s, it is possible to see how these were stimulated due to 
interactions between the realms of law, science and statistics. Prior to the 
Castro case, DNA profiling was largely considered to be an immutable means 
of establishing guilt or innocence, so much so that a successful DNA match 
was deemed to be akin to a guilty verdict. The intervention of lawyers 
Neufeld and Scheck however led to the opening up of a series of discussions 
which eventually encompassed complex scientific issues. As described by 
Derksen (2000), their investigations into the procedures used by Lifecodes Inc 
6 The leading journal Forensic Science International has published genetic data on a wide variety of 
'population groups', a practice continued by its offshoot journal FS!:Genetics. 
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exposed a number of discrepancies involved in supposedly 'objective' 
scientific methods (Derksen 2000). Some of these shortcomings were related 
to technical limitations, with analysts having to use measurement error to 
overcome the lack of accuracy inherent in the visual gel-based system of 
assessment. These limitations however impacted strongly upon the calculation 
of match probabilities. Such figures required databases of DNA profiles and 
allele frequencies, yet the gel system caused serious problems with the 
statistical manipulation of such data. For example, the organisation of allele 
populations into 'bins' was found to be nonrepeatable due to the lack of the 
accuracy of gel electrophoresis. 
Legal questioning also raised issues with the construction of databases used to 
generate match probabilities. Possibly reflecting certain assumptions about 
the relationship between race and genetics, the construction of a 'Caucasian' 
database by the FBI led to a further debate about the possibility of alleles 
being 'substructured' on ethnic lines, sparking a heated debate in scientific and 
forensic circles. The report which arose from this controversy, NRC 1, 
recommended a statistical approach which was heavily criticised for error and 
arbitrariness, and only served to compound the situation further. The 
problems with NRC 1 may have been partially caused by the swiftly-changing 
nature of scientific opinion at the time, but, as Derksen (2000) reports, extra-
scientific factors may have also served to shape the final report, which was 
authored by a committee of leading scientific figures (Derksen 2000, p.823). 
Personality clashes, time and resource constraints, and the pressure of the need 
to make the report comprehendable to non-scientists may have all contributed 
to the outcome ofNRC 1. 
Although generally regarded as an effort to ameliorate the mistakes made in 
NRCl, NRC 2 established a distinction between mathematical and empirical 
attempts to establish confidence intervals. Although it recommended a 
sophisticated mathematical solution, it also conceded that this was of limited 
use, depending on the size of the population database. Hence it also proposed 
a more practical method involving empirical analysis. This led to discussions 
over the efficacy of each system. Whilst the empirical method has been 
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criticised for being less scientifically sound, the mathematical method has 
been considered by some to be too conservative for forensic use, in that it may 
be biased toward the defence position. Hence even through these discussions, 
technical, statistical and legal concerns continue to intermingle. 
The story of the modem development ofDNA evidence is one in which 
probability theory and statistics continues to play a major role, and has 
arguably helped to drive the development of probability theory in the service 
of others areas of evidence interpretation. Central to these developments is the 
ongoing involvement of the Bayesian approach to probability. With reference 
to controversies raised in the UK courts, I therefore continue to describe the 
impact of Bayes in discussions concerning statistics and probability in the 
context of forensic science and criminal justice. 
6. 7 Probability and the Courts 
Challenges to DNA evidence in UK appeal cases have concerned both alleged 
scientific failures and flawed presentations of evidence (Williams et al 2004). 
In R vs Cordon, concerns over statistical reasoning were accompanied by 
challenges to the laboratory method (Williams et al 2004, p.22). Gordon's 
conviction had been based on DNA evidence which had seemingly established 
a match between two profiles obtained from two separate semen samples from 
rape cases. The appeal argument attempted to refute this evidence by claiming 
that the gel technology used to assess the evidence was seriously flawed. 
Although the distribution ofbands from both crime scene samples was found 
to precisely match, only a series of bands matched those of Gordon. The 
original, supposedly incriminating match, had been made using a procedure 
which had incorporated a degree of measurement error between the bands that 
constituted the profile (Williams et al 2004, p.23). This was allowed by 
scientists due to the occurrence of stochastic variations in the length 
measurements represented by the bands each time the procedure was carried 
out. Gordon' s appeal argument was that the degree of measurement error was 
higher than the 'window' that was commonly allowed. In response, the 
scientist who carried out the measurement agreed about the matter of degree, 
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but claimed that the previous variation criteria had been too strict, and hence 
the profiles could still be considered to match (Williams et al 2004, p.23). 
UK law has also been faced with a number of controversies relating to the 
presentation of statistical evidence in court, often involving DNA. One 
particular problem in this regard concerns the 'prosecutor's fallacy', a term 
made use of in a paper published by Thompson and Schumann ( 1987). The 
prosecutor's fallacy is essentially a straightforward example of a logical 
fallacy known as 'the transposition of the conditional' (Thompson and 
Schumann 1987). Thompson and Schumann explain the reasoning behind the 
prosecutor's fallacy by presenting the following example: 
'Suppose you are asked to judge the probability a man is lawyer based on the fact he 
owns a briefcase. Let us assume all lawyers own a briefcase but only one person in 
ten in the general population owns a briefcase. Following the prosecutor's logic, you 
would jump to the conclusions that there is a 90% chance the man is a lawyer. But 
this conclusion is obviously wrong. We know that the number ofnonlawyers is 
many times greater than the number of lawyers. Hence lawyers are outnumbered by 
briefcase owners who are not lawyers (and a given briefcase owner is more likely to 
be a nonlawyer than a lawyer). To draw conclusions about the probability the man is 
a lawyer based on the fact he owns a briefcase, we must consider not just the 
incidence of briefcase ownership, but also the a priori likelihood of being a lawyer.' 
(Thompson and Schumann 1987, p.170, emphasis added)'. 
Hence, the fallacy occurs when the probability of occurrence of a single piece 
of evidence (the ownership of a briefcase), is used as a measure of the 
probability of a hypothesis (that the owner is a lawyer). The fallacy reflects 
the lack, on the part of the reasoner, to take into consideration other pieces of 
evidence. Or, as it was expressed in more simple terms by one interviewee: 
'All elephants have four legs, but if we see a four-legged animal it would be wrong 
to assume it is an elephant on that basis alone!' (Interviewee 6B) 
In a forensic context, the prosecutor's fallacy therefore represents instances in 
which a single piece of evidence is directly associated with the probability of 
guilt of a defendant. Using forensic nomenclature, this can be considered as a 
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belief that the probability of a piece of evidence given a guilty hypothesis 
P(E\Hp ), is the same as the probability of guilt given a piece of evidence, 
P(Hp\E). 
The prosecutor's fallacy has become strongly associated with DNA evidence, 
due in part to the magnitude ofRMPs which are capable of being generated 
using modern methods. It formed the basis of a notable controversy 
surrounding R v Deen. In this case, evidence was presented in which the RMP 
of DNA evidence was given as one in three million. The evidence was 
presented by the prosecution thus: 
'Counsel: So the likelihood of this being any other man but Andrew Deen is one in 
three million? 
Expert: In three million, yes.' (Redmayne 2001, p.58). 
The primary objection advanced in this case concerned the ambiguity between 
the probability that the defendant's DNA matched the crime scene profile, and 
the probability that the defendant had actually left DNA at the crime scene 
(Williams et al 2004, p.22). The first calculation involved the random match 
probability, whilst the second was actually a measure of likelihood that Deen 
had deposited the crime scene stain, generated using a Bayesian schema. The 
crux of the argument was that, in the exchange quoted above, the random 
match probability figure had been used to answer the question about the 
likelihood of Deen' s guilt. Hence, a single piece of evidence (the RMP), had 
been used to prove the hypothesis that Deen had been the depositor of the 
crime scene stain, without taking any other circumstances into account. In 
other words, what should have been regarded as pertaining to 'E' in the above 
formula (the RMP), was actually confused for 'P(E\Hp)'. This, the defence 
argued, was an instance of the prosecutor's fallacy. 
The controversy over the prosecutor's fallacy also came to light in R v Doheny 
and Adams (1996), a case in which two men were charged with rape. DNA 
match evidence was presented against one of the accused, Alan Doheny, 
returned an RMP of 1 in 40 million. The following exchange took place: 
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'Reporting forensic scientist: .. .I calculated the chance of finding all of these 
(matching) bands ... to be about l in 40 million. 
Prosecution counsel: The likelihood of it being anyone other than Alan Doheny? 
Reporting forensic scientist: About 1 in 40 million.' 
(Evett 2005) 
Likewise another DNA match was presented against Adams, the eo-accused: 
'Prosecution counsel: Is it possible that the semen could have come from a different 
person from the person who provided the blood sample? 
Reporting forensic scientist: It is possible but it so unlikely as to really not be 
credible .. .I can estimate the chances of this semen having come from a man other 
than the provider of the blood sample ... I can work out the chances as being less than 
1 in 27 million' (Evett 2005) 
The convictions of both men were brought to appeal, on the basis of 'the 
misleading and inaccurate manner in which forensic evidence was presented, 
in particular the way in which the random occurrence ratio, the frequency with 
which the matching characteristics were likely to be found in the population at 
large, was expressed' (R vs Doheny and Adams 1996, quoted in Williams et al 
2004, p.26). 
Doheny's conviction was quashed on the grounds that 'the approach 
demonstrated by the prosecution's expert was not legitimate and the conviction 
was unsafe.' The decision led the Appeal Court to make specific 
recommendations for how match probabilities, or 'frequency calculations' 
should be presented to the Court: 
'The scientist should not be asked his opinion on the likelihood that it was the 
Defendant who left the crime stain, nor when giving evidence should he use 
terminology which may lead the jury to believe that he is expressing such an opinion' 
(R v Doheny and Adams 1996, quoted in Williams et al2004, p.26). 
Doheny also ruled that, in strictly statistical terms, the match probabilities 
associated with DNA evidence will incriminate a small number of the 
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population, including the suspect. The role of the jury therefore, was defined 
as determining whether or not the additional evidence inculpates the accused 
to an extent that transcends any reasonable doubt. The Appeal Court produced 
a template for the presentation of DNA evidence to juries: 
'Members of the jury, if you accept the scientific evidence called by the Crown, this 
indicates that there are probably only four or five males in the United Kingdom from 
whom that semen stain could have come. The Defendant is one of them. If that is 
the position, the decision you have to reach, on all of the evidence, is whether you are 
sure that it was the Defendant who left the stain or whether it is possible that it was 
one of that other small group of men who share the same DNA characteristics'. 
(Williams et al 2004, p.26). 
The phrase 'on all of the evidence' is informative here, as this indicates the 
sense that juries cannot convict purely on positive DNA evidence alone, nor 
should it be regarded as providing a definitive match between the suspect and 
the crime scene sample. 
Another notable controversy concerning the use of statistics in court 
concerned the trial, and subsequent appeals, ofDennis John Adams (R vs 
Dennis John Adams). These trials were notable for the employment, by the 
defence, of a strategy which explicitly used Bayesian reasoning. Lynch and 
MacNally (2003) present a history of this case, which I now draw upon to 
describe the details of the method and the controversies it provoked. 
Dennis Adams was originally convicted in 1995 of the rape of 'Miss M', 
which had occurred two years previously. A crime scene stain profile had 
been recovered and was stored on a database held by the Metropolitan Police 
Forensic Science Laboratory (now part of the FSS). This was found to match 
with the DNA of Dennis Adams which was sampled following his arrest for 
another sexual offence. 
The original trial took place in January 1995. The DNA evidence presented in 
court reported that Dennis Adams was 200 million times more likely to be the 
perpetrator than any other male. This statistic was, however, virtually the only 
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piece of evidence put forward by the prosecution, and was countered by a 
relatively strong defence case (Lynch and MacNally 2003). Miss M had 
claimed that her assailant had been a Caucasian man aged between 20 and 25 
years at the time ofthe attack, whereas Dennis Adams was 37. Miss M had 
failed to identify the suspect in a police lineup, and subsequently said that 
Dennis Adams did not resemble her attacker, and looked significantly older 
than the offender. Furthermore, Dennis Adams claimed to have an alibi, 
saying he had spent that night with his girlfriend, who in turn corroborated this 
statement. 
In the trial, the defence strategy involved two main areas. First, they 
questioned the accuracy of the gel autoradiogram on which the profile was 
generated, and the ability of forensic scientists to generate the likelihood 
figure based on the data. Second, they adopted a novel line of argument, in 
which they attempted to use Bayes Theorem to show that the prosecution had 
failed to take all the details pertaining to the case into account when 
calculating their likelihood statistic. They wanted the jury to use Bayesian 
methodology for translating all the evidence relevant to the case into 
probability estimates. The defence justified this strategy by claiming that all 
of the evidence be treated the same. They claimed that, in using Bayes 
Theorem to calculate their likelihood statistic based on DNA evidence, the 
prosecution had themselves led the way for the Bayesian approach to 
evidence. The defence however advanced the argument that the prosecution 
approach was flawed and incomplete, in that they had used Bayes only to 
calculate a likelihood measure based on the DNA evidence alone. The 
defence sought to show how Bayes, by accounting for all the information 
relevant to the case, could be used to demonstrate that the likelihood of Dennis 
Adams was actually significantly reduced, well below the threshold of 
reasonable doubt. 
The defence recruited Professor Peter Donnelly, a statistician then at Queen 
Mary and Westfield College, University of London. Donnelly developed a 
questionnaire that jurors could use in order to guide them in Bayesian 
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calculation. This prompted the juror to make four probability estimates 
(Lynch and McNally 2003, p.91): 
1) The probability that a local man committed the offence 
2) The probability that the victim would not have identified the offender 
3) The probability that Adams would have given the evidence he did in favour of 
his innocence 
4) The probability that Adams would have been able to call the alibi evidence on 
his behalf 
Donnelly did not instruct the jurors in which figures to use in making their 
estimates, but presented information for the purposes of illustration. The 
questionnaire consisted of the following questions (Lynch and McNally 2003, 
p.91): 
1) What is the chance, assuming nothing else about the case, that the rapist came from 
the local area? 
Donnelly cited local council data that 153,000 men between ages of 18 
and 60 lived within a 15-kilometer radius of the crime scene, a figure rounded 
down to 150,000 for ease of calculation. He then gave an example to show the 
effects of assuming a 75 percent chance that the attacker was a local man, 
dividing 150,000 by 0.75, resulting in a figure of200,000. According to the 
facts of the case, A dams was a local man, so that in the absence of any other 
evidence the odds of his being the man who deposited the semen sample 
recovered during the victim's examination were 200,000 to one. 
2) What is the chance that the victim would fail to identifY A dams? 
This part of the questionnaire consisted of two relevant sub-questions. One 
asked the jurors to state the probability that, if Adams were innocent, he would 
not match the victim's description. The second question obliged jurors to state 
the probability that, if Adams were guilty, he would not match the victim's 
description. 
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The key issue concerned the ratio between these two figures, for these 
corresponded to a likelihood ratio of the victim's eyewitness evidence between 
the defence and prosecution hypotheses. Again, by way of illustration, 
Donnelly provided an example whereby he assumed that, if innocent, there 
would be a 90 percent chance that he would not match the victim's 
description, but a 1 0 percent that he would not match the description if he 
were guilty. According to the Bayesian logic of the questionnaire, this ratio 
was to be multiplied by the ratio given for the first item, 1 in 200,000, which 
represented the prior odds, to produce a posterior probability estimate of guilt 
reflecting the combination of these two pieces of evidence. In Donnelly's 
example, the multiplication of the two figures returned a figure of 1 to 1.18 
million. 
3) What is the chance of the defendant's evidence? 
In his example estimate, Donnelly assumed that there was an equal chance 
that a guilty or innocent defendant would give the same evidence that Adams 
had done, which returned a 1:1 ratio, hence exerting no effect on the figures 
based on the first two issues. 
4. What is the chance of the alibi evidence? 
Again this question involved a consideration of defence and prosecution 
hypotheses. Donnelly assumed a 25 percent probability that a guilty defendant 
would be able to produce the alibi evidence in this case, and a 50 percent 
chance that an innocent defendant would produce the same evidence. 
According to this example, it would therefore be twice as likely that Adams 
would have the alibi evidence if he were innocent, giving a ratio of 1 to 2. 
Multiplication of 1 to 1.18 million ratio by 1 to 2 returns 1 to 3.6 million. 
Hence, Donnelly put forward a probability of 
1:3.6 million on the basis of the non-DNA evidence alone. 
This figure, of 1 in 3.6 million in favour of guilt, was then used as a prior 
probability to be combined with the likelihood of guilt from DNA evidence, 
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cited as 200 million. A multiplication of these two figures returned a posterior 
probability of innocence of 1 in 55; hence Dennis Adams was taken to be 55 
times more likely to be guilty than innocent. Questions concerning the gel 
autoradiogram were then taken into consideration. One of the bands from the 
crime scene profile that had allegedly matched with Dennis Adams' gel data 
had been questioned by the defence, due to its indistinct appearance. Donnelly 
argued that if this particular band was ignored, the likelihood figure could be 
seen to reduce by a factor of ten, to 20 million, which in turn would render 
Dennis Adams only 5.5 times more likely to be guilty than innocent (Lynch 
and McNally 2003, p.92). Donnelly went on to argue that another discrepancy 
in the DNA profile evidence could force the prosecution figure down to 2 
million, returning a figure of approximately one in 2 that Dennis Adams was 
guilty. The defence even went as far to argue that if the fact that Dennis 
Adams had a brother was taken into consideration, he actually became more 
likely to be innocent, as this turned the probability of guilt into 1 in 18 7 
Despite this approach, Dennis Adams was convicted of the rape ofMiss M. 
An appeal was launched, on two grounds, namely that DNA evidence alone 
was insufficient to prove guilt, and that the original trial judge had 
inadequately instructed the jury in the use of the Bayesian defence. Whilst the 
first argument was accepted as suitable grounds for appeal; the second 
argument, concerning the Bayesian defence, was however rejected. The 
appeal judge criticised the way in which the defence had used Bayes: 
' ... the mathematical formula, applied to each separate piece of evidence, is simply 
inappropriate to the jury's task. Jurors evaluate evidence and reach a conclusion not 
only by means of a formula, 
Mathematical or otherwise, but by the joint application of their individual common 
sense and knowledge of the world to the evidence before them.' 
This despite the defence's assertion that the Bayesian procedure enabled 
'common sense' (or non-DNA) evidence to be weighed on the same scale as 
ostensibly 'scientific' DNA evidence. 
7 See Balding for a discussion of how relatedness affects likelihood calculations based on DNA 
evidence. 
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During the re-trial, the defence once again utilised the same Bayesian 
methodology, but once more a guilty verdict was returned. The defence 
immediately pressed for another appeal. This time however, their arguments 
were rejected. In making the rejection, the Court proclaimed that the Bayesian 
method was only suitable for DNA evidence, claiming that this involved 
'empirical statistical data', as opposed to the seemingly 'non-scientific' data 
put forward by Donnelly. 
In drawing such a distinction, the Court's decision can be viewed as arbitrary. 
The Court's argument was that 'non-scientific', 'commonsensical' evidence 
was being given a scientific veneer, and that this 'common sense' evidence 
should be assessed via suitably intuitive and consensual methods. A 
'scientific' technique, such as DNA profiling, was however entirely suited to 
quantitative Bayesian analysis. 
ln the UK, it may appear that the rulings on Deen, Doheny and Adams, and 
Dennis John Adams have served to act as closure on issues relating to the 
presentation of statistical evidence in court. The issue of the reporting of 
statistical evidence has, however, been debated in the literature. 
For example, Redmayne (2002) argues that the uptake of a statistical mode of 
thought has serious consequences for conceptions of evidence and proof. He 
claims that the use of probabilistic reporting enables the gap separating 
evidence of identity and proof of identity to be fully revealed, as opposed to 
eyewitness testimony where it is not instantly clear whether such a gap can be 
identified. Moreover, Redmayne points out that the Doheny approach 
presupposes that a uniform prior probability is assigned to all those possibly 
incriminated by DNA evidence, an assumption that can be easily taken to be 
fallacious. Redmayne counters by suggesting that if juries were told that an 
accused's profile already existed on a criminal database, it might influence 
their thinking. However, this points to a paradox. Taken to a logical extreme, 
the use of statistical reasoning potentially negates any hope of reaching proof. 
Redmayne cites Raw ling (1999) in arguing that if a full Bayesian approach 
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were ever to be adopted, extremely high likelihood ratios would need to be 
generated in order to pass the high threshold set by the concept of reasonable 
doubt. Redmayne views jurors as requiring certain presuppositions to be able 
to make an informed decision (such as trust in the police to arrest an individual 
who has a high chance of being the offender), but this too is problematic, for 
this invites charges of irrationality. 
Regardless of this, even if a certain mode of reasoning such as probabilism is 
adopted, Redmayne argues that it may yet be underdetermined in the face of 
more naturally intuitive forms of reasoning. An example here is given 
involving DNA evidence. Redmayne equates a suspect being arrested via a 
DNA database search (as opposed to a one-to-one match between the crime 
scene profile and a suspect profile), with the arrest of a suspect on some other 
basis - such as suspicion due to previous form. In both cases, if the defendant 
decides not to reveal the reason behind his arrest (database search or previous 
form), with a DNA match the only evidence against him, then the jury may 
become more suspicious that there is undisclosed evidence against him. 
Otherwise, it could be considered untoward that the police would arrest an 
individual by random on the basis of a DNA match. According to Redmayne, 
the fact that a database search might raise (possibly unjustified) suspicion 
underpins the argument in favour of deflating the DNA evidence. However, 
this argument is not what Redmayne primarily focuses on. Redmayne's claim 
is that the whole debate over database search effects does not rest on a level 
where logical analysis can be taken to settle the matter, and that instead the 
argument concerns claims over how juries are likely to reason. (Redmayne 
2003, pp.881-882). 
Redrnayne ultimately raises the issue over to what extent we allow a particular 
mode of reasoning to guide our way of acquiring knowledge, and when we 
should instead rely on intuitive or experiential knowledge (Redmayne 2002, 
2003). He argues that no concrete rules can be ascribed. If this is so, such that 
any attempt to apply normative standards is inevitably relative, this may 
indicate that the roles of specific technologies, existing as they do at the 
intersection between differing epistemologies, are instrumental to the eventual 
outcome. DNA evidence can be taken to represent a site whereby the 
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epistemic interests of both forensic science and the legal realm have to be 
accommodated. 
6.8 Conclusion 
Whilst the probabilism debate within evidence studies has remained fairly 
esoteric in nature, the use of statistics and probability theory has found ever 
increasing application within the practice of forensic science. In particular, the 
field has seen the rise in popularity of the Bayesian approach to probability 
theory. The enthusiastic embrace ofBayes by forensic scientists and by a 
section of evidence scholars appears to have created a tension between them 
and members of the judiciary, who have been somewhat less than forthcoming 
to grant Bayesian reasoning any further foothold in the courtroom. 
Nevertheless, supporters of the adoption of probabilistic reasoning in court 
cases, and particularly those of a Bayesian persuasion, have continued to state 
their case, and have often adopted something amounting to a fundamentalist 
position. The prescriptive stance taken by many Bayesian evidence scholars 
has naturally provoked close scrutiny not only of the philosophical and logical 
basis of the position, but also over the practical issues involved in the use of 
Bayes in the course of the legal process (1 ackson 1996). Redmayne ( 1996) 
views Bayesianism as a useful analytical tool for forensic science, but argues 
that any wholesale application ofBayes is problematic. Redmayne argues that 
for Bayesianism to work in practice, one needs to simplify and downplay the 
complexities of the real world: ' ... one of the values of the [Bayesian] model 
lies in its ability to uncover some of the very complexities with which it is 
poorly suited to coping' (Redmayne 1996, p.760) Although the Bayesian 
approach is useful for comparing two diametrically opposed hypotheses, he 
argues that prosecution and defence case may not necessarily be defined in 
such idealised terms. 
Regardless of such debates, it seems that the advent of DNA evidence has 
reinforced the pre-eminence of Bayes amongst forensic scientists. Most of the 
methods currently used for the interpretation of DNA evidence utilise a 
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Bayesian epistemology, and it is highly likely that future technologies in this 
area will use Bayes in ever more expansive ways (Taroni et al2006). With 
DNA evidence serving as a means of perpetuating the use ofBayes, its 
immediate future in the context of forensic science is most probably assured, 
but it is clear that there remains no place for it in the procedures of the courts. 
In describing the controversies experienced in the US and UK in the 1990s, I 
have also begun to demonstrate the interdependence that can be identified 
between the domains of science, statistics and law. In the US, judicial 
challenges to DNA profiling led to the wholesale questioning not just of the 
technology and practices involved in the technique itself, but eventually 
sparked a series of debates which touched upon complex and esoteric areas 
within the realms of population genetics and statistics. Legal challenges in the 
UK have centred on the presentation of DNA match statistics in court. Cases 
such as R vs Deen, and R vs Doheny and Adams, have introduced fine-grained 
logical discussions centring on the concept of the 'prosecutor's fallacy', and 
have led to the successful challenge of seemingly unassailable DNA evidence. 
The case of R vs Dennis John Adams however, perhaps indicates an important 
area of uncertainty and contestation; here a statistical approach was seen as 
unnecessarily impinging upon areas considered the preserve of jury reasoning. 
The interdependencies apparent in these examples reinforce the notion of the 
impossibility of isolating science from a wider set of social worlds. The legal 
challenges described above led to a certain unravelling of supposedly 
immutable claims. Moreover, they show how this process of unravelling may 
occur in numerous ways; either by recourse to a linked series of scientific 
issues, or in regard to the manner in which this evidence may be presented. In 
this way, juridico-scientific inquiry can be seen to be a performed and 
constructed achievement, consisting, essentially, of a process of marshalling 
reality. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN- CASE STUDY 1: 
AUTOMATED DNA EVIDENCE 
INTERPRETATION SYSTEMS 
7.1 Introduction 
On 201h December 2007, Sean Gerard Hoey was found not guilty of all fifty-
six criminal charges that were brought against him in relation to his alleged 
role in the bomb attack which took place in Omagh, Northern Ireland, in 
August 1998. This included twenty-nine counts of murder corresponding to 
the number of victims of the attack, which caused the largest single loss oflife 
during the so-called 'Troubles'. The prosecution case during the trial, which 
lasted over a year, was heavily reliant on forensic evidence. Particular 
prominence was given to DNA evidence generated from a technique known as 
'Low Copy Number' (LCN) DNA profiling, which the prosecution argued 
provided a match between the DNA of Hoey and minute quantities of genetic 
material supposedly found on the bomb timers used in the attack. LCN DNA 
analysis had been employed by the Forensic Science Service (FSS) over 
21,000 times previously, and offered as evidence in over 40 cases. It was 
claimed that the technique could facilitate the construction of DNA profiles 
from material extracted from of a small number of human cells, or potentially 
even a single cell (Findlay 1997). 
However, over the course of the trial, the LCN DNA evidence, as well as other 
aspects of forensic evidence relevant to the prosecution case, was subject to a 
rigorous challenge from the defence. In particular, experts testifying for the 
defence questioned the scientific basis of the LCN technique. Speaking for 
the defence, Professor Dan Krane from Wright State University, Ohio, argued 
that the results of LCN DNA testing were susceptible to a far greater level of 
subjective interpretation than conventional forensic DNA analysis. He also 
voiced concerns over the relative ease in which LCN DNA samples could 
become contaminated (BBC News 2007). Cross-examination ofDNA 
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scientists called by the prosecution led to one expert admitting that some of 
the supposedly incriminating results were 'valueless', and that the area of 
LCN was susceptible to a high degree of ambiguity (BBC News 2006d). 
In his criticism of the manner in which LCN had been presented in court, and 
in particular his rejection of the existence oftwo peer-reviewed articles as 
constituting sufficient ground for validation of the technique, the presiding 
Judge Weir highlighted a number ofhighly significant issues in contemporary 
forensic practice. First, his summation highlights the continuing existence of a 
gulfbetween the realms of science and UK.law, with regard to the issue of 
scientific admissibility. Not only did he acknowledge the inability of judges 
to make sole decisions over the admissibility of evidence, but his judgement 
also exposed differences concerning the means by which the worlds of science 
and law determine the 'truth' of scientific evidence. Moreover, the trial has 
also served to expose considerable differences of opinion within the relevant 
scientific community itself. In this instance, Judge Weir can be seen to have 
acted in this context as something of a 'gatekeeper' himself, and the trial, as a 
whole, has served to open the 'black box' of LCN evidence, exposing 
differing judgements over the efficacy of the technique between experts 
(J asanoff 1998). 
This case has also served to emphasise how the interpretation of DNA profiles 
remains an area of contestation. Not only has it raised serious questions about 
the nature of the technical and interpretive work involved, but it has also 
exposed the fact that some aspects of these technologies are not fully accepted 
amongst the forensic science communities themselves, notwithstanding the 
opinions of the courts. 
The Omagh trial represents a significant event in the history of the relationship 
between the law and forensic science, insofar as it was the first time that LCN 
DNA had met any form of concerted challenge from defence counsel. 
Moreover, the defence testimony which challenged the LCN evidence 
appeared to strongly influence the final conclusions of Judge Weir. It is 
possible that this case may come to represent the start of a period where DNA 
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evidence may become potentially more susceptible to similar challenges. 
Following the collapse of the case, the Association ofChiefPolice Officers 
(ACPO) ordered a temporary suspension of the use of LCN technique in 
criminal investigation, with forces in Scotland and Northern Ireland following 
suit. The Crown Prosecution Service also announced a review of all cases 
involving LCN evidence. In Australia, the Omagh verdict led to calls for a 
review of the Falconio murder case (Murdoch 2007). 
There is perhaps a certain amount of irony given the confidence with which 
the LCN evidence was put forward by the prosecution in this and other cases. 
The LCN technique had been involved in some high-profile successes in 
criminal investigations in the UK and in Australia, and LCN has played an 
especially prominent role in resolving many so-called 'cold cases', serious 
offences which had previously lain unsolved. In fact, LCN has formed part of 
a repertoire of sophisticated techniques developed by the FSS and made 
available for casework. These techniques encompass a range of technologies 
which facilitate the interpretation of DNA profiles and extend the 
informational potential of DNA. In addition to LCN, the FSS have developed 
Pendulum List Search (PLS), an automated method for the resolution of mixed 
DNA profiles from multiple contributors, and the 'familial search' technique 
which exploits similarities between the DNA profiles of family members in 
order to compare unknown profiles with possible relatives located on the 
NDNAD. These techniques have been used both singly and in combination, 
with successful results being publicised by the FSS and police forces, as well 
as being keenly received by the media (BBC News 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). 
The existence of such technologies, and the benefits claimed for their use in 
casework, should indicate that the process of interpreting DNA profiles, and of 
matching them to suspects, is not always an unproblematic procedure. Nor 
does it result in categorical assignations of guilt or innocence.· Instead, the 
deployment of these technologies demonstrate the quantity and quality of 
scientific labour required in order to generate meaningful results from 
biological material. This is a process in which the use ofprobabilistic 
approaches such as Bayesian reasoning plays an important role in the 
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development of the algorithms which drive relevant systems. The results 
yielded by these systems produce conditional values, likelihood ratios, which 
can provide powerful guidance with regard to the consideration of hypotheses 
concerning the guilt or innocence of suspects. Certainly the FSS (as developer 
and provider), and the media, have been keen to hail the success ofthese 
interpretation technologies as representing the continuing ability of science to 
make dramatic interventions into the resolution of criminal cases, many of 
which having been seemingly impossible to solve. Novel DNA interpretation 
techniques, such as LCN and PLS, are represented as playing an important 
role in facilitating the progress of specific police operations, and on occasions, 
media imagery closely resembles the depictions of forensic science found in 
fictional dramas such as the American series CS!. 
In this chapter I first focus upon some of the controversies which surround 
these technologies, with particular regard to questions concerning their 
scientific basis. With particular focus on the controversy surrounding LCN 
profiling, I discuss the ways in which certain areas of contestation have 
developed, and show how debates concerning these technologies continue to 
play out. By subsequently extending the discussion to encompass new 
technological developments, I argue that such attempts at constructing 
methods for resolving interpretation issues in an ostensibly more 'objective' 
manner do not succeed in negating these areas of subjectivity. On the contrary, 
I argue that such technologies serve to create new spaces of subjectivity and 
ambiguity within the Bayesian architecture that these systems employ. 
I then continue by presenting a brief history of the employment of these 
techniques in criminal investigations. Here, my intention is to analyse the 
relationship between scientific methods for criminal investigation and other 
investigative issues. In pursuing this aim I seek to address the following 
questions: to what extent have these technologies altered the organisation and 
structure of criminal investigation; or, to what extent have they altered the 
framework of decision-making with regard to the pursuit of criminal cases? 
Conversely, to what extent are these technologies embedded in, and reliant 
upon, a wider set of government policies, police practices, and other 
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exogenous factors? In considering these questions it may be possible to gain 
an improved understanding of the potentially variable relationship between 
technology and the organisation of criminal investigation. 
In what then follows I introduce the practical complications that may be 
encountered during the analysis and interpretation of DNA profiles, and 
describe in more detail efforts to ameliorate these issues, via the application of 
techniques based on applications of probability theory. I focus upon these 
techniques in an attempt to demonstrate the high level of calculative labour 
involved in the generation of systems for the interpretation of DNA profiles, 
an issue which is often masked by popular representations of DNA profiling. 
I seek to further this discussion to highlight how the process of DNA profile 
interpretation can be forced to deal with a number of sources of ambiguity 
which are susceptible to resolution via subjective judgement. Essentially I aim 
to determine to what extent the use ofBayesian theory masks certain 
assumptions, which, when brought to light, may lead one to question to what 
extent the whole process ofthese new technologies is entirely 'objective'. 
Thus, this case study seeks to build on the work of authors such as Latour, 
( 1999) who have aimed to show how technologies may mask sources of 
subjectivity to convey an image of objectivity, a process known as 'black-
boxing'. In particular, the research outlined herein attempts to reflect and 
build upon the research performed by Derksen (2000) who, in an earlier study 
of DNA profiling, sought to demonstrate how social practices determined 
what was construed as 'objective' and 'normal' in the course of DNA 
measurements (Derksen 2000) I also aim to examine the manner in which 
these assumptions of objectivity were upheld for so long, and to explore the 
objections to them. In examining the manner in which these technologies 
have been utilised by prosecuting counsel (namely the practices by which 
evidence from them is represented and conveyed in court), and the practices 
through which they have been challenged, I hope to improve the 
understanding of how scientific debates are re-focused in judicial settings. 
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7.2 DNA Profiling- Controversies 
In Judge Weir's report, criticism of DNA analysis focused on two main issues. 
The first concerned shortcomings in the ways in which the DNA was 
recovered, packaged, stored and transported in the course of its analysis. Via a 
series of thorough examinations of police and forensic laboratory records, the 
Defence exposed several instances of what were seen to amount to 
inappropriate practices, and which, in the view of the Court, seriously 
compromised the integrity ofthe DNA evidence (Weir 2007, para.46). A 
number of concerns were raised over the handling of related exhibits at a 
range of stages in the investigative process, including the lack of appropriate 
labelling of bagged exhibits and the lack of anti-contamination procedures. 
One instance, which drew particularly heavy criticism from Judge Weir, 
involved the recovery of exhibits by a Scene of Crime Officer (SOCO) and a 
Detective Chief Inspector, who had both testified that they had worn suitable 
protective clothing at the time. These testimonies were subsequently revealed 
as untruths in the light of photographic evidence to the contrary (Weir 2007, 
para 50)1• Other concerns centred on the lack of adequate record-keeping of 
the movement and tracking of exhibits, and the wholly unsatisfactory nature of 
the conditions in which exhibits were stored (Weir 2007, paras.52-53). For 
example, no systems were found to exist for verifying precisely what items 
had been recovered or what had been placed in police storage, nor were there 
any methods for recording the removal of items from the store. The store at 
the Newry police station was described as 'a mess'. 
Similar problems were also exposed at the laboratory analysis stage. An 
examination of procedures at Forensic Science Northern Ireland (FSNI), 
where the analysis of evidence was carried out, revealed serious problems 
concerning the labelling procedures of items. Identification labels attached to 
1 
'The effect of this, as I find deliberate and calculated deception in which others concerned in the 
investigation and preparation of this case for trial beyond these two witnesses may also have played a 
part, is to make it impossible for me to accept any of the evidence of either witness since I have no 
means of knowing whether they may have told lies about other aspects of the case that were not 
capable of being exposed as such.' (Weir 2007 para. SO). 
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bags containing evidential items had sometimes subsequently become 
detached, which in a separate case had led to DNA evidence incorrectly being 
attributed to a suspect. This, along with other related shortcomings, had led to 
the temporary suspension of the laboratory's accreditation by the United 
Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) (Weir 2007, para.56). Other 
evidence was presented which strongly implied that items may have been 
handled in a manner which had invited the possibility of contamination. The 
analysis of items had been carried out between 1998 and 1999, prior to the 
acceptance of formal procedures for LCN DNA, which only occurred in 2000. 
Hence witnesses who had worked for the FSNI at the time were unable to 
confirm that scientists wore gloves during analysis (as now stipulated for 
working with DNA), and that they had certainly not worn protective hats and 
masks, now also considered a mandatory requirement. 
The second issue discussed by Weir in his report focused upon more 
fundamental questions concerning scientific opinion on the validity of the 
LCN technique as a whole. He concluded that the LCN technique could not 
be regarded as having been appropriately validated by the scientific 
community (Weir 2007 para 64). In his view, two articles published by the 
developers of LCN were insufficient to constitute validation of the technique. 
Weir accepted the Defence argument, which included references to the relative 
lack of uptake ofLCN in other jurisdictions2, and the lack of international 
agreement on validation procedures for LCN, in contrast to established 
guidelines and definitions for the validation of normal DNA tests (Weir 2007, 
para 62). 3 Attempts to assess the repeatability of the results via the consensus 
method were also criticised. In an experiment performed at the Birmingham 
laboratory of the FSS, three LCN tests had been performed on the same 
sample, with the result being that the consensus results obtained via the first 
2 Apart from the UK, LCN-type methods have only been adopted for evidential purposes in New 
Zealand and the Netherlands so far (Weir 2007, para. 62). Although LCN is also used in the USA, it is 
generally only used for intelligence purposes and has only been used evidentially on just one occasion. 
3 From the judgement: 'There has been no international agreement on validation and a conference held 
in the Azores in September 2005 had ended with agreement only that more work in that area was 
needed ... This lack of agreement on LCN was in marked contrast to the normal SGM+ test for DNA for 
which there were internationally-agreed validation guidelines and definitions approved by the 
Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM).' (Weir 2007, para.62). 
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two tests had been negated by the third. 'Thus the normal approach used in 
the United Kingdom had unintentionally been demonstrated by its own 
proponents to be potentially (and in that particular instance actually) 
misleading.' (Weir 2007, para.62.1 0). 
In his report of the case, Judge Weir used the issue of the scientific validity of 
LCN as indicating the possible need to re-consider the manner in which 
scientific evidence was assessed for admissibility. He cited a report written by 
the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 'Forensic 
Science on Trial', which recommended the development of a 'gate-keeping 
test' of scientific evidence in line with the system used in US courts4. He also 
criticised the apparent lack of activity on the part of the Government to 
implement such a measure (Weir 2007, para.64). 
7.3 The Caddy Report 
Concerns about LCN had been voiced prior to the Omagh verdict (BBC News 
2005, BBC 2007, Caddy et al2008). In response to these a review was 
commissioned by the Forensic Science Regulator, with the findings being 
published in April 2008 (Caddy et al 2008). The report addressed a number of 
areas, relating to sample recovery and extraction, transfer and persistence of 
DNA, quantification and interpretation procedures, validation procedures, and 
the place of LCN DNA in the criminal justice system, including the Omagh 
trial. The report concluded that the scientific basis of LCN was scientifically 
'robust' and that the technique was 'fit for purpose' for forensic use (Caddy et 
al 2008, p.l ). Furthermore, the report was satisfied that all three companies 
supplying the generic technique had adequately validated their processes for 
analysing DNA at 28 and 34 cycles for samples of less than 200pg in volume 
4 In his report Weir quoted paragraph 55 of 'Forensic Science on Trial': "'55. The absence of an agreed 
protocol for the validation of scientific techniques prior to their being admitted in court is entirely 
unsatisfactory. Judges are not well placed to determine scientific validity without input from scientists. 
We recommend that one of the first tasks of the Forensic Science Advisory Council be to develop a 
"gate-keeping" test for expert evidence. This should be done in partnership with judges, scientists and 
other key players in the criminal justice system, and should build on the US Daubert test." (Weir 2007, 
para.64). 
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(Caddy et al2008, p.l). However, it did recommend the development and 
eventual implementation of universal standards for the extraction, 
quantification and interpretation of profiles under LCN conditions. 
The reaction within the forensic scientific community to the findings of the 
report has been varied. In some quarters the report was hailed as providing a 
decisive endorsement of the technique (Clayton 2008 Teeside lecture) 
However, it has also drawn equally vehement criticism elsewhere (Jarnieson 
and Bader 2008, Gilder et al 2008). It has been argued that the report did not 
fully address many of the issues arising from the Omagh trial verdict, such as 
the lack of international agreement, and that it did not acknowledge dissention 
within the UK scientific community itself over LCN by failing to consult with 
known critics of the technique (Gilder et al. 2008; Jarnieson and Bader 2008). 
It was also argued that the report paid insufficient attention to certain scientific 
issues concerning profile interpretation, such as the complications caused by 
the presence of DNA mixtures in LCN analysis5. Furthermore, even though 
the report expressed satisfaction with the manner in which LCN has been 
validated, it does not reproduce or detail any data relating to these validation 
procedures. 
Regardless ofthe issue concerning the lack of published validation data, other 
critics have argued that, in the absence of common guidelines for the 
interpretation of LCN data, any attempts to argue for the existence of 
validation amounts to something of a tautology (Gilder et al 2008) The fact 
that no agreement exists over how data may be interpreted means that attempts 
at proving validation are futile (Gilder et al 2008). Furthermore, if this 
argument is accepted, 'the review raises important issues about what it means 
for a forensic science technique to be validated', and raises concerns over the 
way in which LCN DNA profiles had been interpreted in the past (Gilder et al 
2008). 
5 
'DNA in forensic work frequently involves mixtures. The Report specifically recorrunends "more 
work" on the interpretation of mixtures (and indeed mentions mixtures only three times in 35 pages), 
despite the significance of mixtures in the forensic context and ·thus in criminal prosecutions.' 
(Jamieson and Bader 2008, p.2). 
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The authors of the report have also been accused ofnot consulting sufficiently 
with known critics of the technique, and that disproportionate and 
inappropriate attention was given to the companies who develop and market 
the technique. Moreover, it has also been alleged that one of these companies, 
the FSS, was aware ofthe conclusions of the report at least three weeks prior 
to publication. A report produced for a criminal appeal case by the FSS was 
quoted as stating: 'Preliminary indications are that [the Caddy report) makes 
no significant criticisms of the LCN technique' (Jamieson and Bader 2008, 
pp.2-3). This has been cited as a clear transgression of a Home Office edict to 
the Forensic Science Regulator, namely that the report be 'independent of any 
forensic science provider' (Home Office 2006, Jamieson and Bader 2008)6. 
LCN is clearly a contested technique. As I show below, it has, however, 
played a significant role in UK policing. The next section concerns the 
relationship ofLCN, with the organisational context in which it is embedded. 
Here I seek to demonstrate that the success oftechnologies such as LCN are 
not entirely due to their scientific basis, but are dependent on the wider context 
in which these technologies are deployed 
7.4 DNA Interpretation in Casework 
The LCN technique has been used in the investigation of serious crimes, such 
as rape or murder, where other DNA profiling options have been exhausted, or 
in cases where the possibility of obtaining other forms of forensic evidence are 
limited (FSS 2005b). It is admitted that, due to the sensitivity ofthe LCN, any 
interpretation of the evidence must take context into account (FSS 2005b ). 
However, the FSS also claim that LCN has played an important role in the 
resolution of so-called 'cold case reviews', namely cases which have remained 
unsolved for years, or even decades (FSS 2005b ). 
The FSS cite a number of these successes in their literature (FSS 2005b). 
LCN DNA was recovered from a microscope slide bearing evidence from a 
6 Home Office Consultation Document "Standard setting and quality regulation in forensic science" 31 
August 2006,para 23. 
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case involving the rape and murder ofMarion Crofts in 1981. Having 
supposedly been left deliberately untouched in anticipation of future 
technological advances, an LCN DNA profile from Tony Jasinskyj was 
obtained in 1999, leading to his subsequent conviction and sentencing to life 
imprisonment in 2002 (FSS 2005b ). In another case, LCN was used to obtain 
a profile from a microscope slide retained from an unsolved rape case dating 
from 1995. When loaded onto the NDNAD, the DNA profile matched that of 
Mark Henson, who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2005 
(FSS 2005b ). LCN has also been used in foreign jurisdictions. For example in 
2003, Swedish authorities requested the FSS to carry out LCN DNA profiling 
on a knife used in the murder of the Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh. 
The subsequent profile contained a mixture ofthe DNA ofLindh and that of 
suspect Mijailo Mijailovic, and played an important role in bringing the latter 
to justice. 
PLS has also been hailed as making a decisive contribution to criminal 
investigation. In 2005 Duncan Turner was convicted of a serious sexual 
assault which occurred in a subway in Birmingham. PLS was cited as playing 
an instrumental role in resolving the DNA profiles within a mixture of 
material found on a pair of sunglasses found at the crime scene. A list of 
possible DNA profiles were generated that could have constituted the mixture 
observed on the evidence. These theoretical profiles were then compared to 
the NDNAD, with one of them eventually matching Turner (Sample 2006). 
As suggested earlier in this chapter these technologies have also played a 
particularly prominent role in a number oflarge-scale 'cold case' operations 
conducted by police forces in the UK. Operation Phoenix, launched by 
Northumbria Police in 2002, has involved the re-investigation of all unsolved 
sexual offences in the area carried out between 1985 and 1999 (Crown 
Prosecution Service 2003). Operation Phoenix sought to improve the 
conviction rate for serious sexual offences, and to also make a substantial 
contribution to the NDNAD (Dixon 2004). In the process of casework, LCN 
samples were taken from a variety of objects, particularly samples from 
material retained during previous investigations, as well as archived material 
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such as microscope slides and tapings (FSS 2005a). Overall, the operation 
yielded forty-one previously unidentified DNA matches, with twenty-three of 
these being loaded onto the NDNAD. Fifteen serial offenders have been 
identified. Operation Phoenix led to ten convictions, and three others charged 
pending trial (Dixon 2004). 
A nationwide initiative, Operation Advance, also sought to capitalise on the 
improvements in DNA profiling technology. In 2004, the Police Standards 
Unit (PSU) commissioned the FSS to carry out a study which identified 214 
cases with crime stain profiles generated via the older Single Locus Probe 
method (FSS 2006). Around ninety per cent of these involved serious sexual 
assaults. Operation Advance aimed to re-examine these SLP profiles using the 
more advanced techniques available to the FSS, attempting to match any 
profiles with those found on the NDNAD, and to present the relevant police 
forces with the scientific results for possible further consideration. 154 of 
these cases were progressed, and 73 profiles were developed with 33 
providing matches to named individuals already included on the NDNAD 
(Home Office 2005a). 
Operation Advance was unique in a number of ways. First, it was unique in 
that scientific analysis preceded police investigation of the crimes. It was also 
cited as the first time that re-analysis experiments were instigated under the 
orders of central government. Furthermore, the operation itself acted as an 
important means through which to test the value of pursuing cases in such a 
way, with each the progress of each case being monitored. 
As of October 2004, 108 profiles had been obtained from samples that had 
been upgraded. However, the Home Office Report on Operation Advance 
states that these ranged from full profiles to uninterpretable mixtures. Of 77 
profiles searched on the NDNAD, 42 matches of some kind were recorded, 
(with 34 of these matching immediately to individuals present on the 
NDNAD), hence returning a success rate of 28% (FSS 2006). 
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On 1th July 2005, Operation Advance II was launched, focusing on cold cases 
dating from between 1994 to 1996. Out of 1012 cases of rape and sexual 
assault occurring in the period 1994-96, 15 7 of these were recognised as 
suitable for further forensic work (FSS 2006). 66 cases were subsequently 
processed by the FSS resulting in 22 matches with the NDNAD. Four arrests 
are reported to have been planned on the basis of successful database matches 
(FSS 2006). 
The Report on Operation Advance also provided recommendations to inform 
decisions on whether or not to commence re-investigation on particular 'cold 
cases'. It highlights three issues. The first concerns the investigator's 
perspective. This is viewed as being variable and dependent upon 
organisational 'memory'. Whilst the latter term is not defined, it could be 
construed to refer to the possible continuing presence of investigators involved 
with original pursuit of the case, or the presence of archived documentation 
relevant to the original investigation. (The MacPherson report was critical of 
the poor recording practices employed by the Metropolitan Police, which were 
exposed during the inquiry into the handling of the Step hen Lawrence murder 
investigation (MacPherson 1999)). A second factor concerns the outlook of 
the victim (or their family), and the magnitude of their desire to persevere with 
the case. The Report on Operation Advance cites this as another variable 
factor. It can be seen how re-examination of cold cases involving sexual 
offences may cause distress for victims. Although there exists the possibility 
ofpsychological 'closure' through the resolution of a case, the re-examination 
of such cases may involve the re-visitation of trauma perhaps long buried. As 
in other sex crime cases, there also exists the potentially highly stressful 
experience of having to face the assailant in a courtroom setting, and the 
experience of having to face highly antagonistic and intrusive cross-
examination. 
A third issue, the scientific position, is cited as being a great deal less variable. 
In their view, 'scientific value is added as the body of knowledge increases 
with time'. Whilst this may be the case, the first two issues perhaps represent 
a series of factors which may serve to downplay the effectiveness and 
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usefulness of new scientific developments. If taken all into consideration, in a 
concerted fashion, it can be seen that the decision to re-visit cold cases does 
not depend on scientific developments alone; nor does scientific progress 
guarantee convictions (Home Office 2005). 
Scientific advances in DNA profiling have, nonetheless, been cited as 
catalysing the interest in the possibilities of resolving cases previously 
considered unsolvable, and are often acclaimed as playing an instrumental role 
in improving detection rates as a whole. These developments have attracted a 
considerable of public interest. Many of the technologies which have been 
hailed in this regard involve new methods for resolving complicated DNA 
profiles, in which interpretation by the human eye is compounded by factors 
such as the low quantity of material, or by the presence of mixed DNA 
profiles. In the next section I discuss relevant interpretation issues, and 
describe the Bayesian technologies which have been developed to address 
them. These may involve complex mathematical forms; yet in what follows I 
question whether the use ofBayes in such a way has led to approaches which 
can be considered any more 'objective'. 
7.5 Interpretation Issues 
A number of issues exist with regard to the interpretation of DNA profiles. 
One example of the ambiguity that surrounds the interpretation of DNA 
profiles, and which is of particular pertinence in the case of LCN profiles, 
concerns the manner in which profile peaks are identified from 
electropherograms. In cases where DNA has been recovered in relatively 
ample quantities, the identification of allele peaks is unproblematic; such 
peaks will be large and appear very prominently on electropherograms. In 
cases where the sample volume is small, and the size of peaks becomes less 
marked, peak identification may become more ambiguous. Here, it may be 
more difficult to differentiate DNA peaks on the basis of size, relative to 
background noise, amongst which there may exist artefactual peaks. A key 
factor in the identification and recognition of bona fide DNA profile peaks is 
the peak height threshold. This is the height at which a peak needs to reach 
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before it may be considered as originating from an allele, as opposed to it 
being merely part of the background signal. Decisions concerning the precise 
level at which the threshold is set have a direct influence in shaping 
judgements concerning the recognition of peaks as originating from alleles. 
For example, identifications of peaks may determine whether a DNA profile 
emanates from a single person, or from a mixture of DNA samples: 
'As you drop the threshold ... three new alleles have popped up ... here's a problem, 
because the accused doesn't have them, and this looks like a single source profile, if 
you knew nothing about the case, you gotta say 'that's a single source' ... drop it 
further, and it becomes even more complicated because you think you've got three 
alleles here ... so here I've got three alleles, so that's a mixture, as soon as you mix 
DNA together you can't pull them apart! ... So I've got a real problem in this case. 
And my question to the Crown was 'Why did you draw the line at 25? Because it's 
the best position for the Crown ... ' 
'So that's what I say, I'm not coming up to 'this is the profile you should have 
reported' I'm saying 'why did you report that one and not tell us ... ?' (Interviewee 3, 
2008) 
Figures 7.1 a to 7.1 c display this phenomenon more clearly. Each figure 7.1 a-c 
displays the same DNA profile, but in each case the peak height threshold is 
set at a different level. In Figure 7.la the threshold is set relatively high. In 
this case, only peaks A and B would be recognised as emanating from alleles. 
However, in Figure 7.1 b, the threshold is slightly lower, but sufficient enough 
for peaks C and D to be recognised as originating from alleles as well. In 
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Figure 7.1. Effect of Peak Height Threshold Variance on Peak 
Recognition 
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Figure 7.lc, the threshold is set slightly lower still. In this case, peaks E and F 
may now be considered as bona fide DNA peaks. 
The peak height threshold is thus an instrumental device for enabling scientists 
to differentiate between the existence of peaks arising from DNA, and those 
which correspond to the presence ofunimportant background artefacts7• 
However, rather than being a means of settling controversies over what peaks 
correspond to, the deployment of the threshold actually belies the ambiguous 
nature of the process of DNA interpretation. No clear guidelines exist 
concerning the precise point at which the threshold should be set: 
'I'm not coming up to 'this is the profile you should have reported' I'm saying 'why 
did you report that one and not tell, not anywhere in scientific, did the scientist say 'if 
I do this, then that person's excluded and that's a problem ... There's the 
profile ... here its just showing how from that profile the Crown say they know that 
two people have made that up ... here's the problem ... and when they go that 
way ... there are three possibilities there, there's no way scientifically you can know 
it's the shaded in one which is the Crown position.' (Interviewee 3, 2008). 
Hence the recognition of peaks in CE traces can be a subjective phenomenon. 
Rather than overcoming subjective judgement, it is in effect controlled by it, 
and merely serves to reinforce a particular perception of the data provided by 
the analysis. The decision over where to set the threshold may belie a whole 
host of experiences, something which the absence of clearly defined scientific 
procedures only serves to emphasise. The shape of the peaks themselves may 
defy the possibility of objective recognition even further: 
'Only question comes [is] if a peak has a certain shape, or a certain signal intensity, is 
it below a certain pre-determined threshold ... that threshold is almost arbitrary to 
some degree, some ofthese are arbitrary ... ' 
'We're striving to get as much information as we can, and the arbitrariness of the 
minimum peak height threshold encourages us to throw away some information in 
many instances.' 
(e-Symposium Discussion, 2007). 
7 Caused by, for example, minor contaminants. 
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The use of electrophoresis technology was intended to overcome the sources 
of ambiguity associated with the use of gel technology, which had previously 
been used in forensic DNA profiling (see chapter 6)8. However, what these 
examples show is that sources of ambiguity continue to exist, and hence 
judgemental and experiential reasoning play a continuing part in shaping the 
representation ofDNA data. 
7.6 Mixture Analysis 
The analysis of DNA profiles arising from the interaction of more than one 
individual is an integral part of forensic casework. In cases involving serious 
crime, such as rape or murder, it is almost inevitable that analysis will centre 
on crime scene samples in which a mixed DNA profile is found. Naturally, 
mixture analysis raises specific and complex statistical issues. Technological 
developments have improved the means by which mixed samples can be 
resolved and distinguished, and these have increased the sophistication of 
statistical interpretation. New theoretical approaches have sought to maximise 
the utilisation of available information, yet they have also had to allow for 
certain limitations that new technologies present, for example the phenomenon 
of 'stuttering' which is common to PCR analysis. This in turn has served to 
increase the complexity of such approaches further, yet there still exists scope 
for reconciling statistical theory and practical analysis. 
Many recent developments in mixture interpretation have taken the form of 
Bayesian approaches. These have sought to take into account both the 
enablements and limitations of the instrumentation to hand, all in what is 
claimed to be a 'consistent logical framework' (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, 
p.223). These appear to be replacing older, more rudimentary approaches. In 
what follows the development ofDNA mixture interpretation methods is 
traced, taking into account the historical-technological context in which they 
came about. Following on from the discussion by Clayton and Buckleton 
(2004), the frequentist method, involving exclusion probabilities, is covered 
8 See Derksen (2000) for a review of the issues associated with the interpretation of DNA profiles from 
gels. 
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first, followed by consideration of the development of the major Bayesian 
approaches (Clayton and Buckleton 2004). 
The Frequentist Method- Random Man Not Excluded (RMNE) 
Early attempts at the interpretation of mixed DNA profiles involved the use of 
exclusion probabilities, defined as 'the probability that a random person would 
be excluded as a contributor to the observed DNA mixture' (Clayton and 
Buckleton 2004, p.219). Such a definition gave rise to the alternative title of 
'Random Man Not Excluded' (RMNE). In mathematical terms, the exclusion 
probability at a given locus /, (PE1), is given as: 
Where p(A,) represents the probability of the presence of a certain allele at/, 
given that the alleles observed at I in the mixture ranges from A1 to Ai. The 
sum of all values ofp(A), is squared to acknowledge the presence of two 
alleles per locus, and subtracted from 1, leads to the probability of exclusion. 
In this case, the exclusion probability applies to a single locus. Using the 
product rule, the probability exclusion across a genotype (PE) is therefore: 
PE= 1 - fl(l- PE1) 
It can be seen that the RMNE method relies on the accurate calculation of 
allele frequencies via the use of pre-existing databases. It does not, in itself, 
represent a direct engagement with the data, in terms of allowing for 
measurement error etc. RMNE can thus be seen to be a product of the era in 
which the primitive gel technology available at the time was relied upon to 
convey and represent profile information. In this context issues concerning 
measurement error were dealt with through the use of binning systems, and 
thus it was assumed that the data had been suitably conditioned before PE was 
calculated. Thus it is perhaps understandable that RMNE can be criticised in 
the modem context as a wasteful method in terms of the way it utilises 
information (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, p.223). 
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1) 
2) 
Nevertheless, RMNE is still widely used, although it is claimed there is a 
general trend underway towards replacing the use of exclusion probabilities 
with likelihood ratios. However, it is claimed to possess some advantages 
over Bayesian approaches, most notably the lack of assumptions concerning 
the number of contributors to an unknown mixture, and indeed the ability to 
assess the evidential value of a profile in the absence of a corresponding 
suspect profile to hand. It is not reliant on modern instrumentation, which 
may be advantageous in some cases where resources are limited, and it is also 
claimed that exclusion probabilities are easier to explain to juries than 
likelihood ratios (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, p.222-223). 
However, Brenner ( 1997) has argued that a distinct logical shortcoming is 
apparent within the exclusion probability approach (Brenner 1997). He 
characterised evidence as possibly consisting of thus: 
blood types of the suspect 
blood types of the mixed stain 
According to Brenner this enables one to infer that: 3) the suspect is not 
excluded. In pointing out that, whilst 3) can be deduced from 1) and 2), 1) 
cannot be deduced from 2) and 3), nor from 1) and 3). This, according to 
Brenner, amounts to a loss of information. He claims that a likelihood ratio is 
a summary ofthe information in 1) and 2), which enables some kind of 
inference to be made regarding 3). However, the exclusion probability merely 
summarises 2) and 3), but allows no inference to be made regarding 1) 
(Brenner 1997). 
Qualitative Bayesian Approaches 
A relatively early form ofBayesian interpretation was presented by Evett et al 
(1991 ), which coincided with the advent of the further development of SLP 
technology. This method quickly gained approval, being cited by NRC 2, and 
received favour from the presiding judge in the O.J. Simpson murder trial 
(National Research Council 1996; Clayton and Buckleton 2004, pp. 223-224). 
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This method was formulated before the development of advanced capillary 
electrophoresis systems, which as described below enable additional variables 
such as peak height and area to be taken into account. However, at the time it 
was presented as the most efficient means through which to optimise the data 
available to caseworkers. Furthermore, the likelihood ratio approach was 
amenable to adaptation depending on the particular scenario9, and could also 
be used to account for sources of uncertainty including sampling error and 
subpopulation correction, lending it a flexibility not open to RMNE. 
The basic likelihood ratio (LR) for mixture analysis is thus: 
LR = Pr(E I G2,_Qy..J::IJ 
Pr(E I Gs, Gv, Hct) 
The numerator represents the probability of the evidence given the genotype 
of the suspect (05), victim (Gv) and the prosecution hypothesis (Hp). The 
denominator represents the probability of the evidence given the same data, 
but given the defence hypothesis (Hct), instead. 
Given the technology available at the time, this method provided a simple and 
elegant formula through which evidence could be assessed. It was, like 
RMNE, dependent on accurate measurement methods, and in itself could not 
account for any possible shortcomings on the account oftechnology 10• The 
power of statistical methods was constrained by the representative limitations 
of the technology, which in turn could convey information of only a limited 
quality to supply the formulae in question. 
9 Different hypotheses could be created depending on precisely who the contributors were thought to 
be. For example, the prosecution could advance a hypothesis whereby the mixture contained the DNA 
of a suspect and the complainant, countered by a defence hypothesis allowing for the presence of the 
complainant and an unknown unrelated individual. Another scenario might allow for the same 
prosecution hypothesis, but with the defence arguing for the presence of the suspect in conjunction 
with an unknown individual. Furthermore, the prosecution might consider a mixture to consist of two 
suspects, whereas the defence might counter with the hypothesis that the mixture derived from two 
unknown and unconnected persons. In each case, a likelihood ratio formula can be derived to assess 
each case (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, pp. 226-228). 
1° Furthermore, like any Bayesian approach, it's usefulness was reliant on hypotheses from both 
prosecution and defence that appropriately reflected background information. 
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Quantitative Bayesian Methods: The Binary Method 
The deployment and use of new technologies such as capillary electrophoresis, 
in tandem with PCR and STR technology, has enabled the development of 
more sophisticated statistical approaches, able to incorporate a wider range of 
variables. More importantly still, the way in which data is presented via this 
technology has allowed analysts to draw some notable conclusions about the 
nature of DNA mixtures, which in turn has fed back into statistical 
considerations. It must be pointed out however, that the means by which 
analysis proceeds are not infallible. Certain potential defects regarding, for 
example, PCR, are recognised. Analysts are continuing in their attempts to 
incorporate possibilities raised by such issues into their formulae. However, 
as the following discussion ofthe so-called 'binary method' demonstrates, 
there still exists considerable scope, and need, for subjective judgement in the 
process of interpreting DNA mixture interpretation. 
The interpretation of mixed samples is carried out according to a number of 
distinct steps (Clayton 1998). A DNA profile must be identified as a mixture 
in the first place, a process which may not be entirely straightforward even 
using modem instrumentation. A mixture can only be identified if the alleles 
from the minor contributor are able to be identified above background noise. 
According to Clayton and Buckleton, a mixture ratio of 1:10 is taken as the 
threshold for minor components (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, p.233). 
However, this figure appears to have arisen 'in practice' and it is unclear as to 
what grounds it is based upon. Regardless ofthis, the presence of multiple 
peaks, particularly those presented in unbalanced size, is normally taken to 
indicate the presence of a possible mixture11 . However, certain effects 
observed in the electropherogram may serve to cause obfuscation. Some 
peaks may arise as a result of so-called 'stuttering' whereby repeat units may 
be lost from alleles, normally as a result ofmiscopying during the PCR 
amplification cycle. Furthermore, flaws in data interpretation software may 
serve to misidentify artefacts within the trace as peaks. Conversely, in cases 
11 Notwithstanding the obvious issue of certain background information, most notably the type of 
reported offence being investigated. 
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where contributors share common alleles, it may not be clear from the 
electropherogram if two contributions are present. This may also be the case 
where contributors are homozygotic at a particular locus. Another source of 
confusion may arise from the possibility of genetic phenomena such as 
trisomy (whereby individuals carry more than a pair of chromosomes), or the 
duplication of specific genetic regions to other sites in the genome. Mixture 
interpretation using modem means is therefore a potentially complicated 
process, and may require a significant period of experience before users 
develop the requisite skills. 
Once a mixture is declared and allelic peaks have been designated, the 
potential number of contributors is ascertained. Although some studies have 
sought to develop methods that enable contributor number to be derived via 
statistical means (Egeland et al 2003), it is more likely that at present this is a 
process which occurs through previous data interpretation experience and also 
in relation to the circumstances of each particular case. Certainly, it has been 
reported in the literature that two-person mixtures constitute the 
'overwhelming majority of mixtures encountered during casework' (Torres et 
al 2003). Following this, the mixture proportion (Mx) or mixture ratio (Mr) is 
determined. Calculation of this figure is a complex process, and a computer 
package, known as Pendulum List Search (PLS), is used by the FSS to 
estimate Mx (Clayton and Buckleton 2004). The underlying logic of the 
estimation of Mx relies on the assumption that it is invariant across loci; 
however according to empirical studies there appears to be a certain lack of 
agreement as to whether this is precisely the case (Gill 1998; Clayton and 
Buckleton 2004). 
The estimation ofMx is a key step in the process as this figure is used in the 
identification of the possible genotypes of the contributors, along with the 
degree of heterozygote imbalance (Hb). This latter parameter is first used to 
judge the compatibility of certain alleles if they occurred in pairs, and involves 
the comparison of peak areas. Clayton and Buckleton report the use of~ 0.6 
to indicate possible paired alleles (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, p.240). 
Possible genotype combinations are then assessed using Mx. A similar value 
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for Mx at each locus may indicate a correct profile. Putative genotypes may 
then be compared with any existing reference samples from suspect and/or 
victim, if available. 
Even at this crucial latter stage, decisions over what may be accepted as 
genotypes in a mixture is largely dependent on human judgement. Hb and Mx 
essentially serve as guidelines for the decision by analysts; there appears to be 
no theoretical basis for calculating the threshold value for Hb, instead it seems 
to be derived on the basis of past experience. However, the use ofMx has 
been criticised for revealing an inherent circularity in the process. This value, 
being calculated from putative genotypes, is then used to confirm the final 
genotypes. In practice it may also be the case that between them, loci will 
yield results which combined may serve to adduce ambiguity; and thus the 
final say will essentially rest on human judgement. This decision may be 
complicated by the possibility of stutter peaks, or the potential for alleles 
exhibiting low peak area to be undetected by the software. The binary model 
used in PLS rests on a number of assumptions, namely: the invariance of 
mixture proportions across loci, the proportionality of peak area to the amount 
of DNA; and the area of shared peaks being equal to the sum of the 
contribution of the contributing individuals (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, 
p.242). In practice it is debatable as to what extent these assumptions can be 
relied upon. Furthermore, there are risks associated with the use of reference 
samples to assign genotypes. Clayton and Buckleton have pointed to the 
possibility of the presence of these samples to cause bias in the way that 
an~lysts perceive mixed profiles (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, p.242). 
Finally, it is recognised that there remains further work to incorporate other 
sources ofuncertainty into the theoretical underpinnings of the binary 
approach (Clayton and Buckleton 2004, p.238). 
7.7 Problems in LCN Analysis 
The analysis oftrace elements of DNA was initially envisaged by Jeffreys et 
al ( 1988) (J effreys et al. 1988). Following on from this work, Findlay et. al. 
(1997) reported the successful DNA fingerprinting of material derived from a 
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single cell, and moreover, during the 1990s, DNA was successfully profiled 
using a wide variety of sources, including fingerprints, fingernail debris, 
discarded cigarettes, single hairs and items of clothing (Findlay et al 1997; 
Buckleton and Gill 2004) 
The decision to opt for LCN analysis may depend upon a number factors, such 
as the nature of the surface material from which DNA may be recovered and 
the circumstances ofthe case (FSS 2005b). The decision to proceed with LCN 
analysis will occur if it is felt by the investigation team that a DNA profile 
would benefit the pursuit of the case, but it has been impossible to obtain such 
a profile via conventional profiling procedures. 12 
Certain sources of controversy can be located in practices surrounding the 
assignation of alleles to individuals on the basis of LCN profiles. The process 
of assigning specific alleles in an LCN profile to particular individuals is 
subject to a potentially considerable degree of complication, largely due to 
issues such as contamination, 'drop-out' and other stochastic effects as 
described above. 
Allele drop-in: It may not be entirely accurate to discuss allele drop-in in terms 
of 'contamination'. 'Background' has been discussed as a possibly more 
appropriate term (Buckleton and Gill 2004, p. 280-281 ). Nevertheless, it has 
been argued that spurious allele peaks may arise from two relatively distinct 
sources. Instances involving single allele drop-in have been distinguished 
from occurrences where multiple spurious peaks are sighted (Buckleton and 
12 Approximately forty per cent of all samples submitted for DNA analysis are deemed as 'sub-
optimal', namely they are incapable of yielding profiles that may be generated and interpreted in 
normal conditions (Greenhalgh 2008, Forensic Science Society Conference, Teeside University 17 
April 2008). It has been opined that the generation and interpretation of DNA profiles via conventional 
means requires over 250pg of recovered DNA (Greenhalgh 2008, ibid), although it may be possible to 
obtain some form of result if DNA is recovered in the range of 1 00-250pg. LCN DNA profiling has 
been estimated to involve quantities of DNA below lOOpg. 
The issue of whether to quantify the amount of recovered from casework samples is a matter of some 
contention. Of the three forensic science providers in the UK, only Orchid Cell mark and LGC 
routinely perform quantification (Caddy et al 2008). The FSS do not perform quantification on the 
grounds that potentially valuable amounts of DNA may be unnecessarily discarded (Caddy et al 2008). 
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Gill 2004, p.282). .It is thought the fanner may occur via a number of 
potential stochastic instances constituting 'background' sources, whilst in the 
latter case, contamination may be seen to arise from a more easily identifiable 
source. 
Heterozygote Imbalance: The predominant method for LCN analysis simply 
involves an increase in the number ofPCR amplification cycles, from 28 (as 
used in conventional profiling), to 34. This however, has been shown to 
induce greater imbalance between heterozygotic allele peaks. Furthennore, 
comparisons across individual loci revealed a high degree of variance from the 
multilocus Hb value (Buckleton and Gill2004, p.279). The degree ofvariance 
for Hb in smaller allele peaks was found to become so great as to render the 
latter totally uninfonnative (Buckleton and Gill 2004, p.279). 
Allele drop-out: According to Gill et al (2007) the problem of heterozygote 
imbalance is exacerbated in LCN analyses (Gill et al2007, p.128). An 
extreme form of heterozygote imbalance may result in the disappearance of 
one of the alleles at a locus, a phenomenon which has been referred to in the 
literature as 'drop-out' (Gill et al 2007). When a PCR amplification is 
prepared, only a portion of the extract is analysed; in the case of the 
particularly small volumes associated with LCN, it is claimed that there is a 
greatly increased likelihood that some alleles will not be included in the 
reaction. The phenomenon of dropout may also occur due to sample 
degradation. 
The interpretation of LCN profiles is recognised by the relevant experts as a 
significant issue, and attempts have been made to overcome the related 
problems. Many of the methodological problems associated with conventional 
DNA profiling are exacerbated in the case of LCN. If sufficient quantities of 
an individual's DNA are present at a particular scene, the resulting profile 
should be prominent enough to be easily visible over any contaminating 
material. However, the non-sterility of the environment may also lead to the 
deterioration of DNA samples, and thus analysts may only be able to recover a 
partial profile. Another source of complication involves the recovery from the 
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crime scene of mixed DNA profiles from two or more contributors. Whilst 
these issues add a considerable degree of complication to the interpretation of 
conventional DNA profiles, the small starting quantities involved in LCN 
analysis mean that the problems in interpretation caused by these phenomena 
are rendered even more intractable, exacerbated by the possibility of 'drop-in' 
and drop-out'. 
A paper by Curran and his colleagues attempts to show how such issues may 
be taken into account. First, there is the order in which 'drop-in' alleles may 
come to contaminate an LCN profile. No assumptions are made regarding the 
order in which alleles are added to a profile (Curran, Gill et al. 2005). Hence, 
the assumption of random order of contamination needs to be taken into 
account in mathematical terms. If the set of potential contaminating alleles 
contains k members, then there are k! possible arrangements of the order in 
which these alleles came to contaminate the profile. Second, population 
substructure may have to be taken into account. It is here that a potentially 
serious controversy arises. Although the authors state an equation to take this 
effect into account, it uses the coancestry coefficient e. This raises something 
of a contradiction if it is argued that allele probabilities for contaminating 
alleles are more likely to be related to sources within the laboratory (i.e. 
analysts) rather than the population of the offender. The use of 8 may actually 
have serious implications for the calculation of likelihood ratios based on LCN 
data, as the probability of drop-in for certain alleles may vary considerably 
from a calculated figure based on the genotypes of analysts. It is unclear from 
the literature whether this practice is carried out in UK forensic laboratories on 
a routine basis: certainly the literature does little to emphasise this precaution. 
Originally, analysts had used a so-called 'consensus' system, whereby an 
allele was reported only if duplicated in a replicate analysis of a sample extract 
(Gill et al. 2000). Furthermore, if negative controls displayed duplicated 
alleles corresponding to those found in the samples, they were not reported 
and samples were reanalysed if possible (Gill et al 2000, pp.38-39). However, 
the consensus approach was viewed as inefficient in that it did not make full 
use of the information yielded by the profiles (Gill et al2006) In order to 
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make full use of the data, including the option of making calculations for 
mixed profiles, and to apparently take into account population substructure, an 
expert system, known as LoComatioN, has been developed to relieve the 
computational burden. 
LoComatioN is a hypothesis-driven expert system which has been designed to 
generate likelihood ratios (LRs) for any number of different propositions to be 
evaluated (Gill, Kirkham et al. 2007). The derivation of each LR requires an 
evaluation of the probability of observing evidence under a prosecution and 
defence hypothesis, Hp and Hd respectively, and involves the formula: 
LR= Pr(EIHJ 
Pr(E!Hd) 
The use of likelihood ratios to evaluate evidence based on the consideration of 
prosecution and defence hypotheses shows that LoComatioN utilises a 
Bayesian mode of probability. The system allows the analyst to formulate and 
test propositions of their choosing, although in most cases it is likely there is 
little variation in the type of propositions being formulated. For example, in a 
rape case, the prosecution proposition Hp may be that a crime scene stain may 
consist of material from victim V and a suspect S. A corresponding defence 
hypothesis, Hd, may assume the same stain contains contributions from V but 
from someone unrelated to the suspect. In this case the stain material is 
denoted as V plus unknown ( U) material. However, it is claimed that 
LoComatioN is able to evaluate more complex propositions, such as cases 
involving contributions from up to five individuals, and over five replicated 
analyses (Gill et al 2007). 
A number of assumptions are built into LoComatioN in relation to the issue of 
drop-out and contamination. With regard to the former, two issues are 
encompassed in the probabilistic calculations; firstly, the need to estimate the 
probability of drop-out (Pr(D), and second, the need to include the probability 
of a specific allele being subject to drop-out (Gill et al 2007). In previous 
LCN interpretation approaches, an approach was used in which a possible 
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drop-out event was signified by the designation F. Using this approach, the 
probability of a given allele a being subject to drop-out can be given as 
Pr(aF)= 2pa (multiplication by 2 allows for the possibility of the dropped-out 
allele occurring at either of the chromosomal locations of the locus). However, 
this approach has been viewed as potentially favouring the prosecution 
hypothesis, particularly as Pr(D) decreases; the assumption of a low value of 
Pr(D) possibly creating an erroneously high estimate of a match. A different 
concept has been introduced in LoComatioN. In this case, if drop-out is 
required to support a proposition it is assumed that the identity of the unknown 
allele Q may be any allele except those observed in the DNA profile: 
n 
Pr(Q) = 1- ~; 
where n alleles are observed in the profile and p; is the frequency of the allele 
(Gill et al 2007, p.l29-130). 
LoComatioN can use this formulation to calculate whether drop-out may have 
occurred. For example, an LCN sample taken from a crime scene may yield 
evidence giving a profile in which three alleles, abc, are present at a particular 
locus. A suspect's profile for the same locus is ab. Hence a prosecution 
hypothesis will have to account for the presence of allele c. The assumption 
made here is that another contributor's DNA is present, containing c, plus 
another allele that needs to be accounted for. The Q designation allows for 
this missing allele. In practice, the use of Q manifests itself simply as p(Q)= 
1-pa-Pb-Pc· The first step to formulating a proposition involves calculating the 
probability of the evidence given Hp and the instance of drop-out (D), namely 
Pr(EI Hp, D). This is given by Gill et al (2007), in line with Bayes Theorem, 
as: 
Pr(EI Hp, D) = Pr(EI Hp) Pr(D), where Pr(EI Hp)=2pcPQ 
Any prosecution hypothesis will however also have to account for the 
possibility that no drop-out has occurred. Here, the assumption is that the 
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crime scene stain is a mixture of the suspect and another contributor. Hence, 
if the suspect is ab, and is assumed to be the offender under Hp, then the 
prosecution has to account for what the genotype of the unknown contributor 
might be. In order to explain such a mixture, the unknown contributor would 
be assumed to be either one of three genotypes: ac, be, or cc. If no drop-out 
has occurred, then the probability of there being an unknown contributor is Pac 
+ Pbc + p 2c. Hence ifno drop-out has occurred: 
Pr(EI Hp, D) = Pr(EI Hp) Pr (D) where Pr (D)= probability of no drop-
out, and Pr(EI Hp) = Pac + Pbc + i c 
The prosecution hypothesis allowing for both the possibility of drop-out and 
no drop-out is therefore: 
V 2 V 
Pr(EIHP. D& D) = 2pcPQ Pr(D) + Pac + Pbc + p c Pr(D) 
A corresponding defence hypothesis Hd, would assume that the crime scene 
stain is the result of a mixture between two unknown contributors, and hence 
the suspect is not involved. Allowing for the possibility of drop-out of 
unknown allele Q, Hd has to take into account all the possible permutations of 
alleles in a possible mixture abcQ, of which there are 24. If no drop-out is 
assumed, then the only permutations involve abc, of which there are 12. 
Hence for Pr(EI Hd, D) = Pr (El Hd) Pr(D) where Pr(EI Hd)=24PaPbPcPQ 
Hence Hd, allowing for both the possibility of both drop-out and no drop-out, 
IS: 
The full LR equation, for the assessment of Hp and Hd can be simplified to: 
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LR= Pr(D) (2pa+2pfl±J2e) + Pr(D)(2pQ} 
2paPb[Pr(D)(pa+pb+Pc) + Pr(D)(2pQ)] 
Pr(D) is formulated via simulation. In this case, the simulations estimate the 
probability of observing x alleles (at a certain number of loci), given that the 
probability of drop-out is equal to D (Pr(D)=D). Hence the aim is to estimate 
Pr (xI D). This is problematic however, given that the true probability of 
drop-out, in any situation, cannot be known. Instead, the likelihood ofD is 
estimated from the observed data x. This observed data is generated, via the 
repeated production of random profiles with ne contributors. Each iteration of 
the simulation will produce a random profile that could have resulted from the 
contribution of ne unrelated individuals profiles. From each profile the 
number of observed alleles, x, is counted. Pr(x I D) is therefore estimated by 
determining the frequency of the occurrence of different values of x at a given 
value of D. Repeated iterations of random profiles are generated at a range of 
values ofD from 0.0 to 1.0, and the frequency of values of xis plotted in a 
manner shown in Figure 7.2 below (Gill, Kirkham et al. 2007). 
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Figure 7.2. Reproduced from Gill et al 2007, p.135) 
0 
-
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Using such a graph it is possible to investigate particular cases, and enables 
the analysts to answer questions of the type 'what is the most likely value for 
Pr(D) if x=32?' This can be answered by identifying when the maximum 
likelihood occurs for x=32, which is, (as for any value of x) Pr(D)=O. 
However, as Gill et al (2007) demonstrate in the figure reproduced in Figure 
7.3, which represents a 'slice' of Figure 7.2 taken from x=32, it is quite 
possible to observe 32 alleles even when Pr(D) is as high as -0.2 (Gill, 
Kirkham et al. 2007). Given such a potential range, the analyst is obliged to 
apply a confidence bound on Pr(D). Hence a value ofD (designated D*) is 
chosen so that 95% of intervals of the form 0 to D* would contain the true 
value. This is achieved using a cumulative distribution function The 
likelihood function is converted to a probability function by 'normalising' it, 
i.e. rendering it so the area under a curve equals 1. The resulting graph 
represents the probability function ofD (f(D I x)). From this a cumulative 
distribution function can be generated (Fig 4, reproduced from Gill et al 2007). 
In Figure 7.4, they-axis indicates the probability that the value ofD is smaller 
than the value on the x-axis. If a vertical line is drawn from x=O.l5, it 
intersects the dotted line at -0.95. Hence the analyst concludes that 'assuming 
only two contributed to this mix, it is possible to be 95% sure that the true 
value ofPr(D) is less than 0.15' (Gill, Kirkham et al. 2007) 
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Figure 7.3. Likelihood function for the probability of drop-out when x = 
32 and nc=2, (Reproduced from Gill et al2007, p.136). 
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In practice, the LoComatioN system functions by presenting an results screen 
displaying the possible alleles for each locus (see Figure 7.5.). The analyst 
selects the alleles observed at each loci for each specific LCN profile, from a 
list presented on the input screen. Once these data are entered (a process 
which is apparently fast and convenient), the program requests the user to 
specify the hypotheses they wish to consider by way of a separate interface. 
Possible individual contributors may be considered under a particular 
hypothesis by the simple operation of selecting their name and adding them to 
a particular list. The number of unknown contributors can be specified by 
selecting the 'unknown' option the required number oftimes (Curran et al 
2005). The final step involves the user/analyst requesting the program to 
consider the likelihood of possible genotypes occurring under different 
scenarios. Through another separate interface screen LoComatioN will return 
LR's for each genotype under each scenario. All proposed combinations are 
generally tested unless there is a reason to believe that certain combinations 
may be unreasonable in light of the data (Curran et al 2005, p.53). 
The LoComatioN system may appear to represent an improvement over the 
'consensus' method for the interpretation ofLCN DNA profiles, at least in 
that it is able to return seemingly objective, numerical assessments of the 
likelihood ofhypotheses, against the previous method, which was open to a 
significant degree of subjective judgement. However, a number of 
assumptions are built into LoComatioN, which I now discuss. 
Some of the assumptions made in the construction of LoComatioN are 
questionable when considering the environment from which LCN crime scene 
samples are recovered. Due to the very nature of forensic work, LCN DNA 
samples are likely to be recovered from highly contaminated environments, 
and where there is a high likelihood of samples being degraded. As already 
discussed, whilst this a problem for conventional DNA profiling, 
contamination and degradation effects are even more prominent in LCN DNA 
analysis. Yet a closer examination of LoComatioN indicates that these effects 
have not been appropriately taken into consideration at an appropriate level of 
ngour. 
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Figure 7.5. User Interface Screen for LoComatioN (Reproduced from 
Gill et al 2007, p.137) 
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For LCN DNA, the assumption is made that the probability of allele drop-out 
is independent of locus (Gill 2005). However, this assumption may only hold 
where no sample degradation has occurred. If significant degradation has 
occurred, then loci where high molecular weight (MW) alleles are in existence 
may be preferentially affected (Gill et al 2007, p.l30) However, in the 
LoComatioN system there is no sign that Pr(D) has been modelled to take into 
consideration MW -dependent degradation. In fact, the authors state that they 
estimate Pr(D) under the assumption that allelic drop-out occurs randomly of 
locus, yet this clearly does not take into account the possibility of preferential 
degradation which they acknowledge earlier in the same article (Gill et al 2007, 
p.l33). Furthermore, there is no sign in the literature ofhow the problem of 
analysing a partially degraded allele may be approached. An allele may be 
degraded in such a way that it may appear as another genotype, yet this 
possibility is not mentioned in the literature. This reflects another more 
serious issue. It appears that, in the case ofLCN analysis, degradation is not 
assumed, simply because degradation is something that is extremely difficult 
to be ascertained in LCN work. Hence the integrity of the profile cannot still 
be guaranteed. The lack of degradation can only be assumed in the intact non-
crime scene samples used to determine Pr(D). 
Other issues concern the estimation of the probability of contamination. 
Unlike the probability of drop-out, which involves a relatively complex 
process, the probability of contamination, Pr (C), was calculated from 
empirical data. Gill et al (2007) report that the calculation of Pr( C) was based 
on data taken from negative controls. This is most likely to have involved of 
'blank' samples, containing no sample DNA, which are analysed alongside 
casework samples in order to verify for the quality of the work and to monitor 
the level of contamination based on either user error or environmental effects 
in the laboratory. Such blank samples will, if analysed collectively, contain 
extremely small quantities of alleles. The laboratory records used by Gill et al 
(2007) indicated an estimated contamination probability (Pr(C)= 0.05 per 
sample where: 
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Pr(C)= !1 
LN 
Where n is the number of alleles observed in a series of negative controls and 
N the total number of negative controls analysed, and L is the number of loci 
tested per sample. The probability of any specific allele appearing as a 
contaminant is assumed to be the same as the frequency of its occurrence in 
the white Caucasian population, taken from a frequency database (Gill et al 
2007) 
Aside from the assumptions about allele contamination in relation to other 
ethnic databases, questions must be raised about the use ofPr(CJ=0.05 in the 
LoComatioN calculations. Basing this estimate on blank samples, taken from 
a laboratory, may not necessarily be reflective of the contamination challenges 
to be found within crime scenes. In the latter case, Pr(C) may be considerably 
higher. However, to date no such study has been carried out to evaluate the 
levels of contamination of DNA found in crime scenes. 
The issues raised by these assumptions demonstrate the problems faced by 
scientists, in trying to model effects such as contamination and degradation. 
In this case a combination of both empirical data and theoretical modelling is 
used to help estimate these key parameters. Yet it is far from clear whether 
these techniques accurately reflect the kind of environmental challenges to 
DNA found in crime scenes. Of course, any attempts to generate empirical 
data from crime scenes are fraught with complications, and would be 
decidedly labour-intensive. This is in itself however, can be seen as a 
reflection of the demands ofthe Bayesian approach. In a way, the issues 
outlined here reflect the high informational demands that arise from putting 
Bayes into practical use. 
Furthermore, certain interviewees were highly critical of the use of terms such 
as 'drop in' being used in any way to explain LCN profiles: 
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'You can't exclude people because when you invoke dropout, the reason why there's 
the alleles are not there is because they've dropped out. Or, it may be that the alleles 
are never there in the fust place. Evaluate by Bayesian approach, you can't! 
(Interviewee 3, 2008) 
This Interviewee, who was largely sceptical of the validity of the LCN 
technique, talked of the process of assigning an LCN profile as fraught with 
ambiguity and recourse to arbitrary decision-making: 
The LCN technique is so unreliable that what they have to do is say 'well we repeat 
it if only the alleles come up twice do we count them, Notice again theres a 17 in the 
same sample that's ignored, right, whereas, if you add it up that way, it discounts, 
now, here's the problem, you get a 14, and that becomes a mixture, and there's a 29, 
which is not in the accused. So you're looking good along here for the accused, 15, 
17 16 19 11, OK? All matching the accused, 11 13 matches the accused but also 
matches this person. 11 14 matches so that there is entirely explicable by these two 
people here, right, 15 could have come from this person, 17, remember there could 
have been an unknown. 16 19 could only be down here. The eleven? Well theres no 
11 in there. So that's all very awkward, and that's why the DNA analysts work back 
that way, they say 'well if this is the story, the evidence is consistent with, and that's 
a crap way of looking at evidence. Because the question really is 'how many other 
stories is it consistent with?' So that's an example of how they're using this Low 
Copy Number stuff, and its just guesswork (Interviewee 3, 2008). 
Another interviewee described the use of 'drop in' in equally frank terms: 
'Contamination is contamination. There's no degree of 
contamination .. . contamination ruins evidence.' (Interviewee 10, 2008, emphasis 
added). 
The controversies surrounding the interpretation ofLCN profiles shows that 
these 'inscriptions' cannot be regarded as 'immutable mobiles' which 
facilitate the unproblematic translation and passage of scientific information 
(Latour 1990). Instead, they represent spaces where ontological claims are 
contested, subject to both the critical scrutiny inherent to the scientific 
tradition and that of the adversariallegal system. Certain terms, such as 'drop 
in', and 'drop out', have been invoked to account for the imperfections 
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supposedly apparent in the data, which have actively been constructed, in 
complex fashion, during the course ofthe generation ofLoComatioN. From 
this discussion however it can be seen that these constructions have not fully 
satisfied critics from within the scientific community, and it remains to be 
seen how LCN will cope with future legal challenges. 
The need to model these constructions in the manner described strongly 
reflects the informational demands of a Bayesian system, yet it is not clear 
whether the assumptions upon which they are based, accurately represent the 
reality they are trying to model. The construction of 'drop in' and 'drop out' 
in LCN analysis represents another set of practices which appear to be 
necessary for the propagation ofBayesian reasoning. The contestability of 
these notions show once more how Bayesian interpretation of DNA profiles 
involves a distinctly assumptive element, in contrast to the image often 
portrayed by Bayesians of a perfectly logical schema. As in the case of 
mixture interpretation, where peak height thresholds may be manipulated and 
experiential assumptions are made about key parameters, LCN analysis relies 
on a similar combinations of assumptions and constructive practices. This 
example strongly demonstrates how Bayes does not necessarily remove 
sources of subjective judgement and practices, but instead creates new spaces 
where they may be found. 
7.8 DNABoost 
The previous passages have described the problems associated with the 
interpretation of complex DNA profiles. They have demonstrated how the 
task of making assignations based on DNA evidence is by no means an 
uncomplicated process, with particular difficulties involved with regard to 
mixed DNA profiles, as well as LCN profiles taken from very small quantities 
of DNA. However, this section has also described certain technological 
approaches to these problems, which have used Bayesian probability theory to 
produce automated systems to allow scientists to overcome the complexities 
associated with DNA profile interpretation. Further, I have also attempted to 
show that technologies such as LoComatioN and PLS do not in themselves 
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provide a means of interpretation which is entirely free from human influence. 
In fact a number of assumptions and ambiguities are built into these systems 
which call into question the extent to which such systems can be labelled as 
'objective' means of interpreting profiles, and whether they present a truly 
significant advance on previous methods of assessment. 
By way of a supplement to the previous discussion, I now wish to briefly 
introduce another technology which appears to share a number of 
characteristics with the systems described above. There does not however, 
exist any scientific literature in the public domain that enables one to take the 
same critical investigation taken above, despite the fact that this system was 
widely publicised in the media. In what follows I describe how this system 
was rendered as a convincing scientific technique, in a manner somewhat 
different to conventional modes of scientific persuasion. 
In October 2006, the FSS announced the introduction of a new technique, 
known as 'DNABoost', which was heralded as representing another step 
forward in interpretation technology, a 'world first in bringing clarity to a type 
of sample that was previously difficult to interpret' (New Criminologist 2006). 
It was hoped that this new technology could improve identification rates by up 
to 40 per cent (Journal 2006) and crime detection rates by 15 per cent (Muir 
2006, Telegraph 2006). Pilot schemes were launched among forces in West 
Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, Northumbria and Humberside. These schemes, 
intended to each run for three months, sought to test DNABoost on volume 
crimes such as burglary, theft and assault, with some hopes being expressed 
that the technique could eventually be applied to 'cold cases', namely 
previously unsolved cases involving serious crimes such as murders and 
sexual offences (The Joumal2007). 
DNABoost appeared to have been intended for use to separate individual 
DNA profiles in cases where small quantities ofbiological material had been 
transferred and deposited. For example, the technique could possibly have 
been used in cases where more than one individual had touched a surface such 
as the arm of a chair. It was claimed that DNABoost would be able to 
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separate out multiple DNA profiles in such a scenario. Details of the precise 
scientific basis ofDNABoost have, so far, never been disclosed, although it 
appears that DNABoost was intended to be used in tandem with LCN 
techniques to improve interpretation rates (Morris 2006). It seems that, in 
functional terms at least, DNABoost was largely identical to LoComatioN. 13 
The emphasis on the ability ofDNABoost to resolve complex DNA profiles 
involving multiple individuals, each contributing small quantities of starting 
material, suggests that the technique may share similarities with LoComatioN 
and PLS, and indeed may have amounted to a combination of the two 
technologies. Thus, given the previous philosophical and computational 
approaches utilised by the FSS in the development of DNA profile 
interpretation technologies, it is perhaps reasonable to speculate that 
DNABoost involved some form of Bayesian computational approach. What 
is relevant to this discussion however, is that, to date, no articles have been 
published in the relevant scientific journals, outlining the theoretical basis of 
this particular technological form. This is in contrast to both LoComatioN and 
PLS, which have both been the subject of published papers. 
What is certain however, is the extent to which the FSS invested a 
considerable amount of effort to publicise this new technique. They hired 
Medialink, a company who specialise in converting messages from companies 
into news stories to be distributed along a number of channels, including the 
internet and broadcast media. Medialink's website displays the logos of what 
appears to be a number of high-profile clients. Along with the FSS, the logos 
of companies such as Adidas, Ford, Nokia and HSBC are all prominently 
displayed (Medialink 2008). Further information displayed on Medialink's 
website provides further details of the work carried out by the company on 
behalf of the FSS, and yields some possible idea of the strategy of the FSS. 
As well as raising general awareness 'ofthe process [DNABoost] and of the 
FSS as an entity' (Medialink 2008), it states that FSS 'particularly wanted to 
encourage those police forces who were not taking part in the pilot scheme to 
13 In announcing the technique, FSS DNA manager Paul Hackett said: 'this particular technique is 
based on the foundations of existing DNA profiling technology so the laboratory-based techniques are 
exactly the same as we have used over the last 10 years, so that's very robust, very well established' 
(BBC News 4 October 2006). 
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buy the DNABoost service from them.' (Medialink 2008). Medialink 
conducted 'an intensive media relations campaign, dubbing the breakthrough 
'CS! Britain' (Medialink 2008, emphasis added), and 'successfully placed FSS 
spokesperson Paul Hackett on all major channels for live interviews and 
offered filming opportunities from the FSS Lambeth laboratories' (Medialink 
2008). Furthermore, the efforts ofMedialink, at least by the company 
themselves, were deemed to be a considerable success: 
'The story really captured journalists' imagination (sic) and dominated 
throughout the news day, right from breakfast to 10 o'clock bulletins. 
Medialink obtained some of the most coveted spots in broadcast 
including: the sofa on GMTV; Radio 4's 'Today', Sky Sunrise, BBC 
Breakfast and by the end of the day the FSS had been contacted by all of 
their target police forces in the UK. Even Downing Street commented on 
the story!' (Medialink 2008) 
The information found on Medialink's website raises some very interesting 
issues. First, it shows the extent to which the FSS wanted to sell DNABoost 
to other police forces not involved in the pilot schemes. By placing news 
stories in all the major UK broadcast networks, the FSS were able to obtain 
extensive advertising for their new product. It is perhaps pertinent here to 
recall that the FSS is in the process ofbeing converted into an entirely 
commercial body, and already faces some competition from some private 
firms, most notably the company LGC. Here there appears to be a certain self-
awareness on the part of the FSS to sell itself. However, the work of 
Medialink possibly goes beyond normal advertising. Rather than using 
commercials, news channels were used to act as a platform through which 
DNABoost was able to be exposed to police forces. These news stories 
effectively functioned as advertisements for the product. What is pertinent 
here is not only the way it was packaged, but that it was packaged within a 
particular type of news story- crime- hence an issue of concern to publics as 
well as police. Hence, DNABoost was not only being projected to police, but 
by also being disseminated to the public it possibly led them to both trust the 
science and perhaps also pressurise the police into taking up the technique. 
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This strategy seems to have worked- according to Medialink all police forces 
in the country apparently contacted the FSS to enquire about DNABoost. 
It is also perhaps worth noting the prominence of the term 'CSI Britain'. 
Aside from the possible patriotic connotations (the FSS is keen to position 
itself as something of a world leader in the realm of forensic science), it is 
interesting to note the association with the American TV series. One can only 
speculate as to the real motivations behind the use of such a term, but there are 
perhaps certain connotations. The use of such a term lends a certain glamour 
to the technique, and could be viewed as reinforcing a sense that this is 'state 
ofthe art' technology. However, this possible overshadows the issue of the 
validation ofDNABoost. No details concerning the validation of the 
technique have been published to date. In this case there have not even been 
any peer-reviewed articles released, as in the case of LCN. 
7.9 Conclusion 
The advent of technologies for mixture analysis and LCN can be seen to have 
contributed toward certain developments in policing practices in the UK. The 
potential to re-examine cold cases represents an extension of policing power 
which is also facilitated by the existence of the NDNAD. Thus it appears that 
these developments could be framed as contributing to a greater ability to 
extend the temporal reach of investigation. As my discussion has shown 
however, government policy has played a significant role in regard to this 
trend, and it is important to note that operations such as Advance were 
instigated through a centralised route. The overall success rate of these 
operations has been modest relative to the media interest in singular examples 
of convictions gained via the employment of the 'cold case' rationale. In this 
way, it is possible to view the operations as a whole as experiments in 
applying new technological means to investigation. 
The prominence with which the successes of techniques such as LCN and PLS 
have been reported in the news media shows the interest that these supposedly 
cutting-edge technologies can attract. This of course, does not detract from 
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the high level of controversy these technologies continue to draw. It appears 
that a number of figures in the forensic science community view the Caddy 
report as providing a necessary validation of the LCN technique. The future 
success of techniques such as LCN in securing convictions remains to be seen, 
but it is likely that the kind of technologies employed by the FSS will continue 
to be the source of debate. One issue that remains to be solved is international 
agreement on the efficacy ofLCN. There has been relatively little in the way 
of progress in establishing a common set of guidelines for the employment of 
LCN. More seriously still, the response to the development of LCN has 
aroused scepticism rather than enthusiasm in other jurisdictions (Budowle et a! 
1991 ). The UK is relatively unique in employing LCN on such a relatively 
widespread basis, and the lack of international progress may reflect a less 
accepting stance to LCN in other countries (Gilder et al 2008). 
Much of the debate has surrounded the need for adequate protocols to ensure 
that LCN analysis can proceed to enable the results to be free of contamination 
or compromise. Whilst these kind of problems invite relatively feasible 
solutions, in this chapter I have also sought to introduce areas of discord which 
concern a far less tractable set of issues, namely those concerning the problem 
of interpretation. The interpretation ofboth LCN and mixed profiles 
represents one of the most instrumental steps of the process in converting 
DNA material into evidence, and it is here that I have attempted to 
demonstrate how Bayes plays a vital role, in forming the calculative and 
philosophical basis of these technologies. In describing these technologies 
however, I have sought to show their development has rested on the 
employment on the use of constructions and assumptions whose 
correspondence to reality may be open to some question. For example, whilst 
PLS was meant to replace a highly intersubjective process of the assessment of 
mixed profiles, certain assumptions within the system are open to considerable 
scrutiny. For example, a key element in this technology is the values assumed 
to represent heterozygote imbalance (Hb). It is unclear to what extent this 
assumption has been verified and validated, yet it plays an important role in 
the production of suggested genotypes in mixture resolution. Furthermore, the 
calculation of mixture proportion (Mx) rests on the assumption that the mixture 
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proportion is invariant across loci, yet empirical work suggests this 
assumption may require further testing. Amongst other issues, there is the 
possibility that the peak height threshold value may be set in such a way as to 
favour a certain hypothesis; again to date no scientific work has been reported 
which considers this issue. Despite all this however, PLS has been introduced 
into casework by the FSS, and has already claimed convictions. 
A similar situation appears to exist with regard to LoComatioN, the system 
developed by the FSS to resolve LCN profiles. FSS scientists have 
constructed a certain vernacular which appears to be used to justify their 
propositions, namely the use of 'drop in' and 'drop out'. To date, little 
scientific study exists which serves to rigorously consider whether such terms 
are appropriate; this issue is not addressed in the current literature on LCN. 
Furthermore, the use of laboratory data to assume a certain probability of 
contamination (Pr(C)) may not necessarily reflect the kind of environmental 
challenges that DNA from crime scene samples may actually face. The 
probability of drop-in, Pr(D), on the other hand, is calculated via computer 
simulation. Whilst the literature reports a seemingly rigorous process for this 
calculation, it does not appear to consider the possibility that drop-in could be 
allele-specific, nor does it take into consideration environmental challenges. 
Both assumptions concerning contamination and drop-in therefore, could be 
said to rest on matters of convenience however, as it must be acknowledge that 
further consideration of these issues could take up considerable time and 
resources. 
In this way, both technologies could be construed as involving certain 
practices of black-boxing (as discussed in Chapter 2). They contain 
assumptions which, if tested further, could incur considerable costs for the 
developer. In discussing the controversies surrounding these technologies, I 
have sought to show that the black boxes are not entirely invulnerable to 
interrogation. This case study therefore shows, further to studies such as 
Derksen (2000), that supposed 'technological progress' does not involve the 
continued excision of areas of subjectivity; indeed, this study appears to 
indicate that with new technologies come new sources of contestation and 
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ambiguity, as highlighted by the vehement criticisms emanating from other 
members of the forensic scientific community. 
With regard to the consequences for Bayesian reasoning, it must be noted that 
Bayes has been criticised for placing extremely large informational demands 
on the reasoner. It is unclear to what extent these demands may stretch to, but 
it is clear that practical circumstances may limit the precise quality of 
information being fed into Bayesian algorithms. Yet what this study 
highlights is not necessarily the problem of obtaining quantitative data, but the 
assumptions and practices which go into creating this data. In this way 
Bayesianism can be seen as being centred around a certain set of practices. 
Without these practices, the construction of Bayesian technologies cannot take 
place. 
Bayesianism is seen as a means of assessing 'subjective' measures of 
probability; but what is unclear is precisely what kind of subjectivity is being 
assumed. This case study appears to indicate that this subjectivity, or to be 
more precise, inter-subjectivity, is actually far more complex than first thought. 
What this case study demonstrates is that the kinds of 'subjective' 
probabilities under assessment owe their existence to a heterogeneous mix of 
'objective' and 'subjective' underpinnings, which in turn reflect a particular 
context. The 'Bayesian technologies' that arise are a result of this context, yet 
the same epithet also acts as a means of organising these underpinnings. It not 
only provides a basis for making sense of information gleaned from DNA, but 
it also acts as a framework for facilitating 'scientific' practices. 
Finally, one may wish to consider the question of how the continuing 
development of new technologies, produced through companies operating in 
an increasingly competitive and commercialised market, may be brought to 
the attention of governments (and by extension, their electorate), as much as 
they be made to appeal to police forces who are ostensibly their primary 
customers. The example ofDNABoost appears to suggest that this could be 
the case. The slightly troubling aspect of this example concerns the manner in 
which direct appeal was made to policymakers, publics and police. The PR 
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campaign for DNABoost effectively subverted supposedly unbiased news 
media, leading to the acceptance of a story which effectively functioned as an 
advertisement for the FSS's product. Moreover, no scientific data has ever 
been released into the public domain concerning DNABoost. This 
development leads one to consider whether, in the increasingly competitive 
market for forensic science services, developers of technology may begin to 
direct efforts towards convincing a more wider set of stakeholders, namely 
government and publics, in the apparent worth of their products. As the 
DNABoost example indicates, such efforts may involve strategies other than 
the transparent release of information long considered a mainstay of 
conventional scientific conduct. 
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I 
CHAPTER EIGHT- CASE STUDY 2: THE 
CASE ASSESSMENT AND 
INTERPRETATION (CAI) MODEL 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I move from a consideration of the use ofBayes in support 
of specific instances of DNA interpretation, to examine the wider use of 
Bayes in forensic science in general. To do this I introduce a model of 
forensic scientific investigation which has been constructed by a number of 
senior forensic scientists and statisticians working for, or on behalf of, the 
UK Forensic Science Service (FSS). This initiative, known as the Case 
Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model, has been under development 
since 1998, and has been the subject of a number of articles, published 
predominantly in prominent forensic science journals1• The stated aim of 
the CAI model is to optimise the cost-effectiveness of the casework process, 
by providing a more efficient and focused procedure for comprehending 
evidence in the context of criminal investigations. A key feature of the CAI 
is the use of a Bayesian framework for the evaluation of hypotheses 
formulated in relation to the evidence that becomes available to those 
investigating a criminal case. The CAI is intended to be applicable to any 
form of evidence and also represents a strategic attempt to promote and 
shape the uses of Bayes within a forensic scientific context. 
In the first part of this chapter I present an overview of the development of 
the CAI, and introduce the model's central elements. After outlining the 
theoretical architecture of the model, I then explore a series of issues that 
arise when the CAI is directly applied to investigative casework. In the 
ensuing discussion of these issues, I demonstrate how they comprise a series 
of practical contingencies that are not fully amenable to a Bayesian 
representation of reasoning. I question the extent to which the application 
1 See Cook et a! (1998a, l998b, 1999), Evett et a! (2000a, 2000b), Jackson et a! (2006) 
215 
ofBayes to forensic science is able to reconstitute investigative reasoning 
practices along more explicitly rational lines. Instead, I argue that the 
application ofBayes in this case is necessarily shaped by a wider array of 
individual, organisational and institutional practices and processes. The 
form(s) of 'Bayesian reasoning' outlined in this chapter are not best 
understood as the top-down imposition of a mode ofreasoning which draws 
justification from supposedly transcendental logical principles. On the 
contrary, I argue that these reasoning forms are eo-dependent on the 
practical contexts in which they are inextricably embedded. Hence the 
forms ofBayesian reasoning that are simultaneously applied to, and arise 
from, these contexts, are fluid and flexible accomplishments. 
8.2 Overview of the CAI 
The Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model has been in 
development for over ten years (Cook et al. 1998a) Responsibility for the 
formation and evolution of the model can be traced to work done for the 
FSS by a team of senior forensic scientists. These originators of the CAI 
cite new commercial imperatives as representing one of the main drivers for 
the development and application of the model. Since 1996, the relationship 
between the FSS and the police forces they serve has been one of customer 
and provider; the FSS charges police forces for the analysis of each piece of 
evidence requiring assessment, and the CAI has been developed to enable 
the FSS to optimise the efficiency of the service it can provide to police 
forces (Cook et al 1998a). What this has entailed is a model which has been 
used as a way of estimating the contribution that each piece of evidence is 
able to make to the investigation - and potential prosecution - of each 
specific criminal case. 
In what follows I provide a brief history of the development of the CAI. I 
first discuss the organisational changes that saw a change in the way the 
FSS conducted business with the police. I show how this drove the 
development of the model, with particular reference to the creation of new 
216 
systems of customer feedback. I outline the proposed system of 
consultation between forensic scientists and police investigators, and the 
new system for managing the relationship of criminal investigation and the 
analysis of evidence. 
8.3 History of the CAI 
In the first of a series of papers outlining the CAI, Cook et al ( 1998a) 
discuss an apparent change in 'culture' affecting not only the FSS, but 
police forces as a whole. Following the re-positioning of the FSS as a 
government agency in 1991, direct charging for casework services was 
introduced in order that the costs of forensic science would become more 
directly apparent to operational police officers (Cook et al 1998, p.152). 
This took place as police forces themselves were devolving increasing 
financial responsibility to officers who were more closely involved with 
day-to-day casework (Cook et al 1998a, p.152). With police forces being 
redefined as the primary 'customers' of the FSS2, the latter adopted a 
specific notion of precisely what constituted it's 'products', defining them in 
terms of: 'an activity; the time taken for it; the cost; the standards to which 
the activity adheres; the expected outcome; and the chargeable unit' (Cook 
et al 1998a, p.l52). At the heart ofthe 'new culture' was a sense that 
customers (in this context, criminal investigators) would benefit from a 
greater degree of consultation over the way in which the scientific aspect of 
specific casework proceeded. Thus, the aim of direct charging was to: 
'enable the customers to make better decisions about how to allocate their 
own resources, in turn creating a greater sense of value for money' (Cook et 
al 1998a, p.152). 
It must be noted however, that behind this point is the assumption that 
customers (police officers) have adequate knowledge ofthe circumstances 
2 Cook et a! (1998a) reported that, at the time of writing, 95% of business was coming from the 
British law enforcement agencies, with the remaining business involving private law firms and 
overseas organisations (Cook et al 1998a, p.152). Whether this remains the case in 2008 is a 
matter of conjecture); however what may be of interest in the future are the possible 
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behind a case to be able to make informed decisions about the nature of the 
forensic scientific services they require. One stated aim of the CAI was not 
only to provide better value for money, 'but also of achieving improvement 
through a genuine partnership in which the customer has a greater 
participation than hitherto in decisions about what work is done in the 
laboratory' (Cook et al 1998a, p.l52). This quote is of particular interest, in 
its reference to the sense of 'partnership' in terms of how laboratory-based 
inquiry could proceed. This apparent need to accommodate the interests of 
actors external to the direct task of scientific inquiry points to an obvious 
sign of the way in which economic imperatives have driven a process which 
may be construed as the 'eo-production' of forensic scientific authority 
(Jasanoff2004). This sense of'partnership' differs from the view ofFraser 
(2007), who argues that the introduction of direct charging has led to a 'shift 
from the expert power of the laboratories to that of the police' [Fraser, 2007 
p.384]. The CAI however, indicates a more proactive role for forensic 
scientists. If the assumption of the police having perfect knowledge of their 
forensic scientific needs is relaxed, then it may actually indicate, if anything, 
an enhanced influence of forensic science providers on the course of 
criminal investigations. 
Another aim of the CAI has been to convey the notion that the process of 
interpretation of evidence, defined by the authors as 'the drawing of rational 
and balanced inferences from observations, test results and measurements' 
(Cook et al 1998a, p.l52), is a process that begins at the start of a criminal 
investigation. Hence the interpretation of evidence is not simply taken to 
occur at the final stage of examination, once all the evidence has been 
accumulated. Instead it is viewed as a constantly recursive and 
collaborative course of action that involves a significant degree of 
consultation, feedback and input from other actors from the outset. This 
approach was taken to contrast with an older model of investigation, in 
which suspects were identified through non-forensic means, with the 
collection and deployment of forensic evidence largely being informed by a 
consequences of the FSS becoming a wholly private, independent company, as has been 
mooted several times. 
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concern to more authoritatively incriminate these suspects in the actions and 
events of interest (Interviewee 8). 
In a subsequent paper, the definition of 'interpretation' in this particular 
context is fleshed out further: 
'Interpretation is, of course, a part of everyday life and it is possible to 
visualise a kind of spectrum. At one extreme there is pure intuition, 
which defies rational analysis. At the other extreme is pure logic. 
Scientific judgement cannot be based on pure intuition or 'hunch' ... the 
scientist should, as far as possible, be able to rationalise the opinion that 
is presented. The opinion might be supported by data: there is, indeed, a 
kind of data spectrum ranging from the case where the opinion rests 
largely on an established data collection to the case at the other extreme 
where there are no data and the opinion is entirely based on experience. 
In any case, the expert opinion is necessarily subjective, but it should 
always confirm to logical principles. Those principles are furnished by 
considering probability theory as a means of reasoning under uncertainty: 
this leads to the Bayesian view of evidence interpretation ... ' (Evett et al. 
2000b, p.234) 
Of interest here is the slightly paradoxical reference to subjective expert 
judgement adhering to 'logical principles'. However, as one of the authors 
argues elsewhere, it is Bayesianism which is viewed as the naturally logical 
means through which to reason in such a way. 
'It's a good idea not to use the word 'Bayesian' but just to call the 
approach 'logical'. Nobody is going to attack you for being 
logical! ... That framework-call it Bayesian, call it logical-is just so 
perfect for forensic science. All the statisticians I know who have come 
into this field, and have looked at the problem of interpreting evidence 
within the context of the criminal trial, have come to see it as centring 
around Bayes's Theorem.' (Evett and Joyce 2005, p.37). 
Hence in this instance the application ofBayes to forensic scientific 
problems is viewed as a natural, and possibly inevitable phenomenon. 
Indeed as the quote above demonstrates, Bayes is often cited by it's acolytes 
as the only logical way to reason under conditions of uncertainty. In this 
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context Bayesianism is thought of as embodying certain key principles 
informing the correct practice of evidence interpretation (Cook et al. 1999): 
Interpretation of scientific evidence is carried out within a framework of 
circumstances, dependent on the structure and content of the framework. 
Interpretation is only meaningful when two or more competing 
propositions are addressed. 
The role of the forensic scientist is to consider the probability of the 
evidence given the propositions that are addressed. 
The authors argue that the primary role of the forensic scientist in a criminal 
investigation is to consider the repertoire of claims and allegations of 
investigators, advocates and witnesses which together comprise the 
framework of circumstances in which the scientist operates (Cook et al. 
1999). Furthermore, they assert that it is the responsibility of the scientist to 
formalise this repertoire in order to assess various case elements in 
accordance with the interpretive principles outlined above. 
8.4 Principles of Forensic Interpretation 
The CAI has been described as encompassing three distinct, but interlinked 
phases: an assessment of customer requirement, a case pre-assessment 
phase, and service delivery (Cook et al 1998a, p.152). As shown by Figure 
8.1, each phase is broken down into a series ofprocesses, which may 
interact in the manner of feedback loops, representing the emphasis on the 
continual review and re-appraisal ofthe outputs. 
The customer requirement phase, as the name entails, requires an 
assessment of the customers needs. The developers of the CAI stress the 
need for good communication in this regard, in order that the scientist has 
'an adequate appreciation of the case circumstances so that he/she can set up 
a concise framework for thinking about what kind of examinations may be 
carried out and what may be expected from them'. (Cook et al 1998a, 
p.153). Construction of such a framework of circumstances is taken to be a 
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necessary pre-requisite for the development of propositions relevant to the 
evidence and the case. The authors stress the need for scientists to take a 
'balanced view' of each case, in line with what they regard as the principles 
of 'the Bayesian view of evidence, that it is not sensible for a scientist to 
attempt to concentrate on the validity of a particular proposition without 
considering at least one alternative' (Cook et al I 998a, p. I 53). At each 
stage of the process, scientists are obliged to consider at least two competing 
propositions, most commonly relating to a proposition relevant to the 
prosecution hypothesis, and another relevant for the defence hypothesis. A 
key part of this initial phase involves the identification of precisely what 
kind of propositions may be assessed. In some cases, the proposition of 
interest may appear to be somewhat removed from the crime under 
investigation, possibly relating to the investigation of the origins of transfer 
evidence, e.g. 'these fibres came from this garment'. Such a proposition 
may relate to the crime due to the wider framework of circumstances. For 
example, the fibres in question may have been recovered from the scene of 
an apparent burglary. Subsequently a possible suspect may be arrested, 
wearing a garment which might match with the fibres recovered from the 
scene. Forensic scientists may wish to determine how significant any match 
may be, particularly if the garment in question is unusual or rare. 
In prescribing such behaviours, the CAI marks a notable change from the 
'traditional' role of forensic evidence. In this model of investigation, 
forensic evidence was only identified and analysed if it was regarded as 
contributing toward the construction of a case against an individual 
normally already suspected by the police. The decision to carry out 
particular forensic tests was often the preserve of police officers themselves, 
who may have perceived certain items of evidence as yielding potentially 
incriminating forensic information, regardless of their relative lack of 
scientific understanding. The CAI however, obliges scientists to take a 
more neutral and balanced view of evidence, requiring them to consider 
defence scenarios in addition to prosecution hypotheses. The more 
considered approach to proposition selection also reflects the more 
commercial orientation of forensic science. The CAI aims to minimise the 
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Figure 8.1 Outline of the Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) 
Model (Reproduced from Cook et al (1998a) (Cook et al 1998a, p.l53) 
.~·..-·-·-·-·--. 
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wasting of resources on redundant tests which may yield little or no useful 
data for an investigation. 
Once the type of questions that require consideration have been identified, 
the scientist is able to move into the case pre-assessment phase. Here, the 
scientist would be expected to further clarify the propositions they wish to 
investigate, by possibly re-describing them in more quantitative terms. A 
key component of this phase is the generation of likelihood ratios (LRs) 
which take the form: 
Probability ofthe evidence i(prosecution proposition is true 
Probability of the evidence if defence proposition is true 
This form enables the scientist to represent his/her expectations in a more 
precise and quantifiable manner. For example, in an assault case it may be 
necessary to examine an item of a suspect's clothing in order to determine 
whether any fibres from a victim's clothing might have been transferred in 
the course of an assault being carried out. This might lead to the scientist to 
express the following expectation: 'if this proposition is true, then I would 
expect to find x numbers of transferred fibres'. 
The assessments made in this phase inform the manner in which work is 
carried out in the final service delivery phase. This involves the execution 
of relevant tests in accordance with the case pre-assessment phase. 
Statements will eventually be prepared by the scientist outlining the findings 
of these tests. What is made clear by the authors is that this process is 
viewed as sensitive to feedback and is thus not regarded as followinga 
strictly linear path, as indicated by the curved arrows in Figure 8.1 (Cook et 
al 1998a, p.l53). Hence the process is continually subject to review and 
possible further consultation with the customer. Whilst the initial direction 
of forensic inquiry may be informed by the circumstances of the case, new 
lines of inquiry generated by subsequent developments are able to be readily 
incorporated into the framework. 
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8.5 Investigative vs Evaluative Mode 
In a subsequent paper, the authors of the CAI have put forward a three-stage 
model of hypothesis formation and testing in forensic scientific casework 
(Jackson et al. 2006). In this work, it is proposed that forensic scientists 
operate initially in an 'investigative' mode, followed by an 'evaluative' 
mode, which may break down further into a 'preliminary evaluative' stage 
and then a 'fully evaluative' stage depending on the availability of evidence 
(Jackson et al 2006). Table 1 (Jackson et al 2006) compares the procedures 
and behaviours of forensic scientist in the investigative and evaluative 
modes. A number of general differences can be seen. In the investigative 
mode, a suspect may not yet have been identified, and thus the emphasis 
focuses on gaining information from examination of the incident scene, and 
attempting to explain that evidence. In the evaluative mode, there is more 
emphasis on the suspect. Furthermore, in the investigative mode, the 
conjectures may be based largely on the opinion of the scientist. Whilst 
these may be largely a matter of experience, they may ultimately take the 
form of prior probabilities of a particular cause to account for the incident. 
The investigative mode breaks down into seven activities: first, the making 
of observations; second, the generation of a set of hypotheses, exhaustive 
within the context of the case, to explain the observations; third, the 
assignation of prior probability measures for these hypotheses; fourth, the 
generation of likelihood ratios for the range of possible future observations 
given that each of the hypotheses were to be true; fifth, the further search for 
observations; sixth, the generation of posterior probabilities for each 
hypothesis and their re-ranking in order of probability; and seventh, the 
communication of opinions to the customer (Jackson et al 2006). 
If, via the investigative phase, it is possible to generate two mutually 
exclusive, competing propositions, Bayes theorem may be employed. 
Jackson et al (2006) state that the role of the scientist in this case is to 
generate likelihood ratios (LRs) for the scientific findings, and it is here that 
the scientist can be seen to be making the transition into an 'evaluative' 
mode. Jackson et al (2006) define an evaluative opinion as 'an expression 
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of the magnitude of the LR' (Jackson et al2006, p.38). The evaluative stage 
breaks down further into 'preliminary evaluative' and 'fully evaluative' 
stages. The preliminary evaluative stage involves the construction of 
propositions against which likelihoods concerning the evidence may be 
derived. Typically (although not necessarily exclusively), pairs of 
propositions are compared, pertaining to a prosecution and defence 
hypothesis respectively. Once a comparison of likelihoods are possible, a 
likelihood ratio can be generated which indicates the relative likelihood of 
one proposition against the other. If such a ratio can be derived, it is said 
that the investigation has entered the fully evaluative stage. 
Table 8.1. Summary of the roles of investigative and evaluative 
scientists. (Taken from Jackson et al 2006, p.43). 
Investigative Mode Evaluative Mode 
The issues addressed by the scientist tend to The issues addressed by the scientist tend to 
be centred on, or generated by, the incident be centred on the suspect/defendant 
The scientist begins the process by making The scientist begins the process by 
observations to help answer the key questions considering case circumstances, the 
allegations and the issues 
Hypotheses are generated to explain the Propositions are generated generally from 
observations; explanations may be speculative prosecution and defence positions 
and/or imaginative and/or novel 
The scientist will seek new observations to The scientist makes observations and checks 
strengthen or weaken belief in the against her predictions of the outcomes, given 
explanations that each of the propositions were true 
The scientist may operate from one The scientist is required to be impartial in 
perspective approach 
If the probability of the observations, given The scientist is not concerned, generally, 
the truth of the explanation, is very low, the about very low probabilities for the 
scientist will seek clarification and re- observations. Concern might be raised of the 
assessment of the suitability of the probability for the observations, given the 
explanation. truth of EACH of the propositions, is very 
low. 
Opinions provide direction to the Information is presented to assist the court in 
investigation; options for further investigation addressing intermediate and ultimate issues 
may be generated or eliminated 
The scientist may provide an opinion on the The scientist provides information to help the 
truth or otherwise of an uncertain event court to form an opinion on the probability of 
an uncertain event 
Prior probabilities, either generated by the Prior probabilities are the remit of the court 
scientist or given by others, are taken into 
account explicitly by the scientist 
Investigative opinion may be provided by the Evaluative opinion is provided in the form of 
scientist as a posterior probability expression either of the LR or of single 
likelihoods; posterior probabilities are for the 
court 
The scientist is findings-led The scientist is propositions-led 
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The evaluative mode eventually culminates with the scientist being obliged 
to report likelihood estimates to court which are intended to help the jury in 
their deliberations. The CAI therefore allows for the fact that the latter have 
the ultimate say in the matter of guilt or innocence. 
8.6 Formation of Propositions3 
Evett et al (2000a) describe in more detail how the CAI may be used to 
construct hypotheses in relation to casework (Evett et al 2000a). Through 
their work with operational forensic scientists they posit that the formation 
ofpropositions involves an intermediate stage, in which various 
explanations for the evidence may be tentatively advanced (Evett et al 
2000a, p.4). The formation of explanations will necessarily be dependent 
upon the framework of circumstances relevant to a particular case, and 
which may well be a contingent and rather fluid process, depending on 
certain factors (such as certain pieces of evidence being put into doubt, or 
being rendered inadmissible etc) (Evett et al 2000a, p.5). 
In their discussion of the processes leading to the use of explanations 
through which to generate propositions, Evett et al (2000a) give a number of 
examples of the kind of explanations which may be considered during the 
course of a rape case in which no trace of semen has been recovered: 
'1. Intercourse did not take place. 
2. Intercourse took place and there was no ejaculation. 
3. Intercourse took place but a condom was used. 
4. Intercourse took place but the complainant used a vaginal douche. 
5. Intercourse took place but all trace of the semen has been lost.' (Evett 
2000a, p.5) 
3 It is possible here to view the division between explanations and propositions as relating to the 
two-stage model of scientific inquiry as put forward by the 19th century American philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce. He viewed the scientific process as consisting first of a stage of 
hypothesis formation, known as abduction, followed by a process of hypothesis testing, which 
he referred to as retroduction. In the case of CAI reasoning, it can be seen that the process of 
explanation-generation relates to the abduction stage, whereas the proposition stage relates to 
the retroductive stage. 
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Evett et al (2000a) use this set of examples to demonstrate the varying 
degree to which each explanation accounts for the evidence. Using 
probabilistic terms, they emphasise the relationship between the semantic 
content of explanatory statements and background information. In this 
particular set of examples, No.5 can be seen to provide a complete 
explanation of the observation. Evett et al refer to such an explanation as 
prescriptive. In more formal terms, the probability of the observation, given 
the truth ofNo.5, is equal to 1. However, for a given observationS= 'no 
semen was recovered', it would be that the probability for each of the other 
explanations would also be close to 1 (Evett et al 2000a, p.5). Other 
background information is therefore necessary in order to compare the 
explanations in a more meaningful fashion. For example, in order to 
compare No. I with the others one might wish to know if the suspect and the 
complainant had ever met, and if so under what circumstances. Other 
information, such as past behaviour and experience of the individuals might 
help investigators to more effectively differentiate between the plausibility 
of the explanations. Assessment of the explanations may enable scientists 
to re-frame them as propositions, which may aided by the existence of 
background information able to be translated into quantitative terms4. 
4 Evett et al (2000a) highlight six different aspects which differentiate propositions from 
explanations. It may be of interest here to quote these in full: 
Propositions come in pairs. An essential component of the approach to interpretation followed 
in these papers is the need to address two propositions at any one time: one prosecution and one 
defence. Explanations can be generated without mutually exclusive alternatives. 
Propositions need background information. An explanation needs no circumstantial evidence?; 
it may be completely speculative and introduce new features hitherto not thought of. A 
proposition can only be generated from a stated framework of circumstances and assumptions. 
Propositions are formal. Explanations may be generated quite informally, almost in a 
'brainstorming' sense. However, propositions must have a logical relationship with the 
framework of circumstances. 
Propositions are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Within the stated framework, the two 
propositions will satisfy this requirement. Explanations, being informal, may be interrelated, 
intersecting and open ended. 
Prior odds relate to propositions. The framework of circumstances will enable a jury to assign 
conditional probabilities to the chosen propositions. Explanations may be without any rational 
probability. 
Propositions relate to inference. It follows that propositions are capable of rational inference. 
Explanations will, in general, not be testable in a logical sense' (Evett et al 2000a, pp.S-6, 
original emphasis). 
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Evett et al (2000a) use the above example to show how the framework of 
circumstances may affect the kind of propositions that are generated 
depending on the type of information that may be available. If the 
possibility is considered that a complainant may have been under the 
influence of drink or drugs, then the construction of propositions may 
become more difficult. However, if the complainant is able to recollect 
clear details about the incident, such as whether the offender wore a 
condom, whether ejaculation took place, or if the complainant had not had 
prior intercourse for a month etc, then it may be possible to frame pairs of 
propositions, along the lines of: 
Prosecution proposition: The complainant had intercourse as alleged 
Defence proposition: The complainant had not had intercourse for at 
least a month 
The kind of information that may be garnered from the framework of 
circumstances will vary from case to case. Typical sources of information 
may include details of times and activities, which could also guide scientists 
in the formulation of meaningful propositions specific to each case. For 
example, scientists may be able to use prior data about the persistence of 
semen in the vagina after intercourse to consider the probability of the 
evidence given each of the above propositions. 
8. 7 The Hierarchy of Propositions 
The hierarchy of propositions plays a central role in organising the way in 
which propositions are constructed and assessed. This hierarchy classifies 
propositions along three lines, in order of their relevance to the ultimate 
issue under consideration by the court (Cook et al. 1998b ). Level I, or the 
source level, relates to propositions concerning the origins of the evidentiary 
material. For example, source-level questions may concern the origin of 
glass fragments in a case of breaking and entering. Scientists may wish to 
ascertain the likelihood of the glass fragments originating from a particular 
broken window. In this case, scientists could consider two hypotheses: a 
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prosecution hypothesis which would seek to ascertain the probability that 
the glass fragments originated from the window implicated in the case, and 
a defence hypothesis considering the probability that the fragments 
originated from another window not involved in the act ofbreaking and 
entering. To cite another example, a set of Level I propositions could be 
formulated to consider the origin of blood on the clothes of a suspect under 
suspicion in an alleged assault case. A prosecution hypothesis would seek 
to ascertain the probability that the blood came from the victim of the 
assault, whereas a defence hypothesis would seek to consider the probability 
that the blood originated from another individual not involved in the assault. 
In each instance, assessment of the sets of hypotheses is based on 
observations, measurements and analyses. In the case of Level I questions, 
the process of assessment is generally considered as being exclusively 
within the ambit of scientists, as the means of assessment at this level will 
exclusively involve the measurement and comparison of quantitative data 
(Cook et al 1998b, p.232-233). 
Level II in the hierarchy, the activity level, involves a greater element of 
reconstruction of the events in each case. Re-visiting the example of the 
breaking and entering case, one may wish to pose a prosecution hypothesis, 
concerning the probability that a given suspect smashed the window, against 
a defence hypothesis seeking to ascertain the probability that the suspect 
was not present when the window was broken. In the example of the 
alleged assault, the prosecution hypothesis may concern the probability that 
a suspect attacked the victim by kicking the latter in the head. The defence 
hypothesis, meanwhile, may be concerned with the probability that the 
suspect was not present when the victim was kicked in the head. 
A key difference between Level I and Level II propositions is that, whilst 
the former may be addressed via strictly scientific means, Level II 
propositions cannot be addressed without taking a specific framework of 
circumstances into consideration (Cook et al 1998b, p.233). To address the 
Level I proposition of the probability of glass fragments originating from a 
particular window, it could be feasible to analyse the refractive index of the 
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fragments against a database containing data on the refractive indices of 
glass windows from a number of different manufacturers (Cook et al 
1998b ). However, if the investigators wish to address the probability of 
finding a matching quantity of fragments about a suspect given that it was 
they had smashed the window, they would require further circumstantial 
information. In this case it would be of use to be able to ascertain how the 
window was smashed, and the time interval between the incident and the 
removal of the clothing from the suspect for analysis. In order to assess a 
corresponding defence hypothesis, in this case the probability of finding 
matching glass on the suspect if they were unconnected with the smashing 
of the window, it may be useful to have information which would 
predispose the suspect to have glass present on his clothing, such as lifestyle 
or profession (Cook et al 1998b, p.233). Hence the more information a 
scientist may possess in relation to the circumstances of the case, the more 
fully Level II propositions will be able to considered, and the more bearing 
that insights generated at Level I will have on consideration of Level 11 
propositions. 
However, it is unclear just how much information is required before the 
transition from Level I to II can be made. Here, it seems that the deeply 
contextualised nature of specific criminal investigations necessarily limits 
the extent to which the CAI can be fully systematised. Furthermore, it 
would appear to be the case that the amount of information available to 
investigators influences the type of propositions that can be formed. 
Certainly, it does appear to be the case that the role of the forensic scientist 
becomes more directly involved in the progress of the case. Rather than 
simply analysing material to gain neutral, quantitative results, the forensic 
scientist is obliged to learn more about the specific circumstances of each 
case. This however, can be seen to have certain consequences. In addition 
to possibly widening the workload of operational forensic scientists, in 
terms of a greater amount of information having to be considered, this also 
has a range of ethical and pragmatic implications. The primary concern in 
this regard is whether knowledge of the circumstances of a case may lead to 
bias in the assessment of evidence (Koppl 2005). Regardless of this, it can 
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be seen that the transition from Level I to Level II necessitates greater 
interaction between police investigators and forensic scientists in order for 
the contribution of the latter to lead to more meaningful inferences. 
The emphasis on the role of forensic scientist in generating Level II 
propositions raises some questions about the division ofratiocinative labour 
in the course of investigating a criminal case. The kind of level II 
propositions outlined in the literature appear to be the kind of lines of 
enquiry that one would expect the police to pursue. Hence the remit of what 
could be viewed as 'forensic science' is possibly stretched; what the CAI 
can be seen to represent in this regard is a possible extension of what could 
be seen as constituting forensic scientific inquiry. Rather than a concern 
with the recovery, rendition and analysis of items ofpossible evidential 
interest and importance, 'forensic science' under the realm of the CAI is 
being extended to constitute a possible method for the advancement of 
criminal investigation as a whole. 
The final level in the hierarchy, Level Ill or the offence level, concerns the 
probability that a suspect has committed a criminal offence. Level Ill 
propositions are the domain of the jury, assisted by the judge (Cook et al 
1998b, p.233). Offence-level propositions may also be construed as 
activity-type propositions; however the key difference in the case of Level 
Ill propositions is that they concern the question of whether an actual crime 
has occurred. Although Level Ill propositions are assessed by the jury, and 
ultimately outside the domain of the forensic scientist, the latter may well be 
able to assist the court in their deliberations, by reporting information 
concerning likelihoods in a suitably comprehendable form (Cook et al 
1998b, p.233). As the potential work involved in incorporating Level I data 
into Level II data demonstrates, a considerable amount ofwork may be 
involved in producing propositions and inferences of use to forensic 
scientists before they can then assist courts with ruling on Level Ill 
propositions. In many cases, Level II and Level Ill propositions may 
resemble each other; what separates them is whether a particular activity 
may be construed as a criminal offence. For example, whilst it may possible 
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to prove a Level II proposition such as 'the suspect had intercourse with the 
victim', more persuasive work is required before a corresponding Level Ill 
proposition, namely 'the suspect is guilty of rape' (ie no consent), is 
proven5. 
So far my discussion has focused upon the CAI as it is depicted in the 
literature published in forensic science journals, and so has considered it as 
a series of empirically informed theoretical statements. I now turn to a more 
detailed discussion of the issues that arise when considering the practical 
implementation of the model. In this section I draw upon additional 
material from semi-structured interviews which add greater understanding 
of the contingencies of the application of Bayesian reasoning to support 
criminal investigations. Hence I attempt to show how the use of CAI in 
casework reveals a number of issues which challenge the representation of 
the CAI as an intervention derived from, and shaped by, a set of abstract 
principles of probabilistic reasoning. 
8.8 Application of the CAI in Criminal Investigation 
The use of the CAI can be seen to start right from the outset of an 
investigation: 
'Say we just fmd a body in a field, what's gone on? How did the body get 
there? What happened to the body? So the scientist, whether it be a police 
scenes of crime type scientist or a ... more independent forensic scientist, 
they would be giving some kind of opinion, an investigative opinion, 
probably a posterior probability opinion as to what went on. So they say 
well, you know, looking at the ... tracks in the ... disturbance at the scene, I 
think the body's been dragged from that position to that position, I then 
5 In addition to the three Levels outlined above, another Level, known as sub-source, has been 
proposed to describe the possibility of a further set of considerations that may be introduced by 
the existence of DNA evidence. The consideration of a sub-source level separates questions of 
match probability of DNA from the question of where it was recovered. The question of 
whether the DNA was recovered from blood, semen or another source may vary in importance 
depending on the nature of the crime, or the other circumstances surrounding the incident. The 
use of a sub-source level has been seen as a possible means of preventing the over-privileging 
of DNA profile data, against other evidence in relation to the case. 
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think it's been turned over, you know, and all stuff like that. So these are 
posterior probability opinions.' (Interviewee 5, 2006). 
It is here that forensic scientists are viewed as operating in the investigative 
mode as described above. At this initial stage, scientists will generally be 
preoccupied with attempting to establish some form ofreconstructive 
knowledge based on observations made of the scene. As the interviewees 
comments demonstrate, the ability to make reconstructive inferences in such 
cases may well depend on one's capacity to interpret a variety of visual 
cues. These cues which investigators may use to help make such inferences 
can take all manner of forms. Another interviewee used the term, 'soft data' 
to describe this: 
'You can tell straight away that she's probably been murdered ... she's 
clearly been sick ... and somebody's cleaned her up ... she's probably been 
re-dressed ... now investigators, SIOs, think a lot about that, and their 
hackles rise when they see people with thongs on back to front, and bras 
on inside out, and stuff like that. They immediately start thinking 're-
dressing', then somebody else had killed and dressed her afterwards. The 
lab would probably ... wouldn't see that and know that, so that's got to 
come from the investigative side or somebody with a scientific mind 
who's part of the investigation ... that's what that is, soft data, 'why is the 
zip slightly down?', somebody's tried to re-dress her and hasn't got the 
top button in as he's moved her, its come down, a girl probably wouldn't 
go out, there's no belt there ... that's intelligence, that's ... the life-blood of 
an investigation ... ' (Interviewee 8, 2008) 
The ability to identify and recognise soft data may depend strongly on the 
experiential standpoint of the individual scientist. Experience in this sense 
may refer both to their memory of previous investigations of similar cases, 
but possibly also to a generalised life-experience more akin to what one may 
think of as 'commonsense'. The epistemic grounds of the identification of 
such soft data may therefore, be rather opaque. Identification of soft data 
may rely to a great extent on individually accumulated experience, or shared 
understandings. There also exists the possibility that soft data may be 
recognised through pure intuition, a hunch that 'something isn't quite right 
here'. Even when one is able to reason in a retrospective manner, it can be 
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seen that soft data which may guide such reconstructive efforts may depend 
on the experience and standpoint of the individual scientist. For example in 
the following discussion Interviewee 8 recounted an incident in which a 
girl's body had been found in a ravine: 
'I said we can tell the SIO something important.. .because the scratches 
on the girl's knees were round the legs ... the scratches went round like 
that, and I said to the scientist, she's obviously been upright going 
down the bank, she's run down there, so that means its an attack site.' 
'If she'd been dead, and transported in [a car and the body then dumped 
in the ravine], and she'd have been dragged down the bank with 
scratches they would have gone down the length of the leg.' 
(Interviewee 8, 2008). 
Precisely what constitutes 'soft data' may be open to some interpretation, 
and it may well manifest itself in different ways. It may be seen however to 
refer to information which may not necessarily be readily quantifiable, and 
its existence and significance may be contingent on a series of extraneous 
factors which could include time, location, activity etc. Nonetheless, the 
comprehension of soft data appears to form an important preliminary step 
toward the formation of propositions. The identification ofthese visual cues 
and the inter-relationships between them at a crime scene may directly 
inform the generation of prior probabilities, and hence propositions. 
Consideration of such derived propositions allows the scientist to begin to 
operate in the evaluative mode. However, in the transition to this mode 
certain problematic issues in the application of the CAI become increasingly 
apparent. 
A key issue at source level concerns the availability of suitable databases 
with which to assess the significance of particular pieces of recovered 
evidence. In some cases, such as DNA, these are relatively well established, 
and indeed are considered necessary resources upon which match 
probabilities may be calculated. However, for many other forms of 
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evidence, interviewees argued that the necessary data sets able to aid 
scientists in assessing propositions were often lacking: 
... there's things like assigning priors, if we are to assign priors in 
investigative mode which is what I'm saying we would do, so it's having 
sufficient data to assign priors realistically and obviously. Perhaps more, 
more importantly because either in investigative mode or in evaluative 
mode we 're dealing with likelihoods which is the probability of the 
evidence given propositions but there's huge areas where there just ain't 
the data ... (Interviewee 5, 2006)' 
One exception is the field of the fire investigation. In this case there appear 
to have been efforts to establish databases which may aid investigators in 
making inferences regarding the cause of particular fires: 
' ... they set their priors from a database of known previous fire causes so I 
can't quote you the figures but just for example what they'll say is that 
from a known database the previous fires ... twenty per cent are caused by 
accelerants, twenty per cent are caused by electrical, twenty per cent are 
caused by smoking or whatever ... ten per cent are caused by 
explosions ... so they have a database ... which gives them priors. So it's 
testable, it's exposed, it's explicit, it can be challenged, but it's explicit, 
people can see the priors that we are using. Now we are far, far, far from 
that in any other field.' (Interviewee 5, 2006). 
However, by and large, full implementation of the CAI may be hampered by 
the absence of data which may facilitate the generation of prior probability 
estimates6. It was stated by one interviewee, that in the absence of 
background data, recourse could instead be given to less explicitly 
rationalised means of establishing likelihood estimates: 
' ... so people rely on their own experiences, they maybe kick it round 
with their colleagues and say what do you think about the likelihood of 
getting this, you know, maybe not phrase it like that but that's the sense 
they're trying to get.' (Interviewee 5, 2006) 
6 Forensic science providers however, do keep certain data bases of information from certain 
pieces of evidence. For example, data bases of glass fragments have been developed to compare 
glass on the basis of refractive indices. 
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Hence there is great potential for likelihood estimates to be based on a 
plurality of epistemic groundings. In the absence of standardised data, such 
estimates may be based on experiential or intersubjective understandings of 
the significance of evidence based on previous instances. Likelihoods may 
then be generated in the absence oftransparent calculative procedures. If 
likelihood estimates are grounded on more experiential bases, then a 
potentially considerable amount of variance may be encountered. 
The issue of data availability becomes greatly complicated on progression 
through Level II, the activity level. For progression to occur other factors 
relevant to the circumstances of the case need to be taken into account. In 
the following example, DNA was isolated from a discarded ammunition 
cartridge recovered from the scene of a fatal shooting. The DNA 
subsequently matched that of a suspect. However, as the following 
discussion shows, the match alone is not sufficient grounds to assume the 
suspect was the killer: 
'In, in preparation for arresting this guy there's a discussion with the 
scientist about the potential strength of evidence and the officer says 
something like you find me his DNA on that cartridge case and I'll 
charge him with murder. Now that may or may not have been, you know, 
a sound strategy but obviously what he was doing he was translating his, 
matching the, potentially matching DNA on the cartridge case which 
would be the bottom of our hierarchy, straight through to guilt and I think 
most lay people would say his DNA's on the cartridge case, he must have 
fired the gun. And that just shows again what I was saying before about 
you may get a magnificent likelihood ratio for the source of DNA on the 
cartridge case but what that is in terms of whether or not he pulled the 
trigger, there's a lot of intermediary stages to go through to translate the 
weight of evidence for DNA to weight of evidence for guilt in terms of 
pulling the trigger.' (Interviewee 5, 2006). 
Hence a considerable amount of inferential work needs to be accomplished 
in order to establish a link between the presence of the DNA match and the 
contribution of the suspect to the murder. 
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At this level Bayesian analysis becomes increasingly more dependent on 
information pertaining to the specific framework of circumstances of the 
case under investigation. If such information is not readily forthcoming, 
then the contribution of the scientist may remain at source level. In the 
following casework example, investigators were pursuing the case of the 
murder of two people. The perpetrator had entered the house of the two 
deceased, and had subsequently attempted to use a towel to mop up blood at 
the scene: 
'Well there may be things to be done you see because that then starts to 
test how expert are we at scientific knowledge and understanding of 
transfer and persistence of DNA. What really would we expect to fmd 
given that he handled the towel seven days or ten days ago? If we would 
expect exactly the same sort of profile that we'd expect given he's 
handled it on the day of the murder then sure, we couldn't, the likelihood 
ratio becomes one for that evidence. The evidence is equally likely given 
he did the murder or given he was there seven days ago. But if say, if say 
for whatever reason technically you wouldn't really expect that quantity 
or that form or that amount or that distribution of DNA given that it was 
seven days ago compared to, you know, handling it as a result of the 
murder. .. Then we could say well the findings are somewhat more likely 
given that he handled the towel on the day of the murder and then given 
he handled it seven days before, there is still some probative value, some 
weight of evidence from likely ratio in favour of the prosecution .. 
(Interviewee 5, 2006)' 
The requirement to account for additional variables such as measures of 
transfer and persistence of material brings about a further analytical burden. 
The information required at this level may be highly multifaceted in nature, 
which in turn may impact upon the kind of datasets required. In some cases, 
such as the above example, it may well be feasible to model these 
variables 7, and in doing so add greater weight to the contribution of certain 
pieces of evidence. However, in other cases, the grounds on which activity 
level assessments are made may not be so readily quantifiable. 
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The appropriate use and construction of propositions was viewed as central 
to the aims of the CAI. However, interviewees commonly expressed the 
opinion that the further one ascended the hierarchy of propositions, the 
process of constructing propositions involved an increasing degree of 
complexity. One example given by Interviewee 5 involved the discovery of 
DNA on a bullet cartridge. Interviewee 5 discussed the issue of having to 
reason whether this DNA could be used to inculpate an individual suspected 
of firing the gun, from whom a match had been returned: 
'In, in preparation for arresting this guy there's a discussion with the 
scientist about the potential strength of evidence and the officer says 
something like you find me his DNA on that cartridge case and I'll 
charge him with murder. Now that may or may not have been, you 
know, a sound strategy but obviously what he was doing he was 
translating ... potentially matching DNA on the cartridge case which 
would be the bottom of our hierarchy, straight through to guilt and I 
think most lay people would say his DNA 'son the cartridge case, he 
must have fired the gun. And that just shows again what I was saying 
before about you may get a magnificent likelihood ratio for the source 
of DNA on the cartridge case but what that is in terms of whether or not 
he pulled the trigger, there's a lot of intermediary stages to go through 
to translate the weight of evidence for DNA to weight of evidence for 
guilt in terms of pulling the trigger.' 
'And I don't know how far the case went after that, whether they 
actually progressed to court on a murder charge but at some stage the 
murder charge was either dropped or he was found not guilty. I think 
the murder charge might have been dropped but he was found guilty or 
he did admit to a charge of handling ammunition.' 
'So now it would be interesting to find out whether the case was 
progressed through prosecution and trial or whether it was dropped by 
the prosecution at some stage, I really don't know but again that's a 
nice example I think of the weight of evidence not being translated 
through the hierarchy.' 
7 For example, see the work by Lowe et a! (2002) on DNA transfer and persistence which could 
be used to inform such work. 
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There's kind of a lot of intermediary stages to, to kind of get to weight 
of evidence of this DNA in terms of whether or not he was the man who 
fired the gun at this guy ... 
So we need to know whether or not the DNA, what's the chance the 
DNA on the ... cartridge case came from the person who handled it. 
Now it may or may not have been, a good probability they say the next 
stage is, is he the guy who loaded that bullet into the gun. So they say 
what's the probability that the DNA we found on the cartridge case 
came from the person who handled it and loaded it into the gun and 
then so and then we say what's the probability that the person who 
handled the cartridge case, loaded it into the gun, was the same person 
who fired the gun ... To progress through the hierarchy you'd have to say 
things like OK we've got DNA matching ... the guy so the issue is what 
we would call a sub-source issue which is the source of the DNA so the 
issue is whether or not the DNA came from him, we've got a good 
likelihood ratio for that, the next issue is about whether or not, this is an 
activity level issue, is whether or not he handled the bullet.' 
(Interviewee 5 2006). 
This example shows the need to introduce the concept of the hierarchy of 
propositions, in that it highlights the range of considerations that may need 
to be taken into account before a link can be established between the DNA 
evidence and the alleged offence. However, it also exposes the difficulties 
in constructing this link through the formation of relevant propositions. In 
what follows I discuss this issue in more detail, and demonstrate how a 
number of sources of ambiguity may be encountered, which are potentially 
intractable in nature, and may only be circumvented by distinctly social 
practices. 
8.9 Propositional Ambiguity 
The complexities involved in the application of Bayesianism to 
investigation manifest themselves in a number of sources of ambiguity 
encountered in the process of the construction of propositions. First, intra-
propositional ambiguity concerns the potential uncertainty relating to the 
wording of propositions. Second, inter-propositional ambiguity may 
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involve uncertainty over which is the most appropriate proposition to 
address in relation to an activity. It can also involve uncertainties over 
whether two pairs of propositions are actually mutually exhaustive. Finally, 
statistical ambiguity involves uncertainty over the nature of data used to 
estimate prior probabilities and likelihoods. 
Intra-propositional ambiguity may commonly manifest itself via the use of 
vague terms in propositions. The authors of the CAI have sought to address 
this issue (Evett et al 2000b). They cite the example of the word 'contact' 
as typical of the kind of phrases which are open to interpretation. The 
phrase, 'Mr Smith had been in contact with broken glass' does not convey 
precisely what Mr Smith was doing that led him to be in contact. In this 
case he may have deliberately broken a window, or alternatively he may 
have been an innocent bystander, located close to a window when it was 
broken by someone else. 
'I think in every day language, you know, there's more leeway and we 
probably understand what we mean ... but if we're trying to evaluate 
evidence we've got to be very careful to specify the proposition and the 
alternative, quite crisply, because otherwise it's very difficult, if not 
impossible to assign any probability to the evidence given this woolly 
proposition ... so, you'll see lots of examples of that throughout...' 
(Interviewee 5, 2006). 
There is a possibility that intra-propositional ambiguity may arise as a 
consequence of lack of information at the activity level. If it is difficult to 
establish the precise series of events, scientists may only have recourse to 
more vague terms. 
Inter-propositional ambiguity may exist where there is more than one 
proposition, or set of propositions to address when addressing a particular 
activity based on evidence. One example involves the trial ofBarry George 
for the murder of TV presenter Jill Dando: 
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'The propositions ... it was that 'the result we've got. .. is 'how likely is it 
that to arise if it got into his pocket at the time he fired the weapon that 
killed Jill Dando', and 'how likely is it to have got into his pocket. .. at 
some other time?' Now that does illustrate my difficulty with the process. 
One, why is that second proposition the one they used? Why isn't it 
'anybody else in the street', why isn't it 'anybody else who has an 
interest in guns'?' (Interviewee 8, 2008) 
This example demonstrates the myriad of factors that could be taken into 
consideration when constructing propositions. Here, most of the issues lie 
with the construction of alternative (generally defence-led) propositions. 
Prosecution propositions may simply need to account for the probability of a 
certain suspect committing a particular offence. However, in trying to 
construct an alternative account of events, any number of factors could be 
taken into consideration. 
This kind of uncertainty can lead to questions being raised over whether an 
offence occurred at all. Another example that may be cited here involves a 
case involving the death of an elderly woman in the Netherlands. The 
woman was found dead in her greenhouse with two single stab wounds to 
the neck, seemingly administered by a pair of scissors. The woman was 
also found to have had a high concentration of alcohol and diazepam in her 
system, and had a history of substance abuse. Her husband, who also had a 
history of alcoholism as well as minor domestic violence, was placed under 
suspicion ofher murder. 
' ... the main reason why the police charged the husband with murder was 
that they couldn't see how anybody could accidentally fall and stab 
themselves in the neck fatally with scissors ... ' (Interviewee 8 2008) 
Three senior forensic scientists, a psychiatrist, a pathologist and a lawyer all 
attempted to deliberate over this case using a CAl-led approach. 
Considerable difficulty was experienced in agreeing on which alternative 
propositions to formulate with regard to the case. However, it was felt that 
a possible alternative to consider was that the woman had died accidentally: 
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'the first thing you do when you look at it, is try and get some figures 
about how likely is it that you would be stabbed in the neck fatally, or 
stabbed with scissors anyway ... and how likely are you to accidentally 
fall and stumble, and kill yourself like that. .. (Interviewee 8 2008)' 
Initially, figures were obtained which seemed to suggest that a murder had 
occurred. These statistics indicated that the probability of a murder 
occurring using scissors was one in ten thousand, whilst the probability of 
an accident involving scissors was three in four million. When combined 
these figures returned a likelihood that indicated it was 132 times more 
likely to have been murder. 
'But that's not the right population ... there are only seven hundred 
murders per year in the UK, so that's the population available for murder 
by scissors, so its one in ten thousand ... times 700 ... ofall 
murders ... Whereas, it's the entire population that's available for falls 
onto scissors, so if that's 3 in 4 million, its 60 million times 3 in 4 
million. When you work it out, by Bayes, which I never did at the time, 
ok, it turns out to be instead of intuitively, that its much more likely to be 
murder, its actually much, much more likely to be 640 times more likely 
to be an accident.(Interviewee 8, 2008)' 
It is possible to question these results. As can be seen, the figures for 
murder are obtained for the UK, not the Netherlands. Furthermore, the 
figures relating to accidental death were obtained from the coroner's office 
in Birmingham. However, the ambiguity became further compounded: 
'******said 'no we need to know all fifty year old plus ladies in the 
UK, how likely they are to fall'. And at that point we thought. .. 'but we 
can't get that'. Can we? Because that includes all the falls that don't 
injure anybody, because, by definition the ones that do injure somebody 
enough for them to go to hospital is a subset of that anyway. So its 
actually, quite difficult. .. ' (Interviewee 8, 2008) 
'And****** was adamant that that wasn't what we wanted to know, 
we wanted people who don't fall when they are drunk, and we missed 
that point. Right, because the alternative is that how likely is she to do 
that when she's ... fallen when drunk and he wanted to know how likely 
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are you to fall and not injure yourself when you're drunk. And as well 
as, how likely are you to just fall, and so he wants the proposition to be 
as close to the alternative as relevant ... as possible.' (Interviewee 8, 
2008) 
Here, can be seen an instance of statistical ambiguity and inter-propositional 
ambiguity. Controversies over data are related to the kind of propositions 
one seeks to test. Here, there are a number of other factors that could be 
considered in the analysis, and these affect the kind of propositions that may 
be considered in turn: 
'But then we realised that the population I realised this bit by myself and 
****** said that's right, but then we actually tried to apply it to her 
individually, why was she the person who fell on the scissors? Right? As 
opposed to anybody else? We all found that very difficult. .. by then we 
were definitely going backwards and forwards'. 
'Yes, there probably was influenced by the fact that we could see some of 
the propositions weren't going to get data on. And that wasn't sensible 
was it? Really, we should have got the propositions right and worried 
about the data afterwards ... ' (Interviewee 8, 2008) 
Here, there seems to be a direct inter-dependence on the type of propositions 
constructed and the availability of the data. Propositions were formulated 
after it was considered what data was available, as opposed to agreeing on 
what propositions to test from the outset. Hence a certain degree of 
pragmatism was involved. Ironically, the case was largely solved through 
other means: 
'But in fact, you can, if you think about it, you can think of an 
explanation really easily, which is, I can demonstrate, I Bayesianised it, 
right, but we actually managed to prove it after that. So if you think of 
yourself as ... tottering about, on your feet, and you trip as you 're going 
through the doorway, you might stick out your hand to hold yourself up, 
right ... I'm going through this doorway, I trip, I've got scissors in my 
hand, I spread my hand to try and catch something, this is an upright of 
the door frame, and I fall and I turn my head because I can see the knife 
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(sic) coming, and I've stabbed myself in the left side of my neck, like 
that, with the scissor blades open, and them being against the upright, 
right, so my whole weight is going to push them into my neck ... so, the 
pathologists were thinking, 'how could you fall?' in, scissors in your right 
hand, and get stabbed there, with the scissors open, you can't. But, if you 
think of it that you trip and you open your hand ... you open your hand to 
support yourself, that does everything that's required. It supports them 
against some hard object.. .and you turn your head, naturally, so if you 
look at the wound ... see how wide apart they are, because she's spread 
her fingers, so ... now that's not Bayes ... now I've gone back to just 
expressing it in layman's logic tenns' (Interviewee 8, 2008). 
The important point to consider here is that whilst Bayes may have been 
cited as a guide to reasoning, other more practical modes of reasoning were 
employed to help establish precisely what happened. What is notable is the 
observation of the particular type of marks made by the scissors, and how 
this informed a practical reconstruction of events. The 'layman's logic' is 
redolent of the 'soft data' alluded to above; a mixture of practical action and 
observation is used to reconstruct the events, rather than any final recourse 
to quantitative data. Although the latter might provide some vague 
guidance to the case, in the sense of suggesting a possible alternative 
explanation, a great deal more work was involved to progress the situation. 
More seriously, the concern was expressed that there was a risk that a 
Bayesian analysis might still be conditioned due to the circumstances of the 
case, and that it was the latter, rather than the Bayesian approach, which still 
tended to guide the course of inquiry: 
'I'll give you an example. Let's say, let's say a crime was committed, a 
burglary say but there was a witness to say it was a, it was a very young 
woman in her teens, a young teenager, and the police attend, they find a 
footwear mark which they believe could be proven say it can be proven 
that it was the offender's footwear mark. They arrest the suspect, not 
because of the footwear but from other information, they arrest the 
suspect, take her shoes, they're submitted and the scientist compares this 
and, and says oh that's a good match, that's a small shoe, it's a woman, 
it's a female's shoe and it's really, really unusual that. So, you know, in 
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the general population it would be unusual. .. But then you say well let's 
have a think about this. What is the ... database? You say well what is the 
alternative? Well let's think of the proposition and the alternative. The 
proposition is this shoe made the mark and the alternative is this shoe 
didn't make the mark, it was made by the shoe of another young female. 
So you've conditioned almost, well you've conditioned your alternative 
and you're conditioning then the database because the database is young 
females who are likely to be in the, the potential perpetrators ... So the 
value of the evidence is not what the scientist first thought, this is a very 
unusual shoe. Sure it's a very unusual shoe in the population of burglars 
but in the population conditioned on the alternative which is young 
females in this area at the time, it may be quite common. (Interviewee 5, 
2006)' 
Here, it can be seen that ambiguity exists with regard to the precise type of 
database that the evidence should be compared against. A number of factors 
(gender, location in this case) act to confuse the issue. 
8.10 Responses to the CAI 
It can be seen that there is a marked plurality of understandings and 
representations with regard to the concept of reasoning in a 'Bayesian' way. 
From the above, the latter can be viewed as representing: a process which 
involves the construction and comparison of divergent propositions; a 
means for updating one's beliefs in the light of new information; and a 
necessary and inevitable consequence ofthe explicit adoption of principles 
commonly associated with a 'scientific stance' to forensic evidence and its 
interpretation in the course of criminal investigations. 
However, one notable facet of all of the above is a shared sense that Bayes 
acts as a guide for reasoning through a case. Yet even this is a position not 
necessarily shared by all: 
'Statistics is a tool. Its not science' (Interviewee 3, 2008) 
Here, there is a strong sense of what Bayes can, and can't be seen to 
achieve. In this instance the use ofBayes, and statistics in general, is seen 
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as more limited. Rather than functioning as a guiding mechanism for 
forensic scientists, Bayes is viewed more as a simple means ofverifying 
data. The main issue that lies at the heart of these criticisms is not that of 
the correctitude of Bayes Theorem per se, but more in the way it is currently 
being prescribed for use in forensic scientific practice: 
'All of this is about the weight of the evidence and how its used rather 
than there's any real flaw in the process ..... Bayes theorem was really 
designed for long-running experiments, Bayes used it for rolling balls 
along a table ... now a crime scene is a single experiment, irreproducible 
in that sense, and the question then is, how useful are prior probabilities 
after the event has occurred? Now I'll give an example ... what was the 
probability that you and I would meet in this room? If you estimated that 
a year ago ... now tomorrow, after it has happened ... can we say, well it 
was unlikely that they met because the prior probability was, right, so 
does it really matter, because what we actually use is the corroboration 
of, you and I saying it happened, it's [the secretary's] diary, [a colleague] 
seeing you, you've got a train ticket, all of this other information that says 
it happened ... so the fact that it was unlikely in advance ... ' (Interviewee 
3, 2008) 
The quote above also highlights another perceived shortcoming of 
Bayesianism, namely concerns over the kind of measures that are most 
important in the context of evidential interpretation. Rather than the 
considering the degree of likelihood of a particular event occurring on the 
basis of evidence, it was argued that it is the degree of corroboration of 
evidence that is of most importance. It was also argued that the likelihood 
ratio currently promoted for use in forensic science takes no account of the 
degree of confidence that may be attributed to the numerator or 
denominator8: 
'I think the danger is abuse of the method, and I that its ... the likelihood 
ratio on the other hand of, 'which is more likely to have happened', we 
8 Certain criticisms ofBayes may lie at an even more fundamental level. For example, the 
Bayesian model requires one to assume that the degree ofbeliefin evidence is more relevant 
than the probability of the actual event. This leads one into potential confusion over what 
might actually be meant by 'Bayesian probability'. If it is considered a degree of belief, rather 
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frequently ... we simply don't know how to assess the numerator and 
denominator. And the other problem is, what if. .. I'm entirely confident 
in the numerator but have really no idea about the denominator? If I know 
that something's a million to one, and I'm pretty unsure about the other 
denominator being ten to one ... so the likelihood ratio is hundred 
thousand, but that hundred thousand is the same as, a dodgy million to 
one and a certain ten to one ... or an uncertain and uncertain, or a certain 
and certain. So the likelihood ratio doesn't recognise the confidence in 
either of those. And in reality, for evidence like paint, glass we simply 
don't know.' (Interviewee 3, 2008). 
Hence in this instance, the epithet 'Bayes' was regarded as acting as a mere 
re-packaging of what was still considered, at a fundamental level, the role of 
human judgement in forensic casework: 
'It's giving a scientific coating to what basically is a human judgement 
about the belief in something ... now of course that's what Bayes was 
trying to get around, the belief thing, but put it on an objective basis, on 
measured results ... this is not what's happening ... we're having it now 
transformed into this degree of belief, and it doesn't matter how much 
you believe something beforehand .. .if the hundred to one outsider comes 
in before the two to one favourite, you'd say, nah it couldn't have 
happened. How useful is it knowing that fact if somebody says 'the 
hundred to one outsider won', how useful is that information in assessing 
after it's happened? Well intuitively I'd say no ... ifhowever, you did a 
long-running series of measured experiments ... we don't have a measure 
here' (Interviewee 3, 2008)9 
Here, once again, the question concerning the basis of judgements made in 
the context of using Bayesian reasoning is called into question. In turn this 
raises a related issue, namely the extent to which Bayesian reasoning may 
be considered as a skill, and hence one that may be certain scientists may 
find more or less easier to adopt then others. Although from consultations 
and discussions it seems that certain individuals have accepted the approach 
than a frequentist definition of probability as one that is readily observable and calculable, then 
there may be risks in it usage. 
9 Hence a hypothesis with low a priori probability is suddenly converted into one with a high 
post hoc degree of belief (Interviewee 3, unpublished). Given that instances of single events 
are being considered, this was viewed as potentially dangerous. 
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and found it to be useful, the skill of using Bayes, and reasoning in a 
'Bayesian' manner, seems not to have been acquired in a particularly 
intuitive fashion: 
'I mean it might take a while, you know, because you need to revisit this 
stuff time and time again but it does, you know, we kind of liken it to a 
slippery fish, you know, we grab the fish and you think you've got it and 
then [snaps fingers] it's gone out of your hand ... ' (Interviewee 5, 2006). 
Thus, while committed Bayesians emphasise the supposed logicality of the 
approach, it is far from clear that this is a form of reasoning which 'comes 
naturally' to forensic scientists. Accordingly, it is uncertain whether when 
used, Bayesian reasoning has been applied in a consistent manner. It is 
apparent that consultations with operational forensic scientists had exposed 
some of the difficulties in making probability judgements, and in the 
absence of tangible data, it is notable that forensic scientists appear to 
continue to largely rely on personal experience and tacit knowledge. Those 
relatively new to the profession found themselves taking this experience on 
board themselves so that the ability to draw conclusions was developed by 
having: 
'learnt at the feet of someone else, y'know you kind of look at your more 
experienced colleagues and see what they did, and they pass on their 
wisdom, sort of thing, and .. .l suppose that wasn't very satisfactory really, 
it wasn't very 'scientific'. (Interviewee 5, 2007) 
And I think in the end, in the end, what people do, how people make 
decisions, can be very intuitive, and most people's intuition is quite 
good .. .I think many people see what appears to work well, but on some 
occasions your intuition can really let you down, and that's what we were 
trying to expose, get people to expose more, how they are arriving at their 
decisions in a case.' (Interviewee 5, 2007) 
The reference to the 'apparently tried and tested way of doing things' seems 
to indicate a tendency for forensic scientists to revert to the use of 
accumulated personal or collective experience in casework rather than the 
Bayesian framework. For example, a visit to the laboratory of a large 
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metropolitan police force indicated a wholesale lack of regard for Bayes, 
with identifications and matches being called on the basis of individual 
judgement. 
There may be a number of reasons for this relative lack of uptake. Issues 
regarding the availability, or lack of, adequate data for establishing prior 
probability, was cited as a common reason. Other reasons seemed to centre 
around personal preference. In this latter case it is unclear whether 
preferences were influenced by the disciplinary background of the scientist, 
or whether it was a matter of individuals being comfortable with the method 
as a whole: 
' ... in the early days it was quite difficult to turn some of those people 
round and think in a different way but having said that. .. the handwriting 
people in the FSS have been particular, most of them warm to it very 
much, there were one or two key people who said 'we can't do this, this 
doesn't work' ... and really set the stall out against it. .. so, again ... the 
experience was a bit mixed, some people warmed to it, and took it up, 
and some took it forward, other people said 'no way' dug their heels 
in ... and I suppose in the end it doesn't depend on which discipline you're 
coming from, it depends on your own personal style and ... equally some 
people [in] DNA areas, even though they've been trained to think in 
likelihood ratios for DNA evidence, if they try to apply it anywhere else 
they couldn't see it ... ' (Interviewee 5, 2007) 
In the examples ofboth handwriting and DNA, the respective experiences 
both seem rather mixed. In the case of handwriting, a sub-discipline which 
does not lend itself easily to quantitative methods, it is interesting to note 
that the majority of analysts were open to the methodology of the CAI, 
although it is perhaps equally important to recognise the existence of some 
opposition within this area. Furthermore, the experience ofDNA analysts is 
particularly striking. The difficulties experienced in applying Bayes to 
anything other than the relatively narrow realm of the evaluation of DNA 
evidence point to a potentially more complex series of factors which may 
both influence the desire to use Bayes, and the proficiency with which it is 
applied. 
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What does seem relatively clear is a certain reluctance on the part of some 
forensic scientists to open up their methods to the kind of epistemological 
scrutiny which Bayes requires. Here, the sense of the authority of 
conventional practice being challenged did not necessarily appear to be 
welcomed, and it is evident that some analysts may have been very 
uncomfortable with this: 
'Another area for objection might be because we were challenging 
conventional wisdom, and we were almost kinda challenging the basis of 
their expertise. Or appeared to be, challenging the basis of their 
expertise, so I think that, you know, once a person has that in their mind 
then .. .its very difficult to get past that .. .I'm thinking ... in other areas as 
well, not just handwriting, I know certainly in the chemical areas ... there 
were certainly a few people who had the same reaction as that 
handwriting person, and it was almost like a challenging their, maybe 
even authority in some ways .. .I know it was very difficult 
sometimes ... when we started to talk about propositions and alternatives 
and said well 'what's the probability we get this amount of gunshot 
residue on his hands 4 hours after firing', and what's the probability we 
get this gunshot residue on his hands given he hasn't, he's a member of 
the public, you find people very reluctant to give you, not a definitive 
answer, but a good answer, a good answer that you and I could 
understand ... they waffle on or, well they would kinda say 'well I just 
know this', y'know, so I suppose theres a, a person has to be willing to 
open up, and kind of almost admit that their science, their expertise is on 
shaky foundations.' (Interviewee 5, 2007) 
The concerns raised above relate to the role ofBayes specifically in a 
forensic scientific context. However, this context is quite clearly part of an 
even wider domain, encompassing the contexts of policing, the judiciary, 
and increasingly commercial interests. As I seek to argue below, the 
application ofBayesian reasoning in forensic science is subject to a wider 
series of negotiations relating to this wider domain, another issue which has 
largely been overlooked by those who have previously commentated on the 
subject ofBayes and forensic science. 
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As discussed in the initial section of this chapter, the employment ofthe 
CAI could reinforce the strategy of positioning forensic scientists more 
closely to the centre of the investigative decision-making process. Indeed, 
one notable aspect of concern for the developers of the CAI was the 
awareness that a significant proportion of the burden of decision-making 
remained in the hands of actors other than forensic scientists, at the expense 
of scientific propriety: 
' ... if we haven't got the data about transfer and persistence, has the blood 
come from the window or has the blood come from that man. Have these 
firearms discharge residues come from that gun? ... the big problem is that, 
if we, if we haven't got the information, the data, then and I would say 
scientific information, scientific data, for transfer and persistence and 
detection, primarily for the numerator [prosecution], and then background 
levels, for the denominator [defence], we'd have to stick at source, now if 
we stick at source, it's simply about mainly within-sample variability and 
between-sample variability, and if we stay there, then someone has got to 
progress it to activity level, to get to the offence, and ... the people who 
are gonna do that are gonna be people like lawyers, judges, and jurors, 
lay people. Who aren't as well placed as a scientist should be to get to 
activity ... so there's that disjunction really, when ... there's a lack of 
scientific data, to move from source to activity. But the big temptation is, 
for other people to do it then, on behalf of the scientist.' (Interviewee 5, 
2007). 
There have been some suggestions that the wider deployment of the CAI 
could elicit a change in the nature of the relationship between forensic 
scientists and the police, in terms of the manner in which the decision-
making process is organised. With regard to the roles and responsibilities of 
forensic scientists, the CAI could possibly be seen to have attempted to 
remove some of the pressure on forensic scientists to deliver authoritative 
and categoric solutions to casework-related problems: 
'I think as well, it gets into another area I'm fascinated by, and its this bit 
about the, image of forensic science, the CSI effect, and all that sort of 
stuff. .. its almost, I bet theres scientists who almost feel they've got to be 
authoritative, because they feel that's their role, so I've got to be 
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categoric, I've got to give firm opinions ... and that kind of forces you 
down a route you may not want to go but you feel you have to because, 
I'm the forensic scientist, everyone's expecting the answer ... everybody 
loves categoric answers, so you think I'll give 'em what they want, so I 
think there's an element of that. .. the kind of history has been 
authoritative forensic science, and we feel we have to live up to that.' 
(Interviewee 5, 2007) 
One possible consequence of more use of the CAI would be to re-position 
forensic scientists as acting in partnership with police investigators, and it 
could be seen as re-positioning the two sets of actors in epistemic terms. In 
order to make source-level data relevant and useful to the outcome of the 
investigative process, scientists would be reliant on information garnered 
from police inquiry in order to gain an understanding of the framework of 
circumstances of the case. The CAI has also aimed to give both partners a 
say in which pieces of evidence would be taken forward for analysis: 
'What did happen, or what still does, is that police would say, there's a 
break-in, there's been a glass window broken, look for glass on the 
clothing, or, you know, examine this for DNA, you know, and so, they 
kind of directed the scientists to apply certain techniques, whereas what 
we really try and encourage the police officers to say is, 'what's your 
problem, what are you trying to establish?' in terms of what are the 
issues .. .is the issue, whether or not he broke the window, or is the issue 
whether or not he went inside the property or is the issue whether or not 
he handled stolen goods. You know, what is the issue for you, then, I'll 
go away and have a think about it and then come back with a strategy for 
you to see if, you know, what do you think of that? A costed time-
strategy, and that's ... that's the whole essence ofCAI, really in terms of 
the case assessment bit, the 'A' bit. .. establish good strong propositions at 
activity level.' (Interviewee 5, 2007) 
Thus in the framework of the CAI, the scientists act in a more facilitative 
role, helping police to clarify the important questions to ask in the course of 
a case, in return for the supply of circumstantial information from the police. 
However, it is not clear if this new set of roles and responsibilities is in 
keeping with how the police view the position of forensic scientists in the 
252 
hierarchy of criminal investigation. It may well be the case that police 
investigators may view the role of forensic scientists as somewhat more 
limited: to provide scientific data about evidence, which may occur in 
relative isolation to the deliberations made by police concerning the 
progress of a criminal case. It is difficult to ascertain how easy it may be to 
change the attitude expressed at the start of the above quote, concerning the 
tendency of the police to provide direction to scientists with regard to the 
pieces of evidence regarded as important to the case. 
There may also be issues with the imperative for the forensic scientist to 
consider defence-type propositions. Here, the concern over the potential to 
force defendants to account for evidence is turned on its head. The need to 
take defence propositions into consideration runs counter to the fact that 
more often than not, forensic scientists are generally employed by police 
forces keen to prosecute suspects. Perhaps for this reason, there appears to 
have been suspicion on the part of the police with regard to the need to 
consider defence propositions within the framework of the CAI: 
'We had another group of officers who kind of mis-interpreted really, one 
or two things we said ... we had to do a bit of work re-assuring them that 
you know, we weren't out to ... how shall I put it? Help the defendant .. .' 
(Interviewee 5, 2007) 
Here the main objection by these police officers appears to have centred 
around the possibility that, in conducting a rigorous enquiry into the origins 
of particular pieces of evidence along Bayesian lines, there lay a risk of 
'giving explanations to the defence' (Interviewee 5, 2007). Although the 
respondent above claims that police 'mis-interpreted' what the originators of 
the CAI were undertaking, the concerns of the former are perhaps not 
entirely unfounded. As mentioned above, for evidence to have any use in a 
case beyond Level I propositions, a wider framework of circumstances 
needs to be taken into consideration; however for the 'activity' level to be 
fully considered, it may be necessary for the suspect to be consulted so that 
a defence proposition be entertained. It is not entirely clear what procedures 
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would be used to elicit a suitable defence-level proposition in such an 
instance, although interviewers could possibly be forgiven for exercising 
caution. 
The use of the CAI to construct defence propositions has possible 
consequences slightly removed from concerns over the relationship with 
police. Another criticism levied at the use ofBayes concerns the onus that 
is placed on the defence to account for evidence: 
'The prosecution argument must be proved, but the defence position may 
simply be that any or all other hypotheses that are not the prosecution 
hypothesis is true.' (Unpublished article written by Interviewee 3). 
With regard to the current system, the defence is under no obligation to 
provide an alternative account to that of the prosecution. Instead of giving 
the defendant opportunities to explain away the evidence, a Bayesian 
schema may force them into fabricating accounts which may prejudice juror 
perceptions. There lies a risk that the defendant may be forced into 
concocting a series of potentially contradictory accounts depending on the 
circumstances of the investigation or the progress of the case through the 
courts10• 
This latter concern brings the issue of impartiality into relief. Regardless of 
whether police forces employ forensic scientists on an 'in-house' basis, or 
contract services to external bodies such as the FSS, it is apparent that 
police and prosecutorial bodies enjoy a significant resource advantage in 
terms of the forensic scientific support available to them. Law enforcement 
agencies constitute the overwhelming majority of the business of the FSS. 
Hence forensic science, in the UK at least, can be seen to be somewhat more 
closely aligned with the prosecution domain as opposed to the defence. 
According to one interviewee who was involved with the defence case in the 
10 The authors of the CAI do address the issue of when defendants give 'no comment' (Jackson 
et a12006). 
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Omagh bomb trial, this apparent close association was seen as prejudicial to 
the outcome of cases, a situation only able to be ameliorated when the 
defence had access to sufficient resources, the latter being viewed as an 
instrumental factor: 
'In England and Wales, I've not yet got an answer to the bias that's 
introduced when your entire business is dependent upon the police for 
funding. If they don't get the results, y'know, work it out! However, 
while we've got an adversarial system, where the other side are properly 
funded, as in Omagh for example, then we can see an equality of arms, 
and that's what I've been most exercised about is equality of arms.' 
(Interviewee 3, 2008). 
Furthermore, this interviewee viewed the market for defence science as 
'poor', and that defence testimony on forensic scientific issues tended to be 
provided by individuals who had experienced some form of dissociation 
from major organisations such as FSS, such as retirement. This may risk a 
lack of credibility in the eyes of the jury. 
Thus impartiality was seen as a major issue, and it may have been the case 
that forensic scientists, particularly those working directly for the police, 
may have experienced some discomfort with such comments as the 
following: 
'The****** police own and operate the labs. I was head of the police 
laboratory in*******, that's why I decided that it really should sit 
separately from the police. For everyone's benefit it should sit 
separately from the police. I know the police don't believe 
that. .. unfortunately the police even made it worse ... the detective chief 
superintendent, when asked about impartiality, said 'what impartiality? 
Look at your salary slip'. That didn't go down well with the scientists. 
(Interviewee 3, 2008)' 
Hence police suspicions may have functioned as a notable obstacle 
preventing the CAI from being taken up by the forensic science community. 
For the CAI to function effectively, and for evidence to exert optimal impact 
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on the course of a case if considered within this 'Bayesian' approach, 
forensic scientists need potentially high levels of information from the 
police. However, the CAI also emphasises the desire for scientists to enjoy 
a greater degree of influence with regard to which pieces of evidence are 
seen as most pertinent to a case. This potential re-positioning of forensic 
scientists within the decision-making hierarchy of criminal investigative 
frameworks may not necessarily be in keeping with traditional police views 
on the place of forensic scientists in criminal investigation. 
With regard to consultations with senior figures in the FSS, another set of 
issues presented themselves, related to commercial pressures: 
' ... whilst the leaders and managers of the FSS could see some 
benefit .. .in the approach we were promulgating .. .I think they felt some 
commercial problems as well...certainly at the time ... the way we were 
working in terms of earning our incomes was items examined, the more 
items we examined the more income we got. So there was almost a 
counter-pressure ... not to apply CAI, because CAI in some ways, said 
'lets just look at the items that are gonna be really effective, really 
efficient, in addressing this question, and particularly upfront, if you 
decide with the customer these are the key issues in the case, the strategy 
to address these key issues is this, this and this, it's not these items or 
these tests, so there was almost a counter-pressure not to apply it. And I 
think therein lay some of the difficulties from the managers and leaders, 
because you could see the natural consequences, if we apply CAI. .. we're 
gonna lose a lot of income, potentially. And there was, to be honest, that 
was probably a real risk ... there had to be a real change in the commercial 
basis of charging ... so instead of charging per item, we charged per 
service.' (Interviewee 5, 2007) 
This the manner in which the FSS organise the way in which forensic 
science is conducted within the organisation clearly has some bearing with 
regard to the uptake ofBayesian methods. Interviewee 3 cited a change in 
the way in which forensic scientific practice was organised by the FSS: 
'Particularly in the FSS now, they've gone away from experienced case 
scientists looking at multiple evidence types and synthesising ... all of the 
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evidence together to ... neat little boxes y'know of 'products' where 'you 
want the hair analysed? We'll do that' does the hair analyst ever speak to 
the DNA person, speak to the paint person, speak to the glass person, that 
aspect has probably been reducing, and that's a consequence of the more 
commercial approach.' (Interviewee 5, 2007). 
Here we see an increased concern with commercialism leading to an 
organisational approach which attempts to render forensic scientific 
'products' as neatly packaged and clearly differentiated techniques and 
specialisms: 
'Most scientists who've been involved in forensic science for any length 
oftime know the pros and cons of each, and ifyou like you know the 
linrits of what you know ... knowing what you know and knowing what 
you don't know is vital and so its that but ... to compartmentalise the 
evidence in the way that seems to be happening, I think is compromising 
the scientific evaluation of the whole case.' (Interviewee 3, 2008). 
It must be emphasised that senior FSS scientists will often assist Senior 
Investigating Officers (SIOs), in a 'special advisor' role in a serious 
criminal investigation, providing guidance on how the course of forensic 
investigation should proceed, and possibly also liasing with FSS scientists. 
Nonetheless, whilst there was some indication that the CAI may have been 
used by such 'special advisors' (Interviewee 7, 2006), it was not clear as to 
the extent it had been used successfully in these instances. If the results of 
the study are considered, it is far from certain that one individual, acting as a 
sole special advisor, would be able to successfully address the ambiguities 
experienced in the examples given herein. Furthermore, the point made by 
Interviewee 3, about the compartmentalisation of specialisms, is still 
relevant if one considers the investigation of less serious volume crime, for 
which the police are unable to devote the same amount of resources 
(Interviewee 7, 2006). Here there is far less likely to be a co-ordinating 
forensic scientist involved, forensic investigation may proceed in a more 
piecemeal fashion, in a manner antithetical.to the demands of the CAI. 
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8.11 Conclusion 
This case study has focused upon attempts to formulate a theoretical 
intervention in what may be regarded as a highly practical subject. At the 
heart of this intervention, as in the previous case study, lies Bayesian 
reasoning, regarded as 'the only logical way to reason about evidence' by its 
developers. This case study has sought to explore just how this logic is 
enacted in the course of criminal investigations. It has also sought to 
engage with the critics ofthe CAI to gain a broader idea of the perceived 
challenges in applying such a mode of reasoning to the area of forensic 
science. The challenges in this case are somewhat different to those 
experienced in the previous case study, and in this chapter I have sought to 
highlight this issue. 
In the previous chapter, practices ofblack-boxing were able to identified in 
attempting to construct and use Bayesian technologies. The CAI is no less a 
Bayesian technology, but the practices identified in this case are of a 
different character to those encountered in the case of Automated DNA 
Interpretation Systems. The CAI represents an ambitious attempt to 
produce a framework which not only encompasses evidence such as DNA, 
but extends to encompass other forms of evidence, and serves to amount to 
a technology of reasoning for use in criminal investigation. It is therefore a 
significant extension of the scope of the Bayesian project in forensic 
science. Whilst it shares the same fundamental formula found in 
LoComatioN and PLS, the CAI can be seen to project a very different form 
ofBayes. 
As before though, the CAI is not immune to having to contend with dealing 
with sources of ambiguity and uncertainty. Some of the most notable in this 
case involve the construction of propositions, an activity which itself may 
be considered one ofthe key aspects of what it means to reason in a 
Bayesian fashion. In the course of this case study however, I have 
attempted to show that the construction ofpropositions is complicated by 
certain difficulties. These may relate to problems concerning language 
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itself, namely constructing phrases which exhibit a suitable degree of 
precision. As the CAI literature itself points out, it may be difficult to avoid 
constructing propositions which contain within them ambiguity. A further 
problem may concern the matching of suitable mutually exclusive 
propositions in order to explain an activity. Here, the problem becomes 
further complicated; not only is there the problem of trying to accurately 
correspond with an activity of which knowledge may be limited, but there is 
also the problem of attempting to producing a double explanation, both of 
which need to logically reflect the activity, but which also need to exhibit 
logical symmetry with one another. In order to account for the activity, the 
CAI obligates scientists to base their propositions on data wherever 
possible. Yet in many cases, the most suitable data is not in existence. This 
is perhaps a key problem with the CAI. Whilst certain cases may resemble 
others, it is likely that the precise circumstances of each case will vary so 
much to mean that any data will represent a mere best fit. 
Whilst it could be thought that these difficulties are anterior to Bayes 
Theorem itself, overcoming them is necessary for any version ofBayes to 
come into being; if they aren't overcome, the CAI cannot function. Thus, 
the issues can be easily framed as pragmatic in nature; language must 
correspond with object, otherwise the CAI does not function, for language is 
the only resource. In order to overcome these challenges then it is necessary 
for scientists to generate distinctly inter-subjective understandings, not only 
of the propositions they wish to construct, but also of the circumstances of 
each case to enable them to proceed. Decisions over what constitute 
appropriate propositions is then very much a localised phenomenon. Whilst 
the CAI literature may provide some guidance in this regard, the high level 
of ambiguity serves to block any direct translation. 
A related but no less interesting phenomenon was also observed in relation 
to the problem of fitting statistical data to the construction of propositions. 
Due to the lack of datasets, it appears that investigators using the CAI often 
constructed propositions in relation to the data that was available to them, 
rather than progressing from proposition to dataset in the manner intimated 
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by the literature. Often, it appeared that the process of constructing 
propositions to data was in fact an iterative, oscillating process. This is in 
itself possibly reflects the localised nature of this form of Bayesian 
reasoning, in that the investigators had to use more practical forms of 
reasoning in order to overcome these environmental limitations. 
Aside from the problem of formulating propositions, it is clear that 
experiential judgement contributes to the execution of the CAI. Although 
the CAI literature warns against the use of personal intuition, it appears that 
some for experience is still an ineradicable component of crime 
investigation. This is most clearly expressed via the concept of 'soft data'. 
Here, the comprehension of such soft data appeared to constitute a vital 
initial stimulus in comprehending a crime. Soft data cannot be quantified, 
and it is unclear to what extent it can be separated from the experience of 
the individual perceiver; it is a distinctly embodied phenomenon. Another 
clear example of the contribution of embodied in the reasoning process 
involves the physical re-enactment of incidents, as described in the case of 
the murder with scissors; once again it is hard to determine how such 
knowledge, vital as it is, can be quantified. Yet it can be seen that such 
knowledge was instrumental in providing an accounting for that particular 
incident. 
Some of the oppositions to the use of CAI can be seen to come from other 
forces involved in forensic investigation. This chapter has also shown how 
the authors ofthe CAI have faced opposition from police officers and 
members of the FSS, the same organisation for which the CAI was 
developed. Here, extraneous interests can be seen to impinge upon the 
implementation of the framework. These examples emphasise the fact that 
forensic investigation proceeds in a heterogeneous network of actors and 
institutions. Attempts to perform the CAI in such an environment may be 
hampered by competing interests which are also embedded in this network. 
In this way, Bayesian reasoning can also be shaped by external social forces. 
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The CAI can be seen to involve a heterogeneous array of reasoning 
practices. Due to the practical limitations caused in turn by the inability to 
satisfy the informational demands of the Bayesian framework, these 
practices are vital for the perpetuation of this particular form ofBayesian 
reasoning. These findings therefore point to the possible diversity of 
practices involved in the enactment of Bayesian reasoning. In the next 
chapter I consider this issue further. 
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CHAPTER NINE -DISCUSSION 
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I examine further the issues raised by the preceding case studies. 
I attempt to show how both examples - of Automated DNA Interpretation 
Systems and the CAI- highlight a certain division between efforts to posit 
unified and logical principles of evidential interpretation, and how 
interpretation happens in the context of investigative casework. I consider 
how the transition from representation to intervention is bridged by a range of 
practices which in themselves exhibit an autonomous existence independent of 
theoretical representations, even though these practices facilitate attempts to 
consciously apply the self same principles. In such a way, these practices can 
be seen to effectively constitute a process of representation themselves. I 
discuss these phenomena in relation to approaches that have been identified as 
forming part of the 'semiotic turn' in science studies (Lenoir 1994), in 
particular the work of Call on ( 1998, 2006) who has advanced the notion of 
performativity. I critically examine the way in which the appropriation of 
Bayes in the context of forensic investigation may be considered as a 
performative phenomenon. 
Although the performativity thesis may serve to act as a useful preliminary 
framework to investigate the way in which Bayes is constructed in such a 
context, I argue that it is unable to account for every aspect of these processes. 
I emphasise the merits of moving away from the symmetric treatment of 
human and nonhuman agency, which characterises the semiotic approach to 
science studies, in favour of a renewed emphasis on human practice. I show 
how the two case studies display a diversity of practices that are necessary for 
the construction of representations of Bayesian reasoning, and how these 
representations (which I refer to as 'forms ofBayes') are dependent on 
distinctly social practices to generate information in a 'Bayesian' manner. 
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I discuss the findings of my research in relation to the concept of reasoning by 
abduction, which is a source of great interest amongst Bayesian scholars in 
forensic science. Developed initially by the pragmatist philosopher Charles 
Sanders Peirce, abduction was advanced as a means of explaining how 
scientific discovery proceeded via the development and testing of hypotheses, 
but parallels have also been drawn between abduction and the mode of inquiry 
employed in criminal detection. I discuss the extent to which forms of 
abduction can be identified to be occurring in the examples studied in 
Chapters 7 and 8, and how these problematise the notion of abduction as a 
readily definable concept. I argue that the case studies indicate that, at least in 
the context of forensic investigation, the process ofhypothesis formation is 
considerably more practice-led than the view portrayed by philosophers of 
science. I use this discussion to explore the possibility that the process of 
hypothesis formation is socially constructed. I argue that these cases . 
demonstrate a form of performativity in which the modes of hypothesis 
generation and assessment become conflated. It is this conflation which is a 
notable aspect in the construction of forms of Bayes. 
I continue by briefly discussing the consequences for previous sociological 
studies of expertise, and, finally, I show how the findings of this research hold 
consequences for evidence scholarship. I argue that attempts to render 
systematic frameworks for the interpretation of evidence may lead to 
impoverished accounts of how evidence is interpreted in practice, and that, in 
order to ameliorate this, closer attention should be paid to the manner in which 
Bayes is actually used, as opposed to merely advancing theoretical models for 
evidential interpretation. By advancing an understanding of the manner in 
which actors bridge the divide between representation and intervention. I 
hope to demonstrate how a suitable sociological approach may contribute to 
the field of evidence studies. 
9.2 Representation and Intervention 
As I have demonstrated in a previous chapter, a major theme prevalent in the 
science studies literature has been the challenging of accounts of scientific 
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knowledge production which privilege the role of theory (Lenoir 1994). 
Contending approaches have instead sought to provide accounts more attuned 
with the primacy of practice in the production of scientific knowledge. 
Sociological studies of science have been instrumental in challenging the 
assumption, previously often promulgated in the philosophy of science, that 
the derivation and formation of theory is given precedence over the role of 
testing by experiment. These have been inspired by works such as Ian 
Hacking's Representing and Intervening which argue that, far from acting as 
mere testing grounds for scientific theories, practices of experimentation can 
yield knowledge of the world in a manner that is not necessarily dependent 
upon pre-existing theories, nor through any recourse to a singular 'scientific 
method'. Hacking demonstrates how theory and experiment 'have different 
relationships in different sciences at different stages of development' (Hacking 
1983, p.xii), and argues that experimentation therefore 'has a life of its own' 
(Hacking 1983, p.150). 
Hacking's insights, in particular the distinction between representation and 
intervention, act as a useful starting point upon which to consider issues 
relating to the relationship between the theoretical principles developed in the 
fields of probability and evidence scholarship on one hand, and the practice of 
forensic investigation on the other. Theoretical projects can be regarded as 
sets of practices related to representation. These may include practices of 
formalisation, systemisation, idealisation, depiction etc. On the other hand, 
forensic investigation may be regarded as a set of practices related to action, 
or intervention. Such practices may include the identification, isolation, 
interpretation, and the construction of evidence. 
Translation between these two sets of practices occurs via the presence of 
relevant actors. In the forensic scientific context, this process of translation 
first involves the construction of formalised reasoning systems which are more 
closely tailored to the demands of a particular context or situation. These 
systems aim to draw upon and apply the principles of evidential interpretation; 
and can be considered as secondary representative practices, or partial 
translation. The fom1ulae/algorithms which form the foundation ofthe 
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automated systems for the interpretation of complex DNA profiles, and the 
Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model, can be viewed as a process 
of partial translation, in that they are the result ofthe application of some of 
the principles outlined in the literature about evidence and probability (in this 
case those pertaining to Bayes Theorem), to a more specific set of 
circumstances. 
The production of such technologies of secondary representation themselves 
require a human intervention, and it is here that the divide between 
representation and intervention becomes at once apparent, but at the same time 
also becomes-susceptible to conflation. Practical interventions of evidential 
interpretation, which self-consciously draw upon theoretical principles, may 
actually proceed in a manner underdetermined by the latter. Mathematical 
approaches qua inscriptions, may, in themselves, provide little or no guidance 
in terms ofhow to proceed with their execution. As the work ofLivingstone 
(1986) has indicated, mathematical work involves a potentially more diverse 
series of processes than the purely mentalistic ratiocination which may be 
implied by certain forms of mathematical realism. Any perceived ontological 
gap therefore necessitates a conflation of practice and representation. 
Hence the process of translation may reveal alternative strategies to those 
outlined in the conventions stipulated in the representative schema. Different 
forms of reasoning may be involved the process of intervention. These 
principles may be more informal and not as easily identifiable but no less 
necessary to the enactment ofBayesian reasoning by investigators. What the 
work outlined here indicates is that representations of theory, and practices of 
theorising, can not possibly be regarded as purely distinct. In what follows I 
draw upon examples from Chapters 7 and 8 to show how this may be the case, 
and explore in more detail the idea of differing enactments of forms of 
Bayesian reasoning. 
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9.3 Forms of Bayes: Automated Interpretation Systems 
One recurring theme encountered throughout the research as a whole was the 
repeated reference, in both case studies, to 'Bayesian reasoning', or reasoning, 
'using a Bayesian framework'. On the basis of the literature and the testimony 
of some of the respondents, certain ideas concerning 'Bayesian reasoning' in 
the context of forensic science seemed to have gained a degree of acceptance. 
These seemed to centre around a set of principles which were cited as 
constituting reasoning in the Bayesian mode. These included: the need to 
formulate explicit probabilistic estimates of belief concerning specific events, 
the requirement to think in terms of formulating multiple alternative 
propositions (often involving, but not exclusively, propositions for prosecution 
and defence arguments), the need to take into account as much relevant 
information as possible when making calculations, in turn leading to the 
desideratum to establish comprehensive datasets upon which prior probability 
estimates can be based, and a sceptical approach to judgements based on 
personal intuition and/or subjective experience. These kinds of principles 
were repeatedly cited as being indissolubly linked with Bayes Theorem. They 
were viewed as directly crucial elements in what it meant to reason in a 
'Bayesian' manner, notwithstanding the conscious use ofBayes Theorem to 
calculate likelihood ratios. Furthermore, amongst its proponents, Bayesianism 
was seen as occupying a certain logical higher ground, particularly when 
compared to other probabilistic positions, most notably frequentism. 
Critics ofBayes saw the situation in a different way. Rather than being seen 
as a whole philosophy, critics regarded Bayes as a mere tool. According to 
this view, statistical and probabilistic methods were perceived as aids for 
helping to assess scientific inferences, and were not to be regarded as 
wholesale blueprints for reasoning. Other criticisms included the high 
informational demands that Bayes placed on inquirers, to the extent that any 
attempt to apply Bayes in any kind of suitably rigorous manner was virtually 
impossible. More seriously still, the use ofBayes in forensic science was seen 
in some quarters as providing a dangerously superficial fa9ade of scientificity, 
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in which the use of likelihood ratios merely provided a quantitative gloss for 
judgements which concealed a high degree of subjectivity. 
Certainly as a mere mathematical form, Bayes Theorem seems to invite a 
significant degree of interpretation, and the original rationale behind Bayes 
Theorem appears to have been open to interpretation since it was first 
published in 1763. In fact, as I have attempted to indicate in Chapter 4, the 
construction of notions of Bayesian reasoning appears to owe a certain amount 
to other ostensibly competing probabilistic approaches, most notably 
frequentism. If this can be taken to be the case, then it is appropriate to begin 
to consider how fom1s of 'Bayesian reasoning' constitute social constructions. 
Instead of becoming entities which have been derived through an inevitable 
process of logical proof, modes of probability can begin to be regarded as 
dependent on social practices for their continued generation. Moreover from 
the case study chapters it is possible to identify differing/arms of Bayes, 
characterised in each case by the practices which constitute them. The two 
case studies investigated in this study can be seen to constitute two distinctive 
forms ofBayes. These practices are varied, and can be seen to act anterior to 
the idealised series of procedures and representations associated with Bayes 
and the technologies, but are nonetheless necessary for a particular 
interpretation of Bayes to come into being. In what follows I provide an 
outline of a selection of these practices, with reference to each case study. 
The first case study demonstrates that the interpretation of DNA profiles 
requires a series of negotiations. The recovery and isolation ofDNA samples 
from biological material represents only the initial stages of the process. As I 
have sought to demonstrate in this case study, a series of transformations are 
required to convert DNA samples into information comprehendable to jurors 
and lawyers. These transformations are not only material in nature, as a range 
of calculative processes are also required to construct data. However, the 
inscripted formulae, representing the algorithms which drive technologies 
such as LoComatioN and PLS do not alone account for the resolution of 
conclusions made about these profiles. 
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A cursory examination may leave these technologies rendered as heavily 
'black-boxed' forms. Yet these systems there are the product of certain 
constructions which reflect contestable ontological assumptions. One example 
involves the use of PLS for the resolution of mixed DNA profiles. This 
technology relies on a number of assumptions regarding relationships between 
loci, and, more seriously, untested assumptions regarding the relationship 
between peak shape and area and quantity of DNA. These assumptions have 
been questioned within the forensic scientific community itself, yet it does not 
appear to be the case that the FSS have rigorously tested these assumptions, 
for they do not, as a matter of policy, quantify their DNA samples, the key 
means of doing so. Yet these same assumptions form an instrumental part of 
the foundations ofPLS. Similar concerns can be raised for the seemingly 
tautologous use of the Mx parameter, and the assumption that Mx remains 
invariant across loci, 
This has further consequences when we consider the example ofLoComatioN, 
and the incorporation of variables representing 'drop in', 'drop out' and so 
forth. These appear to have been no less evident in the visual fonn of 
interpretation, in which they acted as incorrigibles to justify a match. In the 
case of a Bayesian assessment, they are required to be quantified. However, 
the precise means by which such parameters appear to be estimated has not yet 
been agreed upon, and the results of Chapter 7 suggest that not all ofthe 
assumptions associated with 'drop in' and 'drop out' have been taken into full 
account. For example, the assumption is held in the systems used to model 
drop in and drop out that these parameters are constant across all loci. The 
means by which they are modelled however, do not appear to reflect the high 
degree of environmental challenge which could affect the quality of profile 
recovered. The model for 'drop in' models contamination found in laboratory 
conditions, which are the most far removed from the kind of contaminating 
conditions potentially found at crime scenes. The model for 'drop out, 
meanwhile, assumes equal chance of drop out when this has not been assessed 
with crime scene samples, and, furthennore, ignores the possibility of 
preferential degradation of alleles at large-MW loci. The estimation of the 
effect of environmental challenge is a difficult task, and it is unlikely that 
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definitive results could be returned concerning the effects of specific forms of 
challenge, but it is still notable that little consideration is even alluded to in the 
technical literature. 
The latter examples show that the notions of'drop in' and 'drop out' used in 
the LCN literature are constructed concepts, created in order to bypass the 
intractability of fully accounting for actual 'real world' effects. These 
constructed notions are crucial for the construction of a Bayesian technology 
such as LoComatioN. With the presence ofthe 'drop in' and 'drop out' 
constructs, LoComatioN itself represents another form ofBayes. It is built 
upon a certain set of questionable assumptions that have been made largely to 
circumvent an awkward gap between theory and world. 
Meanwhile, the existence of a technology such as DNABoost shows the 
potential for a technology to appeal to a wider set ofintersubjective 
understandings, brought about partly by the structural changes to forensic 
science provision in the UK. The example ofDNABoost also shows how the 
success of a technology, brought into an environment subject to a certain 
degree ofmarketisation, may require a set ofnovel practices. In this case, no 
scientific literature on the system was released upon which other scientists 
could scrutinise; no equations or formulae on which the technology was based 
were made available. Instead, media channels were relied upon in order to 
reach a wider audience of police, politicians and publics. For it to have any 
chance of acceptance, a new network needed to be constructed. What is ironic 
in this case however, is that to the majority at least, DNABoost existed in 
name only. This is perhaps a more questionable form ofBayes, for it is 
impossible, at time of writing, to confirm the algorithmic basis ofthis 
technology. If it is, as suspected, a Bayesian technology however, then the 
means by which audiences are convinced, itself represents a new form of 
Bayes, in that radically different techniques have been employed in order to 
convince audiences of its scientific worth, and hence epistemological validity. 
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9.4 Forms of Bayes: The CAI 
With regard to the CAI, recourse to so-called 'Bayesian reasoning' appeared 
very often throughout the relevant literature and was mentioned a number of 
times during interviews, even though it was not always clear precisely what it 
was being used to refer to. Regardless of the possible semantic fluidity of 
such a concept however, it was clear that actors took the possibility of such a 
form of reasoning very seriously indeed. However, the fact that such 
difficulty exists with regard to tracing a clear link between the concept of 
'Bayesian reasoning', and Bayes Theorem itself, acts as an indicator of the 
level of active perfom1ance involved in constructing the former notion. 
The CAI study highlighted a rich multiplicity of forms ofBayes. As discussed 
above, so-called soft data was cited as a playing an important part in the 
criminal investigation process, and it appears that it played an important role 
in forming propositions. Soft data however can be regarded as highly 
dependent on individual experience. Whilst Bayesian reasoning is intended to 
be able to account for subjective beliefs, the fact that soft data may be virtually 
unquantifiable presents an awkward case. Furthermore, the kind of soft data 
possessed by each individual may vary considerably, and this does not appear 
to be accounted for in Bayesian calculations. Nonetheless, the use of soft data, 
at least as an initial means of comprehending situations and informing the 
preliminary reasoning process, appears to be instrumental in allowing the CAI 
to function. 
It was also apparent that the precise nature of the propositions constructed in 
the course of applying the CAI were often dependent in part on the availability 
of data against which prosecution and defence hypotheses could be compared. 
The data that were used did not always fit perfectly with the circumstances of 
the case under consideration, and could often only provide a highly 
approximate probabilistic estimate. In other instances, it was apparent that the 
construction of propositions often seemed to be guided by what kind of data 
was available. Here the process of construction appeared to be guided by a 
certain degree of pragmatism, to use the wider sense of the term. It may have 
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been the case that investigators wished to consider certain propositions, yet 
often the sufficient data was not available. They were often constrained by 
data that they could find, and this appears to have influenced the construction 
of ensuing propositions. Hence a certain degree of recursivity can be 
demonstrated in this process. In searching for relevant data, it also appears 
that investigators may have had to rely on a certain amount of personal 
initiative in order to detennine what data could be considered pertinent to a 
particular case. The precise nature of these data could have reflected the 
unique circumstances of the case. This personal (and by extension, 
intersubjective) initiative could have been based on any number of factors-
local knowledge, experience and specialisms ofthe investigator, degree of 
knowledge in a particular scientific discipline etc. 
It is quite clear then, that proposition formation occurs not in a unidirectional 
manner, but instead involves an iterative, recursive process in which the 
construction of propositions is informed by discoveries concerning the precise 
nature of data sets available to investigators. Constrained by the data available 
to them, investigators may have to modulate the propositions they intend to 
test. They may fornmlate hypotheses viewed as particularly relevant to the 
case, yet find that the data required to generate the required LR estimates is 
not available, hence they may be forced to consider other, more testable 
propositions. 
The problems associated with constructing adequate datasets does perhaps 
reflect a certain contribution from the material realm, in that this issue reflects 
how the possible orderings of material objects through a series of events may 
serve to affect how investigators are able to establish numerical 
representations. However, what is more notable is how discussions over 
language predominate in these episodes. Hence concerns appear to be centred 
more on finding the appropriate ways of articulating reconstructive 
propositions which facilitated a valid correspondence between reference and 
world. Issues conceming the construction of propositions became notable 
sites of discussion and intersubjective activity. These kind of concerns place 
language, a uniquely human activity, at the source ofthe controversy, rather 
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than as the solution. This is highlighted by the numerous forms of ambiguity 
that were identified in the study ofthe formation of propositions. Differences 
in the interpretation of specific phrasings, ambiguities experienced in 
attempting to create fully mutually exclusive hypotheses, and difficulties in 
reconciling linguistic constructs and statistical data were only overcome 
through discussion and deliberation. Hence the negotiation of such difficulties, 
through intersubjective agreement, represents another form ofBayes, and 
shows clearly how Bayesian reasoning may be founded on social practices. 
Finally, it became clear that forms of embodied reasoning played an important 
role in the investigation of incidents. It appears that reconstructive inferences 
often rely on investigators physically 'acting out' possible causal scenarios 
that may explain the precise origins of evidence found at an incident scene. 
The example of the elderly Dutch woman's death clearly illustrates this. One 
of the most notable aspects of this instance of practical reasoning was that it 
appeared to contribute as much to the eventual solution ofthe incident as 
much as the employment of an avowedly 'Bayesian' approach, so much so 
that it is difficult to detennine which form of reasoning made the most 
significant contribution. It was a comparison of hypotheses in the Bayesian 
manner, which led investigators to believe that the case was not a murder as 
originally thought. The use of Bayes however, appeared to provide little 
guidance in establishing a suitably credible alternative account of the event. 
Instead, a series of mock 're-enactments' ofthe way in which the woman may 
have died in an accident involving the scissors, made an important 
contribution to resolving the case to the investigator's satisfaction. 
From this discussion it can be seen that a variety of reasoning practices appear 
to be involved in propagating 'Bayesian reasoning'. Whilst the exact nature of 
these practices may be highly contextualised, it seems clear that they appear to 
be necessary in order to circumvent intractable liminal spaces to allow 
Bayesian reasoning to proceed. This may due to an inability to translate 
phenomena into quantitative forms, as shown by the issue of soft data, and the 
ambiguities faced in constructing propositions in the CAI, or it may be due to 
the inability to reconcile the high information demands Bayes places on 
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reasoners. This in tum may be due to an inability to account for every real-
world instance faced by investigators, as in the use of 'drop in' and 'drop out' 
assumptions in the case of LoComatioN. Regardless of the nature of each 
form ofBayes however, it can be seen that they are required in order for 
Bayesian reasoning to relate in some way to the worlds which are under 
investigation. 
9.5 Forensic Investigation and Abduction 
In what follows next I seek to briefly comment upon what the findings of the 
case studies implicate for the Peircian model of abductive reasoning, and 
particularly the consequences for the adoption of technologies which employ 
Bayesian inference. A focus on this area has relevance for two reasons. First, 
the subject ofPeircian abduction has been of interest to both those working in 
the field of forensic science (Nordby 2000; Jackson et al 2006), and to an 
audience of semioticians and philosophers, who have sought to consider how 
the logic of criminal detection might serve to act as a model for abduction. In 
a celebrated volume, the methods employed by the fictional 'detective', 
Sherlock Holmes, have come under scrutiny from the latter group (Eco and 
Sebeok 1983). The concept of abduction has also been taken very seriously by 
figures such as Jan Evett (Jackson et al 2006), and models such as the CAI can 
be regarded as attempts to consciously adduce a form of abductive reasoning 
to a forensic context. Second, recourse to the performativity thesis naturally 
brings forth its pragmatist roots. Although Callon cites Charles Morris over 
C.S. Peirce as an influence, the two nevertheless exhibit a considerable degree 
of common philosophical ground, and indeed, Peirce's work was cited as a 
key starting point by Morris (Petrilli 2004). 
Peirce himself differentiated between three different forms of reasoning, 
namely deduction, induction and abduction. The first of these is generally 
taken to involve arguments in which the premises are claimed to support a 
conclusion, in such a way that it is impossible for the premises to be true and 
the conclusion false (Hurley 2000, p.33). Induction, on the other hand, 
involves an argument in which the premises are claimed to support a 
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conclusion in such a way that it is improbable for the premises to be true and 
yet the conclusion false. Abduction is taken to be a less clearly defined notion, 
but Walton (2004, p.9) cites three key characteristics. First, it can be regarded 
as a technique for narrowing down a multiplicity of alternative explanations 
for an event by selecting one or a few particular hypotheses. Second, it can be 
conceived of as a process of guessing, or choosing the right guess; a fallible 
process in which wrong hypotheses can be chosen as often as correct ones. 
Third, it is often involved when a new phenomenon is observed which is 
unable to be explained by current scientific understandings. On this basis it 
can be summarised that abduction generally involves the assessment, on the 
basis of observable signs, of an inferential hypothesis which can account for 
the observations, which may then be tested in some way to determine the 
extent of its explanatory power. 
Much philosophical debate has centred on the precise nature of abduction. 
Eco (1983) advances a four-part model. First, overcoded abduction involves 
the formation of a hypothesis about a sense-datum which depends on some 
knowledge of the context in which the latter is comprehended. For example, 
the form of a hypothesis concerning the utterance 'man' (/man/) may be 
different depending on whether it occurs in an English-speaking environment, 
or a multi-lingual one. Overcoded abductions may often be virtually 
instinctive, as the context of experience may condition the abduction, and 
indeed the act of simple perception can be seen to largely equate with the 
concept of overcoded abduction. The second form, undercoded abduction, 
involves a greater degree of choice. Undercoded abductions relate to 
scenarios in which there may be an opportunity to consider a selection of 
possible alternative options, depending on the experience of similar cases, and 
upon the reasoners knowledge of the world at that particular time. 
Undercoded abduction therefore involves the imperative to form a hypothesis 
based on one of these plausible options. Eco cites the example of the 
astronomer Kepler in this regard, who established the elliptical nature of the 
orbit of Mars. Given the observations, and his previous knowledge about the 
behaviour of planets, Kepi er had a finite number of choices between various 
geometrical curves that could account for his data. Abduction in this case 
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therefore required him to formulate and assess hypotheses to help decide 
which one fitted the observations the best. The choice of hypothesis may also 
depend on whether it tallies with previous observations of similar phenomena, 
such as observations of other planets etc. 
A third element, creative abduction, refers to situations where recourse to a 
discrete range of options may not be possible. Unlike the previous two parts, 
creative abduction does not necessarily have to rely on contextual knowledge, 
or choosing between a limited number of possible hypotheses informed by 
previous observations. Creative abduction involves situations in which no 
experience-based generalisations may exist which could serve to account for 
observed evidence, and thus explanations are generated de novo (Schum 2000, 
p.l660). Creative abduction, does, however, require a fourth stage, meta-
abduction (Eco 1983, p.207). This is due to the highly speculative nature of 
creative abduction. Over- and undercoded forms of abduction utilise 
previously held knowledge of the world, and, within that, assumptions about 
that knowledge. Creative abduction does not operate in the same way, and 
may reflect not just a change about the cause of a result, but subsequently 
wholesale changes in worldview. Meta-abduction refers to the process of 
determining whether the possible world outlined in first-order abductions 
based on personal experience, does actually correspond to the external 
environment. 
In his discussion of abductive reasoning in relation to evidence, Schum (2000) 
however concludes by cautioning that the term 'abduction' is susceptible to 
over-appropriation (Sch um 2000, p.l680). Schum argues that philosophical 
attempts to further clarify abduction 'do not seem to capture the true 
complexity of this vital reasoning activity when it is examined in contexts as 
rich as fact investigation in law' (Schum 2000, p.l680). In focusing on 
aspects of forensic investigation, the research presented in this thesis 
corroborates Schum's view, and serves to problematise the notion that 
abduction can be readily taxonomised. In what follows I argue, with 
consideration given to Eco's thesis and my own case studies, that a variety of 
practices that can be construed as 'abduction' are involved in forensic 
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investigation. In doing so I further call into question the portrayal of 
Bayesianism as a uniform approach to forensic science. 
Overcoded abduction can be seen to be present in examples from the two case 
studies. For example, in order for Bayesian analysis of DNA profiles to be 
initiated, one must first be able to recognise allele peaks. Although modern 
capillary electrophoresis techniques can use software to attempt to recognise 
peaks, their shape is not invariant, to the extent that the recognition of peaks 
may still lie somewhat heavily in the domain of instinctive personal 
experience. Furthennore, the recognition of 'soft data' at crime scenes, which 
may play an instrumental role in shaping the kind of questions to be addressed 
in the initial stage of an investigation, may occur instinctively, but is also 
strongly influenced by experience and context. In both cases, the recognition 
of these forms of sense-data are essential for Bayesian analysis to proceed. 
Such identifications are instrumental in enabling actors to determine not only 
which elements of sense-data are relevant to the investigation, but they also 
constitute data which will inform the construction of hypotheses for 
assessment by a Bayesian fonn of reasoning. This latter practice, of assessing 
hypotheses, most closely resembles Eco's concept ofundercoded abduction. 
Here however it is possible to see how undercoded abductions rely on a series 
of overcoded ones, and in doing so we can begin to question Eco's schema. 
To return to Eco's example of the study of Mars, Kepler would have had to 
rely on observed sense-data on which to form hypotheses (the observed 
positions of celestial objects). In Eco's example however, Kepler can be 
viewed as operating under the conditions of 'normal science' as described by 
Kuhn; he operates via an established set of methods involving commonly used 
instruments, and perceives the world in a certain way, where the problems for 
inquiry are well-established (Kuhn 1964). Given this conditioning, Kepler's 
observations can actually be said to be overcoded: he knows what to look for 
on the basis or his previous training and experience. Under normal scientific 
conditions, the question of what hypotheses should be constructed is a 
relatively unproblematic affair, due to the specificity of the scientific problems 
of interest. 
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To compare this example to some of those encountered in the case studies, it 
may appear that a similar process is occurring: the overcoded abductions that 
are the observations of forensic scientists are used as a basis upon which 
hypotheses are constmcted. In these cases however, the nature in which these 
hypotheses are produced may vary. In the example of DNA profile 
interpretation technology, the recognition of peaks in capillary 
electropherograms is vital for determining which alleles may be present in a 
profile. Yet this is not necessarily a straightforward process. Without the 
ability to recognise allele peaks as such, it would not be possible to generate a 
list of alleles at each loci, which could then be subjected to Bayesian analysis 
to compare defence and prosecution hypotheses in order to determine the 
probability of a match. Undercoded abductions are therefore dependent on a 
reasoner to first make overcoded abductions in order to recognise sense-data 
as meaningful scientific data, despite it possibly being mediated by technology. 
In this example, it is still possible to maintain a certain distinction between 
over- and undercoded abductions, despite the seeming dependency of the latter 
on the former. The uncertainty over abductive practices is highlighted even 
further however, in the study of the CAI. Here, soft data, clearly based on 
overcoded abductions, may be used to directly inform the construction of 
propositions The Bayesian format would depict this as an undercoded choice, 
yet whilst it might suggest a simple comparison ofhypotheses, the fact such 
assessments could, at least potentially, have little or no objective basis, leads 
one to wonder whether a form of creative abduction is taking place instead. 
Hence the use ofBayesian reasoning in this manner cannot necessarily be 
taken to represent undercoded abduction, despite the guise of a quantitative 
'scientific' mode of investigation. This also, once again, shows the lack of 
clear means of establishing a fully corresponding relationship between thought 
and world. 
What this brief discussion demonstrates then is that the processes which can 
be taken as forms of' abduction' are heterogeneous and interwoven. An 
attempt, such as that put forward by Eco, to make sense of abduction, is 
subject to struggle if compared to empirical cases such as those described here. 
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What these cases demonstrate is a liminality in terms of abductive practices. 
Not even meta-abduction can be seen to be occurring, for it appears that it is 
impossible to fully establish an appropriate social or material world into which 
one's inferential claims can make the leap. Instead, the above examples show 
how the different kinds of abduction postulated by Eco may co-exist, merge 
between each other, or even remain unable to be characterised, even in a 
context which is considered a natural home to 'abduction' by both 
philosophers, and, increasingly, forensic scientists themselves. Hence, the 
case studies indicate that the concept of abduction appears to be somewhat 
resistant to straightforward characterisation. Abductive practices appear to be 
entangled, and possibly interdependent with, the complex world which they 
seek to explain. If this is taken to be the case, then it reinforces the possibility 
that 'Bayesian reasoning', itself often taken as an exemplar of abduction, is 
merely a label for a whole series of different practices. The term 'Bayes' 
therefore becomes another term for making sense of what abduction is, and is 
hence a constructed epithet. The world which Bayes requires ultimately has to 
be modelled and assumed. In this way the tensions between the objective and 
subjective facets of Bayes become apparent. 
9.6 Modes of Hypothesis Generation and Assessment 
One further issue which I wish to discuss further concerns the extent to which 
Bayesian reasoning may be concerned with the domain of the assessment of 
hypotheses, rather than their generation. Although much philosophy of 
science has tended to by-pass the issue of a 'logic of discovery', debate 
continues in other quarters as to whether such a logic of discovery can be 
identified, and- as discussed earlier in this chapter- abduction has been 
portrayed as possibly leading the way to showing what such a logic might 
entail. Creative reasoning in science has been attributed to a number of 
processes, such as radical ontological change, conceptual combination, 
analogical and visual thinking, anomaly resolution etc (Magnani 2005), which 
might function as the catalyst for abductive thinking. The suggestion of such 
modalities, does, however, beg a series of questions. There is no sense of how, 
or by what means, these suggested processes may be made to come into play. 
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Are such modalities innate to human reasoners, might they be evolutionary as 
Peirce himself thought? What kind of stimuli trigger these kinds of responses? 
Can such stimuli be seen to exist in the first place? Moreover, do they fully 
reflect the complexity of the sociomaterial worlds in which reasoners inhabit, 
one which may gradually reveal further layers of complication, presented as 
much by social factors as material ones? 
The suggestions which are summarised by Magnani suggest a conception of 
the world as a relatively simple puzzle; once a particularly modality is used 
the world may be re-arranged, or be made to be viewed in a different light. 
The assumption here is clearly one of an ontologically separate world. Yet 
even in these accounts there is no explanation for why a creative strategy is 
chosen at a particular moment in time. In this schema, the resolution of these 
puzzles is simply a matter of (perhaps unconsciously) selecting a strategy 
which then leads to the resolution of the issue. The precise moment at which 
this strategy is chosen could be regarded as a virtually instantaneous, and 
perhaps instinctive phenomenon; redolent of the metaphor of the lightbulb 
appearing above a cartoon character's head. No account is given for what 
stimuli might lead to such a phenomenon, and it is difficult to envisage how 
such an account may proceed. 
The results in this study do not, however, suggest such instantaneous 
occurrences. What should also be apparent from these studies is that the 
formation of inference is a decidedly sociomaterial affair. This must be 
contrasted with the above, which seems to assume an isolated reasoner, 
capable of forming instantaneous solutions. Therefore we must consider how 
one might proceed with an alternative explanation for creative inference. A 
major problem in relation to Bayes concerns the construction of worlds 
through which prior probabilities can be measured. The first case study shows 
how the assumptions needed to generate a Bayesian formula may be 
elaborately constructed in terms of their supposed correspondence to the 
material realm for which they seek to account. The second case study also 
highlighted this, showing how data required to construct a prior probability to 
test a proposition may not be in existence, and how this might lead to a eo-
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productive process between proposition and dataset. In both instances, the 
generation of a Bayesian hypothesis involves a need to overcome an 
intractable correspondence gap between proposition and materiality, which 
occurs through strictly sociomaterial practices. This thesis indicates therefore 
that hypothesis creation comes about through a need to fill this gap. The 
means by which this occurs may be contingent, and may require a plethora of 
resources and actors. lt is a complicated, and possibly gradual, endeavour, and 
cannot, therefore, be accounted for by instantaneous thought processes alone, 
however they may be thought of. 
These studies on Bayesian reasoning have instead shown how hypothesis 
formation may be a complex practice, involving both contingent and emergent 
social factors. In order to be able to form hypotheses, a series of constructions 
need to be enacted. In the first case study, this required elaborate constructed 
concepts, and recourse to questionable assumptions about the material realm, 
in order to enable the technology to explain it. The second case study showed 
even more clearly how ambiguity had to be managed and debated 
intersubjectively in the course of constructing propositions, and how 
hypothesis formation was eo-produced with the datasets it was meant to draw 
upon. It also showed, through the existence of 'soft data', how previous 
experience played an imp01tant part in helping forensic scientists postulate 
hypotheses. 
What needs to be reiterated is that all these behaviours which led to hypothesis 
formation were invoked in direct response to the desire to use Bayes in the 
course of investigations. The performance of Bayes therefore, had a direct 
effect on the kind of hypotheses constructed. This contrasts with the view of 
its acolytes in forensic science and evidence scholarship, who in some ways 
view Bayes as a means for the assessment of hypotheses. The examples above, 
however, show how the mode of generation and the mode of assessment 
become conflated. 
Both case studies therefore reveal an interesting tendency ofBayesian 
reasoning. The research indicates this conflation ofhypothesis generation and 
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assessment is perhaps even acknowledged and accepted by staunch Bayesians 
themselves, as signified by Ian Evett's comment in Chapter 5 concerning the 
way in which Bayes 'guides the reasoner in asking the right questions'. In 
itself, this tendency could indicate a strongly performative phenomenon; forms 
ofBayes emerge which reinforce and prescribe a particular set of behaviours 
which come to resemble more closely the representative construct from which 
they originally draw upon. If the application ofBayes can be taken to be a 
form ofperformativity, then this essentially pragmatic process shapes its own 
form of reasoning. 
9. 7 Performativity 
The notion that reasoning practices might arise in an interdependent manner 
with the assemblages which they attempt to make sense of, may appear to be 
consistent with the idea ofperformativity as put forward by Callon, Pickering 
et al. With forms of reasoning being undefined, it may well be the case that 
assemblages, or agencements, control their own way of making sense about 
themselves. In what follows however, I investigate this claim further by 
reference to my two case studies. 
In Mackenzies, and Mackenzie and Millo's study ofperfotmativity, the Black-
Scholes-Merton equation took some time to be accepted, as, for a while, the 
extent of its accuracy and fit with reality was initially doubted (Mackenzie and 
Millo 2003). The eventual acceptance of the formula appears to have been 
dependent in part on the development of the derivatives market as a whole 
(Mackenzie and Millo 2003). Over time, as derivatives were demonstrated to 
perform more in line with the prediction of the equation, it gained greater 
acceptance in the field. F allowing the 1987 stock market crash however, the 
equation was perceived to make inaccurate predictions of implied volatility of 
derivatives, which was compensated for by the introduction of 'skew' 
estimates. The introduction of the skew estimate was cited by Mackenzie and 
Millo as an instance of 'counterperformativity', in that it reflected a lack of 
correspondence with the predictive warrant of the equation. 
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In the case studies outlined in this thesis, the focus has not been on a 
mathematical device that enables prediction. Instead, Bayes Theorem, in the 
context of forensic science, has been utilised for a different purpose. In this 
case, Bayes has generally been used as a means of testing and assessing one's 
own inferences. It acts as a means of assembling a set of representations about 
variables relating to a piece of evidence, or various pieces of evidence, into a 
coherent whole. Rather than serving as an a priori means of prediction, Bayes 
Theorem acts a post hoc means of testing inferences. There is a clear contrast 
then, between these studies of the Black-Scholes-Merton equation and the use 
ofBayes Theorem as outlined in this study. Furthermore, Bayes can be 
regarded as an all-encompassing probabilistic theory, and indeed, forms the 
basis of what some regard as an all-encompassing philosophy. The form of 
Bayesian theory used in forensic science is itself a modulation of the original 
theorem, but not such that it deviates significantly from the original derivation. 
This version ofBayes enables investigators to compare prosecution and 
defence hypotheses, and is common to virtually all applications to forensic 
science, including those technologies featured in the case studies. 
Furthermore, the two examples presented here demonstrate how the 
performative renderings of Bayes enable actors to contend with the liminal 
spaces which arise when reference and world are attempted to be brought into 
correspondence. A study of Bayes, in such a way, shows how performativity 
can be used to fully account for the relationship between language and 
sociomateriality. This contrasts somewhat with previous performative studies 
of mathematical constructions, in which a certain division between the two is 
still apparent. For example, in Mackenzie (2003), and Mackenzie and Millo 
(2003), there still appears to be a certain dichotomy between sociomateriality 
on one hand, and reference on the other. The latter is not as closely 
constitutive of the fonner as is perhaps suggested by the argument of Call on. 
Whilst the performances of the sociomaterial assemblage are linked to the 
Black-Scholes-Merton equation in ways which either suggest a 
correspondence to the latter, the equation in itself is regarded as being 
interpreted in an unproblematic way. The equation has a set of clearly 
definable variables, and appears to exist for a particular purpose, even if that 
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predictive purpose has not always reflected reality over time. This is perhaps 
not a fault of the performativity thesis as a whole, but the question remains 
regarding the range of its application. 
One further possible shortcoming of the performativity thesis, as it has been 
regarded thus far, is that relatively little emphasis is exercised on studying the 
nature of performance itself, or what kinds of performances are facilitated via 
the construction of agencements. The only issue that tends to be highlighted 
by performativity concems that of whether sociomaterial assemblages begin to 
reflect the representative constructs which are themselves constituted by a 
particular assemblage. However, the models advanced in the work of Callon 
(2006), and Mackenzie and Millo (2003), do not begin to reflect the diversity 
of forms of performance that might be necessary in order to constitute these 
assemblages. Indeed, a consideration of the fluidity of meaning of Bayes 
Theorem, as focused upon in the research outlined here, highlights a key 
agential element, namely that of interpretation. This is not a process which 
occurs in passive receivers of data, nor is it a Cartesian process occurring in 
isolated instances. Interpretation is an active phenomenon, dependent upon 
the presence of embodied and experienced actors. This however, poses a 
problem for the performativity thesis. It is these aspects which the Bayesian 
framework has difficulties with accommodating, and indeed, checks on 
personal intuition form part of the motivation behind the use of such a 
framework. However, it seems to be the case that a framework which 
attempts to overcome the inaccuracies of personal intuition is itself dependent 
on subjective data. 
A discussion ofperformativity prompts a short digression, whilst I raise some 
methodological questions: For example, does a successful example of a 
performative assemblage necessitate the total removal ofphenomenological 
aspects, and hence aspects more commonly identified as peculiar to human 
agency? Can performative systems only operate in conditions in which human 
agency is not a priori given, and agency becomes malleable, an independent 
variable of the constructed network? These questions raise the issue of 
possible regress, namely the concern that performative studies, by their very 
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existence, may themselves act as legitimating forces, contributing to the 
construction of a certain ontology. Performativity emphasises the role of 
actions in facilitating reason; however, on these terms the act of writing about 
performativity may in itself be seen as a way of creating a position, and leads 
one to doubt its basis as a suitably reflexive approach. 
Another related methodological issue concerns the temporal aspect of 
performativity studies. Many of the performativity studies have tended to 
focus on relatively short spaces of time. A discussion of the place of time in 
semiotic studies of science points to a set of issues which possibly hold more 
profound consequences with regard to methodological symmetry. If we take 
into account the longer history that Bayes has enjoyed, it is possible to see a 
process which transcends the kind of assemblages conceived in performativity 
studies which have tended to be more short-term in character. A key question 
is whether the version, or versions, ofBayes adopted by forensic scientists 
represent a break with those of the past. 
What semiotic studies overlook is the fact that elements in networks 
experience and are shaped by time differentially. Elements in a network are 
subject to relative temporalities of development; different organisms, be they 
plants, animals and humans, will grow, live and die along different temporal 
trajectories. This is something however, that appears to be ignored in semiotic 
accounts, whereby the existence of each element is somehow posited as being 
dependent on the network as such. Furthermore, each element in a network 
experiences time differently. This is none more so than in the case ofhumans, 
who are not only able to retain and code experiences along a temporal vein in 
a whole series of embodied, cognitive and reflexive ways, but are also able to 
fully express this experience in a reflexive manner via language. This is a 
unique property, and once more points to a more privileged role for human 
agency than is given in semiotic accounts. 
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9.8 The Problem of Agency 
The requirement to shape speculations, conjectures and inferences into a 
formalised system of comparable propositions, as is the case with the Bayesian 
approach, merely serves to highlight the difficulties in applying such a mode 
ofprobability to an area like forensic science. The kind of practices outlined 
in this chapter can be seen to act as methods to circumvent the discordancies 
that arise through attempts to perform Bayes in such a context. The existence 
ofthese practices shows that the mutual construction of reference, materiality 
and social ordering, is neither an unproblematic nor uncomplicated process. 
Whilst many STS studies have sought to emphasise this point, questions 
remain as to whether such approaches capture a sufficiently appropriate level 
of requisite detail. Indeed in this case some of the discordancies appear to be 
almost intractable, and it is unclear whether semiotic approaches are able to 
account for the practices that arise to circumvent these problems. 
As the CAI study in particular demonstrated, language and its meaning, the 
most human of interactions, is the source of contestation, rather than a locus 
around which understandings converged. Whilst epithets like 'Bayesian 
reasoning' might indicate the existence of a performative construct, they hide 
these sources that occur at a localised level. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
consider how any such controversies can be considered as anything but 
intersubjective in character, and indeed this study showed how the 
clarification of propositions was a pragmatic process, which involved a 
necessary amount of intersubjective discussion. Furthermore, this case study 
also showed how experiential and embodied aspects of reasoning continued to 
be incorporated into the process of investigation, even when Bayes was 
actively invoked. It also showed how such embodied practices had the 
potential to transcend the Bayesian process, in a manner for which the latter 
could not account. 
At issue is not just what kind of reasoning forms are being generated in each 
case, but also where this reasoning may be located. What lies at the heart of 
each technology are the algorithms that drive each system. It is these 
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algorithms which form the crucial link between the way in which Bayes may 
potentially be used, and the world required for this potential to be realised. 
However, there is one important difference between the two which should be 
noted. In the case of Automated DNA Interpretation Systems, the algorithms 
are supposedly realised by computerized means; although conceived by 
humans, they are run automatically, supposedly 'objectively', by computer 
systems. By contrast, the algorithms involved in the CAI are run in human 
minds. The CAI itself only provides a set of representations, which may be 
thought of as broad guidelines, or operating procedures, for reasoning about 
evidence in a supposedly 'Bayesian' manner. The actual operation of these 
algorithms, or the actualization of them, is performed by human reasoners. 
This difference already indicates the potential for a certain diversity in the way 
Bayes is actualised, whereby there are differences in which key elements of 
the performative process are localised. More importantly however, whilst it 
could be argued from a performative standpoint that it is the assemblage, 
(which constitutes each fom1 ofBayes), that determines the kind of agency 
which ensues, the ex amp le of the CAI raises particular problems for this 
position. In this case, the way in which these algorithms are put into practice 
by humans is neither a purely mental phenomenon, nor is each individual 
actualisation an isolated instance, unaffected by previous actualizations. As 
this case study demonstrates, 'Bayesian reasoning' using the CAI has the 
potential to involve a high degree of both embodiment and experiential 
judgement, regardless of the quantitative trappings the CAI seeks to adduce to 
the process 
At the heart of each supposedly performative process therefore, lie different 
aspects of agency. The processes involved in the case of Automated 
Interpretation Systems are, automatic, impersonal, disembodied and non-
subjective. Those involved in the CAI are, however, fallible, contextualised, 
personalized, embodied and highly situated in terms of an individual's 
personal history and location. lf different reasoning processes lie at the heart 
ofthese apparent examples ofperformativity, one may not only ask whether 
methodological symmetry is justified, but also whether each of these different 
algorithmic forms may hold implications for the success of each of these 
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projects. In considering this latter question, one issue to be kept in mind is the 
kind of 'Bayes' that is emerging from each agencement. Furthermore, what is 
the nature of the relationship between each depiction of 'Bayesian reasoning' 
and the manner in which this reasoning proceeds? Can each reasoning process, 
or algorithmic enactment, be said to be constructed within each agencement, 
as a conventional reading of the performativity thesis might have it? 
The studies outlined in this thesis indicate that explanations utilising a largely 
semiotic approach are insufficient to fully account for the formation and 
consequences of the application of Bayesian technologies in forensic science. 
Hence, one is led to question just to what extent ANT -based studies are able to 
fully account for the totality of agential interventions that the material domain 
is supposed to contribute to the eo-production process (in the Latourian sense), 
and to what extent it can account for the totality of corresponding social 
practices. This points to the concern that to be truly convincing, the semiotic 
approach to STS, as it is currently conceived, may require more fine-grained 
explanations of the processes involved in creating reference. It is difficult to 
envisage how this may occur, for this would suggest a more rigorous account 
ofpractice, which might expose, counter-productively from the interests of 
many semiotic accounts, the continuing predominance of human agency. 
However, it is difficult to envisage how such a position might provide such 
finely-grained accounts, unless there is some form of reconciliation and 
synthesis with another ethnographic method which introduces a 
phenomenological aspect. 
The tendency to place nonhuman agency on an equal footing thus results in an 
incomplete account of the process by which actors are able to make 
meaningful interventions in linking theoretical representations with actual 
practices of evidential interpretation. The kinds of technologies and 
infrastructures developed in order to aid the process of evidence interpretation 
are primarily the result of human activity in this regard, rather than a series of 
drivers in a wider, unfolding process of eo-construction of theoretical 
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representation and material shaping'. Furthermore as these contingent 
practices come about due to the ontologicalliminality induced by the 
application of Bayesian theory, it can be seen that they result from intractable 
semiotic uncertainty, in contrast to accounts which portray actors as capable of 
making sense of their extemal environment through the unproblematic linkage 
of signs and inscriptions. 
9.9 Does Bayesianism Reflect, Model or Construct Reasoning? 
Bayesian reasoning involves the consideration of relevant questions in a 
highly process-led way. Questions are considered via an iterative, serialised 
procedure, and in the forensic application ofBayes, involve the consideration 
of two competing hypothetical propositions. As I have described, the use of 
such a mode of reasoning has been repeatedly cited, at least in certain quarters, 
as the most logical way in which to reason under uncertainty. Aside from the 
nuanced objections this argument might elicit from the community of 
probabilists, not to mention scholars of formal logic, one most also pose 
another question. Despite the apparent logicality ofBayesian reasoning, is it 
an epistemological form which comes readily to human reasoners? Does it 
correspond with the way in which human actors make sense of events, 
particularly those of which they are uncertain? Or do actors comprehend 
events in ways which reflect a significant departure from the Bayesian 
portrayal? 
As the results of the two case studies demonstrate, the means by which 
hypotheses are assessed may be interdependent with the manner in which they 
are formed. This casts doubt on the portrayal ofBayes as a procedure entirely 
distinct from the generation of scientific hypotheses. This is further 
compounded by the fact that Bayesian technologies can be recognised as 
1 One question which arises is whether this invariant domain can be classified as exerting a form of 
agency, in that it provides the means for eo-production 'on the top of it' as it were. But then if one 
were to pursue this approach. the question arises of whether such permanence can be classed as 
'agency' at all; it is difficult to see how a domain of permanence could be characterised in a manner 
which accrues it with agential power, for to bestow it with mechanisms of change seems hopelessly 
contradictory. 
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emergent social constructions. Bayes Theorem cannot therefore be regarded 
as a simple tool-like device into which data can be unproblematically plugged 
in and processed. The complexity of the forms involved in bringing 
Bayesianism into being contradict the latter representation, and instead show 
how Bayesian technologies may eo-produce hypotheses and data, as opposed 
to the latter being exogenous entities. 
One alternative concept worthy of attention is the notion that actors reason in a 
manner more akin to an act of narrative. This differs from the Bayesian mode 
in that it may entail an inclination to consider a series of events as somehow 
already linked; the reasoner puts events in some form of order, and uses 
various strategies to account for gaps in the story, or contradictory elements. 
These strategies may use creative accounts, or they may involve personal 
experience, recalling the 'commonsense' form of reasoning supposedly used 
by jurors in Lynch and McNally (2003). Scholars have, in the past, applied 
the narrative concept to a wide variety of areas, including economics, 
psychoanalysis, and legal discourses and science (Nash 1990). The work of 
Hutto (2007) is instructive in this regard (Hutto 2007). His studies on 'folk 
psychology' emphasise the innate ability of humans to comprehensively 
account for the behaviour of others by recognising the 'story' of the third party. 
This of course, involves the capacity to fully comprehend the set ofbeliefs, 
desires, emotions that a third party might have been to subject to in their 
actions (Hutto 2007, p.43). According to Hutto, this is gradually acquired in 
childhood, through 'socially scaffolded means' (Hutto 2007, p.47). 
This research demonstrates that a narratorial aspect may be present even in the 
technological practices of forensic scientists. This is particularly so in the case 
of the interpretation of complex DNA profiles. Such an activity should be 
entirely removed from the host of other concerns which might play on the 
minds ofinvestigators involved in a particular case; to invoke just one ofthe 
Mertonian norms of science, they should be 'disinterested' observers of 
phenomena-data. This particular case study, however, highlighted how the 
process of story construction played a vital role in the reasoning processes of 
scientists. lftrue, the claim that LCN, in particular, can only inculpate rather 
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than exculpate a suspect throws a considerable amount of doubt on the 
portrayal of DNA evidence as a neutral indicator. LCN interpretation most 
often occurs when conventional profiling techniques have failed to provide 
sufficient intelligence on which to provide the basis for a convincing case. 
The example of 'cold cases' show quite strongly how scientists, who will 
work together with police on such cases, may be informed by a wider narrative 
framework in which the DNA evidence forms an important thread. 
This extends through to the finer points of the reasoning practices used by 
forensic scientists in their interpretation of such profiles. As I have shown, 
concepts such as 'drop in', 'drop out' etc are invoked to justify the claims 
made regarding the kinds of hypotheses constructed. I have demonstrated how 
such concepts are actively converted into quantitative signifiers, a necessary 
step for their incorporation into the Bayesian algorithms used to drive 
interpretation systems. However, as I have also shown, the realisation of 
'drop in', 'drop out' and 'contamination' is open to a considerable amount of 
question, with regard to how accurately such constructions correspond to the 
forensic environment from which the original DNA samples may be derived. 
Although it may not be quite appropriate to view these key elements of LCN 
interpretation as fictions, they nonetheless act as important constructions, 
based on questionable assumptions, around which 'stories', to use the 
vernacular of one respondent (Interviewee 3 ), are created within which the 
incomplete and confusing LCN data can be rendered as sensible and 
meaningful. These constructions therefore act as important links between the 
seemingly random array of numbers and letters that represent LCN DNA 
profiles, and the wider mise en scene that constitutes a criminal case. The lack 
of consideration given to the environmental conditionings of DNA is shown in 
the use of such assumptions, which instead of reflecting this appear to be 
based in another space where certain scientific beliefs do not appear to hold. 
This example also demonstrates the rapid tendency of a Bayesian schema to 
break down in temporal terms. As Interviewee 9 stated, a fully Bayesian 
approach as applied to forensic evidence might consider the entire process, 
from the immediate recovery of evidence: 
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'What would be useful is ifyou went away and did a Bayesian analysis ofthe whole 
process right from the recovery of evidence, as there are so many factors to consider 
even from there' (Interviewee 9, 2008) 
This is not apparent in the above example however, where assumptions are 
made about how the data came to be. A more advanced Bayesian form might 
concern itself fully with the process from recovery to interpretation, and thus 
the way in which the data came to exist could be considered in an even more 
rigorous manner. The factoring of other issues pertaining to recovery of DNA 
could even go further to consider further issues, such as the prior probability 
of preferential degradation at a given locus, such that this could be 
incorporated into the P(D) calculation. Even this brief discussion however, is 
possibly sufficient to reiterate the fact that a potentially vast amount of 
information could be factored into a comprehensive Bayesian analysis of LCN 
DNA. 
The fact that such information is omitted from this Bayesian technology draws 
doubt upon whether a supposedly highly automated system can be seen to 
fully adhere to Bayesian reasoning, as least as it depicted in theoretical 
accounts. Instead of complying with a formalised system of 'scientific' 
reasoning, the use of LCN in a criminal case is highly contextual, and its 
apparent success may be often due to the kind of stories in which it plays a 
role, rather than acting as a standalone source of objective evidence. 
Furthermore, devices such as 'drop in', 'drop out' can be seen to act as devices 
linking the data to the circumstances of the case. LCN interpretation is 
therefore not necessarily a 'logical', iterative procedure, but one which is 
embedded in a series of assumptions (which may correspond to a different 
reality), and contexts. Whether this is folk psychology may still be up for 
debate, but it certainly shows that the 'scientific' reasoning practices 
employed are not held in isolation; they may require a series of contexts for 
data to acquire meaning. More interestingly still, elaborate links may need to 
be constructed in order maintain a technology in the juridico-scientific 
framework. The irony here is that these links actually enable scientists to 
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justify their stories, and further still, these links are actually a vital part of the 
Bayesian architecture itself. 
9.10 Bayes and Expertise 
A discussion concerning the location of Bayesian reasoning has implications 
for the manner in which expertise may be conceptualised. Automated Systems 
for DNA Profile Interpretation could be regarded as 'expert' systems, but it is 
perhaps more appropriate to regard them, as one interviewee insisted, as 
'intelligent systems' (Interviewee 2). Certainly, it seems that the construction 
of systems such as LoComatioN and PLS reflect the limitations of their 
makers. This in a way provides support for the Latourian notion of expertise 
being distributed throughout an assemblage, as no privilege can be accorded to 
either machine or human, and each become interdependent on one another. 
The forms of Bayes identified in the CAI study however, may suggest 
otherwise. Here, experiential and embodied components played a greater role 
in propagating Bayesian reasoning. Furthermore, the issues experienced in 
producing propositions reflected a strong intersubjective component. 
Moreover, the fact that individuals were keen to cite 'Bayesian reasoning' in 
justifying their behaviours suggests that it has important role to play in 
constructing expert identities. This is also bourne out by the discussions in 
Chapter 5 concerning the history of the incorporation of Bayes into forensic 
science. Bayes appears to be playing a major role in shaping a disciplinary 
identity for forensic science, and with it, representing a set of behaviours to 
which 'expert' forensic scientists are meant to adhere. 
In terms of the accounts of expertise discussed in Chapter 2 though, there is 
little to support any of the conceptualisations put forward by Dreyfus. His 
account does indeed to suffer from a rather solipsistic view of expertise and 
skill. For this particular form of expertise to occur, 'experts' need to be 
recognised as such (by self-asserting a commitment to Bayes). Furthermore, 
whilst the operation of expert reasoning may encompass an experiential aspect, 
that alone is not enough to account for the high level of intersubjectivity 
292 
apparent in other propagations of Bayes. His criticisms of AI, are, however, 
echoed in the clear limitations apparent in the technologies featured in the case 
studies, and the need for a strong element of human involvement. Yet whilst it 
highlights the limitations of computerised technologies in abductive reasoning, 
his work perhaps has little to say about the CAI, and a limited conception of 
the term 'technology' is apparent here. Bayes is a curious technology in that it 
does require a strong human contribution for it to work, and it is perhaps that a 
more nuanced conception oftechnology is required. 
Furthermore, the fact that language become a site of contestation and 
ambiguity in the case of the CAI, casts doubt on Co11ins and Evan's particular 
version of expertise. It appears that in their case, something more is required 
which perhaps takes fuller account of the problems a communication-led mode 
of expertise contains. The main problem identified within this study was the 
problem of correspondence between language and world. This problem is the 
source of issues which lead to uncertainties about how language may be used. 
Whilst Collins and Evans position might require common language, it is not 
always certain how language itself refers to the environment which 
encompasses this expertise. This study indicates that language may be a 
source of contestation for experts, rather than a locus around which expertise 
can be recognised. There also consequences for Fu11er' s conception of 
expertise; whilst a dramaturgical element is present in terms of the self-
assertions made in the literature and by forensic scientists themselves, the 
ontological issues which are raised in the course of the application of Bayes 
play a considerable role in the behaviours displayed. What is shown is the 
need to somehow make sense of a complex and often intractable world. 
Hence the 'expert' behaviours pertaining to Bayes should be regarded as 
contingent and highly localised in character, and therefore not always readily 
rehearsable. 
On the other hand, the fact that the CAI has been vulnerable to opposition 
from those actors it was designed to benefit shows how the success of an 
'expert' technology of reasoning can be shaped by external actors. In this way, 
the 'expert' behaviours of forensic scientists is sti11 influenced by a variety of 
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institutional forces beyond the control of the developers of the CAI. These 
include relatively well-entrenched sets of normative attitudes with regard to 
the role of the police in criminal investigations, and how forensic scientists 
stand in relation to them. The opposition from within the FSS itself may also 
reflect a certain tension apparent between the need to satisfy commercial 
interests, and the desire to produce a 'rational' system that satisfies law 
enforcement needs. Aside from questions of how Bayes can be shaped to 
make sense of the material domain, an equally complex set of relationships 
exist between these wider forces and the CAI. Whilst recourse to exogenous 
forces may not be sufficient to explain the ontological issues that lead to forms 
of Bayes, they cannot be discounted in playing some form of role in shaping 
'expert' technologies, and more research may be desirable to explore the 
precise nature of the relationship further. 
9.11 Implications for Evidence Scholarship 
I conclude this chapter with some remarks regarding the implications that my 
research may hold for the growing field of evidence scholarship. This work is 
of particular relevance given the relative prominence that Bayesian theory 
appears to currently occupy in this area. One aspect I have sought to draw 
attention to, and which evidence scholars and statisticians may wish to 
consider further, are the practical issues associated with applying Bayes in 
'real-world' contexts. These are not simply inconveniences which can be 
disregarded in theoretical summaries; as this study has sought to show, the 
theoretical representations which emerge from disciplines such as statistics 
and evidence studies will inexorably be bound up in localised sociomaterial 
realms. It is through such domains that representations are made meaningful. 
As this study of Bayes has attempted to show, this may often occur in ways 
markedly contingent to the original formulations of equations and formulae, 
despite what the users of such formulations may themselves claim. 
Furthermore, the results of the study indicate not only a possible need to 
somehow consider how mathematical representations, or 'inscriptions' to 
borrow Latour's term, are intertwined with sociomaterial domains, they also 
show the limitations of statistical methods. Experiential and embodied aspects 
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continue to play a strong role in criminal investigation, in a way which 
transcends the capabilities of Bayes. 
The field of evidence studies perhaps needs to investigative the purpose, and 
the role, of approaches such as Bayes. However, that is not to say that 
attempts should need to prescribe any form of limitation or all-encompassing 
method. Instead, the work outlined in this thesis can be seen to tentatively 
point towards the need to understand further how statistics and probability is 
incorporated into the realm of evidence interpretation, rather than how it ought 
to be. Simply put, what this set of studies shows is that evidence scholarship 
needs to concern itself more with descriptive accounts concerning how people 
reason about evidence, and how different contexts, technologies and situations 
affect these processes. It is here that sociological approaches may be of 
considerable benefit. Of course, to make a truly valuable contribution, such 
approaches would benefit themselves from an informed understanding ofthe 
statistical issues, and hence there is a clear need for open communication if 
there is to be any rapprochement in this regard. 
A significant proportion of research activity within evidence scholarship is 
currently devoted to developing the Bayes Networks (BNs) introduced in 
Chapter 4, and indeed these forms can be regarded as somewhat emblematic 
of the field itself2. Whilst BN s are not employed in casework contexts as yet, 
practitioners have noted the potential of such a technique in certain aspects of 
forensic science (Gill et a! 2006). It is therefore worth briefly considering 
BNs in further detail, as relevant discussions by evidence scholars echo some 
of the issues raised here. 
The discussion of these two difficulties, contrasts with other discussions of 
BNs in the evidence literature, which tend to present them in an unproblematic 
fashion (Taroni et al2005). Much of the literature from leading figures in the 
field has tended to view this technology as a means of remedying errors 
associated with evidential reasoning, particularly those involving human 
2 (hJlp://www.evidenccscicnce.or!.!, accessed 9 October 2008) 
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judgement. As well as solving problems such as bias or perception error, 
technologies such as BNs are also viewed as contributing to overcoming 
supposedly logical shortcomings, such as the prosecutor's fallacy (Evett and 
Dawid 1997). In these discussions, BNs are presented in simple and perhaps 
idealised forms. It is also worth noting that much of the BN research 
presented in forensic and legal literature demonstrates the technology via the 
consideration of problems concerning DNA profiling. As interviewee 1 
pointed out, application of BNs to such issues is relatively unproblematic 
given the generally ordered and predictable nature of Mendelian inheritance 
(Interviewee I, 2007). 
More recent developments have involved attempts to apply BNs on a more 
holistic basis to criminal casework, following in the path first charted by 
Kadane and Schum (1996). These attempts however, have tended to elicit 
more critical discussions within the field. Leucari (2006), in a comparison of 
Bayes Networks and Wigmore charts, views the latter as devices for depicting 
and hence constructing arguments. This, she argues, is not a property apparent 
in Bayes Networks, which force users to make assumptions about the events 
related to the nature of the problem under consideration. This, it seems, may 
strongly influence the way in which Bayes Networks may be constructed to 
depict a particular event. In the case of complex events, such as, say, an 
armed robbery, there may be considerable scope for subjective judgement. As 
Schum (2005) notes, in his lucid discussion of the application of Bayes 
Networks to such situations, 'someone can always come along and identify a 
node you left out' (Schum 2005, p.l4). Another problem, this time common to 
both BNs and Wigmore charts, concerns the potentially limitless amount of 
infonnation that could arguably be required in order for a chart-based to 
provide an accurate depiction of an event: 'Wigmorean methods seem to be 
the epitome of compulsive behaviour' (Schum 2005, p.l5). This issue is not 
unique to Wigmore charts, for the same criticism is cited as one of the most 
common shortcomings of the Bayesian approach (Raw ling 1999). 
According to this view, these newer evidential technologies provide a limited 
contribution to the problem of reasoning about evidence, and, despite the 
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claims of some researchers, continue to place a considerable burden on the 
human user. Far from solving the problems associated with evidential 
reasoning, recent research in evidence studies appear to have exposed them, a 
phenomenon which partially correlates with the findings of this thesis. The 
leads one to consider what position this leaves the field of evidence 
scholarship, given the strong influence it has exerted upon developments in 
forensic science. 
This thesis has highlighted the complexity of the practices involved not only in 
reasoning about evidence, but also in applying a supposedly monolithic 
procedure to this aim. In my studies I have not sought to ask why these 
practices have emerged in the way that they have, for that would contradict my 
broad position of these practices being autochthonous and part of emergent 
sociomaterial assemblages. It is necessary however to pose the issue of what 
the implications the apparent conflation of the modes of hypothesis generation 
and assessment, as represented by these practices, holds for the field of 
evidence scholarship. It may appear that the kind of critical position adopted 
here may be totally incommensurable with the approach taken by evidence 
scholars, but in what follows I attempt to provide an initial indication as to 
how the kind of approach outlined in this thesis may yet be able to be 
reconciled with probabilistic approaches to evidence. 
The results of this study may not necessarily be viewed therefore as a 
deathknell for the evidence studies project, and it is not my intention to 
suggest so here. On the contrary, the fact that Bayes is a perfom1ed 
phenomenon (albeit with a strong agential component) allows one to consider 
what factor might play a key role in this conflated process. Recall that the first 
case study showed how Bayesian reasoning processes involved the 
instrumental contribution of constructed concepts in stabilising this particular 
sociomaterial assemblage. Consider also the problems highlighted by the 
second case study in matching linguistic constructions with the material realm, 
and the use of soft data. In both cases then, background assumptions have 
played an important role in the construction of Bayesian reasoning. Yet in 
evidence studies literature, such background knowledge is seemingly ignored. 
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Often, background knowledge will be at the very most acknowledged by its 
inclusion in a Bayesian formula the following way: 
P(Hpl E, I)= P(Hp) P(EIHp, I) 
This is similar to the equations presented in previous chapters, but note the 
inclusion of'['. This is commonly used in the theoretical literature on Bayes 
to denote the consideration 'background knowledge' in a Bayesian formula. 
Yet often the employment of the letter T is as far as the treatment of 
background knowledge proceeds. This may be due to the fact that 
'knowledge' may be simply too problematic to comprehend in a way 
amenable to a Bayesian way of thinking. If we recall again the criticism by 
Schum regarding the informational demands that Bayes places, it quickly 
becomes apparent how the complexity of the world might quickly break down 
the formula. There is also the problem of defining what actually constitutes 
knowledge. Bayesians appear to prefer a conception of knowledge defined as 
quantitative measures of belief, yet the example of soft data shows how 
knowledge relevant to a Bayesian calculation may be involved in a form 
which is not readily quantifiable. Background knowledge might also take the 
form of embodied knowledge, such as the possibilities of physical 
reconstructing an incident. A further issue to consider is that the type of 
background knowledge will vary greatly, influenced by factors such as an 
individual's education, training and other personal experiences. 
What this thesis has shown is that greater understanding is needed on the part 
of evidence scholars concerning the way that Bayes itself is appropriated by 
human users, rather than viewing it as a simple means to an end. It appears 
from the research presented herein that the manner of appropriation may both 
depend on certain ontological assumptions, and on the precise type of 
knowledges which are deployed. What this research indicates therefore, is a 
possible need to consider the nature of such background knowledge in a far 
more rigorous and critical fashion. This in turn points to a continued role for 
a term of sociological inquiry which could aim to identify and highlight the 
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practices informed by these knowledges, which in turn propagate the kind of 
technologies prescribed by evidence scholars.3 
Such an approach would however, need to take each case on its own merits, 
for the kind of practices involved may well vary from case to case, yet if 
considered in combination it may be possible to identify certain patterns which 
might aid further consideration of the challenges involved in applying 
evidential technologies. It is not my intention however, to claim that 
sociological inquiry can alone lead to the kind of technological outcomes that 
evidence scholars might desire. What it does highlight is the potential worth 
of an interdisciplinary approach to problems concerning evidence. Such an 
approach would require fully open discourse. Through this it may be possible 
to explore in more detail the potential issues involved. The kind of study 1 do 
propose through this research is not one which seeks to 'deconstruct' science, 
in the loose 'postmodern' sense of the term. Instead, I propose a more critical 
approach which seeks to question the science on its own terms. 
Methods such as qualitative interviewing could have an important role to play 
in this process, being used to ask innocent-sounding, but possibly scientifically 
awkward questions, in order to get scientists to think more critically about 
their work. In the course of this research the answers put forward by 
interviewees have often contrasted sharply with published material in terms of 
both their candour about the study of evidence, and the complexity of the 
problems under discussion. 
This would however, require an openness on the part of those who wish to 
advance these technologies. Doubts can be raised as to whether this might be 
the case. The belief that Bayes, and statistics in general, and what they stand 
for, should occupy the most privileged ground, appears from observation to 
sometimes become a blinkered view. It still seems that disciplinary tensions 
still abound, and particularly towards a sociological approach, which may 
3 Some Bayesians have made recourse to psychology, but this only raises a limited number of 
epistemological questions. The kind of approach here, which has directly engaged with the subject, 
albeit in a critical fashion, might enable further unknown issues to be uncovered. 
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possibly be a hangover from the so-called 'Science wars' of the 1990s. A 
further problem however, concerns the increasing lack of transparency 
displayed by certain key actors in this study, most notably the FSS. This is 
highlighted both in the account given in Chapter 7 concerning both the Omagh 
trial and DNABoost, but also in the difficulties in gaining access to members 
for interview. It is my suspicion that such opacity may reflect certain doubts 
in the technology, which is understandable, but it is hard to see how future 
mistakes may not occur. Wedded to this is the increasingly commercialised 
nature of forensic science provision, which may increase the reluctance of 
companies to be open to approaches, albeit at the possible expense of proper 
scienti fie scrutiny. 
9.12 Conclusion 
The results of this thesis hold mixed implications for the various strands of 
STS. Whilst the application of Bayes to forensic science provides a relatively 
strong measure of support for the perforrnativity thesis, this is tempered by 
some other aspects of the 'forms of Bayes' identified in the two case studies. 
Most notably, many of the practices involved in bringing 'Bayesian reasoning' 
into being show a decidedly human contribution. The practices involved in 
constructing 'Bayesian reasoning' are more consistent with STS positions 
which emphasise human agency, and hence there are parallels with the 
ethnomethodological position advocated by Lynch et al. Forms of Bayesian 
reasoning could be identified as emergent phenomena, and the diversity of 
forms suggests that they are closely linked with the locale and context of 
application. In these instances, the application of an ostensibly theoretical 
construct may therefore be regarded as a highly practical achievement. 
Furthermore, the interdependency of forms of hypothesis generation and 
assessment informed by both scientific and legal presuppositions, indicates 
parallels with phenomenon of'co-production', in the sense of Jasanoffs use 
ofthe term (Jasanoff2004). 
My studies have sought to highlight not just the practices involved in 
propagating Bayesian reasoning, but also to locate the origins of them. Such 
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practices can be located in the sources of liminality that these practices 
represent attempts to circumvent. As the findings, these liminalities may 
exhibit different forms in relation to the context in which is Bayes is being 
performed, but what is common to them is that their existence is realised by 
the invocation of Bayes itself. This occurs through the intractable 
informational demands placed on reasoners and reasoning systems by the 
Bayesian framework, and commits to formulating a series of means of 
negotiating these liminalities. In this way then, ontological orderings are both 
a result of the Bayesian schema being put into practice, and the reason for 
these practices emerging. 
The existence of these liminalities indicates the manner in which further 
inquiry may proceed. Studies looking to focus on Bayes should begin to 
identify these sources of liminality, as they may well prove instructive for both 
identifying and accounting for the kinds of practices required to bring 
Bayesian reasoning into being. 
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CHAPTER TEN- CONCLUDING REMARKS 
10.1 The Consequences of Paradigm Shift 
'Legal and scientific forces are converging to drive an emerging skepticism 
about the claims of the traditional forensic individualization sciences. As a 
result, these sciences are moving toward a new scientific paradigm.' (Saks 
and Koehler 2005, p.892) 
'You don't learn maths, you do it' (My Sixth Form Pure Maths teacher, 
1994) 
Forensic science has always occupied an awkward niche, buffered on one side 
by the interests of law and justice, to whom it must ultimately be answerable, 
and on the other by the realm of 'science' to which it has always looked to in 
order to provide credibility and a sense of objectivity. Tensions inherent in 
attempting to serve both these domains have often resulted in questions being 
raised about forensic science. Often these questions have been raised in 
relation to its apparent failings, exposed in cases such as the Birmingham Six, 
and more recently, Barry George. This sceptical attitude to the claims of 
certain branches of forensic science has continued in recent years, and in their 
article, published in Science in 2005, Saks and Koehler describe the concerted 
increase in both legal and scientific challenges to the claims of the so-called 
'individualisation sciences'. This, they claim, exposes some serious 
shortcomings: 'A dispassionate scientist or judge reviewing the current state of 
the traditional forensic sciences would likely regard their claims as 
implausible, underresearched and oversold' (Saks and Koehler 2005, p.892). 
In fact, Saks and Koehler claim that forensic science is increasingly moving 
away from the traditional tenet of discernible uniqueness, namely the 
assumption that the identification of an individual may occur through the 
presence of supposedly unique marks, such as fingerprints. This so-called 
'positivity doctrine' (Broeders 2005), they claim, is giving way to a more 
conditional stance to identification evidence, in which probabilistic reasoning 
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is the norm, accelerated in part by the advent of DNA profiling, often referred 
to as 'the gold standard' in forensic evidence (Lynch 2003, Aronson 2005, 
p.3). 
This thesis has sought to address this trend towards the application of 
probability theory in forensic science, and has focused in particular on the use 
of Bayesian reasoning. In identifying the application of Bayes as a series of 
practical, contingent and contextualised performances, I suggest that a form of 
reasoning intended only for the assessment of hypothesis probabilities, is able 
to exert a considerable degree of influence on the way in which investigations 
may proceed, by seemingly shaping the generation of hypotheses as well. In 
the realm of forensic science at least, this apparently neutral mathematical 
construct appears to exert a great deal of influence on the behaviours of its 
supposed users, and leads to a rich diversity of practices. 
In guiding the behaviours of forensic scientists, Bayesianism may therefore be 
considered as an important way in which modem forensic science is 
constituted and ordered. Moreover, through its ability to guide inquiry, 
Bayesianism can be regarded as playing an instrumental role in shaping the 
disciplinary identity of forensic science as a whole. Forensic science has long 
sought to carve out such an identity for itself. This is readily apparent in the 
enduring invocation of locutions such as Locard' s principle, and the 
proclamations of other noted figures such as Paul Kirk, and his claim for 
'criminalistics' to be the 'science of individualisation'. These arguments 
highlight a certain need on the part of forensic scientists to lay claim to a set of 
epistemic principles and practices which can render their practices as distinct 
from other scientific disciplines, rather than being parasitic on them. Some of 
the findings in this thesis strongly suggest that Bayesian reasoning may also 
have a role to play in this regard, as supported by the repeated insistence that 
Bayes 'is the only logical way to reason about evidence'. 
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10.2 Summary of Findings 
The view of Bayes expressed above seems to presume a monolithic set of 
reasoning practices, which is contradicted by the findings of this thesis. 
Rather than suggesting a monolithic model for processing into which 
evidential data can be processed, the results show how the practices which 
produce Bayesian reasoning actually occur in response to the ontological 
liminalities which are exposed by its use. Considered in this way, Bayesian 
theory cannot alone be regarded as providing an all-encompassing procedure 
for reasoning about evidence. Hence neither can it be considered as a unifying 
procedure to be prescribed for all forensic scientific conduct, despite the 
claims made over the association between Bayes and 'best practice' as 
exemplified in Chapter 8. 
This thesis shows how the manner in which Bayes constitutes 'expert' 
behaviours is organisationally and socially constructed. In demonstrating this, 
my thesis raises another set of issues that extend beyond the consideration of 
the immediate concerns of forensic science. Chapter 5 discussed academic 
debates in legal circles which centred on the use of statistics and probability 
theory in courtroom proceedings. Whilst objections were raised in the course 
of these discussions, the advocation of Bayes clearly played a role in 
introducing this form of reasoning into investigative uses of forensic science. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 6 I described the unsuccessful experience of attempts 
to apply a Bayesian model to the defence case in a particular criminal hearing. 
What these examples highlight is the different attitudes exhibited towards 
Bayesianism in courtroom and forensic scientific contexts. Despite the efforts 
of evidence scholarship, Bayes has struggled to find support as a replacement 
for traditional methods of juridical reasoning; the criticisms of Tribe ( 1971) 
appear to have had a lasting impact on the perceived role of Bayesianism a 
law, a situation significantly compounded by the judgements delivered in R vs 
Dennis John A dams. 
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10.3 Implications of Research 
Whilst Bayes may be regarded as unsuitable for courtroom use, the fact that it 
does play an increasingly significant role in forensic investigations points to a 
curious dichotomy of epistemological labour. In the course of this thesis I 
have aimed to display aspects of an area of juridico-scientific life which has, 
so far, received relatively little attention, but plays a vital instrumental role in 
the delivery of justice. Despite their importance, the kinds of practices 
highlighted herein are more often kept concealed from the more public face of 
justice visible in courtroom proceedings. Only on these kind of occasions may 
the techniques used by forensic scientists receive any significant scientific 
scrutiny via cross-examination, and this is normally restricted to cases where 
there is a resourceful or particularly inquisitive defence counsel, such as the 
Omagh trial or the cases handled by Neufeld and Scheck, as described in 
Chapter 6. Instead forensic evidence is more often likely to be presented in a 
relatively circumscribed manner, with a reporting 'expert' scientist giving his 
opinion on the likelihood of a piece of evidence incriminating a defendant. 
From this however, members of the court are unlikely to gain any 
comprehensive impression of the reasoning processes the scientist may have 
used to reach their conclusions about the evidence. As I also reported in 
Chapter 6, alleged failures in reasoning, have, occasionally, been exposed in 
court, as exemplified by the case of R vs Keen, and R vs Doheny and Adams, 
and, whilst unsuccessful, R vs Dennis John Adams represented another notable 
insight into the reasoning processes of forensic science. Yet even the 
discussions raised by these cases present a partial view of the work involved in 
forensic reasoning, as these discussions do not in any way reflect the makeup 
of the activities involved. 
I have hoped that this work has gone some way towards redressing this, 
although I am of course limited in the scope of examples to which I can devote 
attention. Whilst hopefully pointing the way towards an area of inquiry which 
merits further attention, I also wish to raise a further issue with regard to the 
relationship between the practices identified in this study and courtroom 
deliberation. The fact that 'expert' behaviours can be identified as contingent 
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social practices, even those which ostensibly might appear to be wholly 
cognitive in character, must raise some issues for the way in which the concept 
of scientific admissibility is conceived. This research casts doubts on the US 
method for assessing scientific evidence, which determines whether the 
production of such evidence has followed a' falsifiable' method. Here, I have 
shown that recourse to a single scientific method is insufficient to determine 
admissibility, if such a principle were to be followed. Whilst the topic of 
admissibility may not readily yield any easy answers, this research has shown 
that the price for high standards of admissibility may be a stringent, case-
sensitive approach. This research has shown how subjective assumptions may 
be built into advanced scientific technologies, and how these may be no more 
impartial than the old 'case construction' prosecutorial approach. 
To return to discussions of disciplinarity, it still clear that, despite claims of 
unifying principles, forensic science continues to borrow heavily from other 
scientific disciplines, adapting scientific techniques for the purposes of 
identification. The field of evidence studies, from which Bayesian forensic 
scientists have also appropriated ideas, can itself be viewed as an 
interdisciplinary undertaking, bringing together researchers from the fields of 
statistics, law, medicine, psychology, and even history, to name but a few. 
When addressing the subject matter I too have aimed to adopt an 
interdisciplinary posture. I have attempted to maintain an open mind on the 
supposed value of Bayes, keeping a sceptical view towards the supposed 
logicality of the approach in the spirit of another form of symmetry, this time 
that proposed by the Strong Programme (Bloor 1976). 1 Wherever possible 
however, I have attempted to address the scientific issues raised in the course 
of the case studies on their own terms. By this I mean that I have not sought 
to approach the subject with a pre-given set of assumptions to be tested, but 
instead I have aimed to explore the subject as I have found it, but to be 
informed as much by science as sociological theory. 
1 According to the Strong Programme, the 'symmetry principle' is a key tenet, and refers to the need of 
the inquirer to commit to a neutral position with regard to the alleged truth or falsity of the scientific 
practices under study. 
307 
In this study I have emphasised the performances of Bayesian reasoning as 
being emergent phenomena, and it is also true to say that the study itself 
exhibits much the same property. I did not enter into this research with any 
specific set of questions in mind; instead these evolved as I gained familiarity 
with the subject through the investigation of a wide variety of literatures and 
interviews. I believe that this approach, of entering into the research with few 
preconceived ideas, has enabled me to discover areas of forensic scientific 
practice that have hitherto been relatively overlooked by sociological studies, 
and I hope that this has led to original findings. However, this process has 
enabled time for reflection, and at this juncture it is appropriate to consider 
what this research could have additionally achieved, as well as looking toward 
future possibilities. 
10.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
To begin with, I believe there is more to be learned about the construction of 
some of the Bayesian technologies featured in this study, particularly those 
which rely more on automated forms of Bayesian reasoning, such as 
LoComatioN, Pendulum and also the Bayes Networks applications which have 
been developed to address similar forensic issues. Whilst I have been able to 
question these technologies in terms of some of the assumptions which are 
incorporated into them, there exists further scope to investigate the precise 
nature of the means oftheir construction. In the course ofthis study I did 
devote some time in attempting to capture this, as I was struck early on by 
how the technical literature depicted these technologies in a finished form, 
without describing the difficulties and false starts that are involved in their 
construction. For example, Interviewee 2 described the process as akin to an 
'apprenticeship' and 'learning a craft'. From this it is possible to draw the 
conclusion that the construction of such systems is a more gradual process, 
and one involving a greater degree of trial and error than is suggested by the 
technical literature. This interviewee also suggested that I use a relevant 
software package, such as Matlab or HUGIN, in order to gain a first-hand feel 
for the construction of Bayesian systems. Whilst time prevented me from 
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taking up this suggestion, such an approach could provide a highly infonnative 
account of the phenomenological aspects of performing Bayesian reasoning. 
Ideally I would have liked to include some fonn of first-hand account of the 
construction of the systems which formed the focus of Chapter 7. As I have 
stated above, whilst concerted attempts were made to make contact with some 
of the FSS scientists involved in the construction of LoComatioN and PLS, no 
positive response was forthcoming. Whilst this has ultimately not affected the 
claims of this study, it is perhaps indicative of a certain reticence to 
communicate on scientific issues, which seems to be characteristic ofthat 
organisation. Unfortunately, no other forensic science provider offers 
equivalent products, as this would have represented a possible alternative 
means of gaining insight in this particular area. 
Another issue which merits further attention concerns the differences in 
attitudes towards Bayes across differing jurisdictions. Whilst Bayesian 
reasoning has found considerable application within the forensic science 
community in the UK, and certain other jurisdictions in Europe, the attitude 
towards Bayes amongst the American community has been somewhat more 
sceptical. Indeed, as Ian Evett has admitted, there exists 'trenchant 
opposition' to Bayes amongst forensic science practitioners in the US 
(Aronson unpublished), which plays against the supposed logicality of the 
approach. The reasons why this might be the case are unclear, but a 
discussion with Interviewee 2 was instructive. This interviewee's attempts to 
introduce computerised Bayesian systems for DNA profile interpretation into 
American forensics laboratories had met with considerable opposition, and he 
felt that this might be due to the fact that Bayesian technologies are relatively 
new in the USA (Interviewee 2, 2007). In passing, Interviewee 2 cited 
'cultural' reasons for this which he did not specify further, except to talk about 
the difficulties of introducing this technology into a 'medieval' context 
(Interviewee 2 2007). This latter comment, seemingly directed at the attitudes 
of American forensic scientists, seems to indicate a lack of enlightenment on 
their part. Bayesian methods have been communicated in the US however 
(Evett and Weir 1998), and it may have been more reflective of the attitude 
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towards the possibility of automation doing a human's job. Whatever the 
case, this example shows once again how Bayesian forms do not evoke 
acceptance, and once again they become contested artefacts. 
In terms of other research, it may be worthwhile to monitor how future 
developments, most notably the increasing marketisation of forensic science in 
the UK may affect the construction of future technologies in forensic science. 
The production of technologies such as LoComatioN and PLS play an 
important role in maintaining the FSS's position as a market leader in the 
field. However, there are concerns that the increased commercialisation of 
forensic science may not best serve the interests of British justice. Some of 
the criticisms expressed in the Omagh judgement reflect the alleged lack of 
transparency with regard to the validation of LCN techniques by the FSS. 
This opacity is also apparent with regard to DNABoost, where no scientific 
information about the technique has been placed in the public domain. This 
did not stop the FSS however from effectively advertising the technology via 
media channels orchestrated by a PR firm. This example shows a radically 
different means of convincing audiences of the scientific efficacy of a product, 
and draws further questions concerning the relationship between market 
forces, forensic sciences and the technologies which arise. 
This study has also shown how a commercial discourse influenced the 
development of the CAI and the reasoning practices associated with it, and it 
may be fruitful to consider in more detail the manner in which Bayesianism 
may become appropriated, and subsequently tailored, to reflect these kinds of 
influences. As this study also indicated however, commercial pressures also 
appear !o have constituted spaces of opposition to theCAl. Hence the precise 
manner in wl~ich these kind of factors exert influence on the development of 
Bayesian technclogies may be highly complex, and merits further inquiry. 
It is likely however, that the i:1creasing commercialisation of forensic science 
will only serve to hasten t~.e pace at which technological development 
proceeds in this area. This has been bourne out already by the production of 
automated DNA interpretation systems by the FSS. Whilst the introduction of 
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Bayesian reasoning has been accelerated by its application to DNA profiling 
technologies, interest is growing in a number of other forensic technologies 
being developed in areas such as computing and linguistics, and it is likely that 
these could incorporate Bayesian methods. If so, then these would represent 
highly fruitful and relevant areas in which to apply some of the concepts 
developed in this thesis. It is also worthwhile to reiterate that Bayes is finding 
increasing application in areas outside forensic science and I hope that my 
studies might inform others to undertake other critical studies of the 
application of Bayes in other fields. Bayesian methods are being developed in 
a variety of other fields, including economics and medicine, and are of 
particular interest in the field of AI. Such areas may also provide fruitful 
sources for furthering understanding in the application of Bayes. 
It appears that, given the vehement support it receives in influential circles, 
Bayes will continue to play a role in forensic science, as it will in other areas 
of scientific and social life. However, it also seems clear that its use will 
continue to attract controversy and contestation in equal measure. What this 
thesis has attempted to achieve is an improved understanding of the 
practicalities of putting such a mode of reasoning into action. In doing so it is 
hoped that this research will benefit anyone with an interest in the debate 
regarding Bayesianism and forensic science, as well as those with an interest 
in the study of evidence in general, regardless of their personal position on the 
efficacy of Bayesian reasoning. 
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